I

STATEMENTS OF MR. DOUGLAS AND MR. CRITTENDEN. 425

Where the obstacle lay may be learned, also, from a speech of Mr. Douglas in the Senate, January 3d, in which, referring to a similar plan of compromise, introduced by himself, he said:

"I believe this to be a fair basis of amicable adjustment. If you, of the Republican side, are not willing to accept this, nor the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. Crittenden, pray tell us what you are willing to do. I address the inquiry to the Republicans alone, for the reason that, in the Committee of Thirteen, a few days ago, every member from the South, including those from the cotton States (Messrs. Davis and Toombs), expressed their readiness to accept the proposition of my venerable friend from Kentucky, as a final settlement of the controversy, if tendered and sustained by the Republican members. Hence, the sole responsibility of our disagreement, and the only difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment, is with the Republican party.”

Indeed, Mr. Toombs himself, in a speech to the Senate, January 7th, speaking of course for those with whom he was acting as well as for himself, after suggesting the conditions which he would prefer and would accept, "for the sake of peace-permanent peace "-proceeded:

"I am willing, however, to take the proposition of the Senator (from Kentucky), as it was understood in committee, putting the North and the South on the same ground, prohibiting slavery on one side, acknowledging slavery and protecting it on the other; and applying that to all future acquisitions, so that the whole continent, to the north pole, shall be settled upon the one rule, and to the south pole, under the other." "

This was in exact conformity with the propositions of the Peace Conference, and, moreover, the principle of the Missouri Compromise. Mr. Crittenden, also, in a published letter to Mr. Anderson, of Cincinnati, dated March 27th, 1861, remarks, in reference to the resolutions which bear his

name:

"I believe, if those measures thus offered had been, at a suitable time, promptly adopted by the Congress of the United States, it would have checked the progress of the rebellion and revolution, and saved the Union."

On the day of the final disposition of the question, March

1 "Congressional Globe," Appendix, 1860-'61, p. 41.

Ib., 1861, p. 270.

3d, 1861, Mr. Pugh, of Ohio, declared, in a speech to the Senate:

"Before the Senators from the State of Mississippi left this chamber, I heard one of them, who now assumes, at least, to be President of the Southern Confederacy, propose to accept it (that is, the Crittenden proposition), and to maintain the Union, if that proposition could receive the vote it ought to receive from the other side of this chamber. Therefore, of all your propositions, of all your amendments, knowing as I do, and knowing that the historian will write it down, at any time before the first of January, a two-thirds vote for the Crit tenden Resolutions, in this chamber, would have saved every State in the Union but South Carolina." 1

Mr. Douglas followed Mr. Pugh on this occasion, and remarked:

"The Senator has said, that if the Crittenden proposition could have passed, early in the session, it would have saved all the States, except South Carolina. I firmly believe it would. * * I can confirm the Senator's declaration, that Senator Davis himself, when on the Committee of Thirteen, was ready at all times to compromise on the Crittenden proposition. I will go further, and say that Mr. Toombs was also.” 2

On the 3d of March a final disposition was made of the question. The House had already rejected the measure, on the 27th of February, by a vote of 113 to 80. In the Senate, the amendment offered by Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, came up first in order, and was defeated by yeas 22, to nays 14; several Republican Senators, acting with the majority, in order, as they stated, either to allow "the Senator from Kentucky to obtain a vote on his resolutions," or "in order to get an opportunity to vote against the resolution of the Senator from Kentucky." Two or three others were silent as to their reasons, though acting doubtless from similar mo. tives. The question then recurred upon adopting the Crittenden plan of adjustment. All the Republican Senators present voted for its rejection, except Mr. Seward, who abstained from giving his vote at all. The only Senators present from the seceding States were those from Virginia and Tennessee, one from Arkansas, and one from Texas, together

1 "Congressional Globe," part ii., p. 1300.

* Ib., p. 1391.

DEMOCRATS NOT TWO-THIRDS OF THE SENATE.

427

with one from Missouri. All these, including Mr. Johnson, now President of the United States, voted for the adoption of the plan. The result was, its rejection by a strict party vote of 20 to 19. Thus the Senate of the United States put a final end to any lingering hopes which might have been entertained, that at least the moral influence of a majority of that hitherto respected body would have been afforded to the sole measure of pacification formally before the country, and upon which the heart of the nation may justly be said to have been so long and so anxiously fixed.'

