BENJAMIN S. HILTON, Appt., v. WILLIAM H. DICKINSON. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 165–176). allowed," he can appeal to recover the whole amount. Mr. M. F. Morris, for Devlin, assignee of Dickinson, also contra: This is a triangular controversy over a fund in the registry of the Supreme Court of the Dis Cross appeal-how prosecuted-want of jurisdic-trict of Columbia, paid in under a bill of intertion--matter in dispute-jurisdictional amount, how determined-statement in pleading. 1. Cross appeals must be prosecuted like other appeals, and if not perfected until long after the time when by law they should be, they will be dismissed for want of prosecution. 2. If, on looking into a record, this court finds it has no jurisdiction, it is its duty to dismiss the case on its own motion, without waiting the action of the parties. 3. Upon a question as to the jurisdiction of this court, dependent upon amount as to both parties, the matter in dispute, on which our jurisdiction depends, is the matter in dispute between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error, or appeal; that is to say, as it stands in this court. 4. This court has jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a plaintiff below, when he sues for as much or more than our jurisdiction requires and recovers nothing, or recovers only a sum which, being deducted from the amount or value sued for, leaves a sum equal to or more than our jurisdictional limit, for which he failed to get a judgment or decree. 5. This court has jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by a defendant when the recovery against him is as much in amount or value as is required to bring a case here, and when, having pleaded a setoff or counterclaim for enough to give this court jurisdiction, he is defeated upon his plea wholly, or recovers only an amount which being deducted from his claim as pleaded, leaves enough to give us jurisdiction, which has not been allowed. 6. The amount as stated in the body of the decla ration, and not merely the damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment, at its conclusion, must be considered in determining whether this court can take jurisdiction; the same is true of the counterclaim or set-off. Mr. Frank W. Hackett for Dickinson, in support of motion: A party appealing from part of a decree admits the remainder to be correct. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 5th ed., 1467; Kelsey v. Western, 2 N. Y., 505; Norbury v. Meade, 3 Bligh., 261; Sands v. Codwise, 4 Johns., 602. The court will ascertain just what amount is involved between the appellant and appellee. Terry v. Hatch, 93 U. S., 44 [XXÎÎI., 796.] Mr. F. P. B. Sands, for Hilton, contra: As to the jurisdiction in this case, we rely upon the decisions and practice in this court. The rule is well settled in the practice of this court (Phill. Pr., 2d ed., 77); and in Knapp v. Banks, 2 How.,73, its language is precise, that the test of jurisdiction is the amount claimed by the plaintiff below and involved in the judgment or decree appealed from; and "that where a less sum than the whole amount of his demand is NOTE.-Jurisdiction of U. S. Supreme Court dependent on amount; interest cannot be added to give Jurisdiction; how value of thing demanded may be shown; what cases reviewable without regard to sum in controversy. See note to Gordon v. Ogden, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), 33. pleader. The money belonged originally to John Devlin. William H. Dickinson claimed it under an alleged claim of services rendered in recovering it from the United States. Benjamin S. Hilton claimed it as assignee of another individual who sought to show that he was the party who had recovered it. Devlin denied the claims of both. The Special Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia decided in favor of Hilton. The General Term of that court decided that neither Hilton nor Dickinson had any just or legal claim upon the fund, yet concluded to divide it between them as the best disposition that could be made of it. Both Hilton and Devlin appealed. Before the decree rendered by the General Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Dickinson had recovered judgment on the same cause of action in New York; and Devlin had paid the judgment and taken an assignment or relinquishment from Dickinson of any and all rights which the latter had in these suits in the District of Columbia. In other words, Dickinson had been paid and satisfied before the decree was rendered for him and Hilton jointly in these cases. It is submitted that, under these circumstances, the action of Dickinson's counsel is most extraordinary and most unwarrantable. His client has been paid and satisfied; and he has nothing further to do with these cases. Neither as appellant nor as appellee, neither in his own original right nor as the assignee of Dickinson, does John Devlin assent to the mo tions made. On the contrary, he desires to have the appeals heard on their merits when they are reached for argument; and he protests