UNITED STATES, Piff., v. SAMUEL NICHOLS. N a certificate of division in opinion between ed States for the Western District of Missouri. ON UNITED STATES, Piff., V. SAMUEL D. SINGLETON. freedom in the United States, and Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing its provisions, yet such legislative power extends only to the subject of slavery and its incidents; and the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of public amusement, which is forbidden at most, infringes rights which are protected from slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party,but state aggression by the 14th Amendment. 4. Whether the accommodations and privileges Bought to be protected by the 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act, are or are not rights constitutionally demandable; and if they are, in what form they are to be protected, is not now decided. 5. Nor is it decided whether the law, as it stands, is operative in the Territories and District of Col umbia; the decision only relating to its validity as applied to the States. Na certificate of division in opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the Unit-commercial power, may or may not pass a law se 6. Nor is it decided whether Congress, under the curing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States. [Nos. 1, 2, 3, 26, 28.] ed States for the Southern District of New York. Decided 1883. The history and facts of these cases sufficient- Is the Act of 1875 constitutional? This is understood to depend upon its conformity to the provisions of one or another of the constitutional Amendments. Several weighty judgments upon each of the Amendments have been delivered by this court, and to these, as greatly facilitating the present investigation it will be proper to advert. (Counsel here discussed at length the follow *1. The 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1, 1875, are unconstitutional enacting cases: ments as applied to the several States, not being authorized either by the 13th or 14th Amendments of the Constitution. 2. The 14th Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it is not direct legislation on the matters respecting which the States are prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but is corrective legislation, such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws 3. The 13th Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude, which it abolishes; and al- | though, by its reflex action, it establishes universal *Head notes by Mr. Justice BRADLEY. or acts. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall., 36 (83 U.S., XXI., 394); Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall., 130 (83 U. S., XXI., 442); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129 (85 U. S., XXI., 929); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall., 162 (88 U. S., XXII., 627); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S., 90 (XXIII., 678); U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214 (XXIII., 563); Kennard v. La., 92 U. S., 480 (XXIII., 478); U. S. v. Cruik shank, 92 U. S., 542 (XXIII., 588); Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S., 113 (XXIV., 77); R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 155 (XXIV., 94); Peik v. R. R. Co., 94 U. S., 164 (XXIV., 97); R. R. Co. v. Ack ley, 94 U.S., 179 (XXIV., 99); R. R. Co. v. Blake, The Statute of Mississippi providing that people nication, imposing a different punishment when of color should have equal privileges in certain pub-committed by a negro and a white person from that lic places is constitutional. Donnell v. State, 48 Miss., where the persons are of the same race, is constitu661; S. C., 12 Am. Rep., 375. tional. Pace v. State, 69 Ala., 231; 8. C., 44 Am. Rep., 513; affd. 106 U. S., supra; Ford v. State, 53 Ala., 150; Ellis v. State, 42 Ala., 525; Hoover v. State, 59 Ala., 57; Green v. State, 58 Ala., 190; S. C., 29 Am. Rep., 739. A statute making it felony for a white person to marry a negro is not in conflict with the Constitution of the U.S. Frasher v. State, 8 Tex. Ct. of App., 263; S. C., 30 Am. Rep., 131; State v. Bell, 7 Baxt., 12; S. C., 32 Am. Rep., 549; contra; Burns v. State, Ala., 195; S. C., 17 Am. Rep., 34. A statute establishing separate schools for white and colored children is not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Where appropriate schools are maintained for colored children they may be excluded from schools established for white children. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal., 36; S. C., 17 Am. Rep., 405; People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y., 438; S. C., 44 Am. Rep., 232. The same principle has been held under state constitutions with reference to schools. Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind., 337; S. C., 17 Am. Rep., 738; Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio, 198; Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush., 198; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev., 342; S. C., 8 Am. Rep., 713. A colored man may maintain an action for damages under the article in the Louisiana Constitution forbidding the exclusion of any person from any public place on account of race or color. Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann., 382; S. C., 26 Am. Rep., 102. A statute limiting the right of admission as attorney at law to white male citizens is not in conflict with the U. S. Constitution. Matter of Taylor, 48 Md., 28; S. C., 30 Am. Rep., 451. A statute punishing for living in adultery or for If a colored man is indicted for crime and colored persons are excluded from serving on juries because of their color the case may be removed into U. S. Circuit Court. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., XXV., 667, 676. Where the laws are impartial and involving in themselves no denial of rights, mere private infringement of such rights does not under the statute give a right to removal. Ex parte Wells, 3 Woods, 128; State v. Gaines, 2 Woods, 342; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., XXV., 667, 676; Thomas v. State, 58 Ala., 365; State v. Gleason, 12 Fla., 190: Fitzger ald v. Allman, 82 N. C., 492; Le Grand v. U. S., 13 Fed. Rep., 577; State v. Dubuclet, 10 Ch. L. N., 12; State v. Small, 12 Rich. (S. C.), 262. 94 U. S., 180 (XXIV., 99); R. R. Co. v. Coleman, | merce, which it was the province of the United 94 U. S., 181, note (XXIV., 102); Blyew v. U.S., States to regulate even prior to the recent 13 Wall., 581 (80 U. S., XX., 638); R. R. Co. v. Amendments to the Constitution. Brown, 17 Wall., 445 (84 U. S., XXI., 675); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S., 485 (XXIV., 547); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U. S., 303 (XXV., 664); Ex parte Va., 100 U. S., 339 (XXV., 676); Mo. v. Lewis, 101 U. S., 22 (XXV., 989); Neal v. Del., 103 U. S., 370 (XXVI., 567). ) Upon the whole, these cases decide, that: 1. The 13th Amendment forbids all sorts of involuntary personal servitude, except penal, as to all sorts of men, the word servitude taking some color from the historical fact that the United States was then engaged in dealing with African slavery, as well as from the signification of the 14th and 15th Amendments, which must be construed as advancing constitutional rights previously existing; 2. The 14th Amendment expresses prohibitions and, consequently, implies corresponding positive immunities, limiting state action only, including in such action, however, action by all state agencies, executive, legislative and judicial, of whatsoever degree; 3. The 14th Amendment warrants legislation by Congress punishing violations of the immunities thereby secured, when committed by agents of States in the discharge of ministerial functions. Referring to the indictment against Nichols, it appears: The relation of innkeepers to the State differs from that of a man engaged in the more common avocations of life. The former is required to furnish the accommodations of his inn to all well behaved comers who are prepared to pay the customary regular price. This business and that of conducting a theater are carried on under license from the State, through the intermediate agency of municipal authority, which is part of the machinery of the State, being delegated to this extent with the power of the State. This is because the business to be carried on is quasi public in its nature, and for the general accommodation of the people. For this reason Congress has the right to prohibit any discriminations against persons applying for admission to an inn or theater, based upon race, color or previous condition of servitude. Equality before the law is the privilege of American citizenship, conferred by the National Constitution; therefore, to be protected by national legislation. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall., 79 (83 U. S., XXI., 409); U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214, 217 (XXIII., 563, 564)—where the court says that appropriate legislation "May be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected. 1. That the right violated by him, being in- The exclusion complained of in the causes at deed of the same class as that violated by Stan- bar were because of the race and recent servile ley and by Hamilton, is the right of locomotion; condition of the persons excluded. The law for2. That, in violating this, Nichols did not act bidding such exclusion, for such motive, is "apin a capacity exclusively private, but in one de-propriate to efface the existence of any consevoted to a public use, and so affected with a pub-quence or residuum of slavery." Hon. F.T.Frelic (state) interest. Upon behalf of the United States it is, therefore, submitted, also, that: 3. Restraint upon the right of locomotion was a well known feature of the slavery abolished by the 13th Amendment. 4. Granting, that by involuntary servitude as prohibited by the 13th Amendment, is intended some institution, viz.: custom, etc., of that sort, and primarily, mere scattered trespasses against liberty, committed by private persons; yet, considering what must be the social tendency in at least large parts of the country, it is " appropriate legislation" against such an institution to forbid any action by private persons which, in the light of our history, may reasonably be apprehended to tend, on account of its being incidental to quasi public occupations, to create an institution. 