are made a lien on the property, under which it may be sold at the end of the year, if not paid. The Railroad Company was assessed by the commissioners of the District in the sum of $19,886.69, whereas they charge that they are only liable for $12,207.27; and as the commissioners were about to issue a certificate for the larger amount, the Company paid or tendered the sum which they acknowledge to be due, and filed their bill in chancery to obtain an injunction as to the remainder. | the proportions in which these parties are to be charged have no relation to the part to be paid for by the Railroad Company, which is, in no case, a proportionate part of the street along which it runs, but all the expense of the work inside its rails, and for two feet exterior to this on each side. There is no room for apportionment here, and if, for so much of this two feet as is of the same material as the main surface of the street, which is separated from it by no visible line, the easiest mode of ascertaining its of the pavement, that is no reason why this extra and separable expense of blue stone should not be assessed, as the law requires, exclusively to the Company. This difference is owing to the fact that along-cost is to calculate its relation to the remainder side of the exterior rails of the track the paving commissioners required a blue granite stone to be laid the whole length of the pavement, five inches in width and eight inches deep, and each stone about three feet long. This was charged But it is said that the paving commissioners wholly to the Company, as well as the remain-adopted the rule of a general apportionment of der of the two feet next adjoining said track on all the expense, and reported to the commissionthe outside of the rails. ers of the District on that basis, as due from the Company, the smaller sum of $12,207.27, and that their report is conclusive. The report thus made is nowhere in the statute made their special duty, nor are they anywhere authorized to make the final assessment. The report was merely a suggestion of their views for the action of the District commissioners. On the other hand, by the express language of the Act, these latter commissioners are directed to make the assessment on which the parties are to pay, and on which, if they do not pay, a certificate shall be issued which becomes an interest bearing lien on their property. As regards this remainder the Company makes no objection, but they insist that the entire cost of all the paving on each side of their track to the sidewalk should be computed together, and the charge against the Company should be in the proportion which those two feet bear to the entire distance from each exterior rail to the sidewalk. As this string of stone paving is more costly than the Neufchatel and Trinidad material, which constitute the main body of the pavement, this would relieve the Company of a part of the cost of the two feet adjacent to their track. As a matter of strict justice, no reason can be seen for this proposition, for it is quite clear that the requirement of this string or curb of blue granite is wholly due to the existence of the tracks of the railroad in the middle of the street, and is also mainly, if not wholly, for the protection of the track alongside of which it is Îaid. Nothing can be more just, than that the Com-efit of the Railroad Company. It was to prepany should pay for the work which its track alone makes necessary. Nor is there any question that, if this stone was necessary in laying down this new pavement, for the security and durability of the track itself or of the pavement near the track, the Company was bound, by the 4th section of its charter, to pay the expense. That it was a judicious and proper thing to be done is scarcely controverted, and if it were, the testimony shows very clearly that it was. The only question, therefore, that remains, is whether Congress, in the distribution of the expense of this work of repaving the avenue, intended that this should be borne by the Company. The language of Congress, on that subject, would seem to admit of no other construction. The 3d section, already cited, says: "The Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company shall bear all the expense for that portion of the work lying between the exterior rails of the tracks of the road, and for a distance of two feet from and exterior to the track on each side thereof, and of keeping the same in repair." So far from relieving the Company of the duty which it accepted by its charter, the language re-enforces that obligation and makes its application to the repavement clear. The statute goes on to prescribe what the United States shall pay, and what the District of Columbia shall pay, and what individual owners shall pay; and Another source of complaint is, that in making the necessary excavations for the new pavement, it became necessary to support the track of the Company by underpinning, which cost $1,052.12, and was paid for by the paving commissioners. This work was wholly for the ben vent the track from falling or caving in while used during the progress of the work, and the city authorities might have left the Company to take care of itself. But as this might have delayed the work, or led to litigation, they wisely protected it while they worked. It seems to us a proper charge against the Company alone, as they alone were benefited, and their track made it necessary. There is no error in the record, and the decres of the Supreme Court of the District is affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U.S. SARAH E. VANCE AND S. J. ZEIGLER, v. SARAH E. VANCE, Exrx. of the Succession of S. W. VANCE, Deceased, ET AL. (See 8. C., Reporter's ed., 514-522.) Recording Act-limitations as to infants and married women. 1. A constitution and statute of a State which provides that tacit mortgages shall cease to have effect against third persons unless recorded within a stated reasonable time, does not impair the obligation of the contract in such cases, even as to minors; it is in its nature a statute of limitations. 