against the action of Dickinson's counsel as unauthorized. As to the motion to dismiss Devlin's appeal because of his failure to docket and secure the clerk, the failure seems to have been caused by inadvertence and the supposition that the docketing of one appeal would do for both. Since his attention has been called to the matter, he has caused his appearance to be entered, and has given security to the clerk, and only awaits the permission of the court to docket his appeal now. As both appeals can and should be heard together, and no injury has been or can be done to anyone by his failure to docket, and he has now secured the clerk and entered his appearance it is respectfully submitted that he should be allowed nunc pro tune to docket his appeal, and that the motion to dismiss should be denied. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This was a bill of interpleader filed by Charles D. Gilmore against Benjamin S. Hilton, William H. Dickinson, John Devlin, and others, to determine the ownership of $2,500, which Gilmore held as trustee. The fund was paid into court, and when the decree below was rendered had increased by investment to more than $3,000. Hilton, Dickinson and Devlin each claimed the whole. The court, at Special Term, decreed | against him for less than $2,000, it was held the whole to Hilton. From this decree, both Dickinson and Devlin appealed to the General Term. There the decree at Special Term was modified so as to direct the payment of the fund to Hilton and Dickinson in equal moieties, and to adjudge the costs against Devlin alone. Hilton took an appeal to this court from this decree, "In so far as it modifies the decree of the court below, to wit: the Special Term in equity," and citation was issued to Dickinson alone. This appeal was docketed here in due time. An appeal was also allowed Devlin at the time the decree was rendered, but that appeal has never been entered in this court. There was no appearance of counsel or security for costs within the time required by law. Dickinson now moves to dismiss the appeal of Hilton, on the ground that the value of the matter in dispute does not exceed $2,500, and to docket and dismiss, under the 9th Rule, the appeal of Devlin. Devlin also appears by counsel, and presents an assignment to him from Dickinson of all interest in the litigation, which was executed before the decree was modified at General Term. He, therefore, insists that Dickinson has no right to move in the premises, and asks that the appearance of his own counsel be entered. At the last Term, in the case of The S. 8. Osborne, 105 U. S., 451 [XXVI., 1066], it was decided that "Cross appeals must be prosecuted like other appeals. Every appellant, to entitle himself to be heard on his own appeal, must appear here as an actor in his own behalf by having the appearance of counsel entered, and giving the security required by the rules." In that case the appeal had been docketed, but long after the time when by law it should have been done and, following the rule announced in Grigsby v. Purcell, 99 U. S., 505 [XXV., 354], it was dismissed for want of prosecution. Inasmuch therefore, as we would not hear the cross appeal if it should be entered at this time, we deny the motion of Devlin to have the appearance of counsel entered on that appeal, and of our own motion dismiss it for want of prosecution. that the jurisdiction of this court depended, not In Cooke v. Woodrow, 5 Cranch, 13, decided in 1809, trover had been brought in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia for sundry household goods, and the judgment was in favor of the defendants. Upon a writ of error by the plaintiff below, a question arose as to the way in which the value of the matter in dispute should be ascertained, and Chief Justice Marshall, in announcing the decision, said: "If the judgment below be for the plaintiff, that judgment ascertains the value of the matter in dispute; but when the judgment below is rendered for the defendant, this court has not, by any rule or practice, fixed the mode of ascertaining that value." It is a matter of no importance that the motion to dismiss the appeal of Hilton is made by Dickinson after he has parted with his interest Three years afterwards, the case of Wise v. in the decree, for, if on looking into a record Turnpike Co. was before the court, which is we find we have no jurisdiction, it is our duty to very imperfectly reported in 7 Cranch, 276. On dismiss on our own motion without waiting the referring to the original record we find that unaction of the parties. The question is then pre-der a provision of the charter of the turnpike sented whether upon the face of this record it company (2 Stat. at L., 572, ch. 26, sec. 6) appears that the value of the matter in dispute, commissioners were to be appointed by the for the purpose of our jurisdiction, exceeds Circuit Court of the District of Columbia to de$2,500, and that depends on whether the mat- cide upon the compensation to be paid the ownter in dispute is the whole amount claimed by ers of land