MARY R. STEEVER, Appt., court under the provisions of section 5, of the Act of March 3, 1875. 2. A suit against a tax collector for alleged wrongs done while he was engaged in the collection of taxes due the State, in which he is not restrained from discharging any of his official duties, is not entitled to a preference in being heard. 3. Although the questions involved are of public V. JAMES N. RICKMAN. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 74, 75.) importance, that does not necessarily entitle the par- Clerk's fees-dismissal of cause for want of proseties to a hearing in preference to others. [Nos. 969, 971, 972.] Decided Oct. 15, 1883. The cases appear in the opinion. Mr. William Royal, for plaintiffs in error, in support of motion. Messrs. F. S. Blair, Atty-Gen., of Virginia, J. Ambler Smith and Samuel B. Witt, for de fendant in error, contra. cution. 1. The fees of the clerk should be paid in advance, if demanded. 2. If, through the fault of a plaintiff in error or appellant, printed copies of the record are not furnished to the Justices or the parties, when required in the due prosecution of the cause, the writ on appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution, unless sufficient cause be shown to the contrary. Submitted Oct, 22, 1883. Decided Oct. 23, 1883. [No. 67.] Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin-AP ion of the court: PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: These motions are denied. Rule 32 applies only to writs of error and appeals brought to this court under the provisions of section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1875 [18 Stat. at L., 472]; that is to say, to writs of error and appeals from orders of the circuit courts remanding causes which have been removed from a state court, By the Act making appropriations for sundry and from orders dismissing suits because they civil expenses of the government for the fiscal do not really and substantially involve disputes year ending June 30, 1884, ch. 143, Statutes of or controversies properly within the jurisdiction 1882-3, p. 631, the clerk of this court is required of the circuit courts, or because the parties to to pay into the Treasury the fees and emoluthe suits have been improperly made or joined ments of his office over and above his own comfor the purpose of creating a case cognizable un-pensation as fixed by law, and his necessary der that Act. These are not such cases. clerk hire and incidental expenses. It is proper, therefore, that for his protection his fees should be paid in advance, if demanded. That of Poindexter is a writ of error to a state court. In those of White and Carter, begun in the circuit court, the declarations were demurred to because not sufficient in law, and the judgments were in favor of the defendants on the demurrers. The cases as made by the declarations were disposed of on the merits, and the writs of error are for the review of such judgments. Under Rule 10, it is the duty of the clerk to have the record printed, and a fee has been fixed for preparing the record for the printer, indexing the same, and supervising the printing. Ordinarily this fee is to be paid in the first instance by the party who prosecutes the cause. Neither are the parties entitled to a hearing in If he fails to make the payment when demanded preference to others under the provisions of sec-in time to enable the clerk to cause the printing tion 949 of the Revised Statutes. The State of to be dorre in due course, he fails in the orderly Virginia is not a party to either of the suits, and prosecution of his suit, and may be dealt with the execution of the revenue laws has not been accordingly. Consequently if, through the fault enjoined or stayed. A tax collector has been of a plaintiff in error or appellant, printed copsued for alleged wrongs done the several plaint-ies of the record are not furnished to the jusiffs while he was engaged in the collection of tices or the parties when required in the due taxes due the State, but he is not restrained from prosecution of the cause, the writ or appeal will discharging any of his official duties. be dismissed for want of prosecution, unless Paragraph 4 of Rule 26 relates only to reve-sufficient cause be shown to the contrary. nue cases and cases in which the United States are concerned, which also involve or affect some matter of general public interest. Even these cannot be advanced, except in the discretion of the court and on the motion of the Attorney-been paid by the appellant, although demanded. General. The questions involved may be of public importance, but that does not necessarily entitle the parties to a hearing in preference to others. Practically, every case advanced postpones another that has been on the docket three years awaiting its turn in the regular call. Under these circumstances we deem it our duty not to take up a case out of its order except for imperative reasons. True copy. Test: In the present case the record has been printed, but the clerk has not furnished the necessary copies to the justices because his fee for preparing the record for the printer, etc., has not As this is the first time the question has arisen, and the practice has not heretofore been authoritatively announced, it is ordered that, unless the appellant pay to the clerk, within twenty days from the entry hereof, what is due him for this fee, the appeal be dismissed for want of prosecution. If the payment is made, the clerk shall at once notify the opposite party, and the cause may thereafter be brought on for hearing under paragraph 7 of Rule 26, as a case that has been passed under circumstances which do not place it at the James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. foot of the docket. 