2. The exemptions from the operation of statutes to their dotal and paraphernal property, and for of limitation usually accorded to infants and mar- the registration of the same; but no mortgage or ried women, do not rest upon any general doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected to their privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unaction, but in every instance upon express language less recorded in the parish where the property in those statutes giving them time after majority, to be affected is situated. The tacit mortgages or after cessation of coverture, to assert their and privileges now existing in this State shall rights. [No. 280.] cease to have effect against third persons after the 1st January, 1870, unless duly recorded. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the registration of all mortgages and priv Argued Apr. 25, 26, 1883. Decided May 7, 1883. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. ileges." This suit was brought in a state court of The Legislature did pass the Act of March 8, Louisiana, by a minor, after her emancipation 1869, No. 95: "To carry into effect Article and marriage, against the succession of her 123 of the Constitution, and to provide for refather and natural tutor, represented by his ex-cording all mortgages and privileges." Session ecutrix. A judgment was rendered in her favor, which recognized the existence of a tacit mortgage on all the lands owned by her tutor after the commencement of his tutorship. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the judgment of the lower court, on appeal, except as to the existence of the tacit mortgage and an allowance of compound interest; 32 La. Ann., 186; whereupon, the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. A further statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Charles W. Hornor and T. J. Durant, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. E. M. Hudson for G. W. Sentell & Co., interveners, defendants in error. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In a proceeding in the State Court of Louisiana the plaintiff in error recovered a judgment against the defendant in error, as executrix of the succession of her husband, S. W. Vance, for the sum of about $75,000,due from him to plaintiff in error as her natural tutor. The sum thus found due was the result of an accounting concerning this tutorship during the period between October 15, 1859, and May 18, 1877. Article 354 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, in force when this tutorship began, says; "The property of the tutor is tacitly mortgaged in favor of the minor from the day of the appointment of the tutor, as security for his administration, and for the responsibility which results from it." The court of probate, which adjusted this account, decreed in favor of the plaintiff in error, that her mortgage privilege for the sums and interest found due her be recognized on all the lands owned by Samuel W. Vance, the deceased tutor, on and after the 15th day of October, 1859. From this branch of the decree, certain creditors of the deceased tutor, who had been permitted to intervene, appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, and that court reversed the decree of the probate court by deciding against the existence of this mortgage privilege. The ground on which this privilege was denied is found in Article 123 of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, adopted in April, 1868, which is as follows: The General Assembly shall provide for the protection of the rights of married women 108 U. S. U. S., Book 27. Acts 1869, p. 114; section 11 reads: "That it shall be the duty of the clerks of the district courts of the several parishes in this State to make out an abstract of the inventory of the property of all minors whose tutors have not been required by law to give bond for their tutorship, such abstract to describe the real property and give the full amount of the appraisement of all the property, both real and personal, and rights and credits, and to deposit such abstracts with the recorders of the several parishes, whose duty it shall be to record the same, as soon as received, in the mortgage book of their parish; such abstracts to be made out and deposited with the recorders by the first day of December, 1869, and recorded by the first day of January, 1870. This section to apply only to tutorship granted before the passage of this Act, and any failure of the clerks or recorders to perform the service required by this section shall subject them to any damages that such failure may cause any person, and shall further subject them to a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, for the benefit of the public school fund, to be recovered by the district attorney or district attorney pro tem, before any court of competent jurisdiction; such abstracts when recorded in any parish in which the tutor owns mortgageable property shall constitute a mortgage on the said tutor's property until the final settlement and discharge of the tutor; the fees for making out and recording such abstract shall be the same as the fees prescribed for the clerks and recorders for other similar services, and shall be paid on demand by the tutor, or, if the minors have arrived at the age of majority, by them, and if no responsible person can be found, then any property owned by the minors for whose benefit such services were performed shall be sold to pay the same, and if no person or property be found to pay the same, then the parish shall pay the same, and have recourse against the person or property of any person for whose benefit the services were performed." The case comes to this court on the proposition, that, as thus construed, the Constitution and Statute of Louisiana impair the obligation of her contract with her tutor concerning his duty to account for