"The Connemara." tow-boat, a right to salvage. The William passengers, Wurtz, Holser and Evers, in the extinguishment of the fire on board the ship Connemara, were a salvage service. 2. A gross salvage on the ship and cargo of $14,198, or six per cent on the value thereof, should be al-napolis, Lush., 355, 361, 372. And no doubt is lowed. 3. This salvage should be equally divided, half to the owner of the tow-boat and half to the salvors. 4. The moiety allowed to the salvors should be distributed among them in proportion to their monthly wages, the passengers Wurtz and Evers to rank as pilots, and Holser as a steersman. A decree was entered accordingly, and the claimants appealed to this court. A motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction was made and overruled at October Term, 1880. The Connemara, 103 U. S., 754 [XXVI., 322]. The errors assigned are: first, that the facts found do not constitute a salvage service; second, that if a salvage service, it is salvage of the lowest grade, and the amount allowed is exorbitant; third, that the amount allowed to John Evers, he being a passenger on board The Connemara, is not warranted by law. Neither of the grounds assigned will justify this court in reversing the decree. If the fire, which had made such headway as to wholly consume the two coils of tarred rope and the spare sail, and to partly destroy three bales of the cotton stowed in the poop, had not been promptly discovered and extinguished, there was imminent danger that it would extend to the rest of that cotton and, fanned by the stiff breeze which was blowing lengthwise of the ship, destroy or greatly damage the ship and the whole cargo. Saving a ship from imminent danger of destruction by fire is as much a salvage service as saving her from other perils of the seas. The Blackwell, 10 Wall., 1 [77 U. S., XIX., 870]. The shortness of the time occupied in rescuing the ship from danger does not lessen the merit of the service. The General Palmer, 5 Notes of Cases, 159, n.; The Syrian, 2 Mar. Law Cas., 387; Sonderburg v. Ocean Tow-boat Co., 3 Woods, 146. The danger being real and imminent, it is not necessary, in order to make out a salvage service, that escape by other means should be impossible. Tallbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1, 42. or could be raised as to the right of the passen- The Evers, the passenger on The Connemara, was also entitled to share in the salvage. A passenger cannot, indeed, recover salvage for every service which would support a claim by one in nowise connected with the ship. In the case of a common danger, it is the duty of every one on board the ship to give every assistance he can, by the use of all ordinary means in working and pumping the ship, to avert the danger. Yet a passenger is not, as the officers and crew are, bound to stand by the ship to the last; he may leave her at any time and seek his own safety; and for extraordinary services, and the use of extraordinary means, not furnished by the equipment of the ship herself, by which she is saved from imminent danger, he may have salvage. Newman v. Walters, 3 B. & P., 612; The Branston, 2 Hagg. Adm., 3, n.; The Salacia, 2 Hagg. Adm., 262, 269; The Vrede, Lush., 322; The Pontiac, 5 McLean, 359, 363; The Great Eastern, 2 Mar. Law Cas., 148; S. C., 11 Law Times (N. S.), 516; 3 Kent, Com., 246. The services of Evers were of peculiar value, and involved the use of means outside the ship. His promptness and vigilance gave the alarm, which, by the supineness and neglect of the officers and crew of the ship, might not otherwise have been given in time to save her. This might not of itself have entitled him to reward; but beyond this he exerted himself, as if he had been one of the officers and crew of the tow-boat, in the use of the steam-pump and hose on board of her, by which the fire on the ship was effectually subdued. It may also be observed that this case comes before us on the appeal of the owners of the ship; and that there is no controversy, either between Evers and the other salvors, or between The fact that no serious risk was incurred on the salvors who gave their personal exertions the part of the salvors does not change the nat- and the owners of the tow-boat whose machinure of the service, although an important ele-ery was used, as to the distribution of the salment in estimating its merit and the amount of vage. the reward. As has been well said by Mr. Jus- The services performed being salvage services, tice Curtis, "The relief of property from an im- the amount of salvage to be awarded, although pending peril of the sea, by the voluntary ex-stated by the circuit court in the form of a conertions of those who are under no legal obliga-clusion of law, is largely a matter of fact and tion to render assistance, and the consequent discretion, which cannot be reduced to precise ultimate safety of the property, constitute a case of salvage. It may be a case of more or less merit, according to the degree of peril in which the property was, and the danger and difficulty of relieving it. But these circumstances affect the degree of the service, not