5. Therefore, the above Act of 1875, in prohibiting persons from violating the rights of other persons to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations of inns and public conveyances, for any reason turning merely upon the race or color of the latter, partakes of the specific character of certain contemporaneous, solemn and effective action by the United States to which it was a sequel, and is constitutional. The following is an abstract of portions of the brief prepared and filed herein in 1879 by Charles Devens, then Atty-Gen., and Edwin B. Smith, then Asst. Atty-Gen.: Inns are provided for the accommodation of travelers; for those passing from place to place. They are essential instrumentalities of com linghuysen, in debate on this Bill, Vol. 2, Cong. Rec., pt. 4, first session, Forty-Third Congress, p. 3453. At the bottom of the same page he cites the Slaughter House Cases, as holding that "Freedom from discrimination is one of the rights of United States citizenship." What the United States had the right to give, it necessarily has the right and duty to preserve and protect. We cannot proceed against or deal with the States to procure needed legislation; nor compel action by the grand juries of the State. We must necessarily prosecute directly those offenders who deny, on account of race or color, the equality which the Constitution guaranties. It would be strange if language avowedly chosen to effect a desired object, and deemed apt for that purpose by a large majority, if not everybody, in each House of Congress, should now be held by the court not such as to accomplish the end contemplated. The intent of the legislator would not then be the law. Messrs. Wm. M. Randolph and Fillmore Beall, for plaintiffs in error in No. 28. Our case involves the rights of a citizen of one State traveling "by a public conveyance by land" through another State, for the purpose of reaching a place in a third State. We maintain that so far as the Act of Congress applies to such a case, the power to pass it is beyond question. Independently of the "power to enforce by appropriate legislation" the 14th Amendment, there are, as we conceive, at least two other clauses of the Constitution on either of which the Act may rest. The first is the power in Congress 66 to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States; article 1, section 8, clause 3; and the other is the provision that The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Article IV., sec. 2. These provisions, taken in connection with the grant of "all legislative powers" to Congress (article 1, sec. 1), and the power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof" (article 1, sec. 8, clause 18), we submit, leave very little room for argument. In Prigg v. Pa., 16 Pet., 539, it was decided that where the Constitution guaranties a right, Congress is empowered to pass the legislation appropriate to give effect to that right. And see, Ableman v. Booth, 21 How., 506 (62 U. S., XVI., 169); U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S., 214 (XXIII., 563); Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U. S., 303 (XXV., 664). But, whether Mrs. Robinson's rights in this case were created by the Constitution or only guarantied by it, we submit, in either event, that the Act of Congress, so far as it protects them, is within the Constitution. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S., 485 (XXIV., 547); Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S., 1 (XXIV., 708). Messrs. W. Y. C. Humes and D. H. Poston, for defendants in error in No. 28, did not argue the constitutional question, claiming that their case was not within the Act of 1875. The other defendants were not represented in this court by counsel. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: was a person of African descent. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants in this case upon the merits under a charge of the court to which a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs. The case was tried on the assumption by both parties of the validity of the Act of Congress; and the principal point made by the exceptions was, that the Judge allowed evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the conductor had reason to suspect that the plaintiff, the wife, was an improper person, because she was in company with a young man whom he supposed to be a white man, and on that account inferred that there was some improper connection between them; and the Judge charged the jury, in substance, that if this was the conductor's bona fide reason for excluding the woman from the car, they might take it into consideration on the question of the liability of the Company. The case is brought here by writ of error at the suit of the plaintiffs. The cases of Stanley, Nichols and Singleton, come up on certificates of division of opinion between the Judges below as to the constitutionality of the 1st and 2d sections of the Act referred to; and the case of Ryan, on a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of California, sustaining a demurrer to the information. It is obvious that the primary and important question in all the cases, is the constitutionality of the law; for if the law is unconstitutional, none of the prosecutions can stand. The sections of the law referred to provide as follows: "Sec. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommo dations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. These cases are all founded on the 1st and 2d sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Rights Act, passed March 1, 1875, entitled "An Act to Protect all Citizens in their Civil and Legal Rights." 