109 U. S. U. S., Book 27. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk. Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-110 U. S., 402. 861 54 66 Suydam v. Day, 2 Blatchf., 20; Kempton v. Bray, 99 Mass., 353; Hove v. Woolredge, 12 Allen, 21; Farrington v. Gregory, 4 Fisher, 223. A grant of the sole and exclusive right to sell certain patented articles in a specified territory does not pass an interest in the patent; but is only a license, and the licensee cannot sue in his own name for an infringement. Ingalls v. Tice, 13 Rep., 676. That the patentee, assignee or grantee, must sue in his own name for an infringement, is declared by the 14th section of the Act of 1836, and substantially the same language is used in section 59 of the Act of 1870, and in section 5919 of the Revised Statutes. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall., 593 (74 U. S., XIX., 179); Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Off. Gaz., 1135; Blanchard v. Eldridge, 1 Wall. Jr., 337; Curt. Pat., secs. 347, 211. Suits for infringement cannot be brought in the name of the licensee, but must be brought in the name of the patentee or other person holding the legal title, because a license is not an interest in the patent, within the meaning of the patent law. *The re-issued letters patent No. 2979, granted to the Rumford Chemical Works, June 9, 1868, for an improvement in pulverulent acid for use in the preparation of soda powders, farinaceous food and for other purposes," claimed, in claim 1," As a new manufacture, the above described pulverulent phosphoric acid" and, in claim 2, the manufacture of such acid; and, in claim 3, the mixing with flour of such acid and an alkaline carbonate, so as to make the compound self raising, on the application of moisture or heat or both. There was transferred to M., by the Rumford Chemical Works, the exclusive right to make, sell and use, in a specified territory, for five years, self raising flour by the use of the acid, he agreeing to make the flour, and to use his skill to introduce it, and to purchase all the acid from the grantor. M. died in less than three months from the date of the grant; held, under the provisions of sections 11 and 14 of the Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. at L., 121, 123, that the right acquired by M. was only that of a licensee; that the instrument of license did not carry such right to anyone but him personally; and that such right did not, on his death, pass to his administrator, so as to authorize a suit at law, founded on the license, to be brought in the name of the grantor, for the use of the ad-right in and under the patent throughout a specministrator,to recover damages for an infringement ified part or portion of the United States. A of the patent committed after the death of M., by patent may embrace more than one invention. the manufacture and sale of self raising flour, by Curt. Pat., sec. 110. the use of such acid, in said territory. [No. 27.] Argued Oct. 10, 11, 1883. Decided Oct. 29, 1883. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. This action was brought in the court below, by the defendant in error, to recover damages alleged to have resulted from the infringement of certain letters patent. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for $3,538.97, with costs. Whereupon, the defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is fully stated by the court. Messrs. B. M. Estes and H. T. Ellett, for plaintiffs in error. Curt. Pat., sec. 211; Nelson v. McMann, 16 Off. Gaz., 761; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall., 223 (88 U. S., XXII., 579). Messrs. Thomas B. Turley, Geo. Gantt and Isham G. Harris for defendant in error: This is an assignment or grant of an exclusive This patent embraces four claims or objects. Rum. Ch. Works v. Laeur, 10 Blatchf., 122. Either one of these claims or parts could be assigned separately. Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall., 456 (84 U. S., XXI., 703); Dorsey Rake Co. v. Harvester Co., 12 Blatchf., 202. number of machines. Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How., 686; Washburn and fourth claims. The contract between MorMorgan had the exclusive right to the third gan and the Rumford Chemical Works is in two parts. They are to be construed together. Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall., 205 (88 U. S., XXII., 577). The reservation back to the Rumford Chem The decision of the court on the demurrer was correct; these instruments are a mere li-ical Works was a mere right reserved, a license cense. An assignment or grant, as distinguished from a license, must be, 1, an assignment of the whole patent; or, 2, of an undivided part of the whole patent; or 3, a grant of an exclusive right to the whole patent, within a specified part or portion of the United States, and which must embrace the entire monopoly for the whole time and must entirely exclude the patentee. A transfer of any less interest than this is a mere license. Curt. Pat., 4th ed., secs. 178-182, 193, 211, 212, 346, 347; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How., 494; Blanchard v. Eldridge, 1 Wall. Jr., 337; Littlefield v. Perry, 21 Wall.,219 (88 U. S., XXII, 578); Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story (C. C.), 525; Sanford v. Messer, 1 Holmes, 149; Hill v. Whitcomb, 1 Holmes, 317; Potter v. Holland, 4 Blatchf., 206; Baldwin v. Sibley, 1 Cliff., 155; *Head note by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. back, and makes no difference. Littlefield v. Perry (supra); Washburn v. Gould, Story, 122; Dorsey Co. v. Harvester Co., 12 Blatchf. 202; Curt. Pat., 212. In such cases the patentee holds the legal title in trust for protection of the equitable interest of the patentee. Littlefield v. Perry (supra); Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How., 220 (60 U. S., XV., 610). Such exclusive licensee can sue for infringement in the name of the patentee or assignee against strangers. Goodyear v. Mc Burney, 3 Blatchf., 32; GoodPerry (supra); Dorsey Co. v. Harvester Co., 12 year v. Bishop, 4 Blatchf., 438; Littlefield v. Blatchf., 203. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: "" On the 9th of June, 1868, re-issued letters pa- | poration, in consideration of the agreement, of tent No. 2979 were granted to the Rumford even date herewith, entered into between it and Chemical Works, a Corporation of Rhode Isl- Allen F. Morgan, of Memphis, in the County and, for an "Improvement in pulverulent acid, of Shelby and State of Tennessee, does hereby for use in the preparation of soda powders, fari- sell, assign and transfer unto the said Allen F. naceous food, and for other purposes." The Morgan the right to use, within the territory original patent, No. 14722, was granted to Eben described in said agreement, Horsford's patent Norton Horsford, April 22, 1865, for fourteen cream of tartar substitute, for the purpose of years, for an Improvement in preparing phos- manufacturing within said territory self raising phoric acid as a substitute for other solid acids," cereal flours, with the right to use and sell the and was re-issued to the Rumford Chemical flours so manufactured; to have and hold and Works, as No. 2597, May 7, 1867, for an "Im- exercise such rights within the limits aforesaid, provement in the manufacture of phosphoric for and during the time and under and subject acid and phosphates for use in the preparation to the conditions and limitations named and of food and for other purposes." specified in the agreement aforesaid, of even date herewith, to which reference is hereby made as a part hereof." * * * * * It * On the same day Morgan executed and delivered to the Rumford Chemical Works the following instrument in writing: "To all men to whom these presents shall come: Know ye, that, because the Rumford Chemical Works, a Corporation located at and doing business in the Town of East Providence, in the State of Rhode Island, has licensed and granted unto Allen F. Morgan, of the City of Memphis, County of Shelby and State of Tennessee, the exclusive The specification of re-issue No. 2979 sets forth the mode of preparing the acid, which is a dry pulverulent acid, described as having the capacity of being intimately mixed with dry alkaline carbonates, or other sensitive chemical compounds, without decomposing them or entering into combination with them, except upon the addition of moisture or the application of artificial heat. It says: "This requires that the phosphoric acid or acid phosphates, be mixed with some neutral agent, as flour or starch, gypsum, etc., so that action of the acid shall be prevented while dry, and shall, when moist-right to manufacture, sell and use, during the ure or heat is applied, be prompt, thorough and time of five years from the date hereof, the artiequally diffused. It may, cle known as self raising flour, from cereals, among other uses, be mixed with dry alkaline by the use of Horsford's patent pulverulent carbonates, carbonate of potassa, or carbonate phosphoric acid, in the following described terof soda, and remain in this state without evolu- ritory, to wit: Beginning at the point where tion of carbonic acid until moistened or heated, the northern boundary of the State of Tennesthus making it a substitute for cream tartar and see touches the Mississippi River; thence southtartaric acid in the preparation of yeast powerly along the said river to and including Vicksder or baking powder. * * *burgh; thence easterly along the line of the is suited to be employed as the acid ingredient Mississippi Southern R. R. to Jackson; thence in the preparation of self raising farinaceous northerly along the line of the