Argued Apr. 6, 9, 1883. A Decided Apr. 30, 1883. Messrs. Thomas J. Semmes and Richard "The ship-owner has a right to hold a cargo once shipped on board his vessel, and to carry it to its destination, although circumstances may occur which will cause great delay, and perhaps great diminution of value.' Pars. Adm. & Ship., Vol. I, pp. 158-9; see, also, Clark v. Ins. Co., 2 Pick., 104; Bartlett v. Carnley, 6 Duer, 195; Campbell v. Connor, 70 N. Y., 424. "It is now well settled that as soon as he has the goods on board, and perhaps as soon as he has taken charge of them, he has a right to retain them and carry them on." 1 Pars. Adm. & Ship., p. 179; Hayes v. Camp bell, 55 Cal., 424; Bulkley v. Cotton Co., 24 How., 392 (65 U. S., XVI., 601); The Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall., 555 (72 U. S., XVIII., 664); Pearson v. Goschen, 17 C. B. (N. S.), 370; Hubbell v. Ins. Co., 74 N. Y., 251. pairs would exceed her value when repaired, and she | owners of that vessel, to recover freight money is rendered unseaworthy and incapable of earning The district court and, on appeal, the circuit freight, a contract of affreightment for the carriage of cotton by her to a foreign port, evidenced by a court, dismissed the libel. The libelants have bill of lading, containing the usual and customary appealed to this court. The material facts found exceptions, and providing for the payment of the freight money on the delivery of the cotton at that by the circuit court are these: on the 24th of port, is thereby dissolved, so that the shipper is not February, 1878, the ship, while moored at the liable for any part of the freight money, nor for any wharf in New Orleans, and bound on a voyage of the expenses paid by the vessel for compressing to Liverpool, England, and before she had and stowing the cotton. [No. 237.] broken ground for said voyage, was discovered to be on fire in her hold. Her master had given bills of lading for the transportation from New Orleans to Liverpool, with the exceptions usual in bills of lading, of 5,195 bales of cotton, of which 5,008 had been put on board, one hundred sixty-four were on the levee, and twenty-three had not reached the levee. Water was pumped into the ship to extinguish the fire and, on the 26th, near six o'clock, P. M., being filled with water, she sank to the bottom of the river alongside of the wharf, a part of her bulwarks remaining above water. While so resting upon the bottom of the river, the ship, cargo and freight were, on the 27th, libeled in the district court, for salvage, by the New Harbor Protection Company, and about two o'clock P. M. of that day the marshal, by virtue of a warrant of seizure issued by said court on said libel, took possession of the ship and cargo. On the 28th, about noon, the ship was pumped out and raised alongside of the wharf, and the discharge of the cargo on board was commenced, all of it being damaged by water, and some of it by fire, three hundred thirty-six bales having been removed by the salvors in an undamaged condition before the ship sank but after the fire was discovered; but salvage was claimed and allowed on the entire cargo. On the same day, the proctor for the salvors filed in the district court a motion in writing, suggesting that the whole cargo then being discharged from the ship was greatly damaged by water and some of it by fire and water, and would in all probability have ultimately to be sold, being in an unfit condition to be sent to its destination, and an order of the court was thereupon made directing a sale of the cargo, by the marshal, upon the levee as it came out of the ship, on two days' advertisement, in such lots as might accumulate from day to day. On the same day, an application was made to the court by the master of the ship, in which he represented that he was desirous and entitled to bond the ship and cargo, and asked for a rule upon the libelant to show cause on the next day, March 1, why the order to sell the cargo should not be rescinded, and the master be allowed to bond the cargo. On March 1 the rule came on for hearing. The proctor for the salvors, and counsel representing the insurers of the cargo, appeared and resisted the rescinding of the order of sale, and counsel appeared for the master, who filed a formal claim to the ship and cargo. On the trial of the rule, witnesses were examined orally before the Judge, among them various representatives of the underwriters on the cargo, who were called as witnesses by the proctor for the salvors, and who testified that if their interest were to be consulted they preferred that the cotton should be sold by the marshal as it came out of the ship, and that the master should not be permitted to bond the cotton. The counsel for the insurers of the cargo then asked leave to be heard on their behalf. To this the counsel for the master and claimant objected, It is well settled that an actual loss of freight arises only when the circumstances are such as to render the ultimate earning of freight absolutely impossible or practically hopeless; as when the cargo itself is lost, or there are no means of forwarding it, in case of the loss of the vessel, or similar decisive circumstances. Hubbell v. Ins. Co., 74 N. Y., 252; Shipton v. Thornton, 9 Ad. & El., 334; Kidston v. Ins. Co., L. R., 2 C. P., 357; Hugg v. Ins. & Bkg. Co., 7 How., 595; Hickie v. Rodocanachi, 4 Hurl. & N., 455; Jordan v. Ins. Co., 1 Story, 342; McGaw v. Ins. Co., 23 Pick., 405; Saltus v. Ins. Co., 14 Johns., 138; Clark v. Ins. Co., 2 Pick., 104; 2 Pars. Mar. L., 388; Lord v. Ins. Co., 10 Gray, 115. Messrs. P. Phillips, W. H. Phillips and J. McConnell, for appellees: Freight commences from the breaking of ground. The ship begins to earn when she begins to move, and we cannot introduce new principles. Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & P., 634; 3 Kent, Com. (marg.), 224; Macl. Mer. Ship., 455, 458; Bailey v. Damon, 3 Gray, 94. 'If the ship does not begin her voyage at all, does not break ground, no freight can be payable." 1 Pars. Adm. & Ship.,220; Abbott, 12th Lond. ed., 1881, p. 391; Burgess v. Gun, 3 Harr. & J., 225; Smith, Merc. L., 308; Bailey v. Damon, 3 Gray, 94. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: This is a libel in admiralty against the cargo of the ship Tornado, brought by the master and and insisted that counsel for the underwriters that which had been sold were then in the cuson the cargo could not be heard until after the tody of the marshal, in the suit for salvage. proof of abandonment to them by the owners of The libel recites the proceedings above menthe cargo and acceptance of the abandonment. tioned, and alleges that the cotton might have Thereupon, Mr. Palfrey, President of the Fac- been picked, dried and rebaled, and sent to its tors' and Traders' Insurance Company of New destination and freight have been earned thereOrleans, which was one of the companies repre- on, but that the application of the master to sented by said counsel, and one of the witnesses bond the cargo was refused, owing to the oppowho had been called to the stand as above stated, sition of the libelant for salvage, and especially was recalled by said counsel and testified that so to the opposition of the underwriters on the carfar as his company was concerned the loss on go; and that, under the contract of carriage, it the cargo had been paid or ordered to be paid, was the right as well as the duty and the desire and said company had become the owner of the of the libelants to pick, dry and rebale so much cotton insured by it, and abandonment thereof of the cotton as might require it, and which had been made and accepted by his company. could easily have been done, and to carry it to After this said counsel was allowed to and did its destination and earn the freight money for make an oral argument in behalf of the under- carrying it, which they had been unable to do writers, in opposition to the motion to rescind because they had been denied the right to bond the order to sell which had been obtained by the it, owing to the opposition of the libelant for salvors, but no pleadings were filed in behalf of salvage and of the underwriters on the cargo, the underwriters. Upon the trial of the rule evi- resulting in the taking away of the cargo endence was also taken, by order of the court, in tirely from the master, in consequence of which relation to the condition of the cargo, and wheth- the entire freight money agreed on became due, er the same was or was not a total loss. On as well as money paid by the libelants for comMarch 5, and before the district court had made pressing and stowing the cargo in the vessel, any decision or order on the rule to rescind the and other expenses incident thereto, and for order for the sale of the cotton, a proctor repre- railroad charges, for all of which the libel claims senting underwriters at Lloyds, by leave of the a lien on the cargo and on the proceeds of sale. court, filed an intervention for the interest of The circuit court found the following further the insurers of the freight on the cargo, in which facts: the libelants paid for compressing the it was prayed that the order for the sale of the cargo before it was put on board and for stowcargo be rescinded. This intervention was sup-ing it on board, and other expenses incident ported by affidavits filed by the interveners and by a brief of the proctor. Afterwards, on March 6, after consideration of the rule taken by the master of the ship to rescind the order of sale, and of the evidence and arguments thereon, and of the last named intervention, and of the affidavits and brief submitted therewith, the court ordered that the master be allowed to bond the ship and such of the cotton then stored in the levee steam cotton-press as was in good order, amounting to five hundred twenty-three bales, and that the remainder of the cargo on board the ship or upon the levee, which was more or less damaged, be sold by the marshal after three days' notice, and all questions of freight were reserved by the court, and the court appointed a trinity master to advise and assist in making sale of the cotton. On the 19th of March, the underwriters filed their claim, claiming all of the cargo, and procured an order from the Judge of the District Court to be entered on their claim, suspending the right given to the master, on the 6th of March, to bond such of the cotton as