" 1

“that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: and the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.' Mr. Madison in later years added a comment to his notes, stating that "The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a Nat'. Govt. from these different motives began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr. Dickenson said to Mr. Madison You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States." 2

On the 15th Mr. Patterson presented his plan, which, he said, "several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr. Randolph." After discussion it was decided that it should be laid before the Committee of the Whole, that Mr. Randolph's plan should be recommitted in order that the two should be compared, and the convention likewise decided that it should not go into the Committee of the Whole until the day following, in order that the friends of the Patterson plan should be the better prepared to explain and support it and the members of the convention have the opportunity of providing themselves with copies. Thereupon, Mr. Patterson moved nine resolutions, proposing

Jersey Plan

1. That the Articles of Confederation be "revised, corrected & enlarged," The New in order to render them "adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union."

2. That in addition to the powers already possessed, the United States in Congress assembled be authorized to raise revenue and to expend it for federal purposes by duties imposed on imports, stamps upon paper and letters and packages passing through the general post-office; to regulate commerce with foreign nations and with the States; also that suits for the violation of any such regulations be brought in the State courts with an appeal in law and fact to "the Judiciary of the U. States."

3. That requisitions upon the States be made in proportion to the number of white and other free citizens, including inhabitants bound to servitude for a term of years and "three fifths of all other persons

1 Documentary History, Vol. iii, p. 123.

2 The Journal of the Debates, Gaillard Hunt ed., Vol. i, p. 138 note.

except Indians

States

persons

not paying taxes "; provided, however, that the consent of be required for the exercise and enforcement of these powers. 4. That a federal Executive be elected to consist of for a single term of years, to receive compensation for services not to be increased or diminished during the term of office, and subject to removal; that this Executive be authorized to carry out federal acts, to appoint federal officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct military operations, without, however, commanding the army or navy.

5. That a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme tribunal composed of judges ineligible for other positions during service, appointed by the Executive to serve during good behavior, receiving fixed compensation not subject to increase or diminution, possessing the jurisdiction in first instance of cases of impeachment of federal officers, and in dernier ressort of appeals in international matters affecting ambassadors, captures from the enemy, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, cases involving foreigners, and the construction of treaties, "or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue."

6. That the acts of the Congress in accordance with the original and revised Articles of Confederation, and treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, be the supreme law of all the States, insofar as such acts or treaties relate to the citizens of the States, that the Judiciaries be bound thereby "any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding," and that the federal Executive be authorized to use the power of the States "to enforce and compel an Obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such Treaties."

7. That "provision be made for the admission of new States into the Union."

8. That naturalization be uniform in every State.

9, and last. That offenses committed in one State be tryable in any other State of the Union.1

It will be observed that this plan, although recognizing the threefold division of powers, is nevertheless to be looked upon as a revision of the Articles of Confederation, with important additions, not as a substitute for them. It was vigorously debated but it found little favor with the partisans of the national plan, or indeed with those desiring to provide the Union with an adequate government, while preserving the rights of the States.2 On the

1 Documentary History, Vol. iii, pp. 125–8.

2 In the session of August 23d the question of granting power to negative State legislation was revived by a motion of Mr. Pinckney. The diverging views of two delegates, as reported by Mr. Madison, are of interest:

Mr. Wilson considered this as the keystone wanted to compleat the wide arch of Government we are raising. The power of self-defence had been urged as necessary for

19th of June it was moved by Mr. King of Massachusetts "whether the Comittee should rise & Mr. Randolphs propositions be re-reported without alteration, which," as Mr. Madison says, "was in fact a question whether M1. R's should be adhered to as preferable to those of Mr. Patterson "; 1 on which question the States divided as follows: Massachusetts, aye; Connecticut, aye; New York, no; New Jersey, no; Pennsylvania, aye; Delaware, no; Maryland, divided; Virginia, aye; North Carolina, aye; South Carolina, aye, Georgia, aye.

The Randolph plan, as amended and altered in the committee, was therefore reported to the convention and served as the basis of future discussion. The New Jersey plan, however, had served its turn. It had united the advocates of the States and made it clear that either Mr. Randolph's plan would prevail or that a compromise would have to be reached on middle ground. The attitude of the smaller States was accurately but somewhat brutally put by Mr. Pinckney, who is made by Mr. Madison to say that "the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nati'. system."

