the intervening hills and forest; but the roar of the cannonry from the valley of the Harlem River, the sharp and incessant reports of rifles, and the smoke rising above the tree-tops, told him of the spirit with which the assault was received at various points, and gave him for a time a hope that the defence might be successful. The action about the lines to the south lay open to him, and could be distinctly seen through a telescope; and nothing encouraged him more than the gallant style in which Cadwalader, with an inferior force, maintained his position. When he saw him, however, assailed in flank, the line broken, and his troops, overpowered by numbers, retreating to the fort, he gave up the game as lost. The worst sight of all was to behold his men cut down and bayoneted by the Hessians while begging quarter. It is said so completely to have overcome him, that he wept 'with the tenderness of a child.'" *

The surrender of Fort Washington rendered Fort Lee untenable, and Washington accordingly directed that it be evacuated and that the military stores there be removed to a place of safety. Before this could be done, however, Lord Cornwallis with a body of British troops landed on the Jersey shore six or seven miles above Fort Lee, incidentally for the purpose of

Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 453. See also the account of the battle by Edward F. De Lancey in the Magazine of American History (February, 1877).

Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., pp. 164, 183; Greene, Life of Greene, p. 60.

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capturing the garrison at that post by enclosing it between the Hudson and Hackensack rivers. The retreat was hastened as much as possible and the troops succeeded in reaching a place of safety, but the heavy cannon and military stores were abandoned to the British.*

Because of the situation of the British at this time, Washington could devise no plan by which the passage of the river could be successfully disputed, and his safest and most prudent course seemed to be to make as great a show of resistance as possible until his stores were removed from the other side, and then to cross the Passaic and take post at Newark. At this latter post, Washington remained for several days, during which he made the most urgent entreaties for reinforcements from different sections where troops could be raised. also addressed several urgent requests to General Lee, who, it will be remembered, had been left with a strong force at New Castle, to march his forces to the southward with all possible speed and join the main army. The prospect now Washington was most gloomy, as his

He

before

Force, American Archives, vol. iii., pp. 12421243; Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., pp. 144145; Livingston, Life of Putnam, pp. 325–326; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 81-82; Fisher, Struggle for American Independence, vol. i., p. 535; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 16-17.

George H. Morse, Treason of Charles Lee, pp. 47, 48, 187-193. See also the correspondence betwee Lee and Heath in Heath's Memoirs, pp. 8085 (Abbatt's ed.).

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own letters indicate,* for his army was reduced to about 3,000 men (the larger part of whom were dispirited, poorly clothed, and without sufficient tents to shelter them from the approaching winter), and to make matters still worse, he was in the midst of a lukewarm if not hostile population. Besides, the Americans had no cavalry, with the exception of a few Connecticut militia under Major Elisha Sheldon. Washington was evidently very doubtful of the outcome of the war and in a letter written at this time said: "If every nerve is not strained to recruit the new army with all possible expedition, I think the game is pretty nearly up."'t Beside their lack of cavalry and sufficient munitions to equip the infantry, the American army was ill-provided with artillery. The New Jersey militia, consisting of about 1,000 men, were considered to be quite unreliable, and as a further cause for alarm, the term of service of a large portion of the veteran troops was about to expire, so that, unless Washington received large reinforcements, it was feared that there would be no army whatever. On the other hand, the British army numbered about 20,000 veteran troops, in excellent condition, well supplied with cavalry, and supremely confident because of past vic

* See his letters to his brother, in Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 456–458.

Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., p. 231. See also Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 23 et seq.

tories that they would shortly subdue the rebellion.

At this time the neighboring States seem to have been panic-stricken by the proximity of the two armies, many of the people fearing on the one hand that if they refused to succor the American troops, they would be classed as Loyalists and suffer in consequence; while on the other hand, if they aided the American troops and the British should finally conquer, they would be in an equally perilous situation, for undoubtedly the British would severely punish such actions. Washington really had little to fear from these people, however; it was the lukewarm who chiefly concerned him. He feared there was imminent danger of sedition on the part of the disaffected, who would do everything possible to aid the cause of the British. Even in the county of Monmouth, New Jersey, an insurrection was about to break out, and Washington was compelled to send a part of his army to overawe the insurrectionists. The consternation among the people communicated itself to the governments in the neighboring States; each seemed to be concerned

chiefly with securing its own safety and refusing to aid the others or to combine with others to offer united resistance. The presence of a victorious royal army had to a great extent dissipated the fear which had previously inspired the Loyalists; and they began to commit all man

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Trenton at four o'clock in the afternoon, just when the last boat of General Washington's embarkation crossed the river, as if he had calculated, it was observed, with great accuracy, the exact time necessary for his enemy to make his escape."

