that discretion. If it be one which calls for the consideration of evidence and the exercise of judgment, he must be left free to act upon his own conclusions. If, however, the act does not rest in his discretion; if it does not call for the exercise of judgment, but is a specific duty, imposed by the law, ministerial in its character, such as the delivery of a commission, the issue of a patent, the drawing of a warrant, or the payment of moneys appropriated (the subject to which the appropriation is made not calling for the exercise of judgment in its selection), and individuals have a direct pecuniary interest in the performance of that duty, the officer is as much subject to the compulsory process of the judicial tribunals as a private citizen. If it were not so, our government would cease to be a government of laws, and the obloquy to which Marshall refers would be cast on the jurisprudence of the country.

It is not, then, the office of the defendants which can preclude an inquiry into the propriety of calling upon the courts to enforce the performance of duties imposed by law upon them. The propriety of issuing the writ must be determined by the nature of the act to be done; whether it is one which they, under the law, are required to do.

No interference is sought with the general financial affairs of the State. These she may manage as she chooses. What is sought is an injunction to prevent her officers from diverting to other purposes funds collected for the payment of her creditors, and a direction to them to proceed and carry out her command as to the collection hereafter of the specific tax levied by herself, and the disbursement of its proceeds. The fact that she subsequently made an unconstitutional attempt to rescind that command cannot affect its character or efficacy.

a third of a century. The doctrine of stare decisis is deemed of great importance on questions affecting private rights. Much more ought it to be respected and resolutely adhered to in determinations touching the limits of the powers of the Federal and State Governments, and the authority of each over the contracts of States with individuals.

Nor can I perceive in what way the law, as thus pronounced, encroaches here upon any of the powers of the State. It is, undoubtedly, a matter of great importance, indeed of absolute necessity to wise government in this country, that there should be no interference with the rights of the States in the management of their local affairs, including in these the collection and disbursement of their revenues. But if a State contracts to do certain things and, in order that they may be performed, subjects her officers to the control of the courts and makes their refusal to carry out her pledges a felony, it cannot be justly contended that her reserved rights are at all invaded if her officers are ju dicially commanded to do what she says they shall do. No doctrine is here asserted in con flict with the exercise of any rightful authority of the State. All that is claimed is simply a right to compel her officers to obey her own enactments, such as were constitutionally passed and thus became laws, and to disregard such as she had no power to pass. If the State is above the Constitution of the United States; if the protection of that instrument does not extend to her engagements with individuals; if her power is as absolute as that of the Parliament of England; if the theory of the Federal Con stitution, that it binds States as well as individ uals, is unsound; if it is not, as it declares itself to be, the supreme law of the land; then my position falls; but otherwise there is no anIn Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How., 190, de-swer to it, at least none that I have been able cided in 1850, this court enforced a contract of the State of Arkansas in a proceeding by mandamus against one of her officers, compelling him to receive certain bills in satisfaction of a judgment recovered by the State, in the face of a subsequent statute prohibiting their receipt. In Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S., 672 [XXVI., 271], decided only two years since, this court, with but a single dissenting voice, enforced a contract of the State of Virginia in a proceeding by mandamus against one of her officers, compelling him to receive coupons of certain bonds for taxes, pursuant to the law under which the bonds were issued, although a subsequent law of the State had forbidden their receipt. And the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia has, in similar cases, after mature consideration, asserted a like authority over officers of the State, never apparently imagining that the sovereignty of the Commonwealth was at all assailed by judicial process compelling them to do their duty. The Commonwealth has required no reminder from a federal tribunal to awaken her attention to the invasion of any of her rights of sovereignty.

A number of other cases in this court and in the circuit courts might be cited to the same purport; and if the law respecting contracts with States, and rights of property acquired from States, is not to be subject to continual change, that law should remain undisturbed, having been recognized as sound for more than

to see.

True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S.

Mr. Justice Harlan, also dissenting: Having a deep conviction that the opinion of the court is in conflict with the spirit and tenor of our former decisions, subversive of long established doctrines, and dangerous to the national supremacy as defined and limited by the Constitution, I deem it my duty to dissent from it.

