upon the delivery of such copy to the distiller." | coupons, having purchased said bonds with the This is equivalent to saying that the survey coupons attached in open market, paying thereshall be binding on the distiller when the copy for eighty-five cents on the dollar. is delivered to him. When, therefore, the distiller in this case accepted the survey and stipulated that it was binding on him, he in effect said that he would consider the survey as having effect without the formal delivery of a copy. This he might do. The judgment is affirmed. True copy. Test: The court below held that the City of Shreveport had no authority to issue the bonds in question, that they were, therefore, void, and that the defendant was entitled to judgment; whereupon, the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. Messrs. James Grant, Whit. M. Grant, and James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. s. Alfred Ennis, for plaintiff in error: This action was brought in the court below, by the plaintiff in error, to recover the amount of certain overdue interest coupons belonging to ninety negotiable bonds for $1,000 each, issued by the defendant. The parties waived the intervention of a jury, and having agreed upon the facts, submitted the case to the court. It appeared, from the agreement of the parties, that on June 26, 1872, the city council of Shreveport enacted an ordinance which provided for the purchase of certain real estate, to be donated to the Texas and Pacific Railroad Company, upon which the company was permanently to maintain and establish its depots and machine shops; which provided for the purchase price of said real estate by the issuing and sale of the bonds of the City to the amount of $260,000, payable forty years after date, with interest at eight per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, and with interest coupons attached; which provided for the levy of an annual tax to pay the principal and interest of said bonds, and which provided that said ordinance should be submitted to a vote of the people of the City for their ratification and approval; this ordinance is the only one by virtue of which the bonds in question were issued and sold; that on July 1, 1872, the said ordinance was submitted to a vote of the people of the City, and seven hundred five votes were cast for, and three votes against, its ratification and approval, and the bonds were accordingly issued; that the plaintiff is a bona fide owner of the bonds to which the coupons sued on belong, and of said This charter and this identical purchase have been before the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and the power to purchase real estate held to be conferred. Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. Ann., 636. The City had authority to purchase this land, under sections 2 and 21 of the charter. 18t. Munic. of N. O. v. McDonough, 2 Rob. (La.), 244; Edey v. Shreveport (supra). The question then arises: had this City authority to issue negotiable bonds to raise money with which to pay for the same, or a part pay ment thereon? Where a corporation is authorized to do any act, and no mode is pointed out for its exercise, it may adopt any which in its judgment will best secure the purpose contemplated. lena v. Corwith, 48 Ill., 423; State Board v. R. Life Ins. & T. Co. v. Lanier, 5 Fla., 110; GaCo., 47 Ind., 407. chase, carries with it power to incur indebtedThe power in a municipal corporation to purness for the purchase money, and to issue its negotiable obligations promising to pay the indebtedness at a future day. People v. Brennan, 39 Barb., 522; 1 Dill., Mun. Corp., 3d ed., sec. 118, p. 144; 2 Dan. Neg. Inst.. 461; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio (part 2,), 31; State v. Madison, 7 Wis., 688; Clark v. School Dist., 3 R. I., 199; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y, 356. Holding that municipal corporations generally have the power to issue bonds and notes without express authority; see, also, Com. v. Pittsburg, 41 Pa., 278; Douglas v. Virginia City, 5 Nev,, 147; Moss v. Harpeth Academy, 7 Heisk., 283; Adams v. R. R. Co., 2 Cold., 645; R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind., 395; Galena v. Corwith, 48 Ill., 423; Miller v. Board, 66 Ind., 162. Where the power of taxation is given to a municipal corporation with which to accomplish the ordinary and usual objects of its organization or for specified purposes, and no other express power is given to raise money, it may be best to construe its powers strictly, although the weight of authority is opposed to such limitation. Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470; New England, etc., Co., v. Robinson, 25 Ind., 536; Bank v. Danville, 60 Ind., 504; Lynde v. The Co., 16 Wall., 6 (83 U. S., XXI., 272); Sheffield v. Andress, 56 Ind., 157; Kelly v. Brooklyn, 4 Hill, 263; Galena v. Corwith (supra); Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C., 267; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 356; Sturtevants v. Alton, 8 McLean, 393; Austin v. Colony, 51 Iowa, 102. Where the power of taxation is given merely as an incident to enable the corporation to carry out the usual purposes of its organization, and it is authorized to do other and independent things which require the use of money, and es pecially if in large and unusual sums, such as the purchase of property and the construction of buildings, the weight of authority is that they may, where it is not expressly prohibited, borrow the money and give notes, bonds and other usual evidences of indebtedness therefor, as incidental and necessarily implied from the express power, given. Williamsport v. Com., 84 Pa., 487; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis., 470; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio (part 2), 31; Board v. Day, 19 Ind., 450; Miller v. Board, 66 Ind., 162; Bk. of New Albany v. Danville, 60 Ind., 504; Gause v. Clarksville, 5 Dill., 165; Lynde v. The Co. (supra); Police Jury v. Britton, 15 Wall., 566 (82 U, S., XXI., 251); Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. Ann., 636. And that is true, almost without exception, where the notes and bonds are issued to raise funds for an indebtedness already created, as in the case before the court. Clark v. School Dist., 3 R. I., 199; Austin v. Colony, 51 Iowa, 102; Williamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. St., 487; 1st Munic. N. O. v. McDonough, 2 Rob., 242; Barry v. Merch. Exch. Co.,1 Sandf., Ch., 280; Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y., 9-62; Smith v. Law., 21 N. Y., 296; Bank v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, part 2, 31; Ketchum v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 356; Douglas v. Virginia City, 5 Nev., 147. Power to borrow money is almost universally conceded to carry, by implication, authority to the municipal corporation to issue bonds and other securities. Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, 34 Pa., 496; R. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind., 395; Commonwealth V. Allegheny Co., 37 Pa., 241; Commonwealth v. Pittsburg, 41 Pa., 278; Seybert v. Pittsburg, 1 Wall., 272 (68 U.S., XVII., 553); Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall., 654 (70 U. S., XVIII., 79); De Voss v. Richmond, 18 Grat., 338; Galena v. Corwith, 48 III., 423; Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St., 487; Kelly v. Mayor, 4 Hill, 265; Police Jury v. Britton (supra); Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 637; Mayor v. Inman, 57 Ga.,370; | Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C., 267; Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall., 95 (68 U. S., XVII., 550); Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall., 384 (68 U. S., XVII., 564); Lynde v. The Co. (supra). If the issue was improper, it was committed by the officers of the Corporation, and it is estopped from setting it up. E. Lincoln v.Davenport, 94 U.S.,801 (XXIV., 322); Supervisors v. Galbraith, 99 U. S., 214 (XXV., 410). This is at most a mere irregularity in the execution of a power committed by the officers of the Corporation, of which the City is now estopped from taking advantage. Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall., 772 (72 U. S., XVIII., 556); Society for Sav. v. N. London, 29 Conn., 174; Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 Ill., 405; Pendleton Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall., 297 (80 U. S., XX., 579); Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How.,287 (65 U. S., XVI., 664); Savings Bk. v. Springfield, 4 F. R., 276; Woodhull v. Beaver Co., 3 Wall., Jr., 274; Humboldt v. Long, 92 U.S., 642 (XXIII., 752); Lewis v. Comrs., 105 U. S., 739 (XXVI., 993); Warren Co. v. Marcy, 97 U. S., 96 (XXIV., 977). Mr. B. F. Jonas, for defendant in error: The plaintiff's claim is resisted on the ground that the city council of the defendant was ab108 U.S. U S., Book 27. solutely without authority to issue the bonds which constitute its basis. Wilson v. Shreveport, 29 La. Ann., 673. The power to issue these bonds being absolutely wanting, they are void into whosesoever hands they may have come, no matter how innocent a holder he may be, or how good the faith in which they may have been acquired. Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 543 (62 U. S., XXII., 210); Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 WaN., 683 (77 U. S., XIX., 1042); Dill. Mun. Corp., sec. 426. The power of taxation is granted as a means of carrying out these purposes. The diversion of these revenues to other purposes is unlawful and ultra vires. If it is desirable that a municipal body should have the power of subscribing to railroads or plank roads, or of issuing commercial securities to be sold in the financial markets, it is time enough for it to do so when authorized thereto by legislation. It possesses no powers but such as are given to it expressly or by necessary implication. Chisholm v. Montgomery, 2 Woods, 594; see, also, Dill. Mun. Corp., sec. 106; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall., 468 (86 U. S., XXII., 164); Knapp v. Hoboken, 39 N. J. L., 394; Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb., 227; Jones, R. R. Secur., secs. 222, 223. The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are uniform to the effect that a municipal corporation cannot, without legislative authority, issue bonds in aid of an extraneous object. Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall., 676 (77 U. S., XIX., 1040); Pendleton v. Amy, 13 Wall., 297 (80 U. S., XX., 579); Kennicott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 452 (83 U. S., XXI., 319); St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 Wall., 644 (83 U. S., XXI., 328); Harshman v. Bates Co., 92 U. S., 569 (XXIII., 747); Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S., 484 (XXIII., 579); S. Ottawa v. Perkins,94 U.S.,260 (XXIV., 154). Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This was a suit brought to recover the amount of certain coupons cut from bonds issued by the City of Shreveport, Louisiana, which appear on their face to have been issued "in aid of the Texas and Pacific Railroad Company." In point of fact, the bonds were used to buy lands to be donated to the railroad company as a site for depots and machine-shops. We have had occasion, at this Term, in the case of Ottawa v. Carey [ante, 669], to repeat and apply a rule which has always been recognized and adhered to in this court, to the effect, that unless power has been given by the Legislature to a municipal corporation to grant pecuniary aid to railroad corporations, all bonds of the municipality, issued for such a purpose, and bearing evidence of that fact on their face, are void even in the hands of bona fide holders, and this, whether the people voted the aid or not. Every purchaser of such a bond is chargeable in law with notice of the want of power in the municipal authorities to bind the body politic in that way. This principle is elementary. In the present case it is not pretended that any such power was expressly granted to the City of Shreveport, and we find no provision of the charter from which anything of the kind can be implied. The authority to purchase and hold property of all kinds relates only to such prop- trict court, a stipulation in the sum of $2,100, as her erty as is needed for municipal purposes. It is appraised value, was given. The libel having been dismissed by the circuit court, on appeal, the libela matter of no importance that the City em- ant appealed to this court: held, that the matter in ployed agents to sell the bonds, or that its law dispute did not exceed the sum or value of $5,000, officer gave an opinion in favor of their valid- exclusive of costs, as required by section 3 of the ity, or that they have been recognized in official act of February 16, 1875, 18 Stat. at L., 316, and that this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal. statements as binding obligations, or that taxes 2. A decree against the vessel for $27,000 would not have been levied to pay either principal or in- establish the liability of the claimant to respond for terest. Corporate ratification, without author- of the vessel at the time of the collision, and that that amount in personam unless he was the owner ity from the Legislature, cannot make a munic-fact must appear by the record, in order to be so far ipal bond valid which was void when issued for a foundation for such liability as to authorize this want of legislative power to make it. These court to consider the $27,000 as the value of the matter in dispute on said appeal. bonds carried on their face full notice to every [No. 212.] purchaser that they were issued for a purpose not authorized by law, that is to say, to aid a railroad corporation. This whole subject was so fully considered in Ottawa v. Carey, supra, that we deem it unnecessary to discuss the subject further now. Argued Apr. 10, 1883. Decided Apr. 23, 1883. AP York. On motion to dismiss for want of jurisdic tion. The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. Henry J. Scudder, for the claimants, appellees, in support of motion: This motion is based upon the language of chapter 77, of the Laws of 1874, section 3. The value of such matter could not exceed the value of the schooner, for the lien could only consume her, and such value was $2,100. A few elemental propositions demonstrate that it is the question of lien which is the matter in dispute. In Edey v. Shreveport, 26 La. Ann., 636, which is relied upon as establishing the power of the City to issue the bonds, the question was whether the vendor of the land, which had been only partly paid for out of the proceeds of the bonds, could enforce his mortgage and vendor's privilege on the land to recover the balance of pur-section 692, of the U. S. R. S., as amended by chase money due him, and it was decided that he could. This is no more than was in effect held by this court at the present Term in Parkersburg v. Brown [ante, 238]. All that was said by the Supreme Court of Louisiana must be construed in connection with the question then up for decision. There is not a word about the validity of the