was stored in the levee cotton-press, to wit: about five hundred bales, until the further order of the court. On March 26, the master not having bonded the cotton, a rule was taken and duly served on him to show cause why the order of March 6, so far as it allowed him to bond a portion of the cotton, should not be rescinded and the movers of the rule, the insurers of the cargo, be allowed to bond the same. The rule was heard on March 27, the movers of the rule and the master being represented by their respective counsel, and was by the court made absolute, without opposition, and the order allowing the master to bond said portion of the cargo was rescinded, and the movers of the rule were allowed to bond the same. On the 30th of March, the present libel was filed. The unsold cargo and the proceeds of thereto, $14,278.26. The gross freight on the cargo, had it been delivered at its destination in Liverpool, as required by the bills of lading, would have been £4,169.13.1. Of the cotton, five hundred twenty-three bales were in an undamaged and sound condition, being the twenty-three, the one hundred sixty-four and the three hundred thirty-six before mentioned. In consequence of the fire, and as a result thereof, the ship was so badly damaged that the cost of her repairs would exceed her value when repaired, and she was unseaworthy and incapable of carrying freight. The five hundred twenty-three bales were bonded by the underwriters and were appraised at the sum of $19,100. The gross proceeds of the sale of the damaged cotton amounted to $116,000. The purchaser at the marshal's sale shipped to Northern States, in the condition in which it came from the ship, 1,185 bales of the damaged cotton; and 2,896 bales more were picked, dried, rebaled and shipped, part to Liverpool and the rest to Philadelphia. All the damaged cotton taken from the ship was unmerchantable cotton, even after it had been picked, dried and rebaled; that is, it could not be used for making cotton cloth, but could only be used for making felt hats, paper, wadding and such like articles, having lost, by the submersion and drying, a large part of its natural oil, its fiber being injured and its weight reduced. On the facts so found, the circuit court held that the libelants had no lien on the cargo or its proceeds, for freight or for the money paid by them for compressing and stowing the cargo, and dismissed the libel. The libelants seek to apply to the present case the principle applied where a voyage partly performed is interrupted by a disaster to the ship, namely, that the ship-owner has a lien on the cargo for the earning of the freight, and so has it forward, would have been to send it by another vessel. But, although the order of March 6 allowed the master to bond the five hundred twenty-three undamaged bales, and there was no suspension of that order until the 19th of March, they were not bonded. a right to carry the cargo forward by his vessel or some other conveyance, and deliver it and receive his full freight. As in the case of a disaster to the ship in the course of a voyage the whole freight is payable if, by the fault of the owner of the cargo, the master is prevented from forwarding the cargo from an intermedi- We are of opinion that, by the disaster which ate port to its destination, it is contended in the occurred before the ship had broken ground or present case that the libelants have a right to commenced to earn freight, the circumstances recover the whole agreed freight, because they with reference to which the contract of afhad a right to send the cargo to Liverpool and freightment was entered into were so altered by earn full freight, and were prevented from do- the supervening of occurrences which it cannot ing so by the action of the underwriters, who be intended were within the contemplation of became, by abandonment, the owners of the the parties in entering into the contract, that cargo. It is also contended that the owners had the shipper and the underwriters were absolved a right to repair the ship, even though the cost from all liability under the contract of afof repairing would exceed her value when re- freightment. The contract had reference to a paired. particular ship, to be in existence as a seaThe law in regard to the respective rights and worthy vessel and capable of carrying cargo and liabilities of shipper and ship-owner, where car-earning freight and of entering on the voyage. go has been carried for a part of a voyage, is no- All the fundamental conditions forming part of where better expressed than by Lord Ellenbor- the contract of the ship-owner were wanting, at ough, in Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East, 378, 394: the time when the earning of freight could "The ship-owners undertake that they will commence. In addition, as the result of the carry the goods to the place of destination, un- fire, and by no fault of the shipper, all but five less prevented by the dangers of the seas, or hundred twenty-three bales of the cotton was other unavoidable casualties; and the freighter rendered unmerchantable and put into such a undertakes that if the goods be delivered at the condition that its owner might well hesitate to