however, that to produce even thefe changes, active power must have been exerted at fome time, and that impulfe and electric excitement are the mere inftruments of that power; for it feems to us impoflible to conceive a change from one state to another, but by the energy of fome power analogous to volition in men. The active power really exerted on fuch occafions, we believe to be that fiat of the Almighty, which conftituted the corporeal world; fo that certain events fhould always be followed, in fimilar circumftances, by other determined. events of one kind; but if the preceding events be called efficient caufes, fuch caufes fhould not be confidered as agents, for the agency is not in them, but in that powerful being which gave them the qualities which they poffefs. If there fore fuch caufes as have no proper characteristics of activity be called efficient caufes, thofe which have fuch characteriftics fhould have another name, and be always denominated agents. Or if the name of efficient caufes be confidered as fynonymous with agents, and appropriated to fuch beings as exert the energy of power in the juft fenfe of the word; the other kind of caufes fhould be denominated phyfical or inftrumental caufes, and never be claffed with agents strictly fo called. It is in this fenfe only that we could with the phrafe efficient caufes to be always employed, and in this fenfe this author feems to confider it as moft properly employed; but if fo, he ought to have defined an efficient caufe to be, not that "which directly and immediately," but that "which mediately or immediately produces a change or event in nature." Both kinds of caufes-efficient and phyficalmay be neceffary to the production of certain events or changes in nature; but they are not both neceffary in the . fame sense of the word. No change can be conceived which does not imply an exertion of power, in the juft fenfe of the word, at fome time and in fome place; but though, by the prefent laws of nature, phyfical caufes appear to be neceffary to the production of the events which always follow them, and which are never feen to take place but in confequence of the application of fuch caufes, the cafe might have been otherwife. Had it pleased the author of nature fo to conftitute the univerfe, fire might uniformly have hardened wax and foftened clay, and that electric ex. citement which now attracts light fubftances, might have repelled them; but it seems not more impoffible to conceive the whole of any thing to be greater than all its parts, than it is to conceive a change or event in nature, without without the exertion of power fomewhere and at feme time, to which exertion that change may be ultimately traced. The fecond chapter of this Inquiry is divided into fix fections; in the first and fecond of which the author gives a luminous, though very concife, view of the ancient modes of philofophizing in general, and of the opinions of the moft celebrated fchools concerning caufation in particular. The first fection is employed on the philofophy of the eastern nations, a very barren fubject; and the fecond, on the moft celebrated schools of ancient Greece, which, with refpe& to caufation, are not much more fertile. The detail, however, which feems to be extremely candid and accurate, as far as it goes, will be interefting and inftructive to those young men of fcience, who have not leifure or opportunity to fludy Brucker's hiftory of philofophy; and the refult of the whole is, that, with refpect to caufation, the philofophers of antiquity feem to have been all comprehended under two fects. By one of thefe fects, every change in nature was attributed to the immediate operation of effentially intelligent and active principles, or minds, by the other, all fuch principles were excluded from the univerfe, and every change accounted for by the impulfe of atoms, fet in motion by fome inconceivable neceffity of nature. In the third fection we have a remarkably candid and perfpicuous view of the philofophy of Defcartes and Malebranche. To these two eminent men, Mr. Scott does ample juftice. Far from laughing,-as fome of his countrymen have laughed at them, he states their theories,-efpecially refpecting caufation,-with the utmost fairness, even when he differs from them; and acknowledges that Descartes was the first philofopher who marked, with precifion and diftintnefs, the boundary between the material and intellectual worlds. For an account of the merits and defects of the general fyftem of that celebrated Frenchman, we must refer to Mr. Scott himfelf; but we fhall tranfcribe Defcartes's theory refpecting the origin and continuance of motion, becaufe we think much more favourably of it than this author feems to do; and it is not now, perhaps, generally known, According to Defcartes, the fole caufe and origin of motion which we find in the univerfe, is God. "The nature of motion," fays he, "having been confidered, it is neceffary to examine into its caufe, which is twofold: first, an univerfal and primary caufe, whence proceed in general all the motions of the world; next, a particular caufe, by means of which, the various portions of matter acquire motions which they had had not at first. As to the general caufe of motion, it appears manifeft to me to be none other than God himself, who in the beginning created matter, and motion, and reft along with it, and now, by his own conftant interference alone, (jamque per folum fuum concurfum ordinarium) preferves the fame quantity of motion and rest in the univerfe, as he originally affigned to it.” P. 102. The creation of reft feems indeed a very improper expreffion, as we can form no other notion of reft than the abfence of motion. Even "the creation of motion," as diftinguished from matter appears to us a phrafe without meaning; but there is nothing elfe in this account of the origin and continuance of motion, which has not been maintained by fome of the moft diftinguished Newtonians. with as much earnestness as by Descartes or Malebranche. About the primary caufe of motion, there can, among Theifts, be no controverfy; and the late Bishop Horfley, than whom. no man was more converfant with the works of Newton, appears, from a letter quoted by Lord Monboddo in his ancient metaphyfics, to have maintained that, all which Defcartes feems to have meant by folum fuum concurfum ordinarium, is neceflary to continue corporeal motion, produced by whatever cause. It does not appear to