That the bonds and coupons issued by Louisiana, in pursuance of the statute and constitutional amendment of 1874, are contracts, within the meaning of that clause of the Federal Constitution which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; that the provisions in its new Constitution known as the "Debt Ordinance" of 1879 were intended to impair and, if enforced, do impair the obligation of those contracts; and that such Ordinance is, therefore, a nullity as against the bondholders who do not accept its terms, are propositions so manifestly correct as not to require argument in their support. Indeed, I understand the court, substantially, to concede them to be sound. As the Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, "anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding," I had supposed that all state action, whether by

legislative enactment or constitutional provis-ited from paying over moneys so collected to ion, must be disregarded when in conflict with any other person than the state Treasurer; and that law. Yet this court holds that it cannot it is provided that no court or judge of the enforce or restrain the agents of a State from State shall have power to enjoin the payment destroying the obligation of her contract with a of principal or interest of the bonds or the colcitizen because such relief will require them, in lection of the special tax therefor. the discharge of their official duties, to disobey the orders of what is denominated the supreme political power of that State. The court, it seems to me, in effect, adjudges that the defendants cannot be coerced by the courts of the Union to disregard nullifying enactments of their State, although such coercion, if employed, would only be for the purpose of enforcing the rightful authority of the Constitution. It appears, upon the very face of these proceedings, and is not to be disguised, that those officers refuse to perform purely ministerial duties, solely because the will of the State is, with them, paramount and to be obeyed, although thereby they destroy rights guarantied by the supreme law of the land.

To state the proposition in another form: here are contract rights which, but for the nullifying provisions in the new Constitution of Louisiana, the courts, as I will presently show, would unquestionably protect by the process of injunction and also, if need be by mandamus compelling the officers of the State to discharge plain official duties which require in their performance no exercise of discretion. Now, however, it is determined-if I do not misapprehend the decision-that the judicial arm of the Nation is hopelessly paralyzed in the presence of an Ordinance, destructive of those rights and passed in admitted violation of the Constitution of the United States. A State-which "cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, Sovereign power," but is a member of the Union under a Constitution whose supremacy all must acknowledge-assumes to release its officers from the duty of obeying important provisions of that Constitution; and this court, it would seem, holds that, in cases like these, it has no power, as against such hostile State action, to require those officers to respect private rights guarantied by such provisions.

1. What are the terms of the admitted contract between Louisiana and the holders of the consolidated bonds?

These provisions were embodied in the Constitution of Louisiana, by an amendment adopted in 1874; and with a view of facilitating the sale of the bonds, provided for in the Act of that year, it declares that such issue creates "A valid contract between the State and each and every holder of said bonds, which the State shall by no means and in nowise impair;" that "no court shall enjoin the payment of the principal or interest thereof or the levy and collection of the taxes therefor;" that "to secure such levy, collection and payment, the judicial power shall be exercised when necessary;" that the tax required for the payment of the principal and interest of such bonds "shall be assessed and collected each and every year until the bonds shall be paid, principal and interest, and the proceeds paid by the Treasurer of the State to the holders of said bonds, as the principal and interest of the same shall fall due; and, lastly, "that no further legislation or appropriation shall be requisite for the said assessment and collection, and for such payment from the Treasury."

With these statutory and constitutional provisions in force, the State issued bonds to the amount of about $12,000,000, and taxes were assessed, collected and paid over to the state Treasurer solely for the purpose of meeting their interest. Of the amount collected to pay coupons maturing Jan. 1, 1880, about $300,000 are in the state Treasury. The state officers refuse to apply the money for that purpose or to take any steps toward further collections as enjoined by the Statute and Constitution of 1874. 2. What has the State done that impairs the obligation of her contracts?