outstanding bonds, nor of the right of the holders to recover upon them in a suit against the City. The whole effect of the decision is that the City could not keep the land as against the vendor without paying for it. That the court would have held the bonds void, if it had been called on to decide that question, is shown beyond all doubt in the case of Wilson v. Shreveport, 29 La. Ann., 673, where the power to issue bonds, apparently of a much less objectionable character, was expressly denied. The judgment is affirmed. True copy. Test: 2 The lien is a jus in re. The Kate Tremaine, 5 Ben., 69; The Triumph, Blatchf.,n.,433; The Feronia, 17 L. T. R.,622. The stipulation takes the place of the vessel, and relieves her from all liability. The Virginia Ehrman, 97 U. S., 317 (XXIV., 893); The Lady Pike, 96 Ú. S.,465 (XXIV.,674). The utmost amount the libelant can recover is the amount of the stipulation for value. The Wanata, 95 U. S., 614 (XXIV., 465) If it be claimed that the decree in rem will James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. establish a liability of the owners in an action Cited-110 U. S., 196. in personam, the answer is that no such collat- Troy v. Evans, 97 U. S., 3 (XXIV., 942). tion. In that case, a decree for wages amounting to more than $50 was entered by the district court. The right of appeal to the circuit court was resisted on the ground that the matter in dispute was the proceeds of the vessel which did not equal $50. *1. The libelant in a suit in rem, in admiralty, But the circuit court allowed the appeal sayagainst a vessel, for damages growing out of a collision, claimed, in his libel, to recover $27,000 dam-ing, "What is in dispute in this case is not the ages. After the attachment of the vessel in the dis- vessel or even the existence of a lien thereon, *Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. as a security for any wages which may be due; but it is whether any wages are due, and, if any, what is their amount." NOTE.-Jurisdiction of U. S. Supreme Court dependent on amount; interest cannot be added to give jurisdiction; how value of thing demanded may be shown; what cases reviewable without regard to sum in controversy. See note to Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U. 8. (3 Pet.), 33. So in this case the matter in dispute is not the vessel, nor her proceeds, nor the stipulation which takes the place of the vessel, nor the existence of a lien on the vessel for the damages claimed; but it is whether any damages are due | ant to the rules and practice of the district and, if any, what is their amount. court, signed "W. H. Sise & Co., by R. H. We have found no authority in this court so Seward," and also signed by two sureties, not directly in point; but authorities which adopt claimants. A stipulation for costs, entered into the principle and cover the case are not want- on behalf of the claimants, on November 9th, ing. pursuant to the rules and practice of the disKnapp v. Banks, 2 How., 73; see, also, Wil-trict court, recites that a claim had been filed son v. Daniel, 3 Dall., 401; Gordon v. Ogden, 3 in the cause by Daniel Marcy, William H. Sise, Pet., 34. and others, owners of said vessel, etc. The answer, which was sworn to December 18, 1875, purports to be the answer of seventeen persons, two of whom are Daniel Marcy and William H. Sise, whom it states to be claimants of the schooner and respondents, and the answer speaks of the vessel as the respondents' schooner. The oath to the answer is made by a person who swears that he is agent for the schooner and transacts business for her owners, and that the owners are not, nor is either of them, or the master thereof, within this district. This case comes squarely within the general rule laid down by the above cases, that the damages laid are the matter in dispute in cases of tort or trespass. The question of the amount or value of the security which the party plaintiff has for his claim, has never been considered by this court. An attempt to have it thus considered, failed, in the case of Ross v. Prentiss, 3 How., 771. It may be suggested that these cases refer to cases at law. But the same language is used and applied to appeals in admiralty in the case of Olney v. The Falcon, 17 How, 22 (58 U. S., XV., 43). If this libel had been filed to recover the schooner herself, the matter in dispute might be held to be her actual value. Richmond v. Milwaukee, 21 How., 392 (62 U. S., XVI., 61). This is not an action to recover the possession of the schooner, but the damages sustained by the libelant; and it is exactly covered by the language of this court in the case of "The Falcon," above cited, that "An appeal may be taken by the plaintiff, where his claim of damages in the declaration or libel exceeds the sum" which is necessary to the appellate jurisdiction. It is the damages sustained by the libelant which is the matter in dispute between the parties, entirely irrespective of the amount of security which he may have for their payment. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit in rem, in admiralty, to recover damages, for a collision, brought in the district court, where the libel was dismissed. The decree was affirmed by the circuit court, on appeal, and the libelant has appealed to this court. The amount of damages claimed in the libel is $27,000. The collision occurred on the 2d of November, 1875. The libel was filed on the 5th day of the same month, and the vessel was attached, under process, on the same day. On the 9th, Richard H. Seward, describing himself as master of the schooner sued, filed a claim to her, in which he stated that he intervened, as agent of the owners of the schooner, "For the interest of Daniel Marcy, William H. Sise, and others, owners of said schooner," in her, and made claim to her, and averred that he was in possession of her when she was attached, and that the persons above named and others are the true and bona fide owners of her, and that no other person is her owner. The master signed the claim as agent, and made oath to it That the owners of said schooner reside in Portsmouth, N. H., and Kittery, Maine, and that this deponent is duly authorized to put in this claim in behalf of the owners of the said schooner, etc." On the 12th of November, the value of the schooner was fixed by appraisement at the sum of $2,100, and a stipulation for value in that amount was entered into pursu The appellees move to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction in this court to entertain it, on the ground that the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum or value of $5,000, exclusive of costs, as required by section 3 of the Act of February 16, 1875. Ch. 77, 18 Stat. at L., 316. We have held, at this Term, on a full review of the subject, in Hilton v. Dickinson [ante, 688], that while we have jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a plaintiff below when he sues for as much as, or more than, our jurisdiction requires and recovers nothing, the actual matter in dispute in this court as shown by the record, and not alone the damages alleged or prayed for in the declaration, must be looked to in determining the question of jurisdiction. We have also held, in Elgin v. Marshall [ante, 249], that the required valuation is limited to the matter in dispute in the particular suit in which the jurisdiction is invoked; that any estimate of value as to any matter not actually the subject of that suit must be excluded; and that there cannot be added to the value of the matter determined in that suit any estimate in money, by reason of the probative force of the judgment itself in some subsequent proceeding. As is remarked in the latter case: "The value of the judgment, as an estoppel, depends upon whether it could be used in evidence in a subsequent action between the same parties.' In the present case, although the libelant may recover $27,000 against the vessel, because he demands that amount against her, it is plain that he cannot recover on the stipulation for value, which represents her, more than $2,100, and cannot recover against the sureties in the stipulation more than that amount. Therefore, this being a suit in rem only, the value of the vessel, represented by the stipulation, is all that is in dispute, because that is all that the libelant can obtain or the stipulators can lose, in this suit. The libelant contends, however, that a decree for him for $27,000 against the vessel would establish the liability of the claimants for that amount. But it could not be contended that this would be so in any case but one where the claimants were alleged and shown to have been the owners of the vessel sued, at the time of the collision. In the case of The Enterprise, 2 Curt., 317, the record showed that the claimant of the vessel was an owner of her during the voyage for which the wages sued for were claimed, and that by his answer he contested in that character the right to wages. For these reasons it was held that the decree in the suit in rem bound him personally, as res judicata, that a libel in personam against him would lie to execute that decree; and that the matter in dispute in that case was not the vessel or the existence of a lien on her. The proceeds of the sale of the vessel were $13.90, the decree was for more than $50, and $50 was the amount necessary for jurisdiction on an appeal. Under these circumstances an appeal was allowed. ing on pleadings and proofs, and awarded relief; the court be filed as a part of the record. The bill of but it ordered that a bill of exceptions signed by exceptions showed that the Judge who held the court refused to permit the counsel for the plaintiff to argue the cause, and allowed the counsel for the defendant to determine whether the case fell within a prior decision of another judge, and refused to determine that question himself,and then directed that the decree be entered, which was in favor of the defendant. On a bill of review, filed by the plaintiff; held, that the decree must be held for naught. 