Gross 17. Nov. 1862. ment must at once desist from exercising in the State of New York the extra- No. 640. ordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and unconstitutional powers which britannien, it had assumed. They were confident that at all events after the 1st of January next, on which day the newly elected Governor would come into office, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus could not be practically maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as a declaration of the will of the people; that he would increase the moderate and conservative element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavour to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South, and renounce the idea of subjugating or exterminating them. On the following morning, however, intelligence arrived from Washington which dashed the rising hopes of the Conservatives. It was announced that General Mc Clellan had been dismissed from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to repair to his home; that he had, in fact, been removed altogether from active service. The General had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of him had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that the attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in. The irritation of the Conservatives at New York was certainly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with consternation and despondency. Several of the leaders of the Democratic party sought interviews with me, both before and after the arrival of the intelligence of General Mc Clellan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their minds while they were speaking to me, was naturally that of foreign mediation between the North and South. Many of them seemed to think that this mediation must come at last, but they appeared to be very much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the peaceful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavourable for such an offer, and indeed to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the hands of the Conservative party. ¶ I gave no opinion on the subject. I did not say whether or no I myself thought foreign intervention probable or advisable, but I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was plain that it was not thought prudent to avow this desire. Indeed some hints of it dropped before the elections were so ill received that a strong declaration in the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic leaders. At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and reproach the Government with slackness as well as with want of success in its military measures. But they repudiate all No. 640. idea of interfering with the institutions of the Southern people, or of waging a britannien, war of subjugation or extermination. They maintain that the object of the Gross 17. Nov. 1862. military operations should be to place the North in a position to demand an armistice with honour and with effect. The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a Convention, in which such changes of the Constitution should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its slave property, and would enable the North and the South to reunite and to live together in peace and harmony. The Conservatives profess to think that the South might be induced to take part in such a Convention, and that a restoration of the Union would be the result. The more sagacious members of the party must, however, look upon the proposal of a Convention merely as a last experiment to test the possibility of reunion. They are no doubt well aware that the more probable consequence of an armistice would be the establishment of Southern independence, but they perceive that if the South is so utterly alienated that nopossible concessions will induce it to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless war. It is with reference to such an armistice as they desire to attain, that the leaders of the Conservative party regard the question of foreign mediation. They think that the offer of mediation, if made to a Radical Administration, would be rejected; that, if made at an unpropitious moment, it might increase the virulence with which the war is prosecuted. If their own party were in power, or virtually controlled the Administration, they would rather, if possible, obtain an armistice without the aid of foreign Governments, but they would be disposed to accept an offer of mediation if it appeared to be the only means of putting a stop to hostilities. They would desire that the offer should come from the great Powers of Europe conjointly, and in particular that as little prominence as possible should be given to Great Britain. ¶ At Washington I have had fewer opportunities than I had at New York of ascertaining the present views of the chiefs of the political parties. At the interview which I had with Mr. Seward the day after my arrival he showed no disposition enter upon political matters. He did not appear to expect or to desire to receive from me any special communication from Her Majesty's Government. The President, when I waited upon him, talked to me only on ordinary topics. I, for my part, gladly shunned all allusion to foreign intervention, my principal object being to avoid saying anything which might embarrass me in carrying out any instructions on the subject which I may receive from your Lordship. ¶ All things considered, my own opinion certainly is that the present moment is not a favourable one for making an offer of mediation. It might embarrass the peace party, and even oblige them, in order to maintain their popularity, to make some public declaration against it, and this might make it difficult for them to accept a similar offer at a more propitious time. It would in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to have thrown himself into the arms of the extreme Radical party. The views of that party are clear and definite. They declare that there is no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people; that the war must be pursued, per fas et nefas, until the to Gross 17. Nov. 1862. disloyal men of the South are ruined and subjugated, if not exterminated; that No. 640. not an inch of the old territory of the Republic must be given up; that foreign britannien, intervention, in any shape, must be rejected and resented. This party would desire to turn an offer of mediation to account, for the purpose of inflaming the war spirit and producing a reaction against the Conservatives. It is probable, too, that the Government would urge, in answer to an offer of mediation, that it has by no means abandoned the hope of putting down the rebellion within a reasonable time; that, at all events, this is not a moment at which it can reasonably be called upon to put a stop to hostilities. It would observe that the armies of the United States are everywhere advancing, and that expeditions are prepared against Texas, as well as against Charleston, Mobile, and other points on the coast. It would point out that it had equipped a considerable number of war vessels, iron-clad as well as others, at a vast expense; that the season had just arrived when the autumn rains would render the rivers navigable by armed vessels, and when the Southern coast would be free from epidemic disease. It might even represent an advance of the army of the Potomac to Richmond as a probable event. The experience of the past is certainly not calculated to