its nature." The Alphonso, 1 Curt., C. C., 376, 378. The contract of the tow-boat and her officers and crew was to tow the ship, and did not include the rendering of any salvage service, by putting out fire or otherwise. Such a service, which, by the use of the steam pump and engine of the tow-boat, rescued the ship from an unforeseen and extraordinary peril, gave the owner, as well as the officers and crew of the rules, but depends upon a consideration of all the circumstances of each case. The Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240, 267; The Adventure, 8 Cranch, 221, 228; The Emulous, 1 Sum., 207, 213; The Cora, 2 Pet. Adm., 361, 375; S. C., 2 Wash. (C. C.), 80; Post v. Jones, 19 How., 150, 161 [60 U. S., XV., 618, 622]. In The Sybil, 4 Wheat., 98, Chief Justice Marshall said, "It is almost impossible that different minds, contemplating the same subject, should not form different conclusions as to the amount of salvage to be decreed and the mode of distribution." And by the uniform course of decision in this court, during the period in which it had full jurisdiction to reverse decrees in admiralty upon both facts and law, as well | ADRIATIC FIRE INSURANCE COM as in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of England, exercising a like jurisdiction, the amount decreed below was never reduced, unless for some violation of just principles, or for clear and palpable mistake or gross over-allowance. Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Pet., 108, 119; The Camanche,8 Wall., 448, 479 [75 U.S., XIX., 397, 405]; The Neptune, 12 Moore (P. C.), 346; The Carrier Dove, 2 Moore (P. C. N. S.), 243; S. C., Brown. & Lush., 113; The Fusilier, 3 Moore (P. C. N. S.), 51; S. C., Brown. & Lush., 341. By the Act of Congress of 16th February, 1875, ch. 77, the appellate power of this court is restricted within narrower bounds; its author ity to revise any decree in admiralty of the cir cuit court is limited to questions of law; and the finding of facts by that court is equivalent to a special verdict, or to facts found by the court in an action at law when a trial by jury is waived. The Abbottsford, 98 U. S., 440 [XXV., 168]; The Francis Wright,105 U.S.,381 [XXVI., 1100]; Sun Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co. [ante,337]. The effect of this change may be illustrated by referring to the revisory power of the courts in actions at law tried by a jury. The facts are decided by the jury in the first instance. If the jury return a general verdict, clearly against the weight of evidence, or assessing exorbitant damages, the court in which the trial is had may set aside the verdict and order a new trial. But a court of error, to which the case is brought by bill of exceptions or appeal on matter of law only, cannot set aside the verdict, unless there is no evidence from which the conclusion of fact can be legally inferred. Parks v. Ross, 11 How., 362; Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall., 359 [68 U. S., XVII., 642]. Before the Act of 1875, this court, upon an appeal in a case of salvage, gave the same weight and no more, to the decree of the court below, that a court of common law would allow to the verdict of a jury; and might revise that decree for manifest error in matter of fact, even if no violation of the just principles which should govern the subject was shown. Post v. Jones [supra]. Since the Act of 1875 [18 Stat. at L., 315], in cases of salvage, as in other admiralty cases, this court may revise the decree appealed from for matter of law, but for matter of law only; and should not alter the decree for the reason that the amount awarded appears to be too large, unless the excess is so great that, upon any reasonable view of the facts found, the award cannot be justified by the rules of law applicable to the case. PANY ET AL., Piffs. in Err., This action was brought in the court below, by the defendant in error, to recover the sum of $15,000 alleged to be due him for professional services as an attorney and counselor. The trial below having resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $8,293.92 including interest and costs, the defendants sued out this writ of error. The history and facts of the case more fully appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. John E. Parsons, for plaintiff in error: 1. In various forms of expression the agree ment provides that the companies shall only be liable pro rata. This is defined to be in proportion to amount insured by each to the total amount insured by all. Such an agreement is several, not joint. Ernst v. Bartle, 1 Johns. Cas., 319; Ludlow v. McCrea,1 Wend, 228; Peckham v. North Parish, 16 Pick., 274; Fell v. Goslin, 11 Eng. L. & Eq., 554. 2. The committee had no authority outside of the agreement. Their agency was special. Where a special agency is created, the principals cannot be held to a larger liability than that which they have agreed to. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall., 666 (74 U. S., XIX., 169); Martin v. Farnsworth, 49 N. Y., 555. 