Bonaparte. Had the French nation, torn by faction, defolated by crime, weary of the tumultuous tyranny of crafty atheistical regicides, and impelled by remorfe; had it begun to mourn its miferies with penitence, and to fympathize with the fuffering nations which were depreffed by that relentless tyranny; in fuch a ftate of mind had it paffed under the role of a bold and refolute mafter, whofe ftern power should have awed factious confpirators, and whofe fevere but just administration should have repreffed an habitual fondness of his people for rapine, flaughter, and diforder; then there might have been fome hope that fuch vigorous defpotifm would have fome refpect to public law; that the fenfe and the restraints of piety and juftice might be restored eventually to the embruted multitude; and that in the process of moral amelioration, a time might come when France would refume her ftation in civilized fociety, when her greatnefs might be, compatible with the fafety of other nations, and when her peoplewould join to lament and to repair the ruin and devastation which had been perpetrated by a favage democracy.

"But in the confular power of Bonaparte, and in the imperial rule of the great Napoleon, are still perceived the lineaments of pure, unadulterated jacobinifm. In an elaborate work, by Hauterive, who was his foreign minifter, ( Chef de Relations exte rieurs') published by his authority, immediately after his ac ceffion to the confular dignity, it was diftinctly announced to all the world, that the federative fyftem which he adopted was that fame upon which all the preceding revolutionary authorities had acted. It was founded in the fame difregard of treaties and public law, the fame principles of univerfal infurrection, the fame means of robbery, plunder, and confifcation, the fame maxim of appealing to the people in all countries against the authority of their legitimate fovereigns. If France cannot otherwife extend the relations of her continental federative fyftem, the will employ the only means which the folly of the states that have abandoned her alliance, and the obftinacy of thofe which perfift in a fanguinary war, have left at her difpofal. For federative fubfidies, fhe will fubftitute military fubfidies; and if princes dif regard the voice of felf-intereft, which dictates an alliance, fhe will virtually ally herfelf to their countries, which they are incapable of defending, and will convert into auxiliaries all the means of fubfiftence and of defence that can by any ways be furnifhed by the territory which her armies may occupy."

"How fuccefsfully the tyrant has proceeded upon his grand federative maxim of jacobinifm, it would be painful, and is not neceffary to detail." P. 83.

Inftances, in which this "federative maxim of jacobinism" has been reduced to practice, are given in great abundance; and "the peculiar character and fortune of Napoleon" are diftinguished

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diftinguished from those of former celebrated conquerors with equal ingenuity and accuracy, In the conclufion of this part the fuperiority of our own country in found learning, and the advantages derived from our general fyftem of education (which has contributed fo much to preferve us from the errors and exceffes of the French reformers) are forcibly and, we think, juftly defcribed.

We could dwell with pleasure on almoft every part of the next divifion of this work, which treats of the British Confitution, commencing with the flatute of Merton, in which is recorded the celebrated anfwer of the Barons, Nolumus leges Anglia mutari,) and coming down to the prefent times. The writer clearly fhows, that from the e rl:eft periods the English nation has rejected all change upon fpeculative principle; and that practical utility has been always confidered as the chief object and end of our laws and govern.

ment.

"

On the influence of the Crown in the House of Commons (the clamour againft which has been lately revived) the author's rem rks are fo judicious and appofite that we will give a part of them in his own words.

"It may be faid, that a House of Commons, fubject to fuch influence, is but an organ of royalty, a delufive phantom of pub lic liberty, and an unneceffary incumbrance to the state. Such it would be, moft truly, if its decifions were dictated by the Crown, and its deliberations controuled by authority. But that influence to which fome of its members are fubject, is limited, and cannot be directed beyond the ordinary administration of affairs. It can never aim at any object injurious to the public welfare, or at any increase of the royal power; but is naturally and invariably confined to thofe objects which are strictly within the view and intention of the British Conftitution.

"It is a maxim of that Conftitution, that the King shall have the appoinment of the executive fervants of the ftate. If the members of the Houfe of Commons were all of them unconnected with any intereft but that of their own house, would they not more frequently affume the right to which a minority is always devoted, and at which, cnce at least in the prefent reign, a majority directly aimed; that of con rouling the King's nomination, and of imperiously fixing their own leading members in the feveral departments of office? Would the minifters appointed by the vote, and dependent upon the favour of that houfe be most folicitous of serving the King, their nominal mafter, or of obtaining popular applaufe, and the continued fupport of their conftituent majority? In fuch a cafe the honour of the Crown would be titular, and its power extinct; while the

nation,

nation, instead of the fecurity of a powerful and permanent ad. miniftration, refponfible to parliament, would be governed by minifters, conftituted by the Houfe of Commons, without any refponfibility, and without any poffibility of long retaining their appointment; and all parties would be perpetually distracted by the uproar and the diforders, infeparable from a ftate of faction, and political contention.