By her Debt Ordinance the coupons falling due the first of January, 1880, are remitted without the consent of creditors, and the interest tax already collected is therein directed to be used exclusively for the payment of the expenses of the State Government. Unless the holders of consolidated bonds are paid out of this money, raised for their benefit exclusively, and unless future collections are made as required by the contract, they will be wholly without remedy, and their bonds will cease to have any value. Plainly, that Ordinance is a breach of the plighted faith of the State. The financial world, as we have seen, was assured by legislative enactment and constitutional provision that what the state officers now propose to do should never be done; that those who took the bonds might rely upon a fixed annual levy to meet the principal and interest; that all money thereby raised should be applied exclusively to that purpose; and that not only the officers of the State should assess, collect and pay as it stipulated, but that the power of the judiciary should be exercised, whenever necesEach provision of the Act is declared to be a sary, to enforce the obligation of the contract. contract between the State and each holder of These laws, in their substantial provisions, are the bonds; it is made a misdemeanor for any as binding on the State, and are as much a part judge, tax collector or other officer, to obstruct of the contract, as if those provisions had been the execution of any part of it or to fail to per- therein expressly set forth. Bronson v. Kinzie, form his official duty; tax collectors are inhib-1 How., 311; McCracken v. Hayward, 2 Id.,608;

By the Statute of 1874 a fixed annual tax is levied for the purpose of paying the principal and interest of the bonds authorized to be issued; the revenue therefrom is thereby "set apart and appropriated to that purpose and no other," it is made a felony for any officer to divert it from that purpose; the interest tax is declared to be a continuing annual tax until the bonds, principal and interest, are paid or redeemed; the appropriation is made a continuing annual one during the same period; and the levy and appropriation, it is declared, shall authorize and make it the duty of the Auditor and Treasurer, and the Board of Liquidation, respectively, to annually collect the tax, pay the interest and redeem the bonds, until they are fully discharged.

Bank v. Sharp, 6 Id., 301; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall., 314 [83 U. S., XXI., 357]; Edwards v. Kearsey, 96 U. S., 595 [XXIV., 793]; La. v. New Orleans, 102 Id., 203 [XXVI., 132].

The State has no more right by law to impair the obligation of its contracts than it has, by law, to impair the obligation of contracts between individuals. In N. J. v. Wilson, the language of the court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, is: "In the case of Fletcher v. Peck it was decided in this court, on solemn argument and with much deliberation, that this provision of the Constitution (the contract clause) extends to contracts to which a State is a party, as well as to contracts between individuals." 7 Cranch, 164, 166. It is the settled doctrine of this court that contracts with States are as fully protected by the Constitution against impairment by state legislation as contracts between individuals. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat., 1; Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How., 190; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S., 358 [XXVI., 395].

control, when these suits were commenced, all the moneys raised under the Statute and Co stitution of 1874 to meet the interest falling due Jan. 1, 1880. They have, in their hands, more than enough to pay the coupons of Jan. 1, 1880, held by the parties now before the court. Further, a fact most significant in view of the sug gestion that these moneys are mingled with other moneys in the state Treasury, the interest fund created to pay coupons maturing Jan. 1, 1880, were by an Act of the General Assembly of Louisiana, approved Jan. 4, 1882, directed to be invested in United States bonds. Acts, La., 1881, p. 50. And it is not pretended that payment from that fund will produce the slightest confusion in the Treasurer's accounts, or involve the use of moneys raised for other and distinct purposes. If any confusion ensues from such an application of these moneys, it would be only of that kind which arises when the law prevents a repudiating debtor from misappropriating funds, in his hands, that have been dedicated to a specific purpose.

3. If the Debt Ordinance of Louisiana is in It is apparently urged, as an obstacle in the violation of the Constitution of the United way of relief, that plaintiffs do not seek to have States and, therefore, a nullity as against the the proceeds of these taxes applied specially to holders of consolidated bonds, if the latter are the payment of their claims, but ask such orentitled by the terms of their contract to be paid ders as will enable all holders of consolidated out of the moneys collected for their benefit and bonds to participate in the distribution of the to have further collections made, is there any moneys raised under the Statute and Constitution mode, known to the law, by which their rights of 1874. Had the suit for a mandamus sought can be protected? My brethren of the majority the application of the moneys solely to the payanswer this question in the negative when they ment of coupons held by the plaintiffs, it might, adjudge that no relief whatever can be given in perhaps, have been urged as ground for its reeither of these suits. One is a suit in equity fusal, that each bondholder had an interest in commenced in the Circuit Court of the United the fund so created. State, ex rel. Boyer, v. State States by holders of consolidated bonds to pre-Treasurer, 32 La. Ann., 177. If the relief asked vent, by injunction, officers of the State from using the proceeds of taxes already raised under the Statute and Constitution of 1874, for any purpose other than that for which they were collected and paid to the state Treasurer. In the other suit, the plaintiffs, holders of consolidated bonds, and citizens of New York, ask a mandamus against the state officers compelling the application of the moneys so collected to the payment of their coupons, and also the collection of taxes to meet future interest as it becomes due.

