must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the general-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. *TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN WASHINGTON, October 7, 1862. Major-General McClellan, Headquarters Army of the Potomac: You wish to see your family and I wish to oblige you. It might be left to your own discretion, certainly so, if Mrs. M. could meet you here at Washington. A. LINCOLN. LETTER TO T. H. CLAY WAR DEPARTMENT, October 8, 1862. Thomas H. Clay, Cincinnati, Ohio: You cannot have reflected seriously when you ask that I shall order General Morgan's command to Kentucky as a favor because they have marched from Cumberland Gap. The precedent established by it would evidently break up the whole army. Buell's old troops, now in pursuit of Bragg, have done more hard marching recently; and, in fact, if you include marching and fighting, there are scarcely any old troops east or west of the mountains that have not done as hard service. I sincerely wish war was an easier and pleasanter business than it is; but it does not admit of holidays. On Morgan's command, where it is now sent, as I understand, depends the question whether the enemy will get to the Ohio River in another place. A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO GENERAL U. S. GRANT WASHINGTON, D. C., October 8, 1862. Major-General Grant: I congratulate you and all concerned in your recent battles and victories. How does it all sum up? I especially regret the death of General Hackleman, and am very anxious to know the condition of General Oglesby, who is an intimate personal friend. A. LINCOLN. LETTER TO GENERAL S. R. CURTIS EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 10, 1862. Major-General Curtis, St. Louis, Mo.: I believe some Cherokee Indian regiments, with some white forces operating with them, now at or near Fort Scott, are within your department and under your command. John Ross, principal chief of the Cherokees, is now here an exile, and he wishes to know, and so do I, whether the force above mentioned could not occupy the Cherokee country consistently with the public service. Please consider and answer. A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE WAR DEPARTMENT, October 11, 1862. 4 P. M. General Boyle, Louisville, Ky.: Please send any news you have from General Buell to-day. A. LINCOLN. TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE WAR DEPARTMENT, October 12, 1862. 4:10 P. M. General Boyle, Louisville, Ky.: We are very anxious to hear from General Buell's army. We have heard nothing since day before yesterday. Have you anything? A. LINCOLN. *TELEGRAM TO GENERAL CURTIS WASHINGTON, D. C., October 12, 1862. Major-General Curtis, Saint Louis, Mo.: Would the completion of the railroad some distance further in the direction of Springfield, Mo., be of any military advantage to you? Please answer. A. LINCOLN. LETTER TO GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN 1 EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., October 13, 1862. My dear Sir: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that 'In early October Lincoln had visited McClellan to ascertain the actual condition of the army. McClellan complained it lacked "everything" and gave constant excuses for not moving. Lincoln found the army 100,000 strong and in satisfactory shape. On October 6 he ordered McClellan to cross the Potomac and drive the enemy south. It was his failure to do so, together with his former inaction, that called forth the above letter from the President. point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania; but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now |