18 Stat. at L., 335. Two of the cases, those against Stanley and Sec. 2. That any person who shall violate the Nichols, are indictments for denying to persons foregoing section by denying to any citizen, exof color the accommodations and privileges of cept for reasons by law applicable to citizens of an inn or hotel; two of them, those against Ry-every race and color, and regardless of any an and Singleton, are, one an information, the other an indictment, for denying to individuals the privileges and accommodations of a theater, the information against Ryan being for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's theater in San Francisco; and the indictment against Singleton being for denying to another person, whose color is not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the theater known as the Grand Opera House in New York, "Said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude." The case of Robinson and wife against the Memphis and Charleston R. R. Company was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, to recover the penalty of $500 given by the 2d section of the Act; and the gravamen was the refusal by the conductor of the Railroad Company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies' car, for the reason, as stated in one of the counts, that she previous condition of servitude, the full enjoy. ment of any of the accommodations, advan tages, facilities or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offense forfeit and pay the sum of $500 to the person aggrieved there by, to be recovered in an action of debt with full costs; and shall also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $1,000, or shall be impris oned not less than thirty days nor more than one year; Provided, That all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid, or to proceed under their rights at common law and by state statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this Act or the criminal law of any State; And provided, further, That a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively." | the equal protection of the laws. It not only Are these sections constitutional? The 1st sec- does this, but, in order that the national will, tion, which is the principal one, cannot be fair- thus declared, may not be a mere brutum fully understood without attending to the last men, the last section of the Amendment invests clause, which qualifies the preceding part. The Congress with power to enforce it by appropriessence of the law is, not to declare broadly that ate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislaenjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, tion for correcting the effects of such prohibited facilities and privileges of inns, public convey-state laws and state Acts, and thus to render ances and theaters; but that such enjoyment them effectually null, void and innocuous. This shall not be subject to any conditions applica- is the legislative power conferred upon Conble only to citizens of a particular race or color, gress, and this is the whole of it. It does not or who had been in a previous condition of serv-invest Congress with power to legislate upon itude. In other words: it is the purpose of the subjects which are within the domain of state law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the ac- legislation; but to provide modes of relief against commodations and privileges of inns, public state legislation or state action, of the kind reconveyances, theaters and other places of pub- ferred to. It does not authorize Congress to lic amusement, no distinction shall be made be- create a code of municipal law for the regulatween citizens of different race or color, or be- tion of private rights; but to provide modes of tween those who have and those who have not redress against the operation of state laws, and been slaves. Its effect is, to declare that, in all the action of state officers executive or judicial, inns, public conveyances and places of amuse- when these are subversive of the fundamental ment, colored citizens, whether formerly slaves rights specified in the Amendment. Positive or not, and citizens of other races, shall have rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured the same accommodations and privileges in all by the 14th Amendment; but they are secured inns, public conveyances, and places of amuse- by way of prohibition against state laws and ment as are enjoyed by white citizens; and vice state proceedings affecting those rights and privversa. The 2d section makes it a penal offense ileges, and by power given to Congress to legisin any person to deny to any citizen of any race late for the purpose of carrying such prohibior color, regardless of previous servitude, any tion into effect; and such legislation must, necof the accommodations or privileges mentioned essarily, be predicated upon such supposed in the 1st section. state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect. A quite full discussion of this aspect of the Amendment may be found in U. S. v. Cruik shank, 92 U. S.,542 [XXIII.,588]; Va. v. Rives, 100 U. S., 813 [XXV., 667], and Ex parte Va., 100 U. S., 339 (XXV., 676]. Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three Amendments. The power is sought, first, in the 14th Amendment, and the views and arguments of distinguished Senators, advanced An apt illustration of this distinction may be whilst the law was under consideration, claim- found in some of the provisions of the original ing authority to pass it by virtue of that Amend- Constitution. Take the subject of contracts, ment, are the principal arguments adduced in for example; the Constitution prohibited the favor of the power. We have carefully consid-States from passing any law impairing the obered those arguments, as was due to the emi-ligation of contracts. This did not give to Connent ability of those who put them forward, and have felt, in all its force, the weight of authority which always invests a law that Congress deems itself competent to pass. But the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon this court; and we are bound to exercise it according to the best lights we have. The 1st section of the 14th Amendment, which is the one relied on, after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, and of the several States, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the States. It declares