Tennessee (known to the War Department) is that of March 31, 1864, which gives present for duty:1

There were probably 1,000 officers with the two divisions. Colonel Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee,” estimates the effective force of those two divisions when they rejoined the army at 10,000 enlisted men present for duty.2

There were, according to our information, four bat

1 Department of East Tennessee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet commanding, March 31, 1864.

Buckner's division, commanded by Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, consisted of Johnson's brigade of Tennessee regiments and Gracie's and Law's Alabama brigades.

2 So far as I can make out from the very defective returns in our possession of Pickett's division, its effective force (enlisted men present for duty) at this period, the latter part of April, was about 5,000.

The first return, or Morning Report, in the Confederate archives in the possession of the War Department, in which the numbers of Longstreet's Corps are given after that of March 31, 1864, is the Morning Report of the Army of Northern Virginia of June 30, 1864, in which that corps is reported as having present for duty 1,098 officers and 13,060 enlisted men. That this Corps should have gone into the campaign of 1864 with about the same numbers that it had on the 31st of August, 1863, while the Third Corps (Hill's) increased in that time from 13,601 enlisted men present for duty to 20,648, and the Second Corps (Ewell's) from 15,428 to near 18,000 (including Hoke's brigade, and two regiments of Rodes's, absent), was quite unexpected. Neither General Longstreet nor his division commanders state the strength of their commands in their reports of the opening operations of the campaign.

teries of four guns in each infantry division, which, for the eight divisions, is one hundred and twenty-eight guns, seventy-two guns in the reserve artillery, and twenty-four with the Cavalry-a total of two hundred and twenty-four guns.

Using the figures of the extracts from the Morning Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, we have for its numbers "present for duty," May 1, 1864, not less than—

making a grand aggregate of officers and enlisted men of infantry, artillery, and cavalry of 61,953, with probably two hundred and twenty-four guns.

CHAPTER II.

THE PASSAGE OF THE RAPIDAN-THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

On the 2d of May the order for the movement of the Army of the Potomac was issued.'

The movement began promptly at midnight of the 3d, Major-General Sheridan, with two of his cavalry divisions, leading the two infantry columns, one of his divisions, Torbert's, being left to cover the rear of the army. A canvas and a wooden ponton bridge were laid at Germanna Ford, the same at Ely's Ford, and a wooden ponton bridge at Culpeper Mine Ford, five bridges in all, the river being about two hundred feet wide.

The Second Corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry division, crossed at Ely's Ford, and moved to Chancellorville, followed by the reserve artillery. The Fifth Corps, preceded by Wilson's cavalry division, and followed by the Sixth Corps, crossed at Germanna Ford, and moved to Wilderness Tavern, at the intersection of the Germanna plank road,' by the Orange Court House and Fredericksburg pike. The head of the Sixth Corps halted three miles from Germanna Ford, the rear at the ford.

The trains, except those known as the fighting trains, which accompanied the troops (see the order of movement),

1 See order of May 2, 1864-Appendix D.

2 This road ran from Germanna Ford to Fredericksburg.

crossed at Culpeper Mine Ford and Ely's Ford. They were covered by the cavalry, and had an infantry guard of 1,200 men from each infantry corps.

Gregg's cavalry moved to the vicinity of Piney Branch Church, throwing out reconnoissances on the Pamunkey road and toward Spottsylvania Court House, Fredericksburg, and Hamilton's crossing. Wilson's cavalry moved to Parker's store, on the Fredericksburg and Orange Court House plank road, throwing out reconnoissances to the right on the Orange pike and plank roads, and on the Catharpin and Pamunkey roads.

The head of the Second Corps arrived at Chancellorville at 10 A.M. of the 4th, and the whole corps, with the trains moving with the troops, were at the halting-place designated about 1 o'clock. The whole of the Fifth Corps was up to its position by 2 o'clock. Each of these corps had marched more than twenty miles, and both had assisted in laying the wooden ponton bridges at their crossings of the Rapidan, and had improved the roads leading up the steep river-banks. The Sixth Corps had marched more than sixteen miles, but following the Fifth Corps was later in getting to its haltingground for the night.

The canvas bridges were taken up on the 4th, and joined the corps to which they belonged. The wooden bridges were left for the trains and the Ninth Corps.

"This I re

Respecting this operation General Grant says, garded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected." And he might well be gratified at the result, for it was a good day's work in such a country for so large an army with its artillery and fighting trains to march twenty miles, crossing

a river on five bridges of its own building, without a single mishap, interruption, or delay.

It was not practicable, however, to get over all the great trains on the 4th, nor was it expected, as the order of movement shows. In fact it was two o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of May before they had ceased crossing at Ely's Ford, when the wooden bridge there was taken up and moved to Chancellorville; and it was five o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of May before they had ceased crossing at Culpeper Mine Ford, when the bridge there was taken up and the ponton train moved one and a half miles from the river. It was in consideration of the fact that it was not practicable in this region to move the great trains along the protected flank of the army simultaneously with the troops, that led to fixing the halting-places of the heads of the infantry columns at Chancellorville and Wilderness tavern, points which they reached early in the day. The troops might have easily continued their march five miles further, the Second Corps to Todd's tavern, the head of the Fifth Corps to Parker's store, and the head of the Sixth Corps to Wilderness tavern; but even that would have left the right too open during the forenoon of the 5th, and it was more judicious to let the troops remain for the night where they had halted, as it made the passage of the trains secure, and the troops would be fresher when meeting the enemy next day, of which there was much probability.

At 1.15 P.M. of the 4th, General Grant telegraphed from Germanna Ford to General Burnside to make a forced march until he reached there. His First Division, General Stevenson, had then arrived at Brandy Station, and his Fourth, the colored division, had marched that morning from Manassas Junction, more than forty miles distant from Germanna Ford. General Stevenson's division crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford on the morning of the 5th, and