company, when it becomes her turn to expofe the character of her antagonist; and this kind of alternate contention is fometimes carried on for several weeks, during which they are vifited by fome of the principal inhabitants, as the scene affords confiderable entertainment. Sometimes, indeed, these females of colour will challenge a friend, in a frolick, to arrange fuch parties against one another, and a great deal of humour is then difplayed, in which even the visitors are often not spared; but to prevent any disorder at fuch numerous meetings, fome of the police officers are always in attendance *.

"The free negroes are esteemed to be about equal in number at Paramaribo to the people of colour: they are handicrafts, fuch as blacksmiths, carpenters, taylors, fhoemakers, &c. but they work extremely flow, and are very negligent, fo that little dependance can be put in most of them. There is however a great difference between those who have been instructed in the Chriftian religion, by the Moravians, and the others; and I have found by expe rience how much more their word may be relied on; but in general all the free negroes are reported to be very idle, and will only labour juft for a prefent fubfiftence. The negro flaves often de. clare that they are better off than the free negroes. In the fongs which the plantation negroes frequently fing, there is one of a very lively tune, and is always accompanied with much laughter and mirth; the words are, Makarele Saneda, Mackarele Monday, Makarele Tuesday, Mackareie Alleday, &c.; the meaning is, Makarel Sunday, Makarel Monday, Mackarel Tuesday, Mackarel every day, &c. Seeing the negroes fo very merry when they were finging this fong, I asked them the meaning of the words, when one of them answered, "Maftera, when we have good mafter, we find ourselves more happy than thofe free negroes are, and when we fee one of them we make him hear this, for they live upon nothing but Mackarel, whilst we other negroes have plenty of different provifions on the plantations." Mackarel is a very cheap diet here; and that the plantation negroes have fome reafon for their exultation, I am inclined to think, as I have seen very few among the free negroes as ftrong and hearty in appearance as they are," P. III,

The author on leaving Surinam proceeded to Providence in the United States, from which place he vifited Boston, and afterwards, returning to Providence, made a journey to New York, Philadelphia, &c. Many fenfible and judicious obfervations occur in this, and, it may be faid, in every part of this work, and thofe on the return home from Boston more particularly deferve the attention of the government of that coun

*Thefe meetings, for which the license from the fiscal must be obtained, the people of colour call a Doo,”

try.

try. An appendix of almoft 100 pages is occupied in defcribing the plants, animals, birds, reptiles, &c. of Surinam. A few embellishments of no great importance, but of neat execution accompany the volume, which may without hesitation be recommended as an agreeable and very useful addition to books of this character and defcription.

ART. VIII. A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain, commanded by His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir John Moore, K. B. Sc. &c. &c. Authenticated by Official Papers and Original Letters, by James Moore, Efq. 4to. pp. $24. 11. 11s. 6d. Johnfon. 1809.

S O much of the paffions and prejudices of party had been mixed with the difcuffions refpecting this book, on its' first appearance, that we who have no party but that of loyalty and patriotifm, purposely abftained from meddling with it, till thofe heats fhould have paffed away; well knowing that its character, as an hiftorical document, muil be too pernranent to fall into any oblivion, by the lofs of a little time. works, with their novelty, appear to lofe their very life, but fuch could not be the cafe with this Narrative: and our judgment on it will certainly be the more valuable, for the delay that has intervened.

Some

In a fhort and pathetic addrefs to his mother, the author concifely delineates the character of his much lamented brother, with equal feeling and truth; and flates, that being unable to write what was worthy of him, he had collected the facts, and arranged the materials, to enable hiftorians to do him juftice.

The work furnishes a very important feries of records, which future Statefmen, Generals, and diplomatic characters may perufe, with much benefit to themselves, and advantage to their country. The Statefman will perceive how indifpenfably neceffary it is, previoufly to throwing a fine army into the heart of even an allied itate, to afcertain beyond a poflibility of doubt, the real ftrength, means, refources, and actual degree of preparation, calculated for effectual co-operation, and to effect specific objects, diftinctly stated, and mu tually understood. He will be more than ever fenfible, that no reliance whatever can be placed on any information, short of actual reports of the condition and difcipline of the allied forces, made by intelligent, experienced, and fcientific Generals, or Field Officers, detached, in good time for that ex

prefs purpose. He will feel the ftrongeft conviction that on the judicious felection of a commander, not only the ultimate fuccefs, but even the very fafety of a co-operating army may entirely depend. Never was this truth more fully verified than in the instance before us. But for the difcernment, vigilance, and talents difplayed by Sir John Moore, the ariny he commanded, drawn towards Madrid by treacherous counfels, and ill-founded fuggeftions on the fpot, would, after a gallant refiftance, have been overpowered by numbers: and, if not facrificed to gratify the hatred of a remorfelefs tyrant, would, at this moment, lie pining in French dungeons. The narrative will afford the future ftatesman a no less useful leffon in the choice of public emiffaries, on whofe information, refulting from the prudence, fagacity, and diligence that ought to characterize them, the favourable termination of military expe ditions may materially depend. The events fubmitted to our confideration fufficiently evince, how inadequate a mere general knowledge and the experience of a peace establishment, or diplomatic routine, may prove under more trying and difficult circumftances, where a talent for penetration into character, fecrets, and motives, is primarily effential. There can be no doubt that the English envoy to the fupreme Junta, acted with fincerity and zeal; but alas! it was a zeal without knowledge; for it is evident, that he was deplorably misled by the arch-traitor Morla, and others; and that his information and fuggeftions, if acted on, would have led to the most meJancholy confequences. Information only was required from this diplomatic agent; but unfortunately, his information was fupplied by traitors, and his eagerness went beyond even his fuppofed information. This misfortune may not, however, be devoid of a good effect, in the leffon it muft afford to future diplomatic agents, fimilarly fituated.

