States, and recognized according to the laws of the United States, with their secretaries, messengers, families and servants, are not liable to punishment in this state, but are to be returned to their own country for trial and punishment.

Wheat. Int. L., 261, § 6; 271, § 14; Vattel, 470, § 91, etc. 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 585. Act of Cong., Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 25. By treaty, assault by and upon German citizens, on board vessel in port, State courts have no jurisdiction, except as it disturbs the peace; Peo. v. Marine Court, 6 Hun., 214.

TITLE II.

Of Parties to Crime.

SEC. 28. Principal and accessory.
29. Definition of principal.
30. Definition of accessory.

31. All principals in misdemeanors.
32. Trial of accessories.

33. Punishment of accessories.

§ 28. Principal and accessory.—A party to a crime is, either

1. A principal; or,

2. An accessory.

§ 29. Definition of principal.-A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, and a person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces or procures another to commit a crime, is a principal.

Peo. v. McMurray, 4 Park., 234; Wixson v. Peo., 5 ib., 119. Peo. v. Katz, 23 Hun, Pr., 93; Carrington v. Peo., 6 Park., 336.

§ 30. Definition of accessory.-A person who, after the commission of a felony, harbors, conceals, or aids the offender, with intent that he may avoid or escape

from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment, having knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that such offender is liable to arrest, has been arrested, is indicted or convicted, or has committed a felony, is an accessory to the felony.

Innocent agent. Peo. v. McMurray, 1 Sheld., 563; Peo. v. Hall, 57 How. Pr., 342.

§ 31. All principals in misdemeanors.-A person who commits or participates in an act which would make him an accessory if the crime committed were a felony, is a principal and may be indicted and punished as such, if the crime be a misdemeanor.

See § 682, post

Peo. v. Erwin, 4 Den., 129; Lowenstein v. Pco., 54 Barb, 229.

§ 32. Trial of accessories.-An accessory to a felony may be indicted, tried, and convicted, either in the county where he became an accessory, or in the county where the principal felony was committed, and whether the principal felon has or has not been previously convicted, or is or is not amenable to justice, and although the principal has been pardoned or otherwise discharged after conviction.

See 126, post. Evidence. Levy v. Peo., 80 N. Y., 327; 19 Hun, 383. See Jones v. Peo., 20 Hun, 545; 81 N. Y., 637.

See § 126, post.

§ 33. Punishment of accessory.-Except in a case where a different punishment is specially prescribed by law, a person convicted as an accessory to a felony is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dol-* lars, or by both.

TITLE III.

Degrees in the Commission of Crimes and Attempts to Commit Crimes.

SEC. 34. What is an attempt to commit a crime.

35. Prisoner indicted may be convicted of lesser crime, or attempt.

36. Acquittal or conviction bars indictment for another degree, or attempt.

§ 34. Attempt to commit crime defined.—An act, done with intent to commit a crime, and tending but failing to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that crime.

See § 685, post.

Peo. v. Lawton, 56 Barb., 126. Solicitations are not an attempt. Stable v. Com. (Pa.), 22 Alb. L. J., 458; Contra; Peo. v. Bush, 4 Hill, 134.

§ 35. Prisoner indicted may be convicted of lesser crime, or attempt.-Upon the trial of an indictment, the prisoner may be convicted of the crime charged therein, or of a lesser degree of the same crime, or of an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime.

See Code Cr. Proc., §§ 444, 445.

Peo. v. Jackson, 3 Hill, 92; Peo. v. Saunders, 4 Park., 196; Keefe v. Peo., 40 N. Y., 348; Dedieu v. Peo., 22 N. Y., 178; Peo. v. Lyon, 1 N. Y. Cr., 400.

§ 36. Acquittal or conviction bars indictment for another degree, or attempt.-Where a prisoner is acquitted or convicted, upon an indictment for a crime consisting of different degrees, he cannot thereafter be indicted or tried for the same crime, in any other degree, nor for an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or any degree thereof.

Art. 1, § 6, N. Y. Const. Guenther v. Peo., 24 N. Y., 100; Peo. v. Dowling, 23 A. L. J., 353; Peo. v. Saunders, supra.

TITLE IV.

Treason.

SEC. 37. Treason against the state defined.

38. Id., how punished.

39. Levying war defined.

40. Resistance to a statute, when levying war.

§ 37. Treason defined.-Treason against the people of the state consists in

1. Levying war against the people of the state, within this state; or

2. A combination of two or more persons by force to usurp the government of the state, or to overturn the same, shown by a forcible attempt, made within the state, to accomplish that purpose; or

3. Adhering to the enemies of the state, while separately engaged in war with a foreign enemy, in a case prescribed in the constitution of the United States, or giving to such enemies aid and comfort within the state or elsewhere.

Peo. v. McLeod, 25 Wend., 482; S. C., 1 Hill, 377. Adhering to the enemies of the U. S., not treason against the state, and not indictable in State Courts. Peo. v. Lynch, 11 John. 549. Enter. ing service of enemies. Resp. v. McCarty, 2 Dall 86. Robert's Case, 1 Dall. 39. Restoring prisoners. U. S. v. Hodges, 2 Wh. C. C. 477. Resisting act of Congress. U. S. v. Hannay, 2 Wall, Jr. 139.

§ 38. Punishment of treason.-Treason is punishable by death. Code Cr., Proc. §§ 396, 397, 814, 826.

§ 39. Levying war defined. To constitute levying war against the people of this state, an actual act of war must be committed. To conspire to levy war is not enough.

Levying war, exparte Bollman, 4 Cranch., 75; U. S. v. Greathouse, 2 Abb. 364; U. S. v. Hoxie, 1 Paine, 265; U. S. v. Poyer, 3 Wash., C. C., 234.

$40. Resistance to a statute, when levying war.Where persons rise in insurrection with intent to prevent in general by force and intimidation, the execution of a statute of this state, or to force its repeal, they are guilty of levying war. But an endeavor, although by numbers and force of arms, to resist the execution of a law in a single instance, and for a private purpose, is not levying

war.

U. S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall., 348; U. S. v. Hannay, 2 Wall, Jr., 139, 203; U. S. v. Hoxie, supra; U. S. v. Vig ol, 2 Dall., 346. Exparte Bollman, supra.

TITLE V.

Of Crimes against the Elective Franchise.

SEC. 41. Of crimes against the elective franchise.

Crimes

§ 41. Crimes against elective franchise. against the elective franchise are defined, and the punishment therefor prescribed by special statutes.

Of Crimes by and against the Executive Power of the

State.

SEC. 42. Acting in a public office without having qualified. 43. Acts of officer de facto, not affected.

44. Giving or offering bribes.

45. Asking or receiving bribes.

46. Attempting to prevent officers from performing duty.
47. Resisting officers.

48. Taking unlawful fees.

49. Asking or taking reward for omitting or delaying official acts.

50. Taking fees for services not rendered.

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