In part upon the authority of Davis v. Gray, | and this, in part, upon the ground that the reand Osborn v. Bank, this court, in Board of lief asked will require the officers, who have Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S., 531, 541, charge of those moneys, to disregard the con[XXIII.,623,628], maintained the right of a hold- fessedly void orders of the supreme political er of consolidated bonds to a decree against the power of the State. officers of the State of Louisiana, who are here defendants, constituting the Board of Liquidation, preventing the use of such bonds for the payment of a debt due from the State to a levee company. The proposed action of the Board was based upon a statute passed March 2, 1875. So that the suit had for its object to prevent state officers, charged with the execution of the latter Act, from carrying out its provisions. It never eccurred to this court that the suit was, for that reason, one against the State within the meaning of the Constitution. Upon the general question, whether the defendants, being officers of the State, were amenable to process from a Federal Court, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for this court, observed: "On this branch of the subject, the numerous and well considered cases heretofore decided by this court leave little to be said. The objections to proceeding against state officers by mandamus or injunction, are: first, that it is, in effect, proceeding against the State itself; and secondly, that it interferes with the official discretion vested in the officers. It is conceded that neither of these things can be done. A State, without its consent, cannot be sued by an individual; and a court cannot substitute its own discretion for that of executive officers in matters belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter. But it has been well settled, that when a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, is to be performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain personal injury by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance; and when such duty is threatened to be violated by some positive official act, any person who will sustain personal injury thereby, for which adequate compensation cannot be had at law, may have an injunction to prevent it. In such case, the writs of mandamus and injunction are somewhat correlative to each other. In either case, if the officer plead the authority of an unconstitutional law for the non-performance or violation of his duty, it will not prevent the issuing of the writ. An unconstitutional law will be treated by the courts as null and Void." Upon these grounds, the decree of the Circuit Court was affirmed, so far as it prohibited the debt due the levee company from being funded in consolidated bonds. Such use of them was deemed an impairment of the contract rights of those who were entitled to receive them.

It may be asked: when before has this court found the unconstitutional mandate of a State to be an obstacle in the way of compelling her officers to respect rights of contract, the obligation of which is protected against impairment by any law of the State? Of what value is the contract clause of the Federal Constitution if it cannot be enforced against hostile provisions of a State Constitution? This court said, in Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331, 360 [59 U. S., XV., 401, 412], that "A change of constitution cannot release a State from contracts made under a constitution which permits them to be made;" in Bank v. Shelly, 1 Black, 436, 448 [66 U. S., XVII., 173, 179], that a contract between Ohio and a bank in that State was entitled to the protection of the Constitution of the United States against any law of Ohio impairing its obligation; in R. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall., 511, 515 [77 U. S., XIX., 997, 998], that "The Constitution of a State is undoubtedly a law," within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution, and that "A State can no more do what is thus forbidden by one than by the other, there is the same impediment in the way of both;" in White v. Hart, 13 Id., 646, 652 [80 U. S., XX., 685, 687], that" It is well settled by the adjudications of this court that a State can no more impair the obligation of a contract by adopting a constitution than by passing a law; in the eye of the constitutional inhibition they are substantially the same thing;" and in Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall., 610, 623 [82 U. S., XXI., 212, 215], that the Constitution of the United States "Is above and beyond the power of Congress and the States, and is alike obligatory upon both; a State can no more impair an existing contract by a constitutional provision than by a legislative Act; both are within the prohibition of the National Constitution." Why should these established doctrines of the court be overruled, as, for all practical purposes, they are, by the judgment this day rendered? The Constitution declares that it shall be the supreme law of the land, "Anything in the Constitutution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Its mandate, in that respect, is addressed alike to the Judges of the Federal and State Courts, for it declares that the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. And, as is said in Dodge v. Woolsey, to make its supremacy more complete, impressive and practical, that there should be no escape from its operation, and that its binding force upon the States and the members of Congress should be unmistakable, it is declared that "The Senators and Representatives, before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitu

It seems to be impossible, in view of our decision in that case, apart from previous decisions upon which it was founded, to hold that these suits are forbidden by the 11th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. We have adjudged that there is power in the courts of the Union, in a suit by an individual against state officers, to prevent them, in execution of an unconstitutional statute, from using these consolidated tion." bonds for purposes inconsistent with the con- Nor, if the relief here asked be granted, can tract under which they were issued. In these I agree that the officers of the State cannot be cases, it is determined that those courts are pow-protected against her subsequent action. If proerless, in suits against such officers, to prevent ceeded against because of their compliance with the misapplication of moneys collected for the the judgments of the courts of the Union, the purpose of meeting the interest on those bonds; suit can ultimately be brought here for review,

where no one will be permitted to suffer because | right arising under the laws of the United States. of his obedience to the supreme law of the land. In all the cases prior to Bath Co. v. Amy, the Upon the general question of the power of want of power in the circuit court to issue the the circuit court to grant a mandamus against writ, in the first instance, and in advance of a state officers, there are some propositions an- judgment, establishing the rights of the parties, nounced by the court which should be examined. was put distinctly upon the ground that the The fact is mentioned that the coupons held by whole judicial power of the United States had plaintiffs have not been reduced to judgment, not been delegated to the circuit courts. In and it is said that the circuit court, in exercis- Kendall's Case, however, the power of the Ciring its original jurisdiction, can ordinarily grant cuit Court in the District of Columbia, to coma writ of mandamus only in aid of some existing pel the Postmaster-General by mandamus to jurisdiction. As the State cannot be sued as a perform a duty enjoined by an Act of Congress, party defendant, to say that a judgment for the was sustained because, differently from the ciramount of the coupons is a condition precedent cuit courts in the several States, its jurisdiction to a mandamus is only another form of saying then extended to all cases in law or equity aristhat there is no remedy whatever to prevent the ing under the laws of the United States. Now, misapplication of the moneys raised under the it is apparent that the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. contract and by virtue of the Statute and Con- 137, supplies what in McIntire v. Wood, and stitution of 1874. The demands of the plaintiffs McClung v. Silliman was said to be wanting. It are not disputed, except upon the ground that substantially covers the whole ground of the Conthe Debt Ordinance has assumed, without the stitution. It invests the circuit courts with origconsent of the State's creditors, to remit the in- inal jurisdiction, and with jurisdiction by reterest falling due Jan. 1, 1880, and to divert the moval from the state courts, of all suits at law funds raised to meet it. The genuineness of or in equity, where the matter in dispute exthe bonds and coupons is not questioned. The ceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of case, therefore, comes within the rule, explicit- $500, arising under the Constitution or laws of ly laid down in McComb's and other cases, that the United States, or treaties made or which mandamus will lie to compel the performance shall be made, under their authority; or in which by a public officer of a plain ministerial duty, the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners; requiring no exercise of discretion. Such a or in which there is a controversy between citiremedy is absolutely essential for the protection zens of different States; or a controversy beof the rights here claimed. tween citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens or subjects; or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States.

Upon this question, reference is made by the court to Bath Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall., 244 [80 U. S., XX., 539], and Davenport v. Dodge Co., 105 U. S., 237 [XXVI., 1018]. In the first of those It seems to me entirely clear that since the cases it was decided that the circuit court had Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, enlarged the juno power, under the Act of 1789, to issue a writ risdiction of the circuit courts, they have power, of mandamus except where necessary or ancil-in the first instance, and in advance of a judglary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. And that doctrine was re-affirmed in Davenport v. Dodge Co., upon the authority of Bath Co. v. Amy, but without any question being raised in the former case as to the power of the circuit court to issue writs of mandamus since the passage of the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137 [18 Stat. at L., 470]. It will be found that the decision in Bath Co. v. Amy was based upon McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504; McClung v. Silliman 6 Wheat., 598; and Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet., 524.

