454 WASHINGTON'S SITUATION; ARMY REORGANIZED. few moments from the hours allotted to sleep," he addressed a letter to the President of Congress, showing the vexatious conditions under which he was laboring. He pointed out the inefficiency, insubordination, confusion, etc., caused by the system under which the army was then operating, and after indicating what to him seemed the only effectual remedy, he concluded the letter in the following terms: "There is no situation upon earth less envi able, or more distressing, than that person's, who is at the head of troops regardless of order and discipline, and unprovided with almost every necessity. In a word, the difficulties, which have for ever surrounded me since I have been in the service, and kept my mind constantly upon the stretch; the wounds, which my feelings as an officer have received by a thousand things that have happened contrary to my expectations and wishes; the effect of my own conduct, and present appearance of things, so little pleasing to myself as to render it a matter of no surprise to me if I should stand capitally censured by Congress; added to a consciousness of my inability to govern an army composed of such discordant parts, and under such a variety of intricate and perplexing circumstances;- induce not only a belief, but a thorough conviction in my mind, that it will be impossible, unless there be a thorough change in our military system, for me to conduct matters in such a manner as to give satisfaction to the public, which is all the recompense I aim at, or ever wished for." * Before he had written this letter, however, his previous expostulations had resulted in effecting the remedy which he so earnestly advocated. On September 16, 1776, resolutions were *Bancroft, vol. v., p. 51. ↑ Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., p. 110; ibid, Life of Washington, pp. 190-191. See also Lodge, George Washington, vol. i., pp. 166-167. passed by Congress to the effect that the army should be entirely reorganized and placed on a permanent footing.* The various States were requested to furnish eighty-eight battalions, according to their ability— three to be raised in New Hampshire, fifteen in Massachusetts, two in Rhode Island, eight in Connecticut, four in New York, four in New Jersey, twelve in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, eight in Maryland, fifteen in Virginia, nine in North Carolina, six in South Carolina, and one in Georgia. "The pay of the officers was raised. The troops which engaged to serve throughout the war were to receive a bounty of twenty dollars and a hundred acres of land, besides a yearly suit of clothes while in service. Those who enlisted but for three years, received no bounty in land. The bounty to officers was on a higher ratio. The States were to send commissioners to the army to arrange with the commander-in-chief as to the appointment of officers in their quotas; but, as they might occasionally be slow in complying with this regulation, Washington was empowered to fill up vacancies." t Though every moment of his time was occupied by the duties of his position, Washington was not unmindful of the powerful enemy opposing him. * Journals of Congress, vol. ii., p. 357. A colonel was to receive 500 acres; a major 400; a captain, 300; a lieutenant, 200; and an ensign, 150. See Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 163-165. Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 391. DEFENCE OF FORT WASHINGTON DECIDED UPON. 455 The inactivity of Howe's troops, who were in excellent condition and well supplied with all necessities, greatly perplexed Washington, then anxiously awaiting indications of a movement on Howe's part. The latter had already determined upon a change in his plan of operations. He sent some of his warships up the Hudson (which in spite of the American batteries, finally succeeded in passing) to intercept Washington's communications and to prevent supplies from reaching him from across the river. Leaving behind a considerable force to protect New York, Howe then transferred the remainder of his army to Pell's Point, Point, on Long Island Sound, and occupied a position on the neighboring heights of New Rochelle. From this point, after receiving strong reinforcements of Hessians and Waldeckers under General Wilhelm von Knyphausen and Captain Johann Ewald, Howe planned to attack Washington's rear at Throckmorton's or Throg's Neck, in an endeavor to cut off all communication either by land or water, and thus to bring on a general action.* Washington thereupon called a council of war, at which it was decided, in order to defeat this plan, to abandon York Island and to advance into the in *For the disposition of the various brigades, see Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 234– 236. See also Heath's Memoirs, pp. 59, 62, 64; Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. ii., pp. 1117-1118; Lowell, Hessians in the Revolution, pp. 75-76; Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., pp. 138-139. VOL. II - 30 terior.* But while the evacuation was under consideration, the question arose as to whether a garrison should be left in Fort Washington. This measure at first seemed of little use, as the British had complete command of the river. Both Washington and Lee strongly urged the futility of attempting to retain the fort; but Greene considered it most advisable, deeming the fort sufficiently strong to resist any forces sent against it by the British. After much argument, a majority of the council of war agreed to retain the fort as long as possible. It was also supposed that, if matters came to such a pass that the garrison were compelled to evacuate, they could make their escape by crossing the river. Congress also expressed their opinion "that Fort Washington should be retained as long as possible," and in accord * Bancroft (vol. v., p. 69) says that the origin of the American retreat has been industriously misrepresented. Stedman (American War, vol. i., p. 211) says that the movement originated with Lee, and Reed (Life of Joseph Reed, vol. i., p. 251) follows Stedman. Gordon (American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 337-338) also says that Lee prevented Washington from being entrapped by the British. The retreat was more than half executed before Lee arrived, however, as is evidenced by Smallwood's acknowledgement on October 12 of the receipt of orders to retire (Force, American Archives, vol. ii., p. 1014), which is confirmed by Heath's journal of the same day (Heath's Memoirs, p. 76), by Colonel Ewing's note to the Maryland Council of Safety, October 13 (Force, p. 1025), and by Reed's letter to his wife on the same day (Reed, Reed, vol. i., p. 244). See the records of the council meeting in Carrington, p. 237. See also F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, p. 49; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 195; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., pp. 409410. 