us, that by the word concurfum, can be here meant what in English is understood by the word interference. It is not, we think, a well chosen word, to denote any thing applicable to the fubject of difcuffion; but we fhould be inclined to interpret it concurrence rather than interference; for, that the concurrence of the Deity, or the continuation of that volition by which matter was at firft brought into existence, and thofe properties impreffed on it which were and are the immediate fources of motion, is neceffary to prefeive, not only the original quantity of motion in the univerfe, but even the universe itself in exiftence, is a truth which appears to us felf-evident. Accordingly, to the late Dr. Robinson of Edinburgh, another eminent Newtonian,-there are appearances in the heavens, which make it evident that the fuftaining hand of God is ftill neceffary, and that the prefent order and harmony, which he has enabled us to understand and admire, is wholly dependent on his will, and its duration one of the unfearchable measures of his providence *." See likewife our 31ft vol. See our 29th vol. p. 519, &c. p. 511, &c., where, if we mistake not, Mr. Scott's objections to the reafoning of Malebranche on this fubject, are pletely obviated. Rev. com. In the fourth fection Mr. Scott gives a view of the fyf tems of Spinoza and Leibnitz, which, as he juftly obferves, refemble each other in obfcurity, however much they may differ in other particulars. As there is nothing in them of much importance to the enquiry which he is purfuing, we fhall make no extracts from this fection; though we cannot take leave of it, without expreffing a doubt, or something more than a doubt, whether complete juftice be here done to the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, of which a fuller, and, we think, in fome refpects, a more accurate account will be found in the prefent State of the Republic of Letters, vol. IV. October, 1729. That part of the theory in which an attempt is made to fhow how a concatenation of phyfical events may, from the beginning, have been adapted to the moral government of men, has been admitted by Pope*, Warburton, Wollafton +, Whifton, and many other authors of unqueftionable genius and fcience, who yet treated, with juft contempt, the Leibnitzian doctrine of Monads. It muft indeed to a certain extent be admitted, we think, by all Newtonians, who are, as the great ornaments of the school have ever been, genuine Theifts. From the theory of Leibnitz, the author paffes to the doctrines of Cudworth, Bacon, Locke, Newton, Clarke, Dr. Reid, and profeffor Stewart of Edinburgh, refpecting caufation, and flates thofe doctrines with his ufual candour. Of Cudworth, he entertains a very high and therefore a very juft opinion; though he objects to the plaftic nature of that learned author, and fupports his objections by arguments which appear unanswerable. Of the notions of Bacon on this important fubject he gives the following view. "Bacon the great father of the inductive, or analytical philofophy, has no where very precifely ftated his opinion concern. ing the relation of caufe and effect. But all his reafonings refpecting the method of profecuting philofophical inquiries with fuccefs, plainly take it for granted, that the natural philofopher has no concern with active, intelligent or fpiritual caufes; that his fole object is to afcertain by careful obfervation, what are the phyfical properties, or powers, upon which natural phænomenal apparently depend; to arrange thofe under diftinct heads or claffes; and to reduce under its proper clafs, or afcribe to its proper cause, In his Universal Prayer. + Sermons, Vol. III. Sermon ift. Religion of Nature, &c. eighth edition, p. 180-191. every phænomenon which the diverfified fcene of the univerfe exhibits. He feems therefore to have been of opinion, that phyfical effects are immediately produced by thofe powers, or forces which the Deity has originally conferred upon matter; and that the fucceffion of natural events may be compared to the links of a great chain which depends at laft, for its original fupport, upon the Deity." P. 133. It is fome time fince the prefent writer read the philofophical works of Bacon; but he is inclined to admit that this is a fair view of that illuftrious author's notions of the object of natural philofophy, and the relation of physical caufes and effects. Before any inference, however, can be drawn from it, we must ascertain what Bacon meant by the Deity's ori ginally conferring powers or forces upon matter. Active powers, in the proper fenfe of the words, cannot be meant; for Mr. Scott admits that fuch powers can be the attributes of intelligent Beings alone; whilft every Baconian confiders inertia as effential to matter. It appears therefore to us that by this phrase we are to understand, that when the Deity willed matter to exift, he willed it to be a folid, extended fubftance, indifferent alike to motion and to reft; but, at the fame time, of such a nature, that two maffes of it fhould tend towards each other with a velocity in the inverse ratio of the fquares of the diftances, whilft one mafs, if put in motion in free space, and not affected by any foreign force, would move equally and for ever in a ftraight line. Thofe two motions duly adjusted to each other are known to be fufficient to produce the revolutions of the heavenly bodies; and that we may not perplex ourselves by a variety of motions we shall at prefent confine our attention to them, as if they were only corporeal motions in the universe. Thus then we have the heavenly bodies originally set in motion by the will of the Deity; but would that motion be continued for ever by any powers conferred on those bodies, were they left entirely to themselves, as an artift leaves the watch or clock which he has conftructed? Before this queftion can be answered, we must ascertain how the bodies could be left to themfelves. If the volition of the Deity, which firft brought them into being and communicated to them their motions, remains unchanged, it is obvious that they are not left to themfelves, but that the very fame energy continues, which firft produced, their motions. If that volition ceafe, they must neceffarily ceafe with it--not only to move, but even to exift; for as it was by that volition alone that they were firft brought into being and put into motion, it is felf-evident that they cannot continue in being or in motion, but |