In McIntire v. Wood, the circuit court was held to have authority to issue such writs only when necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. But it was said: "Had the 11th section of the Judiciary Act (the one declaring what suits shall be within the original cognizance of circuit courts) covered the whole ground of the Constitution, there would be much reason for exercising this power in many cases wherein some ministerial act is necessary to the completion of an individual right arising under the laws of the United States, and the 14th section of the same Act would sanction the issuing of the writ for such a purpose. But although the judicial power of the United States extends to cases arising under the laws of the United States, the Legislature has not thought proper to delegate the exercise of that power to its Circuit Courts except in certain specified cases.'

In Kendall v. U. S., the previous cases were held to decide that the writ was appropriate to compel the performance of a ministerial act, necessary to the completion of an individual

ment to issue a mandamus, to compel the pcrformance of purely ministerial acts, which require no exercise of discretion and are necessary to the protection or completion of an individual right arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Unless the circuit court can, by injunction, prevent the state officers from doing what they propose to do and, by mandamus, compel them to perform_the ministerial acts enjoined by the statute and Constitution of 1874, then its new and enlarged jurisdiction is of no practical value in any case where a State determines to repudiate its contracts and to enforce ordinances impairing their obligation. The power has always existed in those courts to issue such writs, not specifically provided by statute, as "may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 1 Stat., 81, 334; R. S., sec. 716. Juris diction to hear and determine a suit arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States carries with it the power to issue either s mandamus or an injunction, or both, when es sential to the protection and enforcement of the rights involved. In such cases, the writ is in every legal sense, not simply necessary but vital to the exercise of the jurisdiction granted.

It must also be observed that the mandamus suit was commenced in an inferior court of the State, and thence removed into the Circuit Court of the United States. If the power of the latter depended upon the question whether the state court could, by mandamus,compel a state officer

to perform plain official duties imposed by law, | ana holds that, in the matter of state contracts, the writ should be awarded. This court, I sub- her Constitution is the exclusive mandate to mit with great confidence, is in error if it means her officers, and absolutely binding upon them, to say that State, ex rel. Hart, v. Burke, 33 La. anything in the Constitution of the United Ann., 498, decides, or that the Supreme Court States to the contrary notwithstanding. And of Louisiana has ever decided, that the courts I take leave to say, with all respect for my of that State cannot, under any circumstances, brethren, that the decision this day rendered compel her officers, by mandamus, to perform can be sustained upon no other ground than plain official duties requiring no discretion. The that taken by the state court. But in vain has State Code of Procedure expressly declares that this court repeatedly adjudged that a suit the writ "may be directed to public officers to against the officers of a State to enforce the percompel them to fulfill any of the duties attached formance of plain official duties is not, necesto their office, or which may be legally required sarily, one against the State within the meaning of them." Sec. 834. It is, I think, clear that of that Constitution; in vain has it often debut for the Debt Ordinance the court would cided that contracts with States are as fully have sustained the writ in that case, and com- protected by that Constitution as are those bepelled the officers to obey the Statute and Con- tween individuals, and that a State can no more stitution of 1874. What the court adjudged impair an existing contract by constitutional was that while an officer could not plead the au- provision than by legislative Act; in vain have thority of an unconstitutional statute as a justi- the Circuit Courts of the United States been infication for the non-performance or the viola- vested with jurisdiction of all suits arising untion of his duty, it was different where the au- der the Constitution and laws of the United thority is an article in the State Constitution. States; in vain does that Constitution declare Upon that ground alone the writ was refused. that it shall be the supreme law of the land, That I do not misinterpret that case, is clear binding upon the judges in every State, if it from Newman v. Burke, determined in April, be true, as determined by the Supreme Court 1882. Newman, holding warrants on the gen- of Louisiana, that no court can ever have power eral fund of the State for 1880 and 1881,claimed either to decree a provision of a State Constituthat by virtue of the Debt Ordinance he was tion invalid on the ground that it impairs the entitled to be paid out of moneys in the hands obligation of contracts with that State, or to of state officers, collected under the Statute and compel state officers to disregard such invalid Constitution of 1874, and by that Ordinance di- provision. rected to be transferred to the general fund. He obtained by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State an order for a mandamus against the state Treasurer and fiscal agent, directing them to conform their books to the requirements of the Debt Ordinance, subject, however, to the right and duty of those officers "To retain in statu quo so much of the fund in controversy as may be necessary to satisfy the pending claims of S. J. Hart and John Elliott et al., * in case judgment should be rendered in their favor in the judicial proceedings instituted by them, and now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States." Thus, it seems that those officers, with the approval of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, only await the final determination of these suits to ascertain whether they will be permitted to execute a state ordinance in conflict with the Federal Constitution.