3. No prudent insurance company would sign a different agreement. To do so might result in exposing a company whose insurance amounted to $2,500, the Lafayette Company, for example, to a liability without limit. Nor is it answer to this, to say that either company, compelled to pay the whole expense incurred by the commitee would have a right of contribution against other companies. It was In the present case, a vessel and cargo of to protect against the necessity of resorting to great value were rescued from imminent danger claims for contribution, that the agreement was by the energetic efforts of the salvors; and the framed as it was. To sanction such a view of amount of salvage awarded is less than one six-its practical effect, is to pervert it into a joint, teenth of the value of the property saved. Although upon the circumstances of the case, so far as they can be brought before us by the summary of them in the findings of fact by the circuit court, we might have been better satisfied with an award of a smaller proportion, we cannot say that the amount awarded is so excessive as to violate any rule of law. Decree affirmed. True copy. Test: instead of a several agreement. Messrs. Luther R. Marsh and William G. Wilson, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Matthews delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought by the defendant in error, to recover compensation for professional services as an attorney and counselor at law, rendered, as alleged, at the instance and request James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. of the plaintiffs in error, and each of them, as Cited-109 U. S., 115. well as of sundry other corporations not inhabit ants of the Southern District of New York or of the State of New York, nor found therein, and, therefore, not joined, as defendants below, in and about the defense of certain suits brought against several of them in Massachusetts, but in which all had a common interest, and for which it is alleged these Companies, including the plaintiffs in error, jointly and severally promised to pay what said services were actually worth. The cause was tried by a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff below, to reverse which, for errors of law alleged to have occurred in the rulings of the court during the trial and presented in a bill of exceptions, this writ of error is prosecuted. The plaintiff below put in evidence an agreement in writing, signed by fifteen insurance companies, including the defendants, a copy of which is as follows: "In Re Taylor, Randall & Company v. The St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company et al. The undersigned Insurance Companies, having ing policies outstanding issued to Taylor, Randall & Company, upon property at Central Wharf, Boston, upon which claims have been made against said Companies, do, in consideration of one dollar, by each paid to the other, and divers other good and valuable considerations, mutually covenant and agree to and with each other as follows, that is to say: the said Companies will unite in resisting the claim made upon said policies, and on each thereof, and in the defense of any and all suits and legal proceedings that have been or may be instituted against any of said Companies upon any of said policies, and will, when and as required by the committee hereinafter mentioned, contribute to and pay the costs, fees and expenses of said suits and proceedings pro rata; that is to say, each Company shall pay such proportion of said costs, fees and expenses as the amount insured by said Company shall bear to the whole amount insured on said property by all the Companies subscribing to this agreement. The management and conduct of said resistance to said claims and defense of said suits and proceedings shall be and is fully intrusted to and devolved upon a committee to be composed of W. H. Brazier and James R. Lott, of the City of New York, Charles W. Sproat, of the City of Boston, L. S. Jordan, of the City of Boston, which committee shall have full power and authority to employ counsel and attorneys to appear for said Companies and each thereof, and defend said suits and legal proceedings, and to employ other persons for other services relative thereto, and to assess upon and demand and receive from such Companies, from time to time, as such committee shall deem proper, such sum or sums of money for the compensation of such counsel and attorneys, and such other persons, and all other expenses of such defense of said suits as said committee shall deem necessary and expedient, such assessment upon and payment by each of said Companies to be pro rata as above mentioned. Each and every of said Companies shall fully and faithfully adhere to this agreement, and shall refrain from any act or proceeding in reference to such claims or suit, or the defense thereof, that can or may in anywise defeat, obstruct or interfere with the acts or proceedings of said committee relative thereto, and shall at all times furnish to said committee any and all papers, information and assistance in and about such management and conduct of such resistance and defense as may be in the possession or power of said