"2

The
Proposal

The Patterson plan as a whole out of the way, the discussion turned on the Randolph resolutions as modified in such a way as to give the States an equal representation in the second branch. The foundation had already been laid for this compromise by John Dickinson of Delaware, the possibility of such a solution adverted to by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, and with- Connecticut out attributing either the origin or the success of the project to the representatives of any State or any one person, the delegation of the State of Connecticut, which Oliver Ellsworth declared to be not a small but a middle State, seems to have occupied what may be called the strategic position. The conciliatory attitude of its members seemed inclined to produce conciliation, and from here on until the acceptance of the principle of equality Mr. Ellsworth seems to have played the leading rôle. Certain it is that the members of the Connecticut delegation not only assumed leadership and stated their views in such a way as to court concession from the larger States by showing themselves prepared to yield proportional representation. in the first branch, but Mr. Ellsworth's motion of the 29th of June "that the rule of suffrage in the 2a. branch be the same with that established by the articles of confederation," divided the States equally in the session of

3

the State Governments - It was equally necessary for the General Government. The firmness of Judges is not of itself sufficient. . . . It will be better to prevent the passage of an improper law, than to declare it void when passed.

Mr. Rutlidge. If nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn the Constitution. Will any State ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner. It is worse than making mere corporations of them whose bye laws would not be subject to this shackle. Documentary History, Vol. iii, p. 602.

1 Ibid., p. 162.

2 Ibid., p. 136.

July 2d, leading to the appointment of a committee of one from each State to find a way out. This Committee of the States reported on July 5th the compromise ultimately adopted, that the principle of proportional representation should prevail in the first branch; that, in the second, each State should have an equal vote, with the further provision that revenue bills should originate in the first branch and should not be altered or amended in the second, which latter provision was changed in the course of debate by permitting the Senate to alter but not to originate money bills. Or, as stated more at length in the report of Mr. Gerry, on behalf of the Committee:

That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the Convention on condition that both shall be generally adopted. I. that in the 1st branch of the Legislature each of the States now in the Union shall be allowed 1 member for every 40,000 inhabitants of the description reported in the 7th Resolution of the Com. of the whole House: that each State not containing that number shall be allowed 1 member: that all bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the Salaries of the officers of the Govern'. of the U. States shall originate in the 1st branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the 2a branch: and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the 1st branch II. That in the 2a branch each State shall have an equal vote.1

In the session of the 25th of June, Mr. Ellsworth urged "the necessity of maintaining the existence & agency of the States. Without their co-operation it would be impossible to support a Republican Govt. over so great an extent of Country."2 Dr. Johnson of Connecticut likewise urged "the necessity of preserving the State Govts.- which would be at the mercy of the Gen'. Govt. on Mr. Wilson's plan"; and on the question to agree "that the members of the 2a branch be chosen by the individual Legislatures," nine States voted in its favor, with Pennsylvania and Virginia in the negative.

Thus, Mr. Dickinson's original motion, which laid the basis for the compromise, was reaffirmed for the reason stated by Mr. Madison in a note that "the largest States particularly Pennsylvania & Virginia always considered the choice of the 2a Branch by the State Legislatures as opposed to a proportional representation to which they were attached as a fundamental principle of just Government. The smaller States who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments." 3

In reply to an elaborate and somewhat theoretical disquisition on government by Mr. Madison in the session of the 28th, Mr. Sherman of Connecticut curtly and correctly said:

The question is not what rights naturally belong to men; but how they

1 Documentary History, Vol, iii, p. 270.

2 Ibid., p. 210.

Journal of Debates, Hunt ed., Vol. i, p. 236 note.

of Views

may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And if some give up Diversity more than others in order to obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake the rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed when the articles of Confederation were formed.1

Matters had come to such a pass that Dr. Franklin, immediately after Mr. Sherman's remarks, proposed that hereafter the session should open with prayer. On the 29th, Dr. Johnson carried the matter a step nearer agreement by a series of timely and well balanced remarks:

The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is the States do exist as political Societies, and a Govt. is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of selfdefence. . . . On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented, in the other the States.2

Later, in the same session, Dr. Johnson's colleague, Mr. Ellsworth, moved the proposition previously quoted, for equality of suffrage in the second branch, in accordance with the Articles of Confederation, and in support of his motion he is reported by Mr. Madison to have said:

He was not sorry on the whole he said that the vote just passed, had determined against this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a ground of compromise with regard to the 2a. branch. We were partly national; partly federal. The proportional representation in the first branch was conformable to the national principle & would secure the large States agst the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the federal principle and was necessary to secure the Small States agst. the large. He trusted that on this middle ground a compromise would take place. He did not see that it could on any other. And if no compromise should take place, our meeting would not only be in vain but worse than in vain. To the Eastward he was sure Massts. was the only State that would listen to a proposition for excluding the States as equal political Societies, from an equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An attempt to deprive them of it, was at once cutting the body of America in two, and as he supposed would be the case, somewhere about this part of it. The large States he conceived would notwithstanding 1 Documentary History, Vol. iii, p. 233.

2 Ibid., p. 237.