inspire any great confidence in the results of those warlike preparations, but the political interests of the party now in power render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure of power become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a severe account for their extra - legal proceedings. During the session of Congress which begins next month, the present Administration has indeed reason to expect an uncompromising support from a majority of both Houses of Congress. But on the 4th of March next the existing House of Representatives is dissolved by the terms of the Constitution, and at the same time several of the present Senators go out of office. The majority of the members chosen at the recent elections for the new House of Representatives are of the Democratic or Conservative party, and in some States Senators of that party will be returned in the room of those whose term of office expires next March. The new Congress is in fact likely to be hostile to the Administration and to the Radical party; and although it will not, in the ordinary course of things, assemble until the last month of next year, the President will hardly be able to persist in his present policy and in his assumption of extraordinary powers, unless he can, in virtue of military successes, obtain a reputation with the people which will sustain him in a contest with the Legislature. It would seem, then, to be vain to make an offer of mediation to the present Government, in their present mood, with any notion that it would be accepted. A change of mood may, however, take place after the 4th of March, if no great military successes occur in the interval; such a change may possibly be produced sooner by military reverses.. A proposal, however, to mediate made even under present circumstances, by three or more of the Great Powers of Europe conjointly, might not produce any great inconvenience. It is, indeed, urged by some people that mediation should be ་ Gross No. 640. offered, not so much with a view to its being accepted, as to its clearing the britannien, way for a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. And, indeed, if it were 17. Nov. 1862. determined that the time had come for recognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer of mediation would be a suitable preliminary. But I do not clearly understand what advantage is expected to result from a simple recognition of the Southern Government; and I presume that the European Powers do not contemplate breaking up the blockade by force of arms, or engaging in hostilities with the United States in support of the independence of the South. I have, indeed, heard it maintained that Great Britain should recognize the independence of the South as soon as possible, with a view to impede the success of the efforts of the Conservative Party to re-construct the Union. The advocates of this opinion consider a re-union as a probable event, and apprehend that the first result of it would be that the combined forces of the North and the South would be let loose upon Canada. I certainly do not at present share these apprehensions. All hope of the re-construction of the Union appears to be fading away, even from the minds of those who most ardently desire it. But if the re-construction be still possible, I do not think that we need conclude that it would lead to an invasion of Canada, or to any consequences injurious to Great Britain. At any rate dangers of this kind are remote. The immediate and obvious interest of Great Britain, as well as of the rest of Europe, is that peace and prosperity should be restored to this country as soon as possible. The point chiefly worthy of consideration appears to be whether separation or re-union be the more likely to effect this object. &c. To Earl Russell, London. Lyons. No. 641. Gross 18. Nov. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Ausw. No. 641. Gesandter in Washington an den königl. Min. des Neue Verordnungen, betr. die Ausfuhr von Baumwolle und anderen Waaren aus den südlichen Staaten der Union. Washington, November 18 (received November 30), 1862. My Lord, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a draft of new britannien, Regulations respecting the exportation of cotton and other articles from the 1862. Southern States, which has just been put into my hand by Mr. Seward. I have not time to consider it with attention before the departure of the messenger. ¶ Mr. Seward begged me to bear in mind that the new Regulations would be applicable only to places in the military occupation of the United States. If they were issued, the present system of private trade with the South would, he said, be at the same time abolished. Under that system little or no cotton had found its way to market; under the new Regulations Mr. Seward hoped that all the cotton remaining in the South would be brought out. He considered, however, that he was in some degree bound by pledges to foreign Governments, and was, therefore, unwilling to make a change without consulting M. Mercier and me. Gross He asked me to talk the matter over with M. Mercier, and expressed No. 641. a hope that M. Mercier and I would both meet him to-morrow to discuss it. britannien, ¶ I have, &c. 18. Nov. 1862. To Earl Russell, London. Lyons. Anlage. Draft of New Regulations relative the Exportation of Cotton and other Articles. 1. All cotton, rice, tobacco, sugar and other property found in possession of persons described in the Act of Congress commonly known as the Confederation Act, will be seized for the use of the United States, and forth with sent to the Assistant Quartermaster-General at New York, or other prominent markets, not more in all than three, to be disposed of as directed by the Secretary of War. 2. Cotton, rice, tobacco, and sugar found in possession of others than the persons so described, and not required for consumption by themselves or their families, will be taken possession of by the proper officers of the Military Department in which it may be found, who will give an order on the Assistant Quartermaster-General at New York for one half the value thereof in that market, or pay, on account, not over one-third of such value according to the latest market prices there, as quoted. 3. Officers taking possession of cotton, or other property, under Regulation 2, will give to the claimant thereof a statement showing clearly the quantity and description taken and the amount drawn for, or paid; and will send duplicate copies of the same statement to the Secretary of War and the Assistant Quartermaster-General at New York, to whom all property so taken possession of must be sent with all practicable despatch. 4. The Quartermaster at New York, on receiving any property forwarded to him under the preceding Regulations, will proceed with all convenient speed to sell the same for the highest price that can be obtained in money; and will deposit the proceeds of sale with the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in New York, for the benefit, as to the surplus over amount paid, of the parties from whom received, on proof of loyalty. 5. In the custody of said property, and in making sales thereof, the Assistant Quartermaster in New York will be careful to keep the several lots distinct, both in sale and account, and will, with every deposit of proceeds, file with the Assistant Treasurer a statement showing the quantity sold, the person from whom taken or received, and the proceeds of each lot. Staatsarchiv IV. 1863, 19 |