CHAPTER XVII.

Not easy to define the precise Points upon which rested the Alternative of War or Peace, before South Carolina passed the Ordinance of Secession.-Friendly Feelings between the Majority of the People, North and South.-Mr. Beecher's Definition of the Cause. -After the Secession of South Carolina the Breach could have been easily repaired.— The Leaders of the "Geographical" Party the Obstacle.-The Question really not in the Hands of the People, who dreaded the Idea of War, for the Sake of the Union, but of the Radical Party Managers.-The Mistake of the People in choosing such Men to Office. It was in Contravention of the Purposes of the Constitution.

PREVIOUSLY to the passage of the "Ordinance of Secession," by the Convention of South Carolina, it would have been very difficult to define, in precise terms, any existing actual cause of war. Serious grounds of controversy had long existed, and at length a point of extreme embitterment had been reached, between a portion of the citizens in both quarters of the Union. It is perfectly safe to assert that, at the same moment, the most friendly feelings were entertained towards each other by a large majority of the people on both sides of the imaginary dividing line; and, moreover, that from conviction and habit, and a sense of the mutual advantages of union, and of the honor and glory of the common country, this majority was decidedly averse to the dissolution of the civil relations between the several sections. But the following declaration of the Rev. Mr. Beecher, throws no little light upon the influences which produced the war: '

"A great many people raise a cry about the Union and the Constitution, as if the two were perfectly identical; but the truth is, it is the Constitution itself

Attributed to Mr. Beecher, in Carpenter's "Logic of History," p. 93.

THE UNION STANDS UPON THE CONSTITUTION.

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that is the cause of every division which the vexed question of slavery has ever occasioned in this country. It has been the foundation of our troubles, by attempting to hold together, as reconciled, two opposing principles which will not harmonize nor agree."

Doubtless, two things cannot be reconciled, or continue in a state of ordinary reconciliation, in regard to which the parties in interest are determined not to agree. Mr. Beecher's allegation, that the Constitution and the Union were not identical, was correct enough, in terms. The Constitution was only the framework of the Union. The one was simply the fundamental fabric upon which the other, the superstructure, was built. They were identical only. in the somewhat important sense, that a main part of a thing is essential to the integrity of a whole thing. But since, in the case in question, the part was the very basis of the whole, it is evident that, by taking it away, the structure must tumble down; and, if not shattered to pieces by the fall, yet Mr. Beecher must very well know, what is the fate predicted for a dwelling-place-founded upon the sand, and not upon a rock. But Mr. Beecher's final allegation is inconsistent with the fact, that this carefully constructed edifice had already withstood, for many years, exhibiting no signs of fatal weakness, the fury of the elements without, and the frequently rude practices of the dwellers within; and if at length it began to appear, that the "two principles" of foundation and superstructure showed symptoms that they were no longer reconciled with each other, it could only be, because some of the indwellers had been engaged in undermining the one, upon which alone the other could securely rest. And in case such a breach should prove effectual, it is certain that no propping-up, or patching-up, can afford any warrant of safety in the future.

It is certain, however, that long after secession had begun, by the act of the South Carolina Convention, the breach could have been repaired without much serious difficulty. Undoubtedly that act was in itself a cause of war; that is, it placed the revolting State in a condition of insurrection,

to be dealt with, in due time, as the United States might deem necessary and proper, unless the doctrine of secession were to be admitted as valid.' But a cause of war usually precedes the final commencement of hostilities by a considerable interval; and between civilized nations, alien to each other, it is generally devoted to efforts at reconciliation, so as, if possible, to keep Christian peace unbroken, and to spare the effusion of Christian blood. The question now to be considered is-whether the considerable interval upon the occasion in question was so employed as to heal, or to aggravate the causes of controversy between States existing under a popular government, established "in order to form a more perfect union"?

The effect of the organization of a "geographical" party now became apparent enough, in its influence upon this question. The States of the North had thus been brought into opposition to the United States, which represented the interests and authority of the whole body of States. All but one of the former had given pluralities, at the election, in favor of the incoming administration. Whatever qualities the exigency might demand of the existing administration, it certainly required that itself should enjoy the public confidence; whereas, that part of the country upon which its principal reliance must be placed, at a crisis of extraordinary delicacy and danger, had just pronounced against it. It had been, in fact, deprived of moral power, partly by the strength

The allowance of the right of one State to secede, would be to permit that State, upon its individual reasons, or at its own caprice, to be the arbiter of the destinies of the whole. For the accomplished secession of any one State, from a union of States, would be like taking a central link from a chain; a dissolution of the tie which binds them all together. As in regard to the obligation of the moral law, if broken in the least, it is broken in the whole. It is a breach of the law. But the denial of the right to secede involves the highest obligation, on the other hand, to avoid every occasion of offence, and to redress all causes of complaint. Otherwise, the bond is no longer liberty, but tyranny. Hence ensues the right of revolution, to be controlled only by the actual power of carrying it into effect, or to be pursued, at hazard of the consequences.