"Thofe who lament that the members of the Houfe of Com. mons are some of them fubject to royal influence, should examine the human heart before they proceed to complaint and cenfure. Do they fondly believe that a numerous body, drawn promifcuously by any procefs of delegation, from any order of fociety, fhall poffefs, individually, intelligence and virtue to be placed above delufion or indirect, controul? In what age or country,' under any imaginable mode of formation, has fuch an affembly been conftituted? In the common affairs of life, for the manage ment of municipal tranfactions, or of village-interefts, wherever independent power is lodged in a numerous meeting, fome leader invariably arifes, whom it would be ridiculous to honour as poffeffing a purer heart, or a more able understanding, than thofe who fubmit to his direction. The nature of man is not changed by elevated rank, or by political function. That spirit of intrigue, faction, and ambition, which diffracts the veftry of a parish, and the corporation of a borough, will actuate the heart of the legiflator and the ftatefman. To complain that every individual member of parliament does not reft upon his own intelli gence and knowledge, is to betray a grofs ignorance of the facul ties and temper which are common to all mankind. To raife an outcry, that fome men are influenced by the authority of a government which has fhewn itself juft and patriotic, while praife is bestowed upon others who oppofe that government by a flavish adherence to a leader of factious principles and unsuccessful ambition, plainly fhews, that averfion to the established authority occafions the objection; and that fuch complaint would ceafe when that authority fhould yield to oppofition." P. 123.

There are, in this part of the work, several other remarks on the conftitution of parliament, which deferve ferious attention, particularly the obfervation on the alledged inequality and abufes in the fyftem of representation, namely, that "theoretical defect in this inftance, as in many others, is practical perfection." The author further obferves, that

"The Houfe of Commons, practically, is an affembly, not only legislative, in conjunction with the other eftates, in which capacity it is truly reprefentative of the people, but is alfo, with refpect to the ordinary affairs of government, mediative between the fubject and the Prince, in which character, having a power

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irre.

irrefiftible by either party, it ought, in a degree, to be reprefen tative both of the crown and the nation."

In a difcuffion, which follows, of the charge preferred against the late Commander in Chief, the conduct of the Houfe of Commons on that occafion is ably and (to us) fatisfactorily defended. Some animadverfions on the inconfiftency and tergiverfation of Cobbett and the Edinburgh Reviewers conclude this part of the fubject.

In the laft portion of this work, wherein the prefent dangers to the conftitution are reprefented with confiderable force, the author obferves, that the moral revolution in Europe was complete long before there was any appearance of political convulfion; the men of letters having effected an important change in the opinions, manners, and prejudices of mankind. He then adverts to the conteft in this count y between the party which aimed at fubverting the conflitton, and that which wifhed for its preservation, but which, the author thinks, rather ftrove to evade the conteft than to crush the hoftility "threatened by its presumptuous enemy." In this reprefentation we in a great degree coin cide; and we are convinced that the author is fully warranted in his fubfequent affertions, that Mr. Pitt himself did not at first estimate the extent of the threatening peril; that he was for a long time, from inclination as well as policy, adverse to war; and that "the minifters of this country were driven from their pacific fyftem by the violence and the direct aggreffion of the revolutionary power then directing the affairs of France." The doctrine of the Edinburgh Reviewers, that "the first coalition," as it is called, " against the rev. lution was a manifeft war of aggreffion on the part of the allies," (a moft daring affertion, after the contrary proof given by fo many writers, and indeed by the avowal of Briffot himself.) is here ably combated, and, we think, decifively overthrown. There cannot indeed be a more convincing refutation of this affertion than is contained in the paffage cited by the author from the Edinburgh Review itfelf *,

He then adverts to, and reprobates the conduct of, those writers (in our opinion juftly termed "difaffected") who have invariably cenfured every measure of minifters during

* See the article on Segur's work, "Sur la Politique de tous les Cabinets," Jan. 1802.

the

the laft and prefent war, who (as the author expreffes it) "endeavour to root out of the public mind all confidence in the zeal and under ftanding of their rulers." Of this reprehenfible conduct e enumerates feveral inftances during the time of the prefent adminiftration, among which the vehement oppofition to the Orders in Council, retaliati g on Bonaparte and his vaffal ftates his outrageous blockading Decrees, forms the most prominent. But the able and convincing fpeech of Mr. Stephen has, we conceive, fet that question completely at reft. We will, however, extract the author's remarks on the injurious mifrepresentations of M.. Pitt's measures; and the rather, as we have never seen his adminiftration termed "the reign of terror" without feeling deep indignation at the unblushing audacity of the

writer.

*

"The measures pursued to break the vaft combination of dif affected perfons, which was organized in the affiliated focieties, at the commencement of the latt war, are ftigmatized as "the English reign of terror t." Those focieties were, at that time, eftablished in perfect union throughout the empire for the avowed purpose of bringing about “radical reform," upon the principles then prevalent in France, and were in correfpondence with the public enemy. The fagacious mind of Mr. Pitt detected that formidable confpiracy before it had acquired irrefiftible force, and being armed with extraordinary power, his vigilance and vigour, at that awful crifis, faved the monarchy, the legislature, and the laws. Let us not forget that he performed that difficult task without one capital conviction, without entrenching on the privileges of parliament, without difpenfing with the trial by jury, and without the detention of one accufed individual, except on fufpicion founded on fufficient teltimony. The conftitu tion being faved, that extraordinary power was inftantly furren dered, and the public liberties which, in practice, had never been violated, were perfectly reftored. It is aftonishing that a defignation appropriate to that cruel tyranny which under the bloodthirsty Roberfpierre had tortured mankind, thouid now be applied to characterize those measures. It is impoffible that those who love the British conftitution, can denominate, as the reign of terror," that period, when with the united voice of all loyal men, the government was impelled, by the neceffities of an alarming peril, to affert the utmoft majefty of the laws, and by the aid of parliament, was enabled without fhedding of blood, to

See Brit. for March, 1810, page 262.

✈ 13 Edinburgh Review.

quell