for damages growing out of the apHilton below, or only the difference between propriation of their property to the use of the what he has recovered and what he sued for. company. All awards of the commissioners So far as we have been able to discover, this pre-were to be filed in the circuit court, and unless cise point has never before been passed upon in any reported case. There are expressions in the opinions of the court in some cases which may be and probably are broad enough to sustain the jurisdiction, but these expressions are found where the facts did not require a decision of the question now formally presented. In Wilson v. Daniel, decided in 1798, and reported in 3 Dall., 401, upon a writ of error brought by a defendant below from a judgment set aside by the court were to be final and conclusive between the parties, and recorded by the clerk. Wise & Lynn presented a claim to the commissioners and were awarded $45. On the return of the award to the court they filed exceptions, and, among other things, claimed that they should have been allowed at least $300, but the court confirmed the award. They then brought the case to this court by writ of error, and the turnpike company moved to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute did not exceed $100, that being then the jurisdictional limit on appeals and writs of error from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. The decision of the case is reported as follows: "It appearing that the sum awarded was only $45, the court, all the Judges being present, decided that they had no jurisdiction, although the sum claimed by Wise & Lynn, before the commissioners of the road, was more than $100." Since this decision we do not recollect that the question has ever been made. The silent prac tice of the court has conformed to it. The rea son of the limitation is that the expense of liti gation in this court ought not to be incurred unless the matter in dispute exceeds two thousand dollars. This reason applies only to the matter in dispute between the parties in this court." The writ of error was, consequently, dismissed, all the judges agreeing that there was no jurisdiction. This case was followed at the same term in Smith v. Honey, 3 Pet., 469. " In Peyton v. Robertson, 9 Wheat., 527, replevin had been brought for the recovery of personal property distrained for rent. The defendant Nothing further of importance connected in the action acknowledged the taking of the with the particular question we are now consid goods as charged in the declaration, but justi- ering appears in the reported cases until 1844, fied it as a distress for the sum of $591 due for when, in Knapp v. Banks, 2 How., 73, which was rent in arrear, and recovered a judgment against a writ of error brought by a defendant against the plaintiff for that amount. The plaintiff whom a judgment had been rendered for less then brought the case to this court by writ of than $2,000, Mr. Justice Story said for the court: error, and insisted that as the damages laid in "The distinction constantly maintained is this: the declaration exceeded the jurisdictional limit Where the plaintiff sues for an amount exceedhis writ ought not to be dismissed; but the courting $2,000, and the ad damnum exceeds $2,000, said, through Chief Justice Marshall: "If the if by reason of any erroneous ruling of the court replevin be, as in this case, of property distrained below, the plaintiff recovers nothing, or less than for rent, the amount for which the avowry is $2,000, there the sum claimed by the plaintiff is made is the real matter in dispute. The dam- the sum in controversy for which a writ of erages are merely nominal. If the writ be issued ror will lie. But if a verdict is given against as a means of trying the title to property, it is the defendant for a less sum than $2,000, and in the nature of detinue and the value of the ar- judgment passes against him accordingly, there ticle replevied is the matter in dispute." The it is obvious that there is, on the part of the dewrit of error was, accordingly, dismissed. fendant, nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which the judgment is given; and, consequently, he is not entitled to any writ of error. We cannot look beyond the time of the judg ment in order to ascertain whether a writ of error lies or not." The case of Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet., 33, was decided in 1830. There the action was instituted for the violation of a patent, and the amount of the recovery in damages was $400 by the verdict of a jury. The damages laid in the declaration were $2,600. The defendant brought the writ of error, and on a motion to dismiss because the value of the matter in dispute was not enough to give jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court said: "The jurisdiction of the court has been supposed to depend on the sum or value of the matter in dispute in this court, not on that which was in dispute in the circuit court. If the writ of error be brought by the plaintiff below, then the sum which his