A RADICAL OLIGARCHY.

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of a formidable organization, and partly by the casualty of a division among its own former supporters. But this was not the worst. The question and its final solution had actually passed from the people of the North, to the State officers and others chosen by them-from the many to the few. The disposition of a great majority of the Northern people was in favor of a wise and magnanimous settlement of the question. By far the most found themselves surprised into the appalling danger of civil war, of which they had been often assured, by those whom they had elected to office, there was not the slightest reason to feel any apprehension. The people, in reality, had very little to do with the course of coming events. They had been persuaded to commit the great question of peace and war to men mostly of extreme views, and sometimes "wise in their own conceit." They had been gradually brought, under various specious pretexts, to elect officers of the State governments, and members of both branches of Congress, who constituted a sort of Northern "oligarchy"—an oligarchy in which, unhappily, radicalism exercised the most prevailing influence-which was now to determine the momentous question at stake, and the people must hence abide the issue. To give way, on the part of the oligarchy"-supposing it possible for them to have conceived any such thought-would have been to abandon whatever they had secured and whatever they might yet hope to gain; in fact, to sacrifice themselves, which was certainly not to be thought of by "patriots" of their description; and although it required a great deal of time and management and manipulation, to bring the people up to the work, yet as the steps were gradual towards the final consummation, the Republican party, composed of conservatives, probably in a much larger proportion than of radicals, in the midst of doubts and hopes and fears, continued to follow its most radical leaders to the end.

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CHAPTER XVIII.

Mr. Buchanan's History of his Administration.-His embarrassing Position.-Unanimous Vote of Approbation by the Legislature of Massachusetts.-Anxious Waiting for the Meeting of Congress.-A "John Brown" Incident in Boston.-Official Opinion upon "Coercion," of the Attorney-General of the United States.-Conciliatory Propositions in the Albany Journal, a leading Republican Paper in the Interest of Mr. Seward.Upon Motion of Mr. Boteler, of Virginia, a Committee of One from each State (38) appointed, to consider and report upon the present Perilous Condition of the Country."-Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, moves in the Senate for a Committee of ThirteenProposition of Mr. Andrew Johnson in the Senate.-Speech of Mr. Wade, of OhioHe does not so much blame the People of the South."-Allusion to the Speech by Mr. Nicholson, of Tennessee, in the House.-Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, offers Resolutions.-Extracts from Speeches of Mr. Andrew Johnson.-Great Number of Memorials in favor of the Crittenden Resolutions.-Opinion of Mr. Pugh, Senator from Ohio, of the Popular Vote in their favor, had they been adopted by Congress.-The New York World (Rep.) on the Effect of "one Word that way" from Mr. Seward.Strong Statement of Boston Daily Advertiser (Rep.) as to Popular Aversion to a War. -Changes of Feeling.-The New York Tribune against a “Reactionary Spirit" for Union. -Resolution of Mr. Clark, Senator from New Hampshire, to defeat the Crittenden Propositions.-Mr. Seward disappoints Public Expectation by his Vote-His Speech.-Its Effect.-The "Conservative " Republican Journals become quasi radical. -Statement of Mr. Wilson, Senator from Massachusetts.-Mr. Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts, on "the Barbarism of Slavery."-The Irrepressible Conflict."-Interposition of Virginia.-The Appointment of Commissioners to the "Peace Conference." -Messrs. Shurz, Chandler, and Bingham.-Mr. Chase on this Subject.-The Spirit of the Radicals.-The Conference.-Its Propositions.

THE recent publication of the history of his administration, by ex-President Buchanan, renders it less necessary to examine the course of executive proceedings, during the remainder of his term of office. The situation was peculiarly embarrassing; for he could count upon little support either from the North or the South. The Executive was, as it were, between two fires; or, rather, the fire assailed it in so many different directions, that escape from the effects was out of the question, whatever course it might have seen fit to pursue. The Southern wing of the Democratic party hoped