Companies respectively, and as may be desired by said committee. In witness whereof, the said Insurance Companies have subscribed this agreement, this 24th day of April, 1874." Prior to the execution of this agreement, suits had been commenced against some of the Companies, other than the plaintiffs in error, in Boston, in one of which the agreement itself is entitled; and the defendant in error had been employed to defend them. After the agreement had been signed, the committee named in it employed the defendant in error on behalf of all the Companies parties to it. He testified that the agreement was shown to him and that he accepted the invitation to become the attorney of the Companies. The employment was general, no special terms being fixed, and it is not questioned that it was with full knowledge of the agreement between the Companies, and according to the authority conferred by it upon the committee. The plaintiff below having proved the fact and value of the services rendered, rested his case, at the conclusion of which and afterwards again, after all the evidence had been put in, the defendants below requested the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendants, on the ground "That the agreement was not one under which any joint liability could be created; that the provisions of the agreement were specific, the parties to the agreement were only to pay severally and pro rata any amount that should become due under the agreement." This instruction the court refused to give, and that refusal is now assigned for error. The committee appointed by the agreement between the Insurance Companies, were special agents only for the purposes and within the limits declared in it. They had no authority to bind their principals beyond its import, and the limits of that authority were made known to the defendant in error when he accepted employment from them. Whatever authority to bind the Companies in making that employment, had been conferred upon them by the agreement, they in fact exerted. So that the question to be determined is, whether that agreement conferred upon the committee authority to bind the Companies jointly, or jointly and severally, to pay the expenses of the litigation; or, whether they became liable, severally only, each for its proper proportion. The contract, it will be observed, is between the Companies. No other person is a party. The promises are between them severally. Each binds itself to each of the others. There is no joint undertaking or promise, on the part of all, to anyone else. They "mutually covenant and agree to and with each other." They do agree, indeed, that they “Will unite in resisting the claim made upon said policies, and on each thereof, and in the defense of any and all suits and legal proceedings that have been or may be instituted against any of said Companies upon any of said policies;" but, as to the obligation of payment the express restrictions upon the power of the committee to bind them otherwise than severally, each in proportion to its interest. The defendant in error is and can be in no better position by reason of the employment by the committee, under the agreement between the Companies, than the committee would have been if they had made the advances required, or than he would have been if he had been a direct party to that agreement, employed by the Companies according to its terms. There is not only nothing in the agreement from which it could be inferred that the Companies were to be sureties for each other, but that inference is expressly negatived by the declaration, according to which each is to be liable for its own separate and proportionate part. on that account, its nature and extent, the agree- | admitted, had actual knowledge of them. So ment is, that they "Will, when and as required that, though the employment by the committee by the committee hereinafter mentioned, contri- established a privity between him and the parbute to and pay the costs, fees and expenses of ties to the contract, giving him a right to treat said suits and proceedings pro rata; that is to the Companies directly as his principals and say, each Company shall pay such proportion of employers, nevertheless it must be taken to be said costs, fees and expenses as the amount in- only to the extent of the authority of the comsured by said Company shall bear to the whole mittee under the agreement, and subject to the amount insured on said property by all the com- limitations imposed by it upon the liability of panies subscribing to this agreement." These the Companies. He must be considered as reexpressions leave no doubt as to the intention lying, if he did not stipulate for the individual of the parties in regard to the limit of their sev- liability of the members of the committee, upon eral liabilities as between themselves. their power to raise the fund for the payment The management and conduct of this com- of his compensation by the assessment under mon defense was intrusted to and devolved upon the agreement; which, being made, he would a committee of named persons; and the powers have a right to enforce; or which, if