that we think they have a consider able tendency to increase, as well as to confirm, that class. We might add further, that they have a tendency to shame even where they do not convince.

The third, and perhaps most important,inquiry still remains-namely, how far, in the present state of the church and of the world, it is desirable that all controversy should cease, and all prejudice be done away. Beyond a doubt, if moral and religious truth were susceptible either of intuitive evidence, like the brightness of the sun; or of demonstrative evidence, like a proposition in mathematics; it would be infinitely desirable to clear the visual ray to behold the truth, or to trace out the steps of demonstration to the satisfaction of every inquirer after it. But two impediments occur to this course. Moral evidence is neither intuitive nor demonstrative; and even were it the latter, there are minds incapable of following and apprehending the plainest demonstration. Moral evidence is just that which is sufficient to act upon without demonstration. But here we must see that a very different degree of such evidence will apply and be sufficient to different minds. And if we should forbid others to act but on what we deem sufficient moral evidence—that is, if we should take away what we call prejudice or prepossession-we should often take away a very strong holdfast on religion, without being certain of giving any other in its place. Moral evidence indeed is, from its nature, capable of great changes and modifications, not only in different minds, but also in the same mind: and hence the silencing of all controversy on religious subjects might look very much like a cessation of all rational and progressive inquiry into moral and Divine truth.

We know that prejudice—that is, the assumption of opinions without a sufficient ground for them in reason is in theory a very bad thing: it leads to interminable con

troversy and even hostility, and is one source and foundation of that party spirit which Mr. Whateley so ably and justly discusses. But the question respecting a surrender of prejudice is in practice a very difficult one: and if all opinions should be renounced which are held by one person without evidence tangible and producible to others, or even entirely to the person himself, we may chance to surrender some of the best and wisest of all principles, human and divine, because we are not fully able to give a reason of the hope that is in us. In this case, on the contrary, the duty will not be to renounce the hope, but to find out the reason. We are in truth somewhat jealous of any call, as a practical question, to surrender our prejudices; not, however, because it is not right that unjust prejudices should be relinquished, but because we well know what is often meant by the expression; and how often, under the idea of relinquishing prejudices, is meant giving up some of the most important principles of Christianity, and perhaps Christianity itself. The Letters before us very wisely and ably digress, in the opening, to establish what might be called our just and legitimate prejudices in favour of religion in general, and bid us earnestly to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints. Scepticism is properly implied to be the most pernicious of all prejudices; or, if we please, more pernicious than any prejudice: and to be a good Christian, even without rendering a very clear reason why, is far more desirable than to be an irreligious philosopher with ten thousand arguments. cisely the same thing might be said in respect of Christian doctrines: nor is there a man who, if he fairly spoke his mind, would not prefer even a prejudice in favour of what he deems a fundamental truth, above what he considers a fundamental error at which his friend should have arrived by a process of

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reasoning. The fact is, whether we will avow it or not, we are all, in some of the most important and leading principles of human conduct, creatures of prejudice, whether it be prejudice of opinion, or prejudice of feeling. There is a prior feeling, for instance, in favour of morality, which neither philosophism on the one hand, nor Antinomianism on the other, ought ever to be able to efface. There is a prejudice in favour of free agency, which the most philosophical fatalist that breathes feels and acts upon every time he moves. There is a prejudice, a truly blessed prejudice, existing in the mind of the humble Christian in favour of the entireness and allsufficiency of Christ's salvation, which the gravest possible reasoning on the conditional terms of salvation will happily not remove or shake; as it is to be feared there is a prejudice in the mind of the selfrighteous in favour of his own good deeds, that, even after the admission of the soundest creed, he will still retain "in the proudest corner of his own proud heart."