declaration shows to be due may be still recovered, should the judgment for a smaller sum be reversed; and, consequently, the whole sum claimed is still in dispute. But if the writ of error be brought by the defendant in the original action, the judgment of this court can only affirm that of the circuit court and, consequently, the matter in dispute cannot exceed the amount of the judgment. Nothing but that judgment is in dispute between the parties." Then, referring to Wilson v. Daniel, supra, he said: "Although that case was decided by a divided court, and although we think that, upon the true construction of the 22d section of the judicial Act, the jurisdiction depends upon a sum in dispute between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error, we should be much inclined to adhere to the decision in Wilson v. Daniel, had not a contrary practice since prevailed. * * The case of Wise v. Turnpike Co., 7 Cranch, 276, was dismissed because the sum for which judgment was rendered in the circuit court was not sufficient to give jurisdiction, although the claim before the commissioners of the road, which was the cause of action and the matter in dispute in the circuit court, was sufficient. *** The rule, as thus stated by Mr. Justice Story, was cited in Walker v. U. Š., 4 Wall., 163 [71 U. S., XVIII., 319], and in Merrill v Petty, 16 Wall., 345 [83 U. S., XXI., 500]. But these were cases in which the question was as to the right of a defendant to bring up for review a judgment against himself for less than $2,000. In Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall., 66 [68 U. S., XVII., 559], the plaintiff below sued for $2,000 and the defendant pleaded set-off to the amount of $4,000. Under such a plea, if the set-off had been sustained, the defendant would have been entitled to a judgment for the difference between the amount of his claim and that established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for $575.85, and the defendant brought a writ of error, upon which jurisdiction was sustained because the defendant sought to defeat the judgment against him altogether, and to recover judgment in his own favor and against the plaintiff for at least $2,000, and possibly $4,000. Thus the matter in dispute in this court exceeded $2,000. In Pierce v. Wade, 100 U. S., 444 [XXV., 735], the action was replevin for cattle. A judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs for the most of the cattle taken on the writ, but against them for $1,400, the value of some that were taken which did not belong to them. They brought the case here by writ of error, but the writ was dismissed on the ground that the matter in dispute was only the part of the cattle for which judgment had been rendered against the plaintiffs, the court remarking that" The plaintiffs recovered everything else which they claimed, and the judgment against them is less than $5,000." In Lamar v. Micou, 104 U. S., 465 [XXVI., | no doubt it was the intention of the court to 774], where the appeal was taken by a defendant adopt as an entirety the position of Mr. Justice from a decree against him for less than $5,000, Iredell in his dissenting opinion and to put both it was held that if the set-off or counterclaim sides upon an equal footing. Certainly it could relied on would only have the effect of reducing not have been intended to give a plaintiff any the amount of the recovery, without entitling advantage over a defendant, when there is noththe defendant to a decree in his own favor, there ing in the law to show any such superiority in was no jurisdiction. position. We understand that Wilson v. Daniel, is over- Under this rule, we have jurisdiction of a ruled by Gordon v. Ogden, in which Chief Jus-writ of error or appeal by a plaintiff below when tice Marshall states the opinion of the court to he sues for as much as or more than our jurisdicbe that "The jurisdiction of the court depends tion requires and recovers nothing, or recovers upon the sum in dispute between the parties as only a sum which, being deducted from the the case stands upon the writ of error," and amount or value sued for, leaves a sum equal to that Wilson v. Daniel was not followed because or more than our jurisdictional limit, for which "a contrary practice had since prevailed." It he failed to get a judgment or decree. And we is undoubtedly true that until it is in some way have jurisdiction of a writ of error or appeal by shown by the record that the sum demanded is a defendant when the recovery against him is not the matter in dispute, that sum will govern as much in amount or value as is required to in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally bring a case here, and when, having pleaded a true that when it is shown that the sum de-set-off or counter claim for enough to give us manded is not the real matter in dispute, the sum jurisdiction, he is defeated upon his plea altoshown, and not the sum demanded, will prevail. gether, or recovers only an amount or value Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall., 337 [68 