denied to and rights of that committee are expressly de- him wrongfully, would entitle him to his acfined. They are given full power and authority tion, as if it had been made, or against the comto employ counsel and attorneys to appear for mittee for not making it. But there is no ground said Companies and each thereof, and defend on which he can claim that the employment of said suits and legal proceedings, and to employ the committee imports a joint promise of comother persons for other services relative thereto.pensation from the Companies, in the face of They are thus constituted the agents, for the purposes named, of the parties to the contract, and whatever they do within the terms of that agency, which, of course, is not general, but special, binds the parties according to their agreement. The committee is not a party to the agreement, but derives its powers from it and has rights under it, chiefly the right of re-imbursement for expenses and indemnity for obligations legitimately incurred. This right would be implied, if it were not expressed; but if the mode and measure of it are expressly declared, no implication can enlarge its limits. It is, in fact, expressly defined. The committee have, by the further provisions of the agreement, also full power and authority "To assess upon and demand and receive from such Companies, from time to time, as such committee shall deem proper, such sum or sums of money for the compensation of such counsel and attorneys, and such other persons, and all other expenses of such defense of said suits as said committee shall deem necessary and expedient, such assessment upon and payment by each of said Companies to be pro rata, as above mentioned." It is very clear, we think, from this language, that for any advances made by the committee for the expenses of the defense, or for any indemnity against any personal liability they may have incurred in conducting it, they could have no personal recourse upon the Companies except by way of assessment upon them severally, each for its own proportion, according to the ratio fixed by the agreement. Such proportion could be enforced by action against each delinquent Company. There is no ground on which the Companies could be made jointly responsible, so that any one or more could be required to make good the default of any of the rest. The fund for the payment of all the obligations contemplated by the agreement is limited, in express terms, to be raised in the mode pointed out in it by a pro rata assessment upon each for its individual share. Such being the relation between the several Companies and the committee, those employed by the latter for the purposes of the agreement can have no greater rights than such as grow out of it. The agency being special, those who claim under it are bound by its limitations; and in the present case the defendant in error, it is Similar reasoning, leading to like conclusions upon analogous facts, is to be found in many reported cases. We select as illustrations, the following: Peckham v. N. Haverhill, 16 Pick., 274; Ludlow v. McCrea, 1 Wend., 228; Ernst v. Bartle, 1 Johns. Cas., 319, Howev. Handley, 25 Me., 116; Gibson v. Lupton, 9 Bing., 297; Fell v. Goslin, 21 L. J. (N. S.), Exch., 145. In our opinion, the court below should have instructed the jury, as requested by the plaintiffs in error, to render a verdict for the defendants below, on the ground that no joint liability had been proven; and its declining to do so was error, for which the judgment is reversed, with directions to grant a new trial, and it is so ordered. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U.S. E. R. MATTHEWS, Exr. of NARCISSA v. MEMPHIS AND CHARLESTON RAIL- (See S. C., Scruggs' Exr., v. Memphis and Charles- 1. Where a decree establishes a lien for a certain amount upon real estate in favor of the party in as there was some dispute between the parties possession, such party being insolvent, on proceed-in reference to the construction of the contract ing to collect the decree with interest, may be compelled by bill in equity to account for and credit on the decree the value of the rents and occupancy of the property since the decree was rendered. 2. Where there are in the hands of the court two funds, the principal and the interest of a decree, and one person has a lien on the interest, and the demand of another is payable out of either principal or interest, a court of equity will direct the payment of the lien of the former out of the interest. 3. Where the interest on a decree represents the income of certain real property, a court of equity having jurisdiction over the enforcement of the decree, may satisfy liens on such income out of such interest. 