Mississippi Cenfood. In order to make an article possessing tral R. R. to Granada; thence northeasterly to these qualities, and suited to this office, it is the junction of the eastern boundary line of Alnecessary that a powder should be made which abama with the southern boundary line of Tencan be not only evenly comminuted and dilut-nessee; thence along the eastern boundary line ed, but one which shall have so little affinity of Middle Tennessee (so-called) to the northern for the moisture of the atmosphere that it may boundary line of Tennessee, and westerly along be mixed with flour and bicarbonate of soda in said boundary line to the point of beginning, the practical preparation of self raising flour." by an instrument in writing bearing even date The claims of re-issue No. 2979 are four in herewith, which is made a part of this agreenumber, as follows: "1. I claim, as a new man-ment; and because of other good and sufficient ufacture, the above described pulverulent phos- reasons moving him thereto, that he has agreed, phoric acid. 2. I claim the manufacture of the and by these presents does covenant and agree, above described pulverulent phosphoric acid, so to and with the aforesaid Rumford Chemical that it may be applied in the manner and for the Works, that he will immediately commence purposes above described. 3. I claim the mix- the manufacture of self raising flour in according, in the preparation of farinaceous food, with ance with the written instructions furnished by flour, of a powder or powders, such as described, the said Rumford Chemical Works, as to proconsisting of ingredients of which phosphoric portions and quality of flour, and that he will acid or acid phosphates and alkaline carbon-use all his business tact and skill, and all other ates, are the active agents for the purpose of liberating carbonic acid, as described, when subjected to moisture or heat, or both. 4. The use of phosphoric acid or acid phosphates, when employed with alkaline carbonates, as a substitute for ferment or leaven in the preparation of farinaceous food." means necessary to introduce and sell the same, and to make the sale thereof as large as in any way possible in the territory aforesaid, during the continuance of the license aforesaid, and no longer, and to sell the said self raising flour nowhere but in the territory specified, except upon the written consent of the said Rumford On the first of February, 1869, the following Chemical Works. And I further agree to exinstrument in writing was executed and deliv- cept, in the aforesaid license, such rights as are ered by the Rumford Chemical Works to one covered by the patents granted to Eben N. Allen F. Morgan: "To all people to whom these Horsford, and by him assigned to the said presents shall come, the Rumford Chemical Rumford Chemical Works, and to maintain Works, a Corporation transacting business in them at my own cost and expense in suits at East Providence, in the State of Rhode Island, law, whenever it shall be in my judgment necsends greeting: Know ye, that the said Cor-essary so to do, and to avail myself of such ad vice, counsel and assistance as the said Rumford Chemical Works may elect to give in said suits; and to purchase all of the acid used in making our said self raising flour of the Rumford Chemical Works or of their agents, as directed; and that in case of my failure to perform the covenants and agreements hereby entered into, it shall be lawful for the said Rumford Chemical Works to annul and revoke their said license to me, and to terminate this agreement. The use of said phosphoric acid by families for domestic purposes shall not be construed as a violation of this agreement." On the 12th of April, 1870, the patent was duly extended for seven years from April 22, 1870. On the 21st of May, 1870, the extended term was assigned by Horsford to the Rumford Chemical Works. Morgan died on the 19th of April, 1869. In July, 1869, his widow, Kate G. Morgan, was appointed administratrix of his estate. She afterwards intermarried with J. N. Payne. A suit at law was brought, in 1875, in the name of the Rumford Chemical Works, for the use of J. N. Payne and his wife, Kate G. Payne, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, against J. N. Oliver and others, partners constituting the firm of Oliver, Finnie & Co., to recover damages for the infringement by the defendants, for the period from April 1, 1870, to February 1, 1874, of the rights of the said Kate G. Payne and her husband, under said patent, by making and selling self raising flour by the use of Horsford's patent pulverulent phosphoric acid in the territory before named. The theory of the suit was that the right of Morgan became vested in his administratrix, as a personal asset, and continued under the extension, and that the suit brought would lie for infringements of such right committed prior to the expiration of the five years from February 1, 1869. The suit was tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff's for $3,538.97 damages, and a judgment in their favor for that amount, with costs. To review that judgment, this writ of error is brought. or its agents. No