2. A decree was made by a circuit court, in December, 1873, against two plaintiffs. In January, 1874, they appealed to this court. In December, 1875, the appeal was dismissed for the failure of the appellants to file and docket the cause in this court. In September, 1876, a bill of review was filed for erThere is no allegation, in the libel, in this though not within two years from the making of rors in law; held, that the bill was filed in time, case, as to who were the owners of the vessel the decree, because the control of the circuit court at the time of the collision, and nothing is set over the decree was suspended during the pendency of the appeal. forth therein as a foundation for any ultimate 3. A lot of land, part of the navy yard at Memphis, recovery against any particular persons, as Tennessee, not under lease to a private party, being such owners, of so much of the $27,000 claimed exempt from state and county taxation by section as may exceed the appraised value of the vessel. 9 of the Act of the Legislature of Tennessee, which took effect February 20, 1860, ch. 70, Private Acts of Rule 15, in admiralty, provides that "In all 1859-'60, 284, was, by section 13 of the Act of Consuits for damage by collision, the libelant may gress of August 5, 1861 (ch. 45, 12 U. S. Stat. at L..297), proceed against the ship and master, or against exempt from taxation under the direct tax on land authorized by that Act. the ship alone, or against the master or the [No. 213.] owner alone, in personam." This Rule, as is the vessel and her owners; but it does not pre-APP States for the Western District of Tenwell settled, excludes the joining in one suit of vent the introduction into the libel of allegations as to the ownership of the vessel at the time of the collision, with a view to a proceeding to obtain such ultimate relief in personam, on the basis of a recovery in rem, as the libelant may be entitled to. Nor is there in the record in this case anything which can be held to establish, as against the claimants of the vessel, though they were her owners when the claim was filed, that they were her owners at the time of the collision, and so in a position to be liable to respond in personam for the damages suffered by the libelant, in a proper proceeding in personam. If the libelant had recovered more than $5,000 in this case, in the circuit court, against the vessel, the claimants could not have appealed to this court, because, for the reasons above set forth, the amount in dispute would have been only $2,100, on the record as it stands. As we held in Hilton v. Dickinson, ubn supra, the statute does not give to the plaintiff an advantage over the defendant, under the same circumstances. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. MARMADUKE L. ENSMINGER, Appt., v. JOHN C. POWERS ET AL. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 292–305.) Bill of review-when may be brought after two years-erroneous decree-exemption from tax ation. Submitted Mar. 28, 1883. Decided Apr. 23, 1883. nessee. The history and facts of the case are fully set forth in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Nathaniel Wilson and W. B. Gilbert, for appellant: It is a fatal objection to the bill, as a bill to review the decree of December 27, 1873, that it was not filed in time. Thomas v. Harrie, 10 Wheat., 146; Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet., 6; Kennedy v. Ga. State Bk., 8 How., 586; Evans v. Bacon, 99 Mass., 213; Plymouth v. Russell Mills, 7 Allen, 438; Dan. Ch. Pr., 1584, 5th ed. In a bill of review for error of law, questions of fact are not open for discussion. The only questions that can be considered, are such as arise on the face of the record without reference to the evidence in the cause, and certainly without reference to any new evidence. Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet., 6; Putnam v. Day, 22 Wall., 60 (89 U. S., XXII., 764); Buffington v. Harvey, 95 U. S., 99 (XXIV., 381); Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U. S., 391 (XXIV., 481); James v. Myrne, 7 Fed. Rep., 533. Messrs. William M. Randolph and Fillmore Beall, for appellees: The lot in controversy was exempt from taxation at the time the direct tax to the United States, for the payment of which it was sold, was levied. Act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. at L., ch. 45, sec. 13, p. 297; Act of June 7, 1862, 12 Stat, at L., ch. 98, sec. 1, p. 422. There can be no doubt that the lot, being the property of the City of Memphis under the dedication of the original proprietors Memphis v. Wright, 6 Yerg., 496, or else by the grant contained in the Act of Congress of Aug. 5, 1854, *1. A decree, in a suit in equity, set forth a hear- 10 Stat. at L., ch. 268, sec. 3, p. 586, 587, was *Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD. NOTE.-Bill of review; nature of; when may be brought; who may maintain; time within which; what it should contain. See, note to Bk. of U. S. v. Ritchie, 33 U. S. (8 Pet.), 128. permanently or specially exempted from taxation by the laws of the State of Tennessee. Acts of Tennessee, of 1859, 1860, private, ch. 70, sec. 9, p. 284, sec. 38, p. 289; Code of 1858, sec. 542, subsec. 2. |