Ú. S., XVII., which, being deducted from his claim as pleaded, 557]; Schacker v. Ins. Co., 93 Ü. S.,241 [XXIII., leaves enough to give us jurisdiction, which has 8621; Gray v. Blanchard, 97 U. S., 565 XXIV., not been allowed. In this connection, it is to 1109]; Tinstman v. Nat. Bk.,100 U.S.,6 [XXV., be remarked that the "amount as stated in the 530]; Banking Asso. v. Ins. Asso., 102 U. S., 121 body of the declaration, and not merely the [XXVI., 46]. Under this rule it has always been damages alleged, or the prayer for judgment, at assumed, since Cooke v. Woodrow, supra, that its conclusion, must be considered in determinwhen a defendant brought a case here, the judging whether this court can take jurisdiction." ment or decree against him governed our juris-Lee v. Watson, and the other cases cited in condiction, unless he had asked affirmative relief, which was denied; and this because as to him jurisdiction depended on the matter in dispute here. As the original demand against him was for more than our jurisdictional limit, and the recovery for less, the record shows that he was successful below as to a part of his defense, and that his object in bringing the case here was not to secure what he had already got, but to get more. As to him, therefore, the established rule is that, unless the additional amount asked for is as much as our jurisdiction requires, we cannot review the case. nection therewith, supra. The same is true of the counterclaim or set-off. It is the actual matter in dispute as shown by the record, and not the ad damnum alone, which must be looked to. Applying this rule to the present case, it is apparent we have no jurisdiction. The original matter in dispute was $3,000. On appeals from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia we have jurisdiction only when the matter in dispute exceeds $2,500. Hilton recovered below one half of the $3,000. It follows that as to him the matter in dispute in this court is only $1,500. The appeal of Hilton is dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and that of Devlin for want of prosTrue copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-108 U. S., 309, 311, 565; 110 U. S., 53, 223; 112 RALPH L. SHAINWALD, Receiver, etc., AND HERMAN SHAINWALD, Assignee, etc., Interveners; J. A. WRIGHT, ISAAC HOFFMAN AND S. HOFFMAN, Composing the Firm of HOFFMAN BROTHERS, ET AL., Appts., We are unable to see any difference in principle between the position of a plaintiff and that of a defendant as to such a case. The plaintiff sues for as much as, or more than, the sum re-ecution. quired to give us jurisdiction, and recovers less. He does not, any more than a defendant, bring a case here to secure what he has already got, but to get more. If we take a case for him when U. S., 228, 309. the additional amount he asks to recover is less than we can consider, he has an advantage over his antagonist, such as, in the language of Chief Justice Ellsworth, supra, "It is not to be presumed it was the intention of the Legislature to give." Such a result ought to be avoided, and it may be, by holding, as we do, that, as to both parties, the matter in dispute, on which our jurisdiction depends, is the matter in dispute "between the parties as the case stands upon the writ of error," or appeal, that is to say, as it stands in this court. That was the question in Wilson v. Daniel, where it was held that, to avoid giving one party an advantage over another, it was necessary to make jurisdiction depend" on the matter in dispute when the action was instituted." When, therefore, that case was overruled in Gordon v. Ogden, and it was held, as to a defendant, that his rights depended on the matter in dispute in this court, we entertain v. ISAAC J. LEWIS. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 158-161.) Removal of cause-suit to settle partnership. 1. In a suit brought to close up the affairs of a partnership where the existence of the partnership zenship. See, note to Removal Cases, 100 U. S., XXV., NOTE.-Removal of causes under Act of 1875; citi593. is denied, and the title of all depends on defeating | In this petition they averred that Ralph L. Shainthe claim of one to be a partner, where there are wald had been appointed receiver of the propcitizens of a State on one side of a suit, and citizens of the same State on the other, the suit is not re- erty of Harris Lewis by the district court for movable under the 1st clause of the 2d section of the the District of California, and that he took posAct of March, 1875. 