As further evidence that the state court recognizes the right to a mandamus compelling state officers to discharge ministerial duties, imposed by provisions of the Debt Ordinance, I refer to State, ex rel. Ecuyer, v. Burke, 33 La. Ann., 969. Ecuyer was the owner of certain consolidated bonds, issued under the Act of 1874. He concluded to accept the provisions of the Debt Ordinance of 1879 and, in conformity therewith, applied to the state Treasurer to have his bonds stamped, so as to show that he ac ceded to the reduction of interest made by that Ordinance. That officer declining to comply with this request, an application was made to an inferior state court to compel him to stamp them. His refusal to comply with the relator's demands was based in part upon the statute passed in 1880, after the Debt Ordinance went into operation, which declares that no bond shall be stamped until the coupon of January, 1880, is surrendered. That the relator did not do. A mandamus was refused; but the Supreme Court, after deciding that the Act of 1880 was inoperative, because in conflict with the Debt Ordinance, said: "In his answer, defendant alleges that the service required of him by relator is not a ministerial duty, and that the judiciary has no control over the executive and co-ordinate branches of the government, except as regards purely ministerial duties of executive officers. As regards the first proposition, we decide that the service required in this case is the performance of a purely ministerial duty, and this is too plain to require argument. As to the second proposition, it is elementary; but while This language needs no interpretation. While fully recognizing the independence and all the the Federal Constitution declares that it shall rights of the co-ordinate branches of the gov be the supreme law of the land, anything in ernment, it is only necessary to say that it is the Constitution of any State to the contrary the province and duty of the judiciary, whennotwithstanding, the Supreme Court of Louisi-ever the question is properly brought before it

The state court, affirming the doctrines of State, ex rel. Hart, v. Burke, said: "Inasmuch as no court can ever acquire jurisdiction over a State, or to enforce a contract of a State against her will, it follows that no court can ever have power to decree the invalidity of any provision of the State Constitution on the ground that it impairs the obligation of such a contract. But unless the court may decree the nullity of such a provision, on such a ground, it follows that it cannot compel the officers of the State to do anything in violation thereof, because the Constitution of the State is their exclusive mandate and absolutely binding on them."

in judicial proceedings, to decide whether duties sought to be enforced at the hands of officers are or are not ministerial, and that it is of the essence of the judiciary to adjudge such questions, as otherwise those officers would themselves, by their own decision, be judges of their legal and constitutional powers.' The judgment of the lower court was reversed, and the mandamus ordered to be issued, at the costs of the state Treasurer in both courts.

Thus it is shown that the same court which determined State, ex rel. Hart, v. Burke, has decided that the courts of Louisiana have power, by mandamus, to compel an officer of the State to discharge ministerial duties, requiring in their performance no discretion upon his part; especially when necessary to enforce a provision in the State Constitution in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

It would seem, then, that holders of the consolidated bonds of Louisiana are in this anomalous condition: while her courts, because of the Debt Ordinance in the new Constitution, will not, by mandamus, compel her officers to perform the purely ministerial duties imposed by the Statute and Constitution of 1874, but will, by using that writ, require those officers to execute the provisions of that Ordinance, al

asked should not be granted by any court of proper jurisdiction as to parties;

That to refuse relief because of the command of a State to its officers to do that which is forbidden, and refrain from doing that which is enjoined, by the supreme law of the land; or to give effect, for any purpose, in the courts of the Union, to the orders of the supreme political power of a State, made in defiance of the Constitution of the United States, is, practically, to announce that, so far as judicial action is concerned, a State may, by nullifying provisions in its fundamental law, destroy rights of contract, the obligation of which the Constitution declares shall not be impaired by any state law. To such a doctrine, I can never give my assent.

