Scruggs to enforce the payment of this decree | paid to the marshal, and made Viser and Mrs. by execution, the bill in the present case was Scruggs defendants, and prayed that the rights filed by the Railroad Company in the Chancery of all parties might be settled and determined. Court of Alcorn County. The bill averred that On December 24, 1875, the district court dethe decree of the Alcorn Chancery Court above creed as follows: that the Railroad Company mentioned, which was affirmed by the Supreme is entitled to have credited on the amount Court of Mississippi, established a debt in favor awarded and decreed, by the Supreme Court of of Mrs. Scruggs against the Railroad Company the State, "The reasonable rents which she," for $31,666.66, with interest from April 21, Mrs. Scruggs, had "actually received or might 1871, and fixed that date for the surrender of have received by prudent management, or for the premises by Mrs. Scruggs to the Railroad any period she actually, by herself or agent, ocCompany and gave her a lien on the premises cupied the hotel and property at Corinth, from for the payment of the decree, and upon failure May 11, 1871, forward to the date of the reof the Railroad Company to pay the same with- ceivers taking possession under a former order in thirty days ordered a sale of the property, of this court," and ordered a reference to a and that the decree left Mrs. Scruggs as a mort- master to report the amount with which the degagee in possession until the sum above men- cree should be credited by reason of the rents tioned was paid. The bill further averred that received, and the use and occupancy of said the decree should be reduced by the ground premises by Mrs. Scruggs. rents due the Railroad Company up to April 21, 1871, and for the use and occupancy, rents and profits of said premises, from that date up to the filing of the bill, which had been enjoyed and received by Mrs. Scruggs, amounting in all to the sum of $25,000. The bill averred that Mrs. Scruggs had caused an execution to be issued against the Railroad Company and the Upon the coming in of the master's report, sureties on its appeal bond to enforce collection the court refused to deduct from the decree, in of the entire decree; that she was insolvent, and favor of Mrs. Scruggs, any sum for groundif allowed to collect the decree in full, the credit rents due the Railroad Company, and having reto which the Railroad Company was entitled duced the amount of rent reported by the mas would be a total loss. The prayer of the bill ter as due from Mrs. Scruggs, applied the resiwas for an injunction to restrain proceedings due as a credit upon said decree, and as the reon the execution, and for a reference to a mas-sult of such application found that there was ter to report the amount due the Railroad Company for ground rents up to April 21, 1871, and the amount of rents of the premises received by Mrs. Scruggs from that date to the date of the master's report, and that the amount reported by the master as due the Railroad Company for ground and other rents might be credited on the decree. An injunction was allowed as prayed for. Mrs. Scruggs answered the bill, admitting her retention of the possession of the property, but denied her liability for rents, and averred that she was not only entitled to the rents but also to the amount of the decree and the penalty adjudged by the Supreme Court, and interest on both, and set up said decree as res judicata and conclusive in her favor. At this stage of the cause it was, on petition of the Railroad Company, removed to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi. Upon motion made to the district court, the injunction allowed by the state court was modified so as to restrain the collection of only $20,000 of the decree, and Mrs. Scruggs was required to give, and did give, a refunding bond in the sum of $10,000, for the repayment of any sum which might on final hearing be decreed against her. An execution having issued to collect the residue of the decree, less the said $20,000, the Railroad Company paid the marshal $19,217. On September 24, 1875, the Railroad Company filed its amended bill and bill of interpleader, in which it averred that one J. H. Viser claimed to have a lien on the decree in favor of Mrs. Scruggs against the Railroad Company, and it brought into court the sum of $2,510, the residue of the decree, not enjoined or not On the next day the court decreed that Viser was entitled to $1,382 of the $2,510 paid in by the Railroad Company on filing its bill of interpleader, that being the amount of a judgment recovered by him against Mrs. Scruggs, and for the payment of which the Railroad Company had been duly summoned as garnishee. due from Mrs. Scruggs to the Railroad Cómpany on the refunding bond the sum of $179, for which it rendered a decree in favor of the Railroad Company against Mrs. Scruggs and the sureties on said bond, and also rendered a decree in favor of Viser against the same parties for $3,807.27. From this decree, Mrs. Scruggs and E. R. Matthews and James Matthews, the sureties on the refunding bond, have appealed to this court. Mrs. Scruggs now complains of the decree, so far as it concerns the Railroad Company, on the sole ground that it directed the value of the rents and occupancy of the hotel and improvements to be credited upon the decree in her favor against the Railroad Company. She also insists that the decree against her, in favor of Viser, was erroneous, for reasons which will be found stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. H. P. Branham, J. R. Chalmers and David P. Lewis, for appellants. Messrs. D. H. Poston, and W. Y. C. Humes, for the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company, appellee. Mr. S. F. Phillips, for Viser, appellee. Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court: The contention of the appellant is, that having obtained a decree for the value of the hotel and improvements built by John W. Scruggs upon the lands of the Railroad Company, with damages for the appeal, and interest, to be paid upon the surrender by her of the hotel and improvements to the Railroad Company, she was entitled to the payment of her decree with interest, and as long as the Railroad Company failed to pay the decree, was not chargeable with the rents or the value of the occupancy of | ground for refusing to pay the sum awarded by the premises while she retained possession. We cannot assent to this claim. It appears from the agreement to submit to arbitrators, that both parties, the Railroad Company on the one hand, and John W. Scruggs and Narcissa, his wife, to whom he had conveyed his leasehold and improvements, on the other, had agreed that the property should be surrendered to the Railroad Company, and that, in pursuance of the original contract between John W. Scruggs and the Railroad Company, the latter was to pay the value of the improvements. It was mainly to fix the value of these improvements that the reference to arbitrators was made, and it was agreed that on the payment of the sum so fixed Scruggs and his wife should surrender the property to the Railroad Company, and the amount so fixed should "be a lien on said property." The arbitrators decided that on the payment of the sum awarded by them, Mrs. Scruggs should deliver the possession of the hotel to the Railroad Company. In her bill filed to enforce this award, Mrs. Scruggs prays that the Railroad Company may be compelled to pay the award, and that "her lien for the same in said property may be enforced." the arbitrators as the value of the property. The only question submitted to the arbitrators was the true construction of the contract between John W. Scruggs and the Railroad Company, and the value of the property, or rather, as the arbitrators understood it, the value of the improvements placed by John W. Scruggs on the land of the Railroad Company. They were not authorized to adjust and settle the accounts between the Railroad Company and Scruggs. When, therefore, Mrs. Scruggs filed her bill to enforce the award, it was admitted by her counsel that the matter of the ground-rent was not included in the award, and that the same ought to be deducted from the amount awarded by the arbitrators, and that she should be permitted to set off as against such rents any amount due by the Railroad Company for board of employés, the said amount to be adjusted by reference to the master of the court. The award did not, therefore, settle the controversy between the parties. The Railroad Company was justified in refusing to pay the award until the deductions therefrom, to which it was admitted that it was entitled, should be ascertained, and in defending the suit brought by Mrs. Scruggs to enforce the payment of the entire award. While this litigation was pending, the rents and profits actually received in cash by her were $10,514, and she herself occupied the premises in person for two years. The court in which her bill was filed made a decree to the effect that Mrs. Scruggs had a lien on the property for the amount of said award, with interest thereon from January 21, The court below found that there was due the 1871, ordered its payment within thirty days, Railroad Company, by reason of rents incurred and in default of payment, directed that the by Mrs. Scruggs and the occupancy of the premproperty should be sold and the proceeds ap-ises by her, the sum of $17,414.50. The testiplied to the payment of the amount due on the award. This decree was in all respects affirmed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. We think that upon these facts Mrs. Scruggs must in equity be treated as if she was a mortgagee in possession. All the parties and the Chancery and Supreme Courts have treated the sum awarded Mrs. Scruggs as a lien upon the property, and it was decreed and no one disputed that she was entitled to retain possession until her lien was discharged. Treating her as a mortgagee in possession, she is accountable for the net rents and profits of the estate. If her possession was by tenant, she is accountable for such net rents and profits as she could with reasonable diligence have received. Moore v. Degraw, 1 Halst. Ch., 346; Benham v. Rowe, 2 Cal., 387; Kellogg v. Rockwell, 19 Conn., 446; Harrison v. Wyse, 24 Conn., 1; Reitenbaugh v. Ludwick, 31 Pa. St., 131; Breckenridge v. Brooks, 2 A. K. Marsh, 335; Tharp v. Feltz, 6 B. Mon., 6; Anthony v. Rogers, 20 Mo., 281. There is no equity in the contention of Mrs. Scruggs, that