place of their destination he will pay the stipu- incur the expense of sending it to Liverpool. lated freight; but it was only in that event, viz.: As to the undamaged cotton, the master had an of their delivery at the place of destination, that opportunity for thirteen days to bond it, and he, the freighter, engages to pay anything. If failed to do so. the ship be disabled from completing her voy- The money paid by the ship-owners for comage, the ship-owner may still entitle himself to pressing and stowing the cotton, and for other the whole freight, by forwarding the goods by expenses incident thereto, must be understood some other means to the place of destination; as having been included in the freight money, but he has no right to any freight if they be not and to be re-imbursed out of that, and to be so forwarded; unless the forwarding them be money for which, in any event, the shipper of dispensed with, or unless there be some new the cotton would not have been liable in addibargain upon this subject. If the ship-owner tion to the freight money. If the ship-owner will not forward them, the freighter is entitled was not entitled to the latter, he was not entito them without paying anything. One party, tled to anything. He took, as to the expenses, therefore, if he forward them, or be prevented the risk of losing them if he lost the freight or discharged from so doing, is entitled to his money. So, the two are bound up together. whole freight; and the other, if there be a re- It is an inherent element in a contract of affusal to forward them, is entitled to have them freightment under a bill of lading, that the veswithout paying any freight at all. The gener-sel shall enter on the voyage named, and begin al property in the goods is in the freighter; the the carriage of the goods shipped, or, as it is ship-owner has no right to withhold the posses- technically called, break ground, before a claim sion from him, unless he has either earned his to freight money can arise, unless the shipper freight, or is going on to earn it. If no freight of the goods, the vessel remaining ready to enbe earned and he decline proceeding to earn ter on the voyage, undertakes to reclaim the any, the freighter has a right to the possession." goods. In the latter case, the circumstances These remarks were made in regard to a voyage under which the contract was entered into conpartly performed, and interrupted by a disaster, tinuing substantially the same so far as respects where freight money was claimed pro rata itin- the vessel, the shipper cannot reclaim the goods eris peracti. But no case can be found in which without paying at least full freight. But, subfreight money has been allowed, where the voy-ject to this qualification, it is a principle of the age was not commenced, and the ship was, by a disaster for which the shipper was not at all responsible, put into the situation of the vessel in this case after the contract of carriage was made. maritime law, that if a ship does not begin her voyage at all, does not break ground, no freight can be payable. This was laid down and ap plied in the early case of Curling v. Long, 1 Bos. & P., 634. That case has never been overIn the present case, the ship was rendered un- ruled and no case holding to the contrary is seaworthy by the fire and incapable of earning cited or has been found. It is a case directly freight, and was so badly damaged that the cost in point in two particulars, and it will be useof her repairs would exceed her value when re-ful, therefore, briefly to examine it. Some hogspaired. There is no suggestion in the findings that there was any intention of repairing her, and on the facts found it must be presumed she would not have been repaired. All that could have been done, if the cargo had been bonded by the master or ship-owners, in regard to sending heads of sugar were shipped, under bills of lading, on a vessel while lying in a port in Jamaica, bound for London. Before the vessel sailed she was cut out by privateers and carried to sea, but was recaptured and taken into another port. Under a libel for salvage in the Ad "The Connemara." miralty Court of Jamaica the cargo was sold by The case of Jones v. Holm, L. R. 2 Exch., 335, was a different case. By a charter-party, a vessel was to go to a specified port and take a specified cargo and deliver it at Liverpool for a specified freight. She went to the port and was partly laden, when she was so damaged by fire that she was scuttled. The cargo was injured and sold, except a small part, not on board, which was forwarded to Liverpool by the master. The vessel was repaired and tendered to take the remainder of the cargo. The charterer refused to supply more cargo, and the vessel obtained a cargo and carried it to England at a less freight than she would have earned for a full freight under the charter-party. In a suit to recover damages for a breach of the charter-party, it was held that the charterer was bound to complete the lading of the vessel. The authority of the case of Curling v. Long is recognized in Bailey v. Damon, 3 Gray, 94; Burgess v. Gun, 3 Harr. & J., 225; Clemson v. Davidson, 5 Binn., 392; and in various text books. 