I am, therefore, unable to concur in the opinion and judgment of the court.

Cited-107 U. S., 783; 108 U. S., 78; 109 U. S., 455, 408; 114 U. S., 293.

ANDREW ANTONI, Piff. in Err.,

V.

CITY OF RICHMOND.

(See S. C., 17 Otto, 769-812.)

Coupons receivable for taxes-Act impairing contract-when adequate remedy is left-enforcement-mandamus.

though it is confessedly in conflict with the Fed- SAMUEL C. GREENHOW, Treasurer of the eral Constitution, the courts of the United States, though now invested with jurisdiction of all suits arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States, are, according to the present decision, without power to compel those officers to respect the inhibition in the supreme law of the land against state laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Such are the results which follow from the action of the supreme political power" of a State whose officers, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, are required by the state court, and now permitted by this court, to regard the State Constitution as their "exclusive mandate and absolutely binding on them."

My own conclusions are:

That the officers of Louisiana cannot rightfully execute provisions of its Constitution which conflict with the supreme law of the land, and the courts of the Union should not permit them to do so;

That but for the adoption of the unconstitutional Debt Ordinance of 1879, and whether the suits were in a state court or in the Circuit Court of the United States, these state officers would have been restrained by injunction from diverting the funds collected to meet the interest on the consolidated bonds, and would have been compelled, by mandamus, to perform the purely ministerial duties enjoined by the Statute and Constitution of 1874;

That if, by existing laws, the Circuit Court of the United States has no power to issue such writs, still, upon the removal of the mandamus suit from the state court, the former had power to do what the state court could legally have done had there been no removal, viz.: make peremptory the alternative mandamus granted at the beginning of the suit by the inferior state court;

That the Debt Ordinance being void because in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, furnishes no reason whatever, least of all in the courts of the Union, why the relief

1. When a State issued its bonds, with interest rity for all taxes, debts, dues and demands due the coupons attached, "receivable at and after matuState," it entered into a valid contract with all persons taking the coupons to receive them in payof the State, which forbids the receipt of the coument of taxes and state dues, and a subsequent Act pons for a tax, conflicts with this contract and is void.

2. The question, whether a change of remedy impairs a substantial right, is one of reasonableness, and of that the Legislature is primarily the judge. This court should never overrule the decision of the Legislative Department of the Government on that subject, unless a palpable error has been committed.

3. Where, at the time the coupon was issued, there was a remedy by mandamus from the Suto take the coupon and cancel the tax, but a suit preme Court of Appeals to compel the tax collector was necessary to enforce the right, and the mere pendency of the suit would not prevent the coltax, a subsequent law requiring payment of the lector from proceeding with the collection of the taxes in advance, and changing the place and manner of trial, does no impair the obligation of the contract on the part of the State to furnish an adequate and efficacious remedy to compel a tax collector to receive the coupons in payment of taxes.

4. A remedy which is ample for the enforcement purposes of the contract.

of the payment of the coupons, is ample for all the [No. 845.]

Motion to advance submitted Oct. 16, 1882. Granted Oct. 23, 1882. Argued Jan. 8, 9, 1883. Decided Mar. 5, 1883. Leave to file additional brief granted Jan. 9, 1888.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals

of the State of Virginia.

This case arose upon a petition filed in the court below, March 28, 1882, by the plaintiff in error, for a mandamus to compel the defendant in error, as Treasurer of the City of Rich

mond, to receive a certain coupon in payment | ment arises. It is not denied that the remedy of his taxes. may be modified by subsequent state laws, provided the alteration does not impair the obligation of the contract.

The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia decided, at its November Term, 1872, in the case of Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt., 833, that in issuing these bonds the State entered into a valid contract with all persons taking the coupons to reThe remedy is as much within the protec-ceive them in payment of taxes and State dues, tion of the Constitution as any other part of the contract, and is entitled to the same inviolable sanctity whenever the question of impairSee 17 OTTO. U. S., Book 27.