It has been alleged, indeed, on many hands, and very extensively believed, without examination of the facts, that it was by the wilful default of the Southern Senators, that the Crittenden proposition was defeated; in a word, that the Northern Senators could not be expected to adopt the measure, since those from the South had seen fit to abandon it to its fate. On the contrary, supposing higher motives, worthy of the occasion and becoming statesmen and patriotic citizens, could have had due influence, the very fact alleged-though not altogether accurately stated, since twelve Senators from slave States retained their seats until Congress finally rosemight seem to impose upon the Northern Senators a still higher obligation. It was entirely in their own power to adopt measures which would have put the deserters so clearly in the wrong, as to have left no excuse even to themselves; and which, at the latest hour, could have hardly failed to pave the way for the pacification of the country. It was the very absence of the seceders which gave the others the grand opportunity. For, in that case, no outbreak of violence could have occurred; the question would have been submitted to the people; and time would have been afforded for "the angry excitements of the hour" to pass away. And, even if the seven States, which alone had seceded, at the close of the session of Congress had been able to maintain their attitude until the pop

1 It was stated in the public prints, early in November, 1861, when actual war had been on foot but a few months, that Mr. Lincoln made known his "regrets that he did not urge the adoption of the Crittenden compromise."

ular decision had been reached, it is certain that, upon agreement to the proposed constitutional amendment, by a majority of the Northern States, they must have been compelled to yield to the popular will of the South itself, without further action on the part of the North. Such a course, therefore, adopted by Congress, would have saved the coun try-but it would have broken up the Republican party.

But, in fact, the Democrats and conservatives in the Senate did not have it in their power to give the vote of twothirds, necessary for the submission of the question to the people, even when the Senators from all the States were in their places; to say nothing of the decided majority against any plan of adjustment in the House of Representatives. Of the twenty-seven Senators who constituted the majority, upon the reconsideration of Mr. Clark's amendment, on the eighteenth of January, not less than seventeen were from the slave States, and no Republicans voted in favor of the mo tion. The Senate, at that time, consisted of sixty-six mem bers; of whom thirty were from the slave States, and ten were Democrats or conservatives from the free States. Had all the seceding Senators, therefore, remained in their places till the last, they could not have secured the necessary two thirds, without the aid of four Republican votes; and that those would not be afforded was made sufficiently clear by their action upon the amendment proposed by the Senator from New Hampshire. Indeed, the Republican members let it be known, at the earliest date, as has been already shown, that they "had no guarantees to offer." Had the others, therefore, been in numbers sufficient to obtain a bare two-thirds vote, it would have been simply a reaffirmation of their own well-understood views, and without any moral influence whatever. Besides, the action of the House shows it would have been of no avail. It was for the Republicans to shake themselves free from the trammels of party, and, for the sake of the country, to unite with the Democrats upon plan of adjustment. Deliberately declining to do so, conclusion is unavoidable, that upon them must rest the re sponsibility.

a

the

WHAT REPUBLICAN LEADERS WANTED.

429

Of the spirit which really actuated the Republican leaders, the testimony of Mr. Douglas--liable himself to no suspicion of disunionism, and who had been, at the preceding election, the candidate of nearly two-thirds of the Democratic party, in opposition to the express "Southern wing "-affords convincing proof. The following passage is an extract from a letter addressed by him, from Washington, to Mr. Hayes, of Chicago, dated December 29, 1860:

"Many of the Republican leaders desire a dissolution of the Union, and urge war as a means of accomplishing disunion; while others are Union men in good faith. We have now reached a point where a compromise on the basis of mutual concession, or disunion and war, are inevitable."

But the trouble then, and afterwards, was, that the Republicans who were for the Union voted with those who were for disunion, upon questions tending to promote disunion; thus rendering their own private views of no consequence.

In another letter of Mr. Douglas, addressed to Mr. Taylor, of New York, and dated on the same day, he wrote:

"We are now drifting rapidly into civil war, which must end in disunion. This can only be prevented by amendments to the Constitution, which will take the slavery question out of Congress. Whether this can be done, depends upon the Republicans. Many of their leaders desire disunion on party grounds, and here is the difficulty. God grant us a safe deliverance, is my prayer."

It makes no difference, so far as these special vaticinations. are concerned, that the revolution in the end, as revolutions often have done, took another turn than that originally anticipated. Most men believed, at the time, that the separation would be consummated. But those who had been the most notorious disunionists professed themselves "Union men," when it became more likely that the North would "take possession of the Government," and break down the Constitution in its application to the slave institution of the South. This class of persons is graphically described in the following further extract from a letter of Mr. Douglas, dated at Wash

1 Quoted in "Logic of History," p. 188.

1 Ib., p. 130.