Some comment is made upon the extended nature of the relief asked by plaintiffs. It is sufficient to remark that the court is never bound to give relief to the full extent demanded; and all relief is not to be denied because more is asked than the court will grant under any circumstances or in the particular case. And there is no ground, I submit, for the suggestion that granting relief would require the administration, by the court of the general finances of the State. What should be done, if properly it may be, is, by necessary orders to prevent the officers of the State from depriving creditors of moneys which by express contract have been set apart and appropriated exclusively to the payment of their claims. There is no obstacle to the payment out of that fund, except the prohibition in the void Debt Ordinance of 1879. It is distinctly admitted to be easily ascertainable from the accounts how much of the money in the Treasury is applicable to this class of debts. Indeed, it appears from the opinion in Newman v. Burke, hereafter referred to, that the Treasurer and fiscal agent of Louisiana held within their

cannot be given for the benefit of all holders of consolidated bonds, there would seem to be no difficulty in restricting payments to such as are actually before the court in person or by representation. It is, however, proper to say that, notwithstanding the criticisms made by the court upon the nature and extent of the relief asked, I do not feel authorized to infer from its opinion that relief would be given to the parties before it, had they asked payment only of their coupons. The opinion seems to proceed upon the broad ground that, as Louisiana is not directly suable in its corporate capacity, the courts of the Union cannot reach its agents employed, under its orders, in the work of destroying the contract rights of the plaintiffs.

4. Are these suits forbidden by the 11th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which declares that the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State? I understand the court, in effect, if not in terms, to hold that they cannot be maintained without violating that Amendment.

The first authority cited in support of that view is Reg. v. Lords Commissioners of the Treas ury, Law Rep., 7 Q. B., 387. It appears that, by an Act of Parliament, a round sum was ap propriated to the Crown to be used in paying costs incurred in prosecutions at assizes and quarter sessions in England, formerly paid out of county rates. Bills of costs having been passed by local officers, certain items were disallowed and others reduced by the Lords of the

1

Treasury. Subsequently a rule went against the latter to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue compelling them to pay these bills out of the funds appropriated to the Crown for such purposes. The Judges, although of opinion that the defendant should be governed by the taxation of the local officers, declined to grant the writ. Cockburn, C. J., said: "The question comes to be, whether the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, when this money gets into their hands, are bound to apply it as servants of the Crown, or as the servants of Parliament who vote the money." Black-officers of the Foreign Office to apply in such a burn, J., said: "The question remains, whether there is any statutable obligation cast upon the Lords of the Treasury to do what we are asked to compel them to do by mandamus, namely: to issue a minute to pay that money; because it seems to me clear that we have a right to grant amandamus if there is such a statutory obligation, particularly when the application is made on behalf of persons who have a direct interest in the matter." Similar declarations were made by the other Judges. They all concurred in denying the writ upon the ground that the money was voted, not to named officers to be by them applied to a designated purpose, but as "a supply to the Crown; that the officers who distributed it for the purposes named acted as servants of the Crown, not as servants of Parliament; that a suit against those officers was, therefore, one against the Sovereign, whom, Said Chief Justice Cockburn, the Court of Queen's Bench had no power, even in appear-damus should not issue. They are officers unance, to command.

illy, M. R., said: "It (the money so voted) is not paid in trust for any particular person. The case that was cited was to this effect: that if Parliament votes a sum of £1,000 to John Smith, and the Treasury devote in their books the payment of that sum to other purposes, then a mandamus will lie to the Treasury in order to pay that £1,000 to John Smith. But there is nothing of the sort here. Parliament has merely voted certain sums to Her Majesty, and of these sums £600,000 are to be applied to the Foreign Office. The distribution of that amount is left to the manner as is most subservient to Her Majesty's service and to the due support of the Foreign Office, and there is nothing whatever to connect the plaintiff with a penny of this money in any aspect. It is impossible for me, therefore, in that state of things, to say that there is any trust for him."