3 Kent, Com., 223; 1 Pars. Ship. & Adm., 220; Abb. Ship., 11th Lond. ed., 407; Macl. Ship., 2d ed., 458; Sm. Merc. L., 3d Am. ed., 400. the plaintiffs contracted to erect certain machinery on the defendant's premises at specific prices for particular portions, and to keep it in repair for two years, the price to be paid upon completion of the whole. After some portions of the work had been finished, and others were in the course of completion, the premises, with all the machinery and materials thereon, were destroyed by an accidental fire. It was held that both parties were excused from the further performance of the contract, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue in respect of those portions of the work which had been completed, whether the materials used had become the property of the defendant or not. See, Benj. Sales, 3d. Am. ed., sec. 570; Wells v. Calnan, 107 Mass., 514, and cases there cited. These principles are so well established that it is only necessary to refer to one case in this court, Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S., 24 [XXIV., 644], which recognizes them, in which it is said: Where an act is to be performed by the plaintiff before the accruing of the defendant's liability under his contract, the plaintiff must prove either his performance of such condition precedent, or an offer to perform it which the defendant rejected, or his readiness to fulfill the condition until the defendant discharged him from so doing, or prevented the execution of the matter which the contract required him to perform. *** A contract may be so framed that the promises upon one side may be dependent on the promises upon the other, so that no action can be maintained, founded on the written contract, without showing that the plaintiff has performed, or at least has been ready, if allowed by the other party, to perform his own stipulations, which are a condition precedent to his right of action." On a full consideration of the case, we are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. WILLIAM P. SINCLAIR AND SAMUEL G. v. BEATRICE MORAN COOPER, Widow of On principle, this case falls within the rule that where the stipulations of a contract are interdependent, a defendant cannot be sued for the non-performance of stipulations on his part which were dependent on conditions which the plaintiff has not performed. The ship-owner was entitled to freight only for carrying the cargo and delivering it at Liverpool, with the implied covenant that this particular vessel was to take it on board and enter on the voyage. Before that event occurred, this vessel was substantially put out of existence by no fault of the shipper, and he had and could have no benefit from the contract. He had a right, therefore, to treat the contract as rescinded, so far as any liability for freight was concerned. In Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & Smith, 826, it is laid down as a rule that "In contracts in which the performance depends on the continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is implied, that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance." The reason given for the rule is, that, without any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing shall excuse the perform- Salvage service by rescue from fire—cxcessive deance, "That excuse is by law implied, because, from the nature of the contract, it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular person or chattel." The rule was there applied to excuse the owner of a music hall, which had been burned, from fulfilling a contract to let the use of it. The principle was extended farther in Appleby v. Myers, L. R., 2 C. P., 651. There (See S. C., "The Connemara," Reporter's ed., 352360.) crce. *1. A ship, towed by a steam-tug down a river came to anchor in the evening, and the tug was lashed to her side. In the night, no watch having been set, a passenger on board of her was awakened Head notes by Mr. Justice GRAY. NOTE.-What is salvage; who is a salvor; rates of salvage. See note to Stratton v. Jarvis, 33 U. S. (8 Pet.). 4. of the tug, might share in the salvage. cable to the case. Argued Apr. 17, 1883. Decided Apr. 30, 1883. by a smell of smoke arising from a fire, which had | value, or $18,930.96; and the owners and claimbroken out in part of the cargo stowed in the poop, ants of the ship appealed to the circuit court. and which endangered the ship and cargo. He gave the alarm to the officers and crews of the ship and The circuit court found the following facts: of the tug; and he and the officers, crew and passen- on the 15th of April, 1879, the ship Connemara, gers of the tug, working together, and by means of being in the Port of New Orleans, with her cara steam-pump and hose upon the tug, and unaided by the officers and crew of the ship, put out the fire go on board, consisting chiefly of pressed cotin twenty minutes. Held, that this was a salvage ton, and bound on a voyage for Liverpool, Enservice, and that the passenger on board the ship, gland, engaged the tow-boat Joseph Cooper, Jr., as well as the owner, officers, crew and passengers to tow her to the mouth of the Mississippi Riv 2. Under the Act of Congress of 16th of February, er, and