his thinking distinct, but every such attempt will always be a failure. He cannot separate religious from political reasoning.

A few of the older Constitutions, that of Massachusetts (1780), spoke of a "duty" as well as a "right" in all men in society, at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and Preserver of the universe; but such obligatory phrases grew early obsolete, and a simple acknowledgment of the right of all to worship God according to the dictates of their conscience," became the normal phrase. There lingered, however, for some time, objections to atheistic jurymen, but they were never regularly insisted on, after the Quakers had secured the right to affirm simply, instead of swearing, in giving testimony. The Constitution of North Carolina, made in 1776, retained for a long time the clause: "No person, who shall deny the being of God, or the truth of the Protestant (afterwards, in 1836, changed to Christian) religion, or the divine authority of either the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the state, shall be capable of holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this state;" but this did not extend to the right to vote at elections (see Arts. VII., VIII., and IX.). The voter must, to be a voter, hold property, but he may hold, or not, certain religious opinions, provided they were not of the kind currently objected to.

The same Constitution and a few others forbid "clergymen or preachers of the gospel of any denomination being members of either the Senate, House of Commons, or Council of State, while they continue in the exercise of their pastoral functions," which shows, that a remarkable and hardly consistent antipathy existed both against the preachers as well as the deniers of the saving gospel. The infidel was excluded from all office; the minister only from seats in the legislature. It only proves, that prejudices always hunt in couples. All Constitutions require pledges, under oath or affirmation, from officers, legislators, &c., to support them. The adopted citizens have to swear allegiance on being naturalized. These oaths add, one and all, religious obligations to political ones, and are always acts recognizing the coherency of religion and politics. How sharply does, on the other hand, the French Constitution of 1795 cut between the two: 352. “The law recognizes no religious vows, nor any obligation conflicting with the natural rights of man."

Every oath is a religious vow, it is one fact in the great chain that still binds together laws, usages, and religions. Society needs them as long as an oath produces greater veracity than the simple word.

We may deride the pomposity with which the French express their meaning, but we must admire the directness with which they speak, what they mean, and with which they go to the root of a thing. Our people were ever against what are called "violations of the rights of conscience," but between 1861-70 they stood the most monstrous abuse of test oaths the world ever saw.

A like directness was in Art. CXXIII. of the French Constitution of 1793: when it says:—

"The French republic places the Constitution under the guarantee of all virtues.'

What else than this very idea did Washington express in his inaugural address, April 30, 1789, when he said: "The foundations of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable principles of private morality"? The words that follow confirm this view. In his second farewell address, Washington says: "With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles "-words that certainly describe the unity of the four as the "tout d'ensemble" of the state. He subsequently states this in the words: "Of all dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports.' "The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked: "Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice?"

Washington followed these ideas up by saying, that "experience forbids us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principles." And further on he urges: "Promote then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion, as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."

John Adams ventured still nearer to an expression in favor of the religious unity of the people of the United States by saying, that "among the best recommendations for the public service is a veneration for the religion of a people, who profess and call themselves Christians, and a fixed resolution, to bear a decent respect for Christianity." We may doubt the propriety of such remarks in an inaugural address from a President of the United States, but we cannot overlook the fact, that all our Presidents, indeed, we might say, all our public men, have felt called upon to mingle with their political lugubrations, religious sentiments. It proves our statement, that the inherent unity

of ethics, law, and public policy has never been entirely forgotten. We do not say that the right unity was in their minds, though we are convinced that the remarks quoted from Washington contain the true idea in great perfection.

The first amendment to our federal Constitution—“ Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof "-has a puzzling look; it contains a double negative: first, that the general government shall not enact a religious establishment; second, that it shall not prohibit such establishments. It has not taken loose constructionists long to argue both negatives into an affirmative assertion of the rights of the states, and the people to erect, indirectly, religious establishments. This political application of the old rule, that two negatives make an affirmative, is not necessary to our argument. We know, that society is the mother of all religious as well as political rule, that social necessity and the perennial welfare of society is the reason for their establishment. As federal governments are the creatures of already-organized societies, that have their ethical (religious) developments, there is no necessity, and therefore no reason, for any such establishment in connection with our Union government. And for Congress to prohibit any religious developments in the states or their society, would be as absurd, as it would be to forbid them to establish legal relations, or their society to evolve morals. A federal religion is as preposterous as an international religion; because in both there are only political relations, and they are expressed in the respective Constitutions or treaties and the custom of nations and states.

We say then, in conclusion, the phrase: "Separation of Church and State" has really no application to our federal government. It has never been united to a church, and can therefore not be separated from one. Our churches can have national organizations, but the United States cannot be their organism; nor do either of these public agencies need the recognition of the other. But this does not mean, that they are antagonistic to each other; on the contrary, the relation is that expressed in an often-abused term: "Laissez faire lessez aller." The latest federal Constitution, that of the German realm, does not contain one word on the subject of churches and religion; and the United States Constitution, as it came from the hands of the Convention, had but one clause in which the word "religious" occurs. It is: "But no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." The first word of this clause-" but "-was inserted, so as to take out of the immediately preceding clause the construction, that

an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution was a religious act. We do not want to be hypercritical, but must say, that this procedure was ingenuous; for it did not alter the fact. And, finally, we ask permission to say: that we regard the American separation of church and state as an armistice during which pour parlers are allowed, and we ask the reader to accept this chapter as one of these. There is sure to be a future unity of laws and religious rules, in our so-called "Church free America."

CHAPTER XX.

PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.

"Civilization begins with commercial intercourse."

-M. M. von Weber in his " Railroad Technics."

THE fact, that the United States have never had a system of public improvements, which could be sustained on sound scientific, ethical or political principles, proves that something is wrong in our modes of forming a public will. With the experience of many centuries and nations before us, and entirely free to adopt the best, we have been vacillating in our policy, and selected one bad system after another!! Our projects have been vast and costly enough; for we have had a continent and the world's commerce ever in our eye, and have often felt giddy at the vast sweep of view we had. But in the carrying out of our schemes we lacked attention to details, had poor administrations, venal directions, and mercenary local motives, so predominating as to rob ourselves of the glory that shone out of our gigantic enterprises, and to subject us to the accusation, that with all our greatness we have much narrow-mindedness and fiscal littleness. Everybody was for public improvements; but nobody wanted them upon a rightful basis; and their advocacy in Congress and State legislatures, fell therefore into the hands of artful popularity-hunters; their administration into the hands of adventurers; and the end of it all was, what always happens, when false and inadequate means are employed, poor roads in bankrupt hands.

Will the reader, whom our remarks perhaps offend, please reflect, that here was a subject-public roads-which of all subjects, being beyond the capacities of individual procurement, has always been regarded as within the province of government, thrown out and assigned to corporations! Here was also an excellent federal organism, with public authorities that could each respectively attend appropriately to each branch of this public business. But instead of agreeing on their respective sphere, they disputed about it, and either asked one day each of the other, too much, or the next day denied each to the