It seems to me that case furnishes no support for the suggestion that these are suits against the State, simply because they are brought against its officers. It does not conflict with the proposition that the state Treasurer can be compelled to apply the proceeds of these taxes as stipulated in the Statute and Constitution of 1874, which were his sole authority to receive them. Here there is a statutable obligation upon him to pay the coupons as they matured. And to that is added the obligation imposed by that Constitution, which, in terms, declares that the proceeds of taxes collected under the Act of that year "Shall be paid by the Treasurer of the State to the holders of said bonds, as the principal and interest of the same shall fall due," without further legislative authority. These obligations remain upon that officer, unless it be that the Debt Ordinance, although unconstitutional and void, has discharged them. Had Parliament, instead of the Act involved in the case cited, passed one directly imposing upon the defendants the duty of paying out of moneys appropriated for that purpose a certain class of claims, it is manifest that the court of Queen's Bench would have compelled them, by mandimus or other process, to perform that duty. In the case supposed, there would have been a statutable obligation which the court would not have permitted the defendants to evade on the pretext that they were officers of the Crown.

I refer also to Rex v. Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 4 Ad. & El., 286. That was an application for a mandamus against the defendants, who had authority by statute to grant a certain " superannuation allowance." Sir J. Campbell, Attorney-General, contended that it was against principle that the court should order a mandamus in the name of the King, directing the King to pay money. But the mandamus was granted. Lord Denman, C. J., said: "If, then, this is only the case of public officers having the control of a sum of money for this particular purpose, there is no reason that a man

der the Crown; but the Crown has no more to do with them for this purpose than any other officers. They are merely parties who have received a sum of money as trustees for an individual under the provisions of an Act of Parliament. *Here it only appears that a sum of money has been voted as an allowance to an individual, which sum they have and refuse to pay."

*

*

There is another consideration which strengthens this position, that is, the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States over State Constitutions and state laws. To the duty imposed by the Statute and Constitution of 1874 upon its officers, there is superadded the duty imposed by the fundamental law of the land, not to regard as binding any state enactment which impairs the obligation of contracts.

If the case cited from the Queen's Bench were susceptible of the construction put upon it by this court, it should not have controlling influence. Here, no such relations exist between the executive and judicial departments as exist in England between the Crown and the courts. This was shown in the elaborate opinion of Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court in United States v. Lee [ante, 171]. That was ejectment to recover real estate, in the actual possession of officers who claimed it, not in any personal right, but for the United States; property used and occupied as a cemetery for dead soldiers of the Union. It was contended that a suit against the This distinction is well illustrated in Grenville- officers, having for its object to disturb their posMurray v. Earl of Clarendon, Law Rep., 9 Eq., session, was a suit against the government. In 11. There the plaintiff sought a decree for the support of that position, numerous cases were value of diplomatic services alleged to have been cited from the English courts, which held that rendered by him. He claimed that he was en- a suit could not be maintained against officers titled to be paid out of certain money voted by of the Crown. But we held that upon such a Parliament to the Foreign Office. Lord Rom-question but little weight should be given to