The work confifls, principally, of official letters, which paffed between the characters who figure in it. The author has, with thefe letters, given a connecting narrative, and fuch reflections as naturally arofe out of the fubject, He was fully enabled to draw up the narrative, by having recourse to an accurate journal kept by Sir John Moore, to authentic documents, official records, the reports of staff-officers, and to information acquired from fuch as were well qualified to communicate it. The diftinct though concife account of the various movements of the relative component parts of the army, and of the arduous retreat to, and final action at, Corunna, proves that his information was genuine; and renders it probable, that he derived fome affiftance from the advice of able military friends. He complains that his brother's memory had been

5

affailed

affailed by ungenerous attacks, and the dark infinuations of envy: and he was induced to publish, to obviate the effects of calumny and malignant infinuations, directed against a noble character, who terminated an illuftrious career by a most glo

rious death.

The army of ten thousand men fent up the Baltic in May 1808, is, briefly noticed. The circumftances related of that expedition are extraordinary. Sir John Moore found the Swedish army quite inadequate to even defenfive operations; and yet the impracticable plans of conquering Zealand, and of ftorming a fortrefs in Ruffian Finland, were feriously propofed. These rash schemes, which would have drawn on a handful of British troops, the whole force of the Ruffian Empire, and kingdom of Denmark, were respectfully remonftrated againft by Sir John Moore. This drew on him the refentment of the Swedish Monarch, who arrested him in his Capital. He found means, without committing his government, to withdraw from this embarraffing fituation; and returned with his army (which was not permitted even to land in Sweden) to his native country, where he was honoured with the approbation of his Sovereign, and of minifters; as his good fenfe and political firmness had faved the army from being implicated in plans that would have exposed it to inevitable deftruction.

Sir John Moore was, now, appointed third in command in Portugal. He arrived there fubfequently to the battle of Vimeira, and bestowed the highest praises on Sir Arthur Wellesley (now Lord Wellington) who is an ornament to his profeflion, an honour to his country, and an able opponent of the most experienced generals of the enemy. The dif graceful convention of Cintra occafioned the return of many general officers to England. On the 6th of October, Sír John Moore was appointed to the chief command of an army to be employed in Spain. Lord Caftlereagh conveyed his inftructions under date the e5th September. They ftated principally as follows.

His Majefty having determined to employ a corps of his troops, of not less than 30,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry, in the north of Spain, to co-operate with the Spanish armies in the expulfion of the French from that kingdom, has been graciously pleased to entrust to you the command in chief of this force. It has been thought prudent to fend that part of this army which is to proceed from hence, to Corunna, rather than difembark any part of it, in the first instance, at any pofition more advanced towards the enemy. It will be for you to confider on what points of Gallicia, or on the borders of Leon, the troops can be most advan

tageoufly

tageously affembled and equipped for fervice, from whence they may move forward as early as circumftances will permit; and it is left to your judgment to decide whether the whole of the in. fantry and artillery fhail be transported from Lisbon by Sea to Corunna, or whether a portion fhall be marched through Portugal to that deftination. With refpect to the plan of operations on which it may be moft expedient to employ your troops, when affembled and ready for fervice, there will be full time, before your equipments can be completed, for concerting this with the commanders of the Spanish armies. I fhall lofe no time in forwarding to you from hence, fuch information as I may have been able to collect. And I am to recommend that you will take the neceffary meafures for opening a communication with the Spanish authorities for the purpose of framing the plan of a campaign, on which it may be adviseable that the refpective armies fhould act in concert." On the 50th of September Lord Caftlereagh writes to Lord William Bentinck,

"That the Marquis de Romana approved of the decision to make Corunna our principal depot, and to operate from thence; that the Marquis, with nearly 10,000 men, would proceed to St. Andero, and was to augment that number by the incorporation of the armed peasants of the Afturias and the Montagna, to 20,000 men, which with the Afturian army, and Blake's, will carry the force in that quarter, to 60, or 70,000 men, exclufive of the ar. mies operating towards the front or left of the enemy's line."

In conformity with thefe inftructions, Sir John Moore made fuch arrangements as reflect the higheft credit on his military talents; and, after encountering multiplied difficul. ties from mifinformation, the intemperance of the weather, the state of the roads, and precarious fupplies, he conducted his advanced guard to Salamanca, which place he entered on the 13th of November. The Portuguese were totally igno rant of the state of their own roads; and even British officers joined in afferting, that cannon could not be transported over the mountains. On this account, General Hope with a corps of 6000 men, and five brigades of artillery, was directed to march by Elvas on the Madrid road, to Badajos, and Efpinar. This march of detour was afterwards a fubject. of ferious regret: for it was afcertained that though the roads were bad, they were practicable for artillery; and that the whole of the army from Lifbon, could have marched through Portugal.

After the furrender of Dupont, the French amounting to 45,000 men, independent of troops in garrifons, concentrated their force behind the Ebro; and waited for the numerous reinforcements which were rapidly advancing in every di

rection,