There are, if we may venture to assert so much, bad prejudices and good prejudices; and perhaps the worst feature they have in common, is this, that where any one endeavours to persuade their respective possessors that they are prejudices, each will hold fast all that is essential to his own opinion, and only make use of the representation for overthrowing, as far as possible, the fabric of his adversary. There are also worse consequences that may ensue. The bad being in general the most obstinate, the possessor of it may derive greater strength from that part of the reasoning which makes for his own case; and the possessor of the good prejudice,being scrupulous, conscientious, and tender, may perhaps be inclined to go far in surrender of what is true, from an apprehension of the consequences with which he is threatened for entertaining prejudice at all.

Are we then, it will be asked in

rejoinder, to attempt no coalition, no terms of peace, no mutual surrender of hostile prejudices,at the shrine of our common belief in the Gospel of the Prince of Peace? Doubtless we are.

We are to attempt the surrender of every thing hostile. If we hold our prejudices, let us at least not quarrel about them. "Let us not controvert," says some writer of sentiment, "but let us go hand in hand in search of truth." Let us not call any thing prejudice that might go by a softer name. Let us spend our time as much as possible in gaining first principles, points on which all are agreed: and then let us gently urge each side to compare their own opinions with what all in common acknowledge. We might suggest more, and then turn to the "Letters on Prejudice," and find it done to our hands; for a more entire spirit of Christian candour and charity could scarcely have been exhibited in any work: and in strictly prohibiting a party spirit in the investigation of truth, our readers will also presently see we follow a most able guide in tracking Mr. Whateley.

One word, however, more as to the possibility of at length uniting all hearts, if we cannot reconcile all opinions. We believe most fully, that the best way after all to reconcile all opinions, is to unite all hearts: and on this plain truth, we are concerned to add, rests our des pair of seeing either the one or the other fully accomplished. It has often appeared to us, that sufficient regard has not been paid, by reconcilers on all sides, to that most important, though mysterious declaration of our Saviour; "Think ye that I am come to send peace on earth? I am not come to send peace, but a sword." Is then Christ the minister of discord? it will be asked; and we reply, No more than He is the minister of sin. But this we understand to be meant, that so long as men remain corrupt and tainted by the Fall, there is something in the pure, undefiled, and

self-denying Gospel of Jesus Christ, that will inevitably lead to dissensions, swellings, tumults in the heart itself, and consequently in the world. Even in natural science, we know the tumultuous effect attending upon the union of opposite chemical substances; and what, we would ask the reflecting mind, must it anticipate, all analogies apart, from the infusion of a divine and purifying principle into that which is in itself born of the flesh, and therefore flesh? Under the operations of these opposite principles, the heart is not even at unity with itself. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." And if, under the renovating principles and powers of Divine grace, the heart is not at unity with itself, how, in the presence of the very same principles, shall we hope that different hearts should be at unity with each other? The discordance of opinion, in fact, arises from a discordance of heart. In plain words, that which is sinful in one heart rises up in rebellion against that which is virtuous in another heart. Were one heart all sin, and another all virtue, there would be perfect enmity. Were one exclu sively devoted to the service of the most pure and holy God, and another exclusively to the worship of the spirit of darkness; one wholly led by spiritual, another by carnal affections; one greatly independent, and, like the pure spirits, etherial in its views, motives, and purposes, and another selfish, earthly, sensual, devilish; it is clear in this case no more concord could subsist than between light and darkness, Christ and Belial. Here, no removal of prejudice, no mutual explanations, nor, were it possible, concessions could be of the least avail. He that is filthy would be filthy still: he that is holy would be holy still.

Extreme cases, it is true, do not by any means apply to our present CHRIST. OBSERV. No. 254.

mixed, confused, probationary state. But in enunciating such an extreme ease, we hope to make our readers understand our own view, as to what we deem one grand source of religious dissension and dissatisfaction between man and man. Sin and virtue are, in fact, as far as they exist and act, whether in different individuals or in different parties, mutually and necessarily opposed to each other. The pure presses against the impure; and the impure re-acts against the pure. The holy resentment of piety, humility, justice, and generosity, against impiety, pride, iniquity, and selfishness, is met by corresponding though far different animosities of the latter against the former. Far different, we say; for here let us not be understood to mean, that violence, outrage, sarcasm, bitterness, fierceness, cruelty, are at all the characteristics of the good principle; indeed, wherever these exist, we be lieve they may always be traced up to some share of the evil principle] in the heart of him who uses them*.