those adjudications; that there is a vast differ- | lish, upon grounds which cannot well be shaken, ence in the essential character of the two gov- that a suit against state officers, to prevent a ernments in reference to the source and depos- threatened wrong to the injury of the citizen, is itaries of power; that while in England the not necessarily a suit against the State within Crown, the fountain of honor, cannot be dis- the meaning of the 11th Amendment of the Conturbed in its possession of property by process stitution; for, said Chief Justice Marshall, “The directed against its officers or agents, under our 11th Amendment, which restrains the jurisdicsystem, the people, who are there subjects, are tion granted by the Constitution over suits Sovereign; that "Their rights, whether collect- against States, is, of necessity, limited to those ive or individual, are not bound to give way to suits in which a State is a party to the record.” a sentiment of loyalty to the person of the mon- Here, the State is not a party to the record. arch;" that "The citizen here knows no person, Here, officers of Louisiana only are parties dehowever near to those in power or however pow-fendants; and the relief asked is that they be reerful in himself, to whom he need yield the quired to perform purely ministerial duties imrights which the law secures to him when it is posed upon them by the Statute and Constitution well administered;" that "When he, in one of of 1874, whose provisions, as respects the matthe courts of competent jurisdiction, has estab- ters now in issue, are still in force and obligalished his right of property, there is no reason tory, because never affected, modified or rewhy deference to any person, natural or artifi- pealed, otherwise than by a Debt Ordinance,subcial, not even the United States, should prevent sequently adopted, conceded to be in conflict him from using the means which the law gives with the Constitution and, therefore, absolutehim for the protection and enforcement of that ly void. right." Said the court further, in that case: "No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office, participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."

In that case the court re-affirms the doctrines of Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat., 738. The latter was a suit to recover moneys, which officers of the State of Ohio, in conformity with its statutes, had illegally taken from a bank of the United States. The suit being against the officers of the State, the objection was taken that it could not be sustained without the State itself being a party; that the State could not be sued; consequently, it was argued, the relief prayed (the restoration of the money) could not be granted. But to that objection the court, speak ing by Chief Justice Marshall, and this language is quoted approvingly in United States v. Lee, said: "If the State of Ohio could have been made a party defendant, it can scarcely be denied that this would be a strong case for an injunction. The objection is that, as the real party cannot be brought before the court, a suit cannot be sustained against the agents of that party; and cases have been cited to show that a court of chancery will not make a decree unless all those who are substantially interested be made parties to the suit. This is certainly true where it is in the power of the plaintiff to make them parties; but if the person who is the real principal, the person who is the true source of the mischief, by whose power and for whose advantage it is done, be himself above the law, be exempt from all judicial process, it would be subversive of the best established principles to say that the laws could not afford the same remedies against the agent employed in doing the wrong, which they would afford against him could his principal be joined in the suit."

The decision in that case has not been heretofore questioned in this court. It seems to estab

There are other decisions of this court still more directly in point. The leading one is Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall., 203 [83 U. S., XXI., 447]. In that case it appears that the State of Texas made a grant of lands to a railroad company, upon the basis of which bonds were issued known as land-grant mortgage bonds. They were sold in large numbers in this country and Europe. Subsequently the State, by provisions of its statutes and Constitution, attempted to repudiate and nullify its contract; and, in pursuance thereof, its officers proposed to issue patents to others for a part of the lands embraced in this grant. Thereupon a suit in equity was instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States against the Governor and the Commissioner of the General Land-Office of Texas, to prevent them from issuing patents for the lands or any part of them. The State was, of course, not made a party on the record. The bill was demurred to upon the ground that she could not be sued, and that the suit, being against her officers, was one, within the meaning of the Constitution, against her. The demurrer was overruled, and the relief asked was given.

Touching the question of jurisdiction, the court, speaking by Mr. Justice Swayne, stated these principles as having been announced in Osborn v. Bank. 1. A Circuit Court of the United States, in a proper case in equity, may enjoin a state officer from executing a state law in conflict with the Constitution, or a statute of the United States, when such execution will violate the rights of the complainant. 2. Where the State is concerned, the State should be made a party, if it can be done. That it cannot be done, is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may proceed to decree against the officers of the State in all respects as if the State were a party to the record. 3. In deciding who are parties to the suit, the court will not look beyond the record. Making a state officer a party does not make the State a party, although her laws prompt his action and the State stands behind him as the real party in interest. P. 220 [458]. It was in conformity with those doctrines that the relief asked was given. See, also, Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet, 252; R. R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How., 497; 2 Story, Const., sec. 1685; 1 Kent, Com., 351.