was by her towed about twenty-six miles 1875, ch. 77, a decree of salvage by the circuit court down the river, and came to anchor about eight is not to be altered by this court for excess in the o'clock in the evening opposite the Belair planamount awarded, unless the excess is so great that, upon any reasonable view of the facts found, the tation. About eleven o'clock at night, the ship, award cannot be justified by the rules of law appli- with the tow-boat lashed to her side, was lying with her bow to the current and her stern to the [No. 255.] wind, which was blowing stiffly; no watch had been set; and the two mates and the boatswain of the ship were under the influence of liquor, but the captain and the rest of the crew were sober. Evers, a passenger on board the ship, being then asleep in the second mate's cabin, was awakened by a smoke of burning cotton, sprang from his berth, and gave the alarm to the officers and crews of the ship and of the tow. boat. The fire was not in the hold, but in the poop above the main deck, and near the door, which could be opened by raising the latch; and the fire, when discovered, was confined to three bales of cotton, a spare sail, and two coils of This court defines the elements of salvage serv-tarred rope. There were one hundred and ice to be: "Danger to property, value, risk of life, skill, labor and the duration of the service." Post v. Jones, 19 How., 161 (60 U. S., XV., 622); The Henry, 2 Eng. L. & E., 565. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United Messrs. P. Phillips and W. Hallett Phillips, for appellants: Joseph Cooper and crew are not entitled to salvage compensation, but only to a liberal remuneration pro opere et labore. The Clifton,3 Hagg. Adm.,117, cited in Abb., Ship. (marg.), 557. The service was performed by the tug and her crew, then in the employ of the ship. It was long doubted whether a tug, while engaged in the service of a ship, could ever claim salvage. It is well settled that when a tug is so engaged this will greatly diminish the quantum of reward. James, Salvage, 40; Dr. Lushington, on "The Wm. Brant, Jr.," 2 Notes of Cas. supp., p. LXVII. The main ingredient, danger, being absent in ordinary services rendered by tugs, large amounts should not be awarded. The Birdie, 7 Blatchf., 243; Williams & Br., Adm., 100; The Blackwell, 10 Wall., 14 (77 U. S., XIX., 875). The value of the ship and cargo should not constitute the main consideration in the case. The Amerique, L. R., 6 P. C., App., 472. The decree in favor of Evers, a passenger on The Connemara, is not sustainable. 3. Kent, Com., 246; The Cranston, 2 Hagg., 3; The Clarita, 23 Wall., 18 (90 U. S., XXIII., 152); The Vrede, 1 Lush., 322. Messrs. Charles W. Hornor, J. R. Beckwith and Richard DeGray, for appellees. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: This is a libel in admiralty by the owner, master and crew of the steam tow-boat Joseph Cooper, Jr., for salvage on the ship Connemara and cargo. Louis Wurtz and Henry Holser, passengers on the tow-boat, and John Evers, a passenger on the ship, were permitted to file intervening libels. The value of the ship and cargo was agreed to be $236,637. The district court awarded as salvage eight per cent on that | twenty-seven bales of cotton stowed in the poop. The fire was not caused by the fault of the towboat, nor by any defect in her equipment or management. The tow-boat had on her deck a pump worked by steam, and hose long enough to reach the fire on the ship. As soon as the alarm was given, and by the exertions of the tow-boat's officers and crew, of her two passengers and of Evers, the hose was laid from the pump to the deck of the ship, and by their use of this pump and hose the fire was put out in fifteen or twenty minutes, without any damage to ship or cargo, beyond the burning of the sail and the two coils of rope, the partial burning of the three bales of cotton, and the charring of a part of the upper deck or roof of the poop. In extinguishing the fire, there was no serious risk of loss or damage to the tow-boat, or of injury to life or limb of any of the salvors. No efficient effort was made by the officers or the crew of the ship to extinguish the fire. The ship had on her deck, within fifteen feet of the fire, two tanks of water, holding four hundred gallons each, one of which was full and the other half full, with six buckets near the fire and seven above, and a pump by which water could have been pumped upon the upper deck. At the time of the fire, the steam-tug Harry Wright was lying about a quarter of a mile off; and there was a telegraph station on the Belair plantation, from which a dispatch could have been sent to the City of New Orleans for aid to put out the fire, and efficient aid might have reached the ship from the city in two hours and a half after notice. The agreed value, as aforesaid, of The Connemara and cargo, and the names and monthly wages of each of the officers and crew of The Joseph Cooper, Jr., were also stated in the findings of fact. From these facts, the circuit court made and stated the following as conclusions of law: 1. The services rendered by the tow-boat Joseph Cooper, Jr., her officers and crew, and the three |