act just as I would do if I strove with all my might to be that one, who should live in my time.

THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body, and determines their motions, does also govern itself, and determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice; and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing, or commanding anything at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that: and if that directing volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined: that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series; and if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that. Which is a contradiction; because, by the supposition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will which deter

mines and fixes the subsequent acts be not free, none of the following acts which are determined by it can be free. If we suppose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will: that is, that each of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in determining. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same if, instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by something out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on; none of them are free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by, some cause out of the Will; and so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next; and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link; and that is moved by something else; in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain, yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or selfdetermining power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not

belong to the chain. If the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely; because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because, in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one; if the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts; because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act; and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all. Thus, this Arminian notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's Self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world.

THE TIMES THAT TRIED MEN'S SOULS.

THOMAS PAINE.

[Among the literary artists of the Revolutionary period of American history Paine occupied a very high rank, through his vigor of thought and peculiar vividness of expression, his fearless patriotism and broad grasp of the true political relations and rights of mankind. Born in England in 1737, it was not until 1774 that he emigrated to America. Yet he must have been deeply imbued from his youth with the revolutionary sentiment and with hatred of kingcraft, for he very soon afterwards issued his famous pamphlet "Common Sense," which is full

of original democratic thought and performed a valuable work in teaching the principles of republicanism to the American people. The depressed feeling which prevailed in the winter of 1776-77 was met by him with the stirring appeals of "The Crisis," a periodical which appeared irregularly and had a highly beneficial influence. We copy the most famous of the papers of the "Crisis." For vigor, fearlessness, and patriotism no Revolutionary document surpasses it, while it paints the situation with a vividness which seems to take us back in person to "the times that tried men's souls." In 1791 Paine wrote his "Rights of Man," in reply to Burke's "Reflections on the French Revolution." This also was a highly-valuable addition to democratic literature, and attained great popularity. He lived in Paris during the French Revolution, and narrowly escaped the guillotine. In 1795 he published his deistical work, "The Age of Reason." The religious radicalism of this book gave great offence, and has covered Paine's name with an obloquy through which his important aid to the cause of human liberty has been almost lost sight of. He returned to the United States in 1802, and died in New York in 1809.]

THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it Now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: 'tis dearness only that gives everything its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right (not only to TAX, but) "to BIND us in ALL CASES WHATSOEVER;" and if being bound in that manner is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even the expression is impious, for so unlimited a power can belong only to GOD.

Whether the independence of the continent was de

clared too soon, or delayed too long, I will not now enter into as an argument: my own simple opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier it would have been much better. We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependent state. However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own: we have none to blame but ourselves. But no great deal is lost yet all that Howe has been doing for this month past is rather a ravage than a conquest, which the spirit of the Jerseys a year ago would have quickly repulsed, and which time and a little resolution will soon recover.

I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, who had so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the calamities of war by every decent method which wisdom could invent. Neither have I so much of the infidel in me as to suppose that He has relinquished the government of the world, and given us up to the care of devils; and, as I do not, I cannot see on what grounds the king of Britain can look up to heaven for help against us: a common murderer, a highwayman, or a housebreaker has as good a pretence as he.

'Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country. All nations and ages have been subject to them: Britain has trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of flat-bottomed boats; and in the fourteenth century the whole English army, after ravaging the kingdom of France, was driven back like men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was performed by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman, Joan of Arc. Would that heaven might inspire some Jersey maid to spirit up her countrymen,