2. A suit, brought to close up the affairs of an al- session under that appointment. It was also leged partnership, where the main dispute is about stated that in the suit begun in the district the existence of the partnership, and there is no court for the District of Nevada, an attachment controversy which can be separated from that about was issued under which the property was the partnership and fully determined by itself, is not severable so it can be removed by part of the seized by B. C. Thomas, the sheriff, who was in possession under that authority. It also appeared that, in obedience to an order of the District Judge in California, Harris Lewis had executed a formal assignment of all his property to the receiver appointed there. defendants. [No. 976.] Motion to advance submitted Nov. 27, 1882. Granted Dec. 4, 1882. Submitted Mar. 16, 1883. Decided Mar. 26, 1883. On the 26th of January, Ralph L. Shainwald was, by order of the court, admitted as a defendant in the suit and the pleadings amended accordingly. Before this time a petition for the removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nevada had been filed by Herman Shainwald and Ralph L. Shainwald, in which it is stated "That the real parties in interest in this action are I. J. Lewis, of the County of Lander, State of Nevada, as plaintiff, and Ralph L. Shainwald, Receiver:" that the defendant, Pringle, is the agent of Shainwald, the Receiver, and in possession for him; that Ralph L. Shainwald and Herman Shainwald are citizens of California; that the defendants, Wright, Coleman, Hoffman, Huber, Sadler, Sower, Hogan, Polkinghorn, Thomas, Pringle and Brennan, are nominal defendants, and have no interest in the suit; that the goods for which they were sued were sold to them by Ralph L. Shainwald, as receiver; and “That the controversy in said action between said plaintiff and said B. C. Thomas, holding the possession of said property by virtue of said at Isaac J. Lewis, a citizen of Nevada, the appellee, on the 15th of January, 1881, began the suit against Harris Lewis, a citizen of California, for the dissolution of an alleged partnership between them, and a settlement of the partnership affairs. To this suit he made Abraham Coleman, a creditor of the firm and a citizen of California, J. A. Wright, Hoffman Brothers, Joseph Huber, Charles Sadler, A. & M. Sower, R. Hogan, J. D. Pringle, Charles Polkinghorn, B. C. Thomas, and James Brennan, citizens of Ne-tachment in favor of said assignee, and the convada, defendants, jointly with Harris Lewis. troversy in said action between said plaintiff According to the averments in the bill, Harris and said J. D. Pringle, holding the possession Lewis, one of the partners, had become involved of said property as agent of said Receiver, Ralph in business complications of his own, and a large L. Shainwald and by virtue of his appointment judgment had been taken against him in the as Receiver, is wholly between citizens of difDistrict Court of the United States for the Dis-ferent States and which can be fully determined trict of California in favor of Herman Shain- as between them, and that said Ralph L. Shainwald, assignee in bankruptcy of Schoenfield, wald and said assignee, Herman Shainwald, are Cohn & Co. A suit was begun on this judg- actually interested in said controversy." Upon ment in the District Court of the United States this petition the state court, after admitting for the District of Nevada, and Ralph L. Shain- Ralph L. Shainwald as a party to the suit, but wald was, by an ex parte order, without notice, not Herman Shainwald, ordered a removal, appointed Receiver of the estate of Harris Lewis but the Circuit Court of the United States for in Nevada. The Receiver at once took posses- the District of Nevada, when the record was sion of the property of the partnership, where- filed there, remanded the cause. From an order upon a motion was made to vacate his appoint- to that effect this appeal was taken. ment, which was granted. Notwithstanding We entertain no doubt of the propriety of the this, Shainwald retained possession and was order remanding the suit, brought, as it was, to selling the interest of Harris Lewis in the prop-close up the affairs of the partnership between erty, and on such sales delivering the possession to the purchasers. All the defendants named, except Harris Lewis and Coleman, are either purchasers of the property, or in possession as the agents of the Shainwalds. On the filing of this bill, a receiver of the property of the firm was appointed and qualified. All the defendants, except Harris Lewis and Coleman, answered the bill on the 17th of January, denying the existence of the partnership and claiming that the property in dispute was the individual property of Harris Lewis. On the same day, Herman Shainwald and Ralph L. Shainwald filed a petition of intervention in which they asked to be admitted as defendants. Isaac J. Lewis and Harris Lewis. All the defendants, except Harris Lewis and Coleman, who have not answered, deny the existence of the partnership. Upon one side of that issue, as now made up, is Isaac J. Lewis, a citizen of Nevada, and on the other Ralph L. Shainwald, a citizen of California, and all the other answering defendants citizens of Nevada. If Thomas, the sheriff, and Pringle, the agent, are nominal parties, the other defendants are not. If Shainwald is a necessary party, so are they, because they are interested in the controversy in the same way, if not to the same extent, that he is. They get their title from him, and if he holds the property under the assignment from Harris |