she should receive interest on the debt secured by her lien, and not account for the rents and profits of the property on which her lien rested while it was in her possession. She says that the Railroad Company might have had immediate possession by paying the amount of the award. So any mortgagee in possession might say that the mortgagor could take possession on paying off the mortgage debt, but this does not excuse the mortgagee from accounting for the rents and profits of the mortgaged property received by him. It appears that the Railroad Company had mony in the record fully sustains this finding. As Mrs. Scruggs insisted that she should have interest on the amount decreed her by the Chancery and Supreme Courts of Mississippi, she was not entitled also to claim the rents of the premises. On The case, therefore, stands thus: the Railroad Company was indebted to Mrs. Scruggs in the sum of $31,666, which was a lien upon the premises, and Mrs. Scruggs was in possession. the other hand, the amount of the decree and interest, it was admitted, were subject to be reduced by the ground-rents due to the Railroad Company. Mrs. Scruggs, who was shown to be insolvent, was proceeding to collect by execu tion the full amount of her decree, with interest; the Railroad Company was compelled, in order to protect itself from loss, to file the bill in this case to have the decree credited with the amount due for the ground rents. While this litigation was pending, Mrs. Scruggs received in cash, rents to the amount of $10,514, and occupied the premises herself two years. She was clearly liable to account for the rents received by her, and for a reasonable rental while the premises were actually occupied by her. The court below did not charge her with a dollar for which she was not accountable. So far, therefore, as the decree relates to the controversy between her and the Railroad Company, it is a just and proper decree. It remains to consider that part of the decree by which the debt claimed by J. H. Viser was ordered to be paid out of the money due from the Railroad Company on the decree in favor of Mrs. Scruggs. After the bill of interpleader, filed by the Railroad Company, Viser filed his cross-bill against the Company and Mrs. Scruggs, in which he alleged that, on May 11, 1869, John W. Scruggs and Narcissa, his wife, executed to him a mortgage upon the leasehold and improvements thereon, known as the Scruggs House, of which said Narcissa was then the owner, to secure a note dated the same day as the mortgage, made by them for the payment to him of $5,000 twelve months after date, and prayed that the Railroad Company might be compelled to pay to him, out of the moneys due from it to Mrs. Scruggs, the amount due him on said note and mortgage. This relief was resisted by Mrs. Scruggs on the ground that, at the date of the note and mortgage, she was a feme covert and incompetent, under the law of Mississippi, to incumber her property for her own or her husbands debts. the court was not justified in rendering a decree in favor of Viser against the sureties. The bond took the place of $10,000 which was virtually in possession of the court, to do with as justice and equity might require. The court disposed of the sum payable on the bond as if it had been so much money in the registry of the court. It is true the bond was payable to the Railroad Company. But the amount decreed to be paid to Viser was deducted from the sum due the Railroad Company on the refunding bond, and the appellants have no ground of complaint. We are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court was in all respects right and it must, therefore, be affirmed. Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Matthews did not sit in this case, and took no part in its decision. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. In the suit which Mrs. Scruggs brought in the Chancery Court of Alcorn County to enforce the award of the arbitrators, Viser, who had been made a party defendant, had filed his answer and cross-bill, setting up said note and insisting that the mortgage given to secure it was a lien on said property. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, that court decided that the mortgage was a good lien on the income of the property covered thereby. Viser v. | WM. KING, JOHN M. GOETCHIUS AND Scruggs, 49 Miss., 705. The property covered by the mortgage was represented by the decree rendered in favor of Mrs. Scruggs against the Railroad Company for $31,666. The income of the decree represented by the interest was, as appears by the report of the master, ample to pay the demand of Viser. There was no application of the income until the court made the final decree in this case. There were then two funds, the principal and the interest of the decree. Viser had a lien on the interest, and the demand of the Railroad Company was payable out of either principal or interest. Following, therefore, the practice of courts of equity in marshaling securities, Aldrich v. Cooper, 8 Ves., 382, the court directed the payment of Viser's lien out of the interest. In doing this, no injustice was suffered by Mrs. Scruggs. The method adopted for calculating the amount due on the decree was according to the established rules in such cases. The debt due Viser was clearly proven. It was payable out of a fund which in effect was in possession of the court, and the court was right in ordering it to be paid. THOMAS BOESE, as Receiver of the Property of WM. H. LOCKE, Plff in Err., A v. EDWARD E. POOR, Assignees of the Property and Effects of WM. H. LOCKE. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 379–388.) ment of one's property, to be equally distributed 2. The assignment was sufficient to pass the title from the assignor to his assignees,and was not void provided for the distribution of the proceeds of the as between the parties thereto, simply because it property in pursuance of a statute, none of the provisions of which were then in force. the Bankrupt Act, an assignment for the benefit of 3. except as against proceedings instituted under creditors made without intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, is valid, at least for the purpose among creditors, and the assignees can hold the proof securing an equal distribution of the estate ceeds of such property deposited by them in another State, against a receiver of the debtor's property appointed in that State. [No. 235.] Argued Apr. 5, 6, 1883. Decided Apr. 30, 1883. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. It is contended for Mrs. Scruggs that the debt of Viser could only be satisfied by laying hold of the corpus of the property by a receiver and through him collecting the income and apply. ing it. But in this case there was no necessity for a receiver for the property and its income was virtually in the hands of the court. The appointment of a receiver was, under the circumstances of the case, unnecessary and impracticable. The property was a decree of court, of which a receiver could not take pos-head, for defendants in error. session. Complaint is made by appellants because the decree of the circuit court for the payment of Viser's demand was rendered, not only against Mrs. Scruggs, but against the sureties on the refunding bond given by her. It is said that the bond was payable to the Railroad Company and in the opinion of the court. Mr. C. Brainbridge Smith, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. M. W. Divine and A. P. White when not. See note to Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U. S. NOTE.-Assignment with preferences; when valid: (7 Wheat.), 556. Bankrupt and insolvent laws of State, constitutionality of; U. S. Statute suspends state bankrupt laws; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.), 19. discharge in foreign country, no bar. See note to Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: We are to consider in this case whether the final judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York has deprived plaintiff in error of any right, title, or privilege under the Constitution or laws of the United States. This question arises out of the following facts, which are embodied in a special finding made by the court of original jurisdiction: By deed of assignment executed and delivered September 25, 1873, Wm. H. Locke, a citizen of New Jersey, transferred and conveyed to Wm. King, John M. Goetchius and Edward E. Poor, and the survivor of them and their and his heirs and assigns, all of his property of every kind and description, except such as was exempt by law from execution, "In trust to take possession of and collect and to sell and dispose of the same at public or private sale in their discretion, and to distribute the proceeds to and among the creditors of the said Wm. H. Locke, in proportion to their several just demands, pursuant to the statutes in such case made and provided, and on the further trust to pay the surplus, if any there be, after fully satisfying and paying the said creditors and all proper costs and charges, to the said Wm. H. Locke." Although the deed does not, in terms refer to any particular statute, it may be taken-the fact being so found-that the intention of Locke and the assignors was to have a distribution made among the creditors of the former, in conformity with the requirements of an Act of the Legislature of New Jersey, passed April 16, 1846, entitled "An Act to Secure to Creditors an Equal and Just Division of the Estates of Debtors Who Convey to Assignees for the Benefit of Creditors." That Act provides, among other things, that every conveyance or assignment by a debtor, of his estate, real or personal or both, in trust, to an assignee for the benefit of creditors, shall be made for their equal benefit in proportion to their several demands to the net amount that shall come to the hands of the assignee for distribution; and all preferences of one creditor over another, or whereby one shall be first paid or have a greater proportion in respect to his claim than another, shall be deemed fraudulent and void, excepting mortgage and judgment creditors, when the judgment has not been by confession for the purpose of preferring creditors (sec. 1); further, that the debtor shall annex to his assignment an inventory, under oath or affirmation, of all of his property, together with a list of his creditors, and the amount of their respective claims, such inventory not, however, to be conclusive as to the quantity of the