456 BATTLE OF WHITE PLAINS. with his right wing but separated from it by the Bronx, Washington posted a force of 1,600 men under General Alexander McDougall.* Because of the proximity of the two forces, frequent skirmishes occurred, the advantage resting chiefly with the British; yet these skirmishes were of great service to the Americans as they thus became accustomed to face the British soldiers without fear. On October 28 the British force established itself in front of Washington's line, with the evident purpose of drawing him out. Howe had observed the detachment of American troops on Chatterton's Hill and ordered his forces to dislodge them. After a short action, this was accomplished by the Hessians, under Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall; the loss was about equal, the British losing about 230, and the Americans about 150. This action is known as the battle of White Plains.‡ † Livingston, Life of Putnam, p. 320. Lowell, Hessians in the Revolution, pp. 76-77; Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 274-275; Gordon, American Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 339-342; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. ii., p. 312 et seq.; Stedman, American War, vol. i., pp. 210-215; Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., p. 141; Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 240-241; Heath's Memoirs, pp. 68-71 (Abbatt's ed.); Jones, New York in the Revolution, vol. i., p. 601; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 616617; Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 72; Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. ii., pp. 991, 1025, 1168, 1188, 1202-1203, 1205, 1240, 1270, 1284, vol. iii., pp. 472-473, 543, 547, 576, 654, 922, 925; Reed, Life of Joseph Reed, vol. i., pp. 246-247. Sparks (Life of Washington, p. 196) says, "The American loss has been variously represented. According to INVESTMENT OF FORT WASHINGTON BEGUN. Washington now expected that Howe would make a general assault, but the latter seems to have had no such intention. While Howe procrastinated, Washington occupied the neighboring heights of North Castle, and two or three days afterward, when Howe received reinforcements, he found that Washington was too strongly entrenched to be dislodged without great loss to himself.* He therefore changed his plans. Ascertaining that he could not draw Washington into a general engagement, Howe withdrew his army toward the Hudson and Kingsbridge. Clearly perceiving that the British plan would be to invest Fort Washington, to pass the Hudson, then to carry the war into New Jersey, and finally to attempt the reduction of Philadelphia, Washington made his arrangements so as to completely frustrate the British designs. He left General Lee at the head of about 4,000 troops (including the New England militia, whose term of enlistment was about to expire) and then ordered all the forces west of the Hudson to make a tedious circuit and cross the river at King's Ferry, at the entrance of the Highlands. He was unable to cross lower down, because the ships of the enemy occupied that part of the river. He next visited the posts in the Highlands, or the return made by General Howe himself, the prisoners were four officers and thirty-five privates. The number killed was not known." *Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., p. 151; Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 71-74; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 422 et seq. 457 dered fresh works to be erected, and, having crossed the river, joined the main army at Hackensack.* Meanwhile, Howe had begun the investment of Fort Washington, and resolved to make an assault upon the works from several different points. Washington had always doubted the propriety of maintaining this post, but had not given any positive orders to evacuate the fort, leaving the matter to Greene's discretion, he being upon the ground.† Now, however, it was too late to evacuate the fort, as the troops could not effect a retreat in their present situation. Howe summoned Colonel Magaw to surrender the fort, but received the reply that the Americans intended to defend the post to the "last extremity."‡ About the moment the assault began, Washington, Putnam, Mercer, and Greene were on the point of putting off from the Jersey shore for a final visit to Fort Washington, chiefly to decide upon the advisability of attempting to hold it. But before they reached the other side, the threatened attack on the fort had begun and it was thought best that all should return.|| Early on the morning of Carrington, Battles of the Revolution, pp. 245-247; Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. v., pp. 4, 8, 24; Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. ii., p. 1094, vol. iii., pp. 555, 557, 560, 620, 630, 639, 657; Heath's Memoirs, pp. 7576 (Abbatt's ed.). F. V. Greene, Life of Greene, pp. 52-55. See the letter written by General Greene to Colonel Knox in Brooks, Life of Knox, pp. 73-74, and in Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pt. ii., pp. 100-101, quoted from Frank S. Drake's Life and 458 FORT WASHINGTON CAPTURED. British and Hessians under Rall and Knyphausen had lost 400 men that the outworks were taken. When the enemy had advanced to within 100 yards of the fort, Magaw could not persuade his soldiers to man the lines; furthermore, fearing that because of their crowded condition in the fort they would become a better target for the British artillery, Magaw deemed it a wise course to surrender. Hence the whole force, numbering about 2,700, together with all the artillery and munitions of war, was surrendered into the hands of Knyphausen.* "Washington, surrounded by several of his officers, had been an anxious spectator of the battle from the opposite side of the Hudson. Much of it was hidden from him by fense, and it being late at night I returned." See Carrington, p. 249; Livingston, Life of Putnam, p. 324; Sparks, Life of Washington, p. 200; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. ii., p. 449. * Gordon, American Revolution,. vol. ii., p. 348 et seq.; Lowell, Hessians in the Revolution, pp. 78-84; Trevelyan, American Revolution, vol. iii., pp. 1-9; Hildreth, vol. iii., pp. 155-156; Sparks' ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. iv., p. 183; Jones, New York in the Revolution, vol. i., p. 626; Stedman, American War, vol. i., p. 217; Heath's Memoirs, pp. 77-78 (Abbatt's ed.); Bancroft, vol. v., pp. 75-80; Fiske, American Revolution, vol. i., pp. 219-221; Drake, Life of Knox, pp. 33-34; Lossing, Field-Book of the Revolution, vol. ii., pp. 619-621; Force, American Archives, 5th series, vol. iii., pp. 707, 856, 1071, 1233-1234, 1429-1430. Carrington says that the stores captured embraced shot, shell, 2,800 muskets, 400,000 cartridges, 161 cannon of all sizes and several hundred tents.- Battles of the Revolution, p. 251. See also Lamb, City of New York, vol. ii., pp. 142144, where it is stated that the fort was betrayed, the traitor several years later acknowledging his treason in a letter which has since been well authenticated. |