But we mean that holiness will hold off from its antagonist sin, and sin revolt against its antagonist holiness. And whilst a great difference will be perceived in the spirit and temper in which the opposition will be respectively conducted, still the saying, we believe, will ever be substantially verified on both sides, in this imperfect state, "I am not come to send peace on earth, but a sword."

And this will bring us, by the help of a single observation more, to the points immediately treated of in the works before us. We observe then, that the foregoing principles will teach us exactly how far we may hope to do away pre

* No examples of this spirit could be adduced more replete with instruction than from the writings of some of the old Puritans. We could wish their match were never found in some modern writings, emanating, in appearance from far different schools. "Ye know not what. manner of spirit ye are of."

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judice, and soften and reconcile a party spirit-namely, just so far as we are really agreed on fundamental principles and heart-reforming truths. As far as the doctrines of Scripture and a pure church have produced their real and proper, that is, their renovating, effects on the soul, so far, but no farther, will at tempts at reconciliation ultimately avail; or, if availing, be beneficial to the world. The man who will shew that all true Christians agree in substance, and that they differ only in the use of certain obscure and ill-defined terms, will indeed deserve the title of an angel of healing. But persuade persons really different in spirit that they are entirely one, because they harmonize in a certain series of wellconceived propositions, or because they all join in some one religious or charitable act, and you lay a foundation for much self-deception at least, if not lasting confusion, and final collision where least expected.

Such, however, is not the plan of our two worthy authors. To begin with the Letters on Prejudice-We find in them a delineation of truth, as truth, attempted; and an invitation held out to all the children of truth and wisdom to join under her standard. Prejudice we understand, in the view of this writer, to be that which separates persons who ought to be united; and the object of the Letters we apprehend to be, to convince those who are already of one heart in religion, that they may and ought to be of one mind. Error is here not confounded with truth: nor is a worldly spirit by any means coaxed into harmony with a spiritual mind. Hence in the three first letters, the proud objector against all religion is properly dismissed as one whom the subsequent reasoning will have little tendency to convince, and whose errors in opinion must be clearly traced to an obliquity of soul. Says our sensible letter-writer,

"The charity and diffidence for which

I would plead are applicable only to the differences of those who alike acknowledge the authority of Revelation, while they charity requires no compromise of truth, variously interpret its meaning. But and modesty involves no concession to infidelity. It is, therefore, not amiss to mark this distinction clearly, and to premise, that you are never to understand any of my emollient and qualifying observations as applicable to those who question the truth, or reject the morals, of the Gospel." pp. 30, 31.

This letter contains some tolerably close and original reasoning, upon scepticism in general; though perhaps it is somewhat too abstract and discouraging to stand at the threshold of a work of confessedly popular application.

The comparative weakness of metaphysical evidence is well shewn in the following passage.

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“A religion of abstract ideas and dry propositions is neither congenial to the affections of man, nor communicable by general evidence to his understanding: nor would it be possible, on the basis of such a religion, to construct a system of moral obligations, consistent in its principle, and efficient in its sanctions. The truths which it requires a long process of sense of responsibility resulting from reasoning to prove must be proportioned,

not so much to the evidence of those truths, as to the capacity of him to whom they are presented; and the uncertainty inseparable from the hypothetical character of all metaphysical speculations, must necessarily accompany the moral deductions which have only such speculations for independence and superiority inseparable their principle. There is also a feeling of from the idea of self-derived knowledge, (as the discoveries of what is styled natural religion, may in some sort be called,) which revolts from the acknowledgment of duties and obligations, attested by no extraneous evidence, and enforced by no superior authority." Letters, pp. 24, 25.

In Letter II. decision in religion is considered. This letter, shews still further, the bearing of the author's mind on the difference in religion between questions of faith and those of opinion. The former, as involving religion in general, are recommended to be pursued with all possible earnestness and zeal.