debtor's estate, and the assignee to be entitled to any other property, belonging to the debtor at the time of the assignment, and comprehended within its general terms (sec. 2). Other sections provide for public notice by the assignee of the assignment; for the presentation of claims of creditors; for filing by the assignee, under oath, of a true inventory and valuation of the estate; for the execution by him of a bond in double the amount of such inventory or valuation; for the recording of such bond; for the filing with the clerk, of the court of common pleas of the county of the debtor's residence, within three months after the date of the assignment, of a list 108 U. S. U. S., Book 27. of all such creditors as claim to be such, and the amount of their demands, first making it known by advertisement that all claims against the estate must be made as prescribed in the statute, or be forever barred from coming in for a dividend of said estate, otherwise than as provided; for the right of the assignee or any creditor or person interested to accept to the allowance of any claim presented; for the adjudication of such exceptions; for fair and equal dividends from time to time among the creditors of the assets in proportion to their respective claims, and for a final accounting by the assignee in the orphan's court of the county; such settlement and adjudication to be conclusive on all parties, except for assets which may afterwards come to hand, or for frauds or apparent error. Secs. 3-7. The Act further provides: "Sec. 11. If any creditor shall not exhibit his, her or their claims within the term of three months as aforesaid, such claim shall be barred of a dividend unless the estate shall prove sufficient after the debts exhibited and allowed are fully satisfied, or such creditor shall find some other estate not accounted for by the assignee or assignees before distribution, in which case such barred creditor shall be entitled to a ratable proportion therefrom. Sec. 12. Whenever any assignee or assignees, as aforesaid, shall sell any real estate of such debtor or debtors as is conveyed in trust as aforesaid, he or they shall proceed to advertise and sell the same in manner as is now or may hereafter be prescribed in the case of an executor or administrator directed to sell lands by an order of the orphan's court for the payment of the debts of the testator or intestate. Sec. 13. Every assignee, as aforesaid, shall have as full power and authority to dispose of all estate, real and personal, assigned, as the said debtor or debtors had at the time of the assignment, and to sue for and recover in the proper name of such assignee or assignees, everything belonging or appertaining to said estate, real or personal, of said debtor or debtors, and shall have full power and authority to refer to arbitration, settle and compound and to agree with any person concerning the same, and to redeem all mortgages and conditional contracts, and generally to act and do whatever the said debtor or debtors might have lawfully done in the premises. Sec. 14. Nothing in this Act shall be taken or understood as discharging said debtor or debtors from liabilities to their creditors who may not choose to exhibit their claims either in regard to the persons of such debtors or to any estate, real or personal not assigned as aforesaid, but with respect to the creditors who shall come in under said assignment and exhibit their demands as aforesaid for a dividend, they shall be wholly barred from having afterwards any action or suit at law or equity against such debtors or their representatives, unless on the trial of such action or hearing in equity the said creditor shall prove fraud in the said debtor or debtors with respect to the said assignment, or concealing his estate, real or personal, wheth er in possession, held in trust, or otherwise." The estate which came into the hands of the assignees was converted into money in New Jersey the amount being nearly $200,000, and the proceeds for the convenience of the assign-upon Congress to establish a uniform system ees were deposited in a bank in the City of of bankruptcy, having been exercised by the New York. No proceedings in bankruptcy passage of the Act of 1867, the latter Act wholly were ever taken against Locke. suspended the operation of the local statute as to all cases within its purview; consequently, it was held, the assignment was not valid for any purpose. The Court of Appeals, recognizing the paramount nature of the Bankrupt Act of Congress, and assuming that the 14th section of the New Jersey Statute, relating to the effect upon the creditors' claim of accepting a dividend, was inconsistent with that Act and, therefore, inoperative, adjudged that other portions of the local statute which provided for the equal distribution of the debtor's property among his creditors, and regulated the general conduct of the assignee, were not inconsistent with, nor were they necessarily suspended by the Act of 1867; further, that the New Jersey Statute did not create the right to make voluntary assign On the 3d day of February, 1876, William Pickhardt and Adolph Kutroff recovered a judgment against Locke in the Supreme Court of the City and County of New York for $3,086.85. Upon that judgment, execution was issued and returned unsatisfied. Subsequently, May 27, 1876, in certain proceedings, before one of the Judges of that court, supplementary to the return of execution, Thomas Boese, plaintiff in error, was appointed Receiver of the property of Locke, and having executed a bond for the faithful discharge of the duties of his trust, he obtained an order from the same court giving him authority, as Receiver, to bring an action against the assignees of Locke. Thereupon, June 9, 1876, he commenced this action. It proceeds upon these grounds: 1. That the indebt-ments for the equal benefit of creditors, but edness from Locke to Pickhardt and Kutroff arose in New York, where they reside, before the making of said assignment; 2. That the Statute of New Jersey with reference to or under which said assignment was made was, by force of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 [14 Stat. at L., 517], suspended and of no effect; 3. That the assignment was fraudulent and void by the laws of New Jersey, in that it was made with the intent upon the part of Locke to hinder, delay | and defraud his creditors, and in that he had a large amount of money and other property which he fraudulently retained to his own use and did not surrender to the assignees. The Supreme Court of New York, both in General and Special Term, sustained the action and gave judgment against the assignees in favor of Boese, as Receiver, for the amount of the demand of Pickhardt and Kutroff.. But in the Court of Appeals that judgment was reversed, with directions to enter judgment for the defendants. was only restrictive of a previously existing right, and imposed, for the benefit of creditors, salutary safeguards around its exercise; consequently, had the whole of the New Jersey Statute been superseded, the right of a debtor to make a voluntary assignment would still have existed. The assignment, as a transfer of the debtor's property, was, therefore, upheld as in harmony with the general object and purposes of the Bankrupt Act, unassailable by reason merely of the fact that some of the provisions of the local statute may have been suspended by the Act of 1867. In the view which we take of the case it is The prayer of the complaint, the allegations unnecessary to consider all of the questions of which were fully met by answer, was for covered by the opinion of the state court and judgment against the defendants; that the as-discussed here by counsel. Especially it is not signments be adjudged fraudulent and void; necessary to determine whether the Bankrupt and that the defendants be required to account Act of 1867 suspended or superseded all of the to plaintiff for all the property and money re-provisions of the New Jersey Statute. Undoubtceived or to which they are entitled under and edly the local statute was, from the date of the by virtue of said assignment. It was conceded passage of the Bankrupt Act, inoperative in so at the hearing that defendants had in their far as it provided for the discharge of the debtor hands, of the proceeds of the sale of the assigned from future liability to creditors who came in property, an amount sufficient to pay the judg- under the assignment and participated in the ment of Pickhardt and Kutroff. distribution of the proceeds of the assigned property. It is equally clear, we think, that the assignment by Locke, of his entire property, to be disposed of as prescribed by the Statute of New Jersey and, therefore, independently of the bankruptcy court, constituted itself an act of bankruptcy, for which, upon the petition of a creditor, filed in proper time, Locke could have been adjudged a bankrupt, and the property wrested from his assignees for administration in the bankruptcy court. In re Burt, 1 Dill., 440; In Re Goldschmidt, 3 Bk. Reg., 168; In re Smith, 3 Bank Reg., 377. The claim of Pickhardt and Kutroff existed at the time of the assignment. The way was, therefore, open for them, by timely action, to secure the control and management of the assigned property by that court for the equal benefit of all the creditors of Locke. But they elected to lie by until after the expiration of the time within which the assignment could be attacked under the provisions of the Bankrupt Act; and now seek, by this suit, in the name of the plaintiff in error, to secure an advantage or preference over all others; this, notwithstanding the assignment was made without any intent to hinder, de We dismiss from consideration all suggestions, in the pleadings, of actual fraud upon the part either of Locke or of his assignees. The court of original jurisdiction found as a fact, and upon that basis the case was considered by the Court of Appeals, that the assignment was executed and delivered by the former and accepted by the latter in good faith and without any purpose to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of Locke. It is further found as a fact that the assignment was made with the intent, bona fide, to make an equal distribution of the proceeds of the trust estate among creditors, in conformity with the local statute. The Supreme Court of New York ruled that the Statute of New Jersey was in its nature and effect, a bankrupt law, and the power conferred |