While Washington was in camp at Trenton, his army was augmented by a force of 2,000 Pennsylvania troops, which had been raised in Philadelphia, principally by General Thomas Mifflin. Somewhat encouraged by this, Washington planned to attack the British, but learning that Cornwallis had received large reinforcements, he was compelled to abandon the idea, and on December 8 crossed the Delaware, placing that river between himself and the British army. Before the arrival of the British, he took the precaution of collecting all the boats on the Delaware for a distance of seventy miles above Philadelphia and as far as possible

on the south side of the river.* He hoped thereby to prevent the British from making an immediate attack, and, by delaying them in crossing the river, to place a greater distance between the two armies. Upon their arrival at the river, the British acted as though they would attempt to cross, and Washington stationed several detachments of

* Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 84-85; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 256-257; Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 77.

Van Tyne, American Revolution, pp. 123–124; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 2021.

troops on the opposite side to oppose them, whereupon the British abandoned the attempt. Washington, therefore, was under the necessity of remaining idle until reinforcements arrived, though he despatched several parties to observe and harass the enemy in every way possible.

Fearing that the British would be able to drive Washington entirely out of Jersey and to capture Philadelphia, Congress on December 12 decided to remove their sittings and as much of their records as possible to Baltimore,* where they could attend to continental affairs with a greater degree of safety. Robert Morris was left in charge of its affairs in Philadelphia and thus had his first opportunity to prove his ability as a public

executor and to manifest his devotion to the cause of independence. Congress authorized him to borrow $10,000 for the use of the marine committee in strengthening the fortifications on the Delaware, and on December 20 he, together with George Clymer of Pennsylvania and George Walton of Georgia, were appointed "a committee of Congress with powers to execute such Continental business as may be proper and necessary to be done in Philadelphia." Morris, however, was the only member of the committee to remain at his post, faithfully discharging all duties con

* See the letter of Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, December 18, 1776, in Henry, Life of Patrick Henry, vol. iii., pp. 33-35.

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Meanwhile, where was General Lee? We have seen that Washington, while retreating across the Jerseys, had ordered him to hasten his march to the Delaware River and to join the main army there. Lee, however, notwithstanding that he knew the critical condition of affairs and the pressing needs of the commanderin-chief, made no haste to obey his orders. Probably his chief reason for this was a reluctance to relinquish a separate command and place himself under the orders of a superior; consequently, he delayed matters as much as possible without actually incurring a court-martial for disobedience of orders, and did not begin his march until December 4. He then advanced by slow stages toward the southward, at the head of about 3,000 men. His slowness of movement and his unwary conduct, however, were fatal to himself and caused much excitement throughout the colonies. ‡

*See Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Robert Morris, Patriot and Financier, pp. 24-25.

See his orders to Heath in Heath's Memoirs, pp. 86-88, 90 (Abbatt's ed.). See also Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 41 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 461 et seq.

For the correspondence between Lee and Washington, etc., see Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 257-263; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., Appendix, p. 530; ibid, Correspondence of the Revolution, vol. i., pp. 306–308. See also Reed's letters to Lee regarding Washington's indecision- - an impression brought about by Washington's habit of industriously consulting his generals regarding the minutest details - W. B. Reed, Life of Joseph Reed, vol. i., p. 255 et seq.; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 462-463,

County, he stationed his troops there, and retired to more commodious quarters some distance from the army, without taking the precaution of providing himself with a sufficient guard. The British were not unaware of these movements, and on December 13 Colonel William Harcourt, who had been sent with a small detachment of cavalry to observe Lee's movements, upon learning of Lee's carelessness, suddenly attacked the house, captured Lee, and conveyed him to New York City,* where for some time he was closely confined. His case was considered peculiar, for he was not treated as a prisoner of war, but as a deserter from the British army, and therefore as deserving harsher treatment. Lee's capture was considered a great misfortune to the American army and the cause of independence, for up to this time he had enjoyed the regard and esteem not only of the commander-in-chief,

473-474; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., p. 52 et seq.; also note in Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., p. 15. Lee's letters to James Bowdoin throw some light on his delay in obeying Washington's orders. See Irving, vol. ii., p. 465 et seq.

*Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. iii., pp. 1041, 1121-1122, 1153, 1202-1204, 1232, 1239, 1247, 1262, 1265, 1365, 1377, 1411; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 85-87; Thacher, Military Journal, p. 68; Fiske, American Revolution, vol. i., pp. 223–228; Stryker, The Battles of Trenton and Princeton, pp. 55-59; Wilkinson's Memoirs, vol. i., pp. 105-108; Jones, New York in the Revolution, vol. i., p. 672; Fonblanque, Life of Burgoyne, p. 50; Sparks, Life of Charles Lee, in Library of American Biography, 2d series, vol. viii., p. 143.