4. The appointment of a receiver is unnecessary and impracticable, where the property is a decree of the court, of which a receiver could not take possession, but which is virtually in the hands of the court. [No. 116.] Submitted Mar.13, 1885. Decided Apr. 30, 1883. A sippi. The history and facts appear in the of July 7, 1857, they agreed to submit to arbitrators to decide upon the legal construction of said agreement, and the value of said improvements, and the amount which should be paid therefor by the Railroad Company to Mrs. Scruggs upon the surrender of the premises. All other questions arising under said agreement, whether as to the rights of the party to recover damages or otherwise, were expressly reserved. It was further agreed that the award of the arbitrators should be entered as a decree of the Chancery Court of Alcorn County. The arbitrators on April 21, 1871, made their award as follows: "The Memphis and Charleston Railroad the sum of $31,666.66, in full payment of all Company shall pay to the said Narcissa Scruggs the improvements placed on the ground occupied by the Scruggs House on the grounds of said Company, at Corinth, Mississippi, and on payment of said sum of money, the said Narcissa Scruggs shall deliver possession of said hotel to said Railroad Company. We do further decide and decree, that the true construction of the contract is, that by its terms J. W. Scruggs acquires a perpetual lease on the ground occupied by the said hotel on the payment of the sum of $250 per annum rent, and subject to be defeated by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company only on the condition that Scruggs failed to keep a first rate eating-house, and by the said J. W. Scruggs, on condition that said Memphis and Charleston Railroad failed to use said hotel as an eating-house. We do further determine, that from the evidence in the case and the articles of submission and contract, that the sum to be paid by the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company to said Narcissa Scruggs, is, as heretofore mentioned, the value of the property surrendered to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Com Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Woods: On January 8, 1872, a decree was rendered by the Chancery Court of Alcorn County, in the State of Mississippi, in favor of Narcissa Scruggs, one of the appellants, against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad Company, for the sum of $31,666.66, and interest thereon from January 21, 1871. This decree was, on December 14, 1874, affirmed, on appeal, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and a decree rendered against the Railroad Company and the sureties on its appeal bond for the amount of the decree of the Chancery Court of Alcorn County, and interest thereon, and $1,583.33 damages, the whole to bear interest until paid. The transactions which gave rise to the litigation which resulted in this decree were as follows: on July 7, 1857, John W. Scruggs, the husband of said Narcissa, made a contract in writing with the Railroad Company, by which he agreed to erect on its land at Corinth, Mis-pany." sissippi, which was one of the stations on the Company's road, a railroad hotel, and conduct it in a manner acceptable to the Railroad Company, and pay the Company an annual ground rent of $250. It was provided that, should the Railroad Company at any time become dissatisfied with the manner in which the hotel was carried on, the right was reserved to it to take possession thereof by paying Scruggs its value; and if Scruggs became dissatisfied with the schedule or management of the Company, he reserved the right to surrender the improvements put by him on the land, and to require the Company to pay their value at the time of surrender. Scruggs erected a hotel building according to the contract, and kept therein a boarding-house for the officers and employés of the Railroad Company, and a house of refreshment for travelers, until April 21, 1871. About that time, he conveyed the hotel building and other improvements by him put upon the land, and his leasehold in the land, to his wife, Narcissa. On the day just mentioned, Scruggs and his wife and the president of the Railroad Company agreed with each other that the lease should cease and determine, and the property should be surrendered to the Railroad Company. And The Railroad Company refused to pay the award or to take possession of the property. Whereupon, on May 2, 1871, Narcissa Scruggs filed her bill in the Chancery Court of Alcorn County to enforce the performance of the award. After the bringing of the bill, the counsel of the parties filed in the case an agreement in writing, as follows: "In the above case it is agreed that the amount due to the defendant as ground-rent for the land upon which the Corinth Hotel is built, as specified in the lease to J. W. Scruggs, was not included in the award by the arbitration; and it is agreed that the amount due for the same for said rent shall be deducted from whatever amount may be found to be due by the award of said arbitrators; and that the said Scruggs shall be permitted to set off as against said rents, any amount due him by said Railroad for board of employés, etc., the said amount to be adjusted by reference to the Master of the Chancery Court." The litigation commenced by this bill resulted in the decree of the Supreme Court of Mississippi above mentioned. In the meantime, to wit: on August 13, 1871, John W. Scruggs had died. On January 8, 1875, upon an attempt by Mrs. |