erty," is irrelevant, for this "power" relates to property. The argument from the clause, "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union," is all on the other side, from the very meaning of the terms. The House, therefore, was wrong in imposing the restriction as the condition of admitting Missouri, and the Senate was right in voting to admit her without this restriction. Thus much in regard to RESTRICTION.

3. But did the North act honorably in respect to the coмPROMISE? This compromise was proposed by a Northern man, and was accepted by Southern men and by Northern men; and yet it was not adhered to by Northern men, after the North had received the advantage of admitting the State of Maine, and after slavery had been prohibited north of 36° 30'. When Missouri a third time had presented herself for admittance with this compact or compromise in her hand, she was again rejected by a vote of 87 against admission, and 67 in favor of it.

4. The difference between the "restriction" and the " compromise," has not been well understood. "No words," says BENTON, in his "Debates," "have been more confounded than those of the restriction and the compromise; so much so, that some of the eminent speakers of the time have had their speeches against the restriction quoted as being against the compromise, of which they were zealous advocates. Though confounded, no two measures could be more opposite in their nature and effects. The restriction was to operate on a State, the compromise on a Territory. The restriction was to prevent the State of Missouri from admitting slavery; the compromise was to admit slavery there, and to divide the rest of Louisiana about equally between free and slave soil. The restriction came from the North, the compromise from the South. The restriction raised the storm, the compromise allayed it.”

5. One of the most unfortunate circumstances attending the debate was, that some of the Northern members used intemperate and insulting language towards the Southern men and Southern institutions, which were not soon forgotten. Instead of discussing constitutional questions, by referring to the Constitution as the sole ground of argument, they uttered the language of invective and sarcasm against slavery itself, if not against slaveholders. Such men as RUFUS KING and HARRISON GRAY OTIS

were not guilty of these improprieties. But there were others who drew from their quiver arrows envenomed by hatred, and sent them, at random or with deliberate aim, to rankle in the breast of the South. And the effect of their speeches upon the North was to kindle up a bitter and intolerant spirit. The present writer remembers that, in a most respectable Northern city, during the discussions respecting the admittance of Missouri, a small company of boys were employed to carry through the streets, on a flag, the picture of a chained African, uttering the words, "Am I not a man and a brother?" and also another, in which the "noble Virginians" were represented, with upraised whips, driving the negroes at their field work. In this way, but more especially by speeches and inflammatory articles in newspapers, the passions of the people of the North were kindled into indignation.

6. To men of this generation it may seem strange, that worthy men in both Houses should refuse to vote for the admission of Missouri upon the grounds alleged, and for the reasons given. But it should be borne in mind that the real reason was the fear of increasing the political power of the South. Under the influence of this fear, on the part of demagogues in Congress, the evils of slavery were magnified, and the constitutional powers of Congress were distorted, until the members, in given cases, felt that they should commit political suicide by voting for the measure of admitting Missouri. It was easier to excite the masses than it was to calm the excitement. In some cases they did commit political suicide. They voted for the measure, but their constituents never forgave them. Some of the State Legislatures passed resolutions against the measure, which might operate to prevent the members from those States from acting in the premises, according to their own judgment.

7. Did Congress act Constitutionally in prohibiting slavery north of 36° 30'? This question did not come up in a very dis tinct form for discussion, though there were those, Mr. RANDOLPH among them, who refused to vote for the compromise on that ground.

His penetrating mind saw the constitutional objection. But the Senate and the House were in an awkward relation to each other, each insisting on its own bill. Missouri, with great reason, complained of the treatment she had experi

enced.

Maine was clamoring for admission. The whole country was agitated. The power of Congress was greater over Territory than over States. The ordinance of 1787, which excluded slavery, was remembered, while the difference between the two cases was not insisted on. Congress was tired of the subject. Some thought, perhaps, that it was best to do a great right and a little wrong. The bill, as amended, came from the Senate without very much discussion in that body, into the House, March 2, 1820, and was passed the same day.

The subject has since been more carefully examined, and the conviction has been produced upon some of the ablest statesmen of the land, that the Constitution gives no power to interdict slavery in the Territories.

The restriction of slavery in Missouri as the condition of admission into the Union, with the delay, after the restriction was struck out, of the bill, on the ground of an invidious distinction between the States, opened a fountain of sectional feeling, the bitter waters from which at the time delůged the land. These waters from that fountain have not yet ceased to flow.

CHAPTER VIII.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS' ADMINISTRATION.

MARCH 4, 1825-MARCH 4, 1829.

MR. ADAMS was elected by the House of Representatives over General JACKSON, there having been a failure to make an election of President by the electoral votes. The friends of Mr. CLAY united with the friends of Mr. ADAMS in placing the latter in the Presidential chair; though General JACKSON had the largest vote of the electors.

Mr. ADAMS had large experience and undoubted honesty as a statesman, but was inclined to a broad interpretation of the Constitution; and, like Mr. CLAY, was in favor of a high tariff, as was supposed. It was very natural that Mr. CLAY should unite his political fortunes with him, in preference to General JACKSON; but by doing so, they both lost some share of the public confidence, especially from the circumstance that Mr. CLAY accepted of the office of Secretary of State under him. Sectional feelings were strongly excited during the Presidential contest, and especially during the administration of Mr. ADAMS. The protective policy, sanctioned by the tariff act of 1824, entered now, for the first time, into a Presidential contest.

THE TARIFF OF 1828.

Previous to the year 1816, protection to American manufactures had been incidental. The Constitution gave Congress power to raise a revenue, but not to encourage one branch of

industry to the injury of another. As the powers granted by that instrument do not allow Congress to protect manufactures directly, they were forced to depend on such an amount of protection as they could incidentally receive from the imposition of duties for revenue. By a judicious discrimination as to what imported articles should be dutied, and what should be the duty on each class, the American manufacturer had the advantage of the foreign manufacturer of the same class of articles, by the amount of the duty paid added to the expense of transportation; while the consumer could not complain, because what he paid additional to what he would have to pay for the same articles if imported duty free, he paid only as revenue for the support of the Government.

But in 1816 a new policy was adopted. It had been found by the experience of the war, that the country had suffered great inconvenience from depending on foreign manufactures. Accordingly, patriotism was appealed to for the support of domestic manufactures, which would render the country more independent of foreign nations. Besides, a large amount of capital had been embarked in manufactures, which, at peace prices, with foreign competition, could not be sustained. The national debt must be paid. In this state of things the tariff law of 1816 was enacted, the opposition to it being based chiefly on the ground that it would produce an injurious effect upon com

merce.

In 1824 a bill was passed, giving still further protection to manufactures. It was in support of this bill that Mr. CLAY made his celebrated speech in favor of what, by a strange misnomer, he called "an American system." It was the privilege of the present writer to hear that speech, and, indeed, all the speeches of importance delivered that session on the subject of the tariff. In a very taking and persuasive statement of the present distress of the country and the necessity of a change of policy in favor of manufactures, he presented the general and special arguments in favor of a protective tariff. He was aided by manufacturers or their agents, who were present to furnish him, and others united with him, with facts which would operate on the minds of members to induce them to favor domestic industry employed in the manufacturing business. A