her estate in his hands, and also violates the provision of section 1, article XIV. of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The view of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on this matter is very clearly presented in the following extract from its opinion in the case. "Waiving the question, which is certainly a debatable one, whether or not the obligations The authorities in support of this view are ample. Perhaps the case most directly in point is one in this court, namely: Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall., 68 [80 U. S., XX., 513]. and mortgages existing against the natural tutor | was required and what was eminently just to in favor of his ward arise or spring from con- everybody. tracts, we think the plaintiff's argument untenable, in that it assumes that article 123 destroyed or impaired plaintiff's mortgage obligation in the sense of the Constitution of the United States. Had the article simply declared the abolition and extinction eo instanti of all tacit mortgages, there would have been the case presented by plaintiff's argument. But it did nothing of the sort. It fixed a future day, reasonably distant, and declared that such mortgages would perempt, prescribe, or cease to exist as to third persons unless recorded by that date. It is in its nature a statute of limitations. The right of the State to prescribe the time within which existing rights shall be prosecuted, and the means by and conditions on which they may be continued in force, is, we think, undoubted. Otherwise, where no term of prescription exists at the inception of a contract, it would continue in perpetuity, and all laws fixing a limitation upon it would be abortive. Now, it is elementary that the State may establish, alter, lengthen or shorten the period of prescription of existing rights, provided that a reasonable time be given in future for complying with the statute." See, Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 376; Story, Const., 236, sec. 1385. That was a case like this, arising out of a statutory contract, to which the Legislature, by a law enacted after it was made, added, as in this, the duty of giving notice. Curtis purchased at a public sale, for delinquent taxes, a tract of land, and received from the proper officer a certificate, which by law authorized her to obtain a deed at the end of three years, if the land was not redeemed by paying the amount of the bid and interest. After this sale and before the end of the three years, the State passed an Act, that where any person was found in the actual occupancy of the land, the deed should not issue unless a written notice had been served on the owner of the land or on the occupant by the holder of the tax certificate at least three months prior thereto, and it was made applicable to past sales as well as future. Mrs. Curtis applied for and obtained her deed without giving this notice, and when she brought suit to quiet the title so acquired, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided her deed void for want of it. The case was brought to this court on the ground that the Statute of Wisconsin requiring this notice impaired the obligation of the contract evidenced by the certificate of sale, but this court held that it did not. That the case is very like the one before us, is obvious. The These observations seem to us eminently just. The strong current of modern legislation and judicial opinion is against the enforcement of secret liens on property. And in regard to real property, every State in the Union has enacted statutes holding them void against subsequent creditors and purchasers, unless they have actual notice of their existence, or such construct-court said: "That the statute is not void beive notice as arises from registration. The Constitution of Louisiana introduced this principle and did it with due regard to existing contracts. It did not change, defeat nor impair the obligation of the tutor to perform that contract. It did not take away nor destroy the security which existed by way of lien on the tutor's property, nor as between the tutor and the ward did it make any change whatever. But it said to the latter, "You have a secret lien, hidden from persons who are dealing every day with the tutor on the faith of this property, and in ignorance of your rights. We provide you a way of making those rights known by a public registration of them which all persons may examine, and of which all must take notice at their peril. We make it the duty of officers having charge of the offices where the evidence of your claim exists to make this registration. We make it your duty also to have it done. We give you a reasonable time after this Constitution is passed and after the enabling statute is passed to have this registration made. If it is not done within that time your debt remains a valid debt, your mortgage remains a valid mortgage, but it binds no one who acquires rights after that in ignorance of your mortgage, because you have not given the notice which the law required you to give." We think that the law, in requiring of the owner of this tacit mortgage for the protection of innocent persons dealing with the obligor, to do this much to secure his own right, and protect those in ignorance of those rights, did not impair the obligation of the contract, since it gave ample time and opportunity to do what cause it is retrospective, has been repeatedly held by this court, and the feature of the Act of 1867, which makes it applicable to certificates already issued for tax sales, does not of itself conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Nor does every statute which affects the value of a contract impair its obligations. It is one of the contingencies to which parties look now in making a large class of contracts, that they may be affected in many ways by state and by national legislation. For such legislation demanded by the public good, however it may retroact on contracts previously