right was granted to make the acid, or to use it or to sell it otherwise than as an ingredient in the self raising flour. The effect of the grant made by the two instruments of February 1, 1869, is subject to the provisions of section 11 of the Act of July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. at L., 121, which was the statute in force at the time, and provided as follows: "Every patent shall be assignable at law, either as to the whole interest or any undivided part thereof, by any instrument in writing; which assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent, to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use, the thing patented within and throughout any specified part or portion of the United States, shall be recorded in the Patent Office within three months from the execution thereof." By section 14 of the same Act it was provided that damages for making, using or selling the thing whereof the exclusive right is secured by a patent, "May be recovered by action on the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of the person or persons interested, whether as patentees, assignees or as grantees of the exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States." Morgan was not an assignee of the entire right secured by the patent, nor of any undivided part of such entire right, nor of the exclusive interest in such entire right for the territory specified. He did not acquire the whole of the exclusive right or legal estate vested in the Rumford Chemical Works by the patent for the said territory, leaving no interest in his grantor for that territory, as to anything granted by the patent. It is well settled that a transfer of a right such as Morgan acquired is not an assignment, nor such a grant of exclusive right as the statute speaks of, but is a mere license. Curt. Pat., 3d ed., section 179; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How., 477, 494. This being so, the instrument of license is not one which will carry the right conferred to any one but the licensee personally, unless there are express words to show an intent to extend the right to an executor, adminVarious questions are presented by the record istrator or assignee, voluntary or involuntary. and have been discussed in argument, but there In Iron and Nail Factory v. Čorning, 14 How., is one which goes to the foundation of the suit, 193, 216, this court said: "A mere license to a and upon which our views are such as to make party, without having his assigns or equivalent it unnecessary to consider any other. The words to them, showing that it was meant to court charged the jury that the interest of Mor- be assignable, is only the grant of a personal gan in the patent did not terminate at his death, power to the licensee, and is not transferable but passed to his administratrix. The defend- by him to another." In the present case, there ants excepted to this charge. The evidence was are no words of assignability in either instruthat Morgan died on the 19th of April, 1869, ment. The right is granted to Morgan alone, and the defendants asked the court to instruct to him personally, with an agreement by him the jury that the privilege conferred on Morgan that he will enter on the manufacture of the self by the instrument of February 1, 1869, from raising flour, and that he will use all his busithe Rumford Chemical Works to him, termi- ness tact and skill to introduce and sell the nated at his death, and did not pass to his ad- flour. It is apparent that licenses of this charministratrix, and that they should find for the acter must have been granted to such individudefendants, if they believed that Morgan died als as the grantor chose to select because of their on the 19th of April, 1869. The court refused personal ability or qualifications to make or furto give such instruction, and the defendants ex-nish a market for the self raising flour and thus cepted. for the acid, all of which was to be purchased It is apparent that what was granted to Mor- from the grantor. The license was made revogan was only the exclusive right to use, within cable by the grantor on the failure of Morgan to the territory specified, the patented acid in mak-perform his covenants and agreements. ing self raising flour, and to use and sell in said territory the flour so made. The acid used in making the self raising flour was all of it to be purchased from the Rumford Chemical Works, We have not overlooked the fact that the privilege granted to Morgan was to continue for five years. This means no more than that he was to have it for five years, if he should live so long, and if the patent should not have expired. But it cannot have the effect to impart assignability to the privilege, or to prolong its duration beyond that of his life. Submitted Oct. 11, 1883. Decided Oct. 29, 1883. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. D. T. Watson, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Thos. C. Lazear, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: This is an action by the assignee in bankruptcy of S. B. W. Gill, to recover the purchase money of land of the bankrupt, sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. Respect for the Supreme Court of Tennessee induces us to say that we have carefully examined the opinion of that court in Oliver v. Mor. gan, 10 Heisk., 322. That was a suit brought by the widow and administratrix of Morgan against Oliver, Finnie & Co., in a court of the State, to recover compensation under an agreement made between him and them February 15, 1869, and which was to continue till April 1, 1870, whereby he was to prepare self raising flour for them, under the license to him from the Rumford Chemical Works, and they were to pay him so much a barrel. In that suit it was held that Mrs. Morgan could recover not only for the time prior to Morgan's death, but for the subsequent time, and that the license to Morgan vested in him an interest which passed, In the case stated by the parties the following at his death, to his personal representative. The facts were agreed: on the 28th of November, proceedings in that suit are made a part of the 1877, Gill, upon petition of his creditors, was record on this writ of error. But the suit in the adjudged a bankrupt by the District Court of circuit court was tried wholly on the view that the United States for the Western District of the question as to the construction of the in- Pennsylvania, and the plaintiff was afterwards struments of February 1, 1869, was an open one, appointed assignee of his estate, which included and was a question of general law, and not one two lots of land in Pittsburgh. On the 27th of as to a rule of property, and that there was noth- May, 1878, the assignee, pursuant to an order ing in the former suit which, as res judicata, of the district court, and for the purpose of could be binding between the parties in this suit, raising money to pay the bankrupt's debts,sold as an estoppel. There is nothing in the plead these lots by public auction to the defendant ings which raises the question of such an estop-for the sum of $465, subject to the lien of a cerpel. The lower state court having, in the prior tain mortgage for $2,550; but the order of the suit, rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, the court directed and the advertisement thereof Supreme Court of the State, while giving the stated that all other liens and incumbrances interpretation before mentioned of the rights of should be discharged by the sale. At the time Morgan, reversed the judgment for errors in of the commencement of the proceedings in other respects, and awarded a new trial. Aft- bankruptcy, the bankrupt had a wife, who is erwards there was, in the lower court, a verdict still living, and who claims a right of dower in by consent, followed by a judgment for the the land. The sale having been confirmed abplaintiff, for a less sum than the amount of the solutely by the district court, the assignee therefirst verdict and judgment. Moreover, the pres- upon executed and tendered a deed of the land ent suit is one in a court of the United States, to the defendant, and demanded payment of the brought under the provisions of an Act of Con- purchase money, which was refused, by reason gress, for the infringement of letters patent. of the incumbrance of the right of dower. It The former suit arose out of a contract between was agreed that if the court should be of opinMorgan and Oliver, Finnie & Co., and was ion that the right of dower of the bankrupt's brought to recover damages for the breach of wife was devested by the bankruptcy proceedthat contract. Under these circumstances, the ings and sale, judgment should be entered for question as to the rights of Morgan under the the plaintiff for the sum of $465, with interest patent must be regarded as one to be passed and costs; otherwise, judgment for the defendupon in this suit as an original question, as if ant. there had been no former suit. Giving to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that consideration which is due to the force of reasoning in the views which it announces, we are unable to concur in the construction it gave to the license to Morgan. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with direction to award a new trial. Upon the case stated, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The single question is, whether a wife's right of dower is barred by an assignment in bankruptcy and a sale by the assignee in bankruptcy under order of the court. By the law of England, which is our law in this respect, except so far as it has been changed by statute, the True copy. Test: the husband, and is not affected by proceedings in bankruptcy against him. Squire v. Compton, W. D. PORTER, Assignee, Piff. in Err., 9 Vin. Abr. Dower, G. pl., 60; Smith v. Smith, v. CHARLOTTE C. LAZEAR. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 84-90.) 5 Ves., 189. If it is barred in this case, it must be either by force of the provisions of the recent Bankrupt Act, or by reason of the nature Pennsylvania. Dower not barred by sale by assignee in bank of the right of dower under the local law of ruptcy. *In Pennsylvania, as in other States, dower is not barred by an assignment of the husband's estate *Head note by Mr. Justice GRAY. |