that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them gress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of contracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by state legislation might be counteracted and corrected; and this power was exercised. The remedy which Congress actually provided was that contained in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 [1 Stat. at L., 85], giving to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction by writ of error to review the final decisions of state courts whenever they should sustain the validity of a state statute or authority alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. By this means, if a state law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract, and the state tribunals sustained the validity of the law, the mischief could be corrected in this court. The legislation of Congress, and the proceedings provided for under it, were corrective in their character. No attempt was made to draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally; and no such attempt would have been sustained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might have been provided in that case. Probably Con certain acts committed by individuals shall be deemed offenses, and shall be prosecuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated the pro gress had power to pass a law giving to the courts of the United States direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a state law; and under the broad provisions of the Act of March 3, 1875, giving to the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists. But under that or any other law it must appear, as well by allegation as proof at the trial, that the Constitution had been violated by the action of the State Legislature. Some obnoxious state law, passed or that might be passed, is neces-hibition of the Amendment. In other words, sary to be assumed, in order to lay the foundation of any federal remedy in the case; and for the very sufficient reason, that the constitutional prohibition is against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts. it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities. in every possible case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances and theaters? The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a par ticular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress against such state legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It it is repugnant to the 10th Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. And so in the present case, until some state law has been passed or some state action through If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the prohibitions of the Amendment, it is difficult the rights of citizens sought to be protected to see where it is to stop. Why may not Conby the 14th Amendment, no legislation of the gress with equal show of authority enact a code United States under said Amendment, nor any of laws for the enforcement and vindication of proceeding under such legislation, can be called all rights of life, liberty and property? If it is into activity; for the prohibitions of the Amend- supposable that the States may deprive persons ment are against state laws and acts done under of life, liberty and property without due proc state authority. Of course, legislation may and ess of law, and the Amendment itself does supshould be provided in advance to meet the exi- pose this, why should not Congress proceed at gency when it arises; but it should be adapted once to prescribe due process of law for the proto the mischief and wrong which the Amend-tection of every one of these fundamental rights, ment was intended to provide against; and that is, state laws, or state action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by the Amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of the State Legislatures and to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and property, which include all civil rights that men have, are, by the Amendment, sought to be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due process of law, Congress may, therefore, provide due process of law for their vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the Amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the Amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or take, and which, by the Amendment, they are prohibited from committing or taking. It is not necessary for us to state, if we could, what legislation would be proper for Congress to adopt. It is sufficient for us to examine whether the law in question is of that character. An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference whatever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the 14th Amendment on the part of the States. It is not predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that We have not overlooked the fact that the 4th section of the Act now under consideration has been held by this court to be constitutional. That section declares "That no citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color or previous condition of servi tude; and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined, not more than $5,000." In Ex parte Va., 100 Ú. S., 339 [XXV., 676], it was held that an indictment against a State officer under this section for excluding persons of color from the jury list is sustainable. But a moment's attention to its terms will show that the section is entirely corrective in its character. Disqualifications for service on juries are only created by the law, and the first part of the section is aimed at certain disqualifying laws, |