made, and enhance the cost and difficulty of performance, or diminish the value of such performance to the other party, there is no restraint in the Federal Constitution, so long as the obligation of performance remains in full force. In the case before us the right of the plaintiff is not taken away, nor the time when she would be entitled to it, postponed. The right to the money or the land remains,and can be enforced whenever the party gives the requisite legal notice. The authority of the Legislature to frame rules by which the right of redemption may be rendered effectual, cannot be questioned, and among the most appropriate and least burdensome of these is the notice required by statute." * 營 * In the case of La. v. New Orleans, 102 U. S., 203 [XXVI., 132], the Supreme Court of the State refused the relator a writ of mandamus, to enforce a levy of taxes to pay a judgment against the city, on which an execution had been issued and a return of nulla bona made. The Supreme Court denied the writ because the relator had not registered his judgment with the proper officer of the city, under a statute which The case was brought to this court on the are Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet., 457; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall., 596 [84 U.S., XXI., 787]; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat., 122. It is urged that because the plaintiff in error was a minor when this law went into operation, it cannot affect her rights. But the Constitu tion of the United States, to which appeal is made in this case, gives to minors no special rights beyond others, and it was within the legBut this court held that the registry of these islative competency of the State of Louisiana to judgments was "A convenient mode of inform- make exceptions in their favor or not. The exing the city authorities of the extent of the judg-emptions from the operation of statutes of limments, and that they have become executory, itation, usually accorded to infants and married to the end that proper steps may be taken for women, do not rest upon any general doctrine their payment. It does not impair existing of the law that they cannot be subjected to their remedies." action, but in every instance upon express language in those statutes giving them time after majority, or after cessation of coverture, to assert their rights. No such provision is made here for such exception, but, in place of it, the Legislature has made it the duty of the proper officer of the court to act for them. It was also the duty of the under tutor appointed in this case. In Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet., 290, this court said: "It is within the undoubted power of State Legislatures to pass recording Acts, by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within the limited time; and the power is the same, whether the deed is dated before or after the recording Act. Though the effect of such a law is to render the prior deed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Such, too, is the power to pass Acts of limitation, and their effect. Reason and sound policy have led to the general adoption of laws of both descriptions, and their validity cannot be questioned." And this language is reproduced with approval in the case of Curtis v. Whitney, above referred to. The decisions in regard to the Statute of Limitation are full to the same purpose, and as the Supreme Court of Louisiana says, this is a statute of limitation, giving a reasonable time within which the holder of one of these secret liens may make it public, otherwise it will be void against subsequent purchasers and creditors without notice. The case of Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S., 628 [XXIV., 365] presents, in the terse language of the Chief Justice of this court, both the rule, the reason for it and the limitation which the constitutional provision implies. This court, he says, "Has often decided that statutes of limitation affecting existing rights are not unconstitutional, if a reasonable time is given for the enforcement of the action before the bar takes effect." He adds, in reference to the case then before the court, which was a South Carolina statute of limitation, passed since the civil war: "The business interests of the entire people of the State had been overwhelmed by a calamity common to all; society demanded that extraordinary efforts be made to get rid of old embarrassments, and permit a reorganization upon the basis of the new order of things. This clearly presented a case for legislative interference within the just inferences of constitutional limitations. For this purpose the obligations of old contracts could not be impaired, but their prompt enforcement could be insisted upon, or an abandonment claimed. That, as we think, has been done here, and no more." And Jackson v. Lamphire, is again cited with approval. The same principle is asserted in the case of Koshkonong v. Burton, at the last Term, 104 U. S., 668 [XXVI., 886]. Other cases in this court If the foregoing considerations be sound, they answer also effectually the suggestion in regard to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. We see no error in the record of the case of which James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. Ex Parte: In the Matter of HUNG HANG, Petitioner. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 552, 553.) Writ of habeas corpus, office of. This court has authority to issue the writ of ha beas corpus, but except in cases affecting ambassa- APPLICATION for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. S. F. Phillips, Thomas Šimons and Hall McAllister, for petitioner. No opposing counsel appeared. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an inquiry into the legality of the detention of the petitioner, Hung Hang, a subject of the Emperor of China, by the chief of police, under a warrant for his arrest, issued by the police judge of the City and County of San Francisco, California, for a violation of an order or ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of such city and county, alleged to be in contravention of the Constitution and of a Treaty of the United States. It has long been settled that ordinarily this court cannot issue a writ of habeas corpus except under its appellate jurisdiction. Ex parte Boll- | subject to review here on a writ of error. Upon man, 4 Cranch, 101; Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet., 572; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., 99 [75 U. S., XIX., 337]; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall., 165 [85 U. S., XXI., 875]; Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S., 22 [XXIII., 788]; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., 341 [XXV., 677]; Ex parte Siebold, Id., 374 [XXV., 718]. Section 751 of the Revised Statutes, which re-enacts a similar provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 14, gives this court authority to issue the writ, but except in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers or consuls, and those in which a State is a party, it can only be done for a review of the judicial decision of some inferior officer or court. This petition presents no such case. The writ is, consequently, denied. such a writ, the question of the right to maintain the action on which the case was adjudged below, if presented by the record, may be reexamined here. This being so, a writ of mandamus cannot issue. It has been often held that mandamus cannot be used to perform the office of a writ of error. Ex parte Hoard, 105 U. S., 580 [XXVI., 1177]; Ex parte Loring, 94 U. S., 419 [XXIV., 165]. In Ex parte R. Co., 103 U. S., 796 [XXVI., 461], it was expressly decided that a writ of mandamus could not be used to bring up for review a judgment of the circuit court on a plea to the jurisdiction. That is practically what is asked in this case. The writ is denied. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U.S. Ex Parte: In the Matter of the BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 566, 567.) NEAL RUGGLES, Piff. in Err., v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. (See S: C., Reporter's ed., 536-541.) Final judgment, what is—mandamus, when not | Grants of immunity from government control issuable. 1. Where in an action of replevin, the circuit court quashed and vacated the writ and dismissed the action at the costs of the plaintiff, and awarded execution because it had no jurisdiction, this is a final judgment. 2. A writ of mandamus cannot issue to review a final judgment which is within our jurisdiction, and subject to review here on a writ of error. Mandamus cannot be used to perform the office of a writ of error. [No. 15, Orig.] railroad charges, when regulated by the State -conclusiveness of state rule-interpretation of charter. 1. Grants of immunity from legitimate governmental control are never to be presumed; on the contrary, the presumptions are all the other way. 2. When in a charter of a railroad company it is expressly declared that no by-law shall be made that is in conflict with the laws of the State, and that the rates of charge to be levied and collected for the conveyance of persons and property are to be regulated by by-laws, only such charges can be Submitted Apr. 23, 1883. Decided May 7, 1883. collected as are allowed by the laws of the State. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This petition shows that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company brought an action of replevin against John E. Hamilton in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, to recover the possession of certain railroad cars; that a summons for the defendant and a writ of replevin for the property were issued in the suit; that the defendant, Hamilton, was duly served with the summons; that the property sued for was taken by the marshal under the writ of replevin and delivered to the Company; that a declaration was filed, and that before pleading thereto, Hamilton appeared and moved to vacate the writ of replevin because the court had no jurisdiction to issue the same. This motion was heard, and thereupon the court ordered and adjudged "That said writ be quashed and vacated; and all proceedings subsequent to be of no avail;" and that the action "be dismissed at the costs of the plaintiff, for which execution may issue, etc." This is a final judgment in the action and, if the case is otherwise within our jurisdiction, 3. In such case, in the absence of direct legislation on the subject, the power of the directors over the rates is subject only to the common law limitation of reasonableness; but if the State establish a maximum of rates to be charged by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property, the rates fixed by the directors must conform to its requirements. 4. When the words of a charter of incorporation are plain and interpret themselves, extrinsic facts will not be considered as bearing on their meaning. [No. 135.] Argued Mar. 9, 12, 1883. Decided May 7, 1883. In March, 1873, Morgan Lewis, the complaining witness, demanded to be carried at the rate established by the Legislature of Illinois, three cents per mile, from Buda to Neponset, Illinois, points on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, tendering eighteen cents, being that amount, which the conductor, Neal Ruggles, refused, and demanded twenty cents, the regular fare established by the company. Lewis refused to pay more than the statutory fare, and thereupon Ruggles attempted to expel him from the train. Proceedings were instituted against the conductor, Ruggles, for assault and battery, and he was fined $10 and costs. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, where the judgment was affirmed (Rug gles v. People, 91 Ill., 256), and brought here on NOTE.-State control over railroads. See note to Balt. & O. R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 88 U. S., XXII., 678. |