For the determination of the first of these ob- | the destruction of the other vessels, may, in that jections, it will be necessary to consider the sense, be said to have been effected by his fleet movements of the fleet under command of Ad- alone, yet, without the aid of the army, the remiral Porter, immediately preceding the capt- sult mentioned would not probably have been ure of Richmond. The record enables us to accomplished. Certainly its movements condo this, although officers present on the vessels tributed most essentially to the success of the differ in their recollection of dates. fleet. For several months it had been lying near Richmond, under the command of General Grant, with the avowed purpose of capturing that city and of destroying the confederate forces. The result of the battle of Five Forks, on the first of April, satisfied the confederate commander that he could not hold his lines and protect Richmond. The withdrawal of his troops and the evacuation of Richmond followed. Had they not been thus forced to retire and his lines had continued to cross James River between Chaffin's Bluff and Drury's Bluff, it would have been almost if not quite impossible for the fleet of Admiral Porter to ascend the river. The fire of the shore batteries, with the assistance of the confederate troops near by, would have checked any advance, supported, as they would have been, by the confederate vessels and the torpedoes in the stream. It is plain, therefore, that whatever was accomplished by the fleet of the Admiral, in James River, on the 2d and 3d days of April, 1865, must be considered as the result of the co-operative action of both the army and the navy. It matters not that the movements of the army were miles distant from the operations of the fleet. They relieved that fleet from resistence which might, and probably would, have defeated any attempt to ascend the river above the shore batteries, and destroy the armed vessels of the enemy.

On the morning of April 2, 1865, General Lee, commanding the enemy's forces around Richmond, informed the confederate authorities that he should immediately withdraw his lines and evacuate the city. The withdrawal and evacuation took place on the evening of that day. Information of his purpose was, undoubtedly, communicated to Admiral Porter soon after it was generally known in Richmond, which was before noon. At that time there were in James River, for some miles below Richmond, obstructions which the Confederates had placed to prevent the ascent of the Union fleet. Vessels filled with stone had been sunk and numerous torpedoes planted in the stream. Batteries had also been erected along the river. Some of the obstructions were just above the lower end of what was known as Dutch Gap Canal about sixteen miles by the river from Richmond, which were originally placed there by the Confederates, and afterwards maintained by the forces of the United States. Two miles above them was Howlett's confederate battery. Eight miles above the Dutch Gap Canal was Chaffin's Bluff, and one mile above that on the opposite side of the river was Drury's Bluff, seven miles below Richmond. General Lee's lines extended across the river between the two bluffs, and below them. Above the obstructions near Dutch Gap Canal several confederate vessels of war were stationed. When General Lee was compelled to abandon his lines, orders were given that the batteries on James River should be withdrawn and the confederate vessels destroyed.

As soon as Admiral Porter, on the 2d of April, was informed or had reason to believe that General Lee intended to retreat from Richmond, he gave orders for the removal of the obstructions in the river, and for his vessels to open fire on the confederate batteries within range, and to push on through the obstructions as fast as they were carried away, first sending boats ahead to remove the torpedoes. These orders were carried out with great gallantry and spirit; a heavy fire was opened on the batteries and, during the following night, a channel was cut through the obstructions. Soon after the fleet opened fire the enemy, to prevent the capture of his vessels, commenced destroying them, setting fire to some of them and blowing up others. On the next day, the 3d, the fleet passed through the obstructions and moved up to Drury's Bluff, capturing one of the enemy's vessels which had not been destroyed, the iron-clad ram, Texas. Another of the enemy's vessels, The Beaufort, was subsequently captured further up the river. At Drury's Bluff, the vessels were detained by the obstructions until the 4th. On that day the Admiral, accompanied by President Lincoln, proceeded up to Richmond. Although, in the movements of the Admiral's fleet in its ascent of James River and in its attack on the batteries, he was not assisted by the actual presence of any portion of the Army of the United States, so that the capture of the two vessels, The Texas and The Beaufort, and

Prize money, or bounty in lieu of it, is not allowed by the laws of Congress where vessels of the enemy are captured or destroyed by the navy with the co-operation of the army. To win either, the navy must achieve its success without the direct aid of the army, by maritime force only. No pecuniary reward is conferred, for anything taken or destroyed by the navy, when it acts in conjunction with the army in the capture of a fortified position of the enemy, though the meritorious services and gallant conduct of its officers and men may justly entitle them to honorable mention in the history of the country. The Siren, 13 Wall., 389 [80 U. S., XX., 505].

The second objection to a recovery, that the destruction of the confederate vessels was effected upon inland waters of the United States, is equally clear, if the term "property" used in the 7th section of the Act of 1864, can be construed as counsel seem to take for granted-to embrace public vessels of the enemy. That Act provides, among other things, for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and is in addition to the Act on that subject of March 12, 1863. 13 Stat. at L., 377; 12 Stat. at L., 820. The 7th section declares, "That no property seized or taken upon any of the inland waters of the United States, by the naval forces thereof, shall be regarded as maritime prize; but all property so seized or taken shall be promptly delivered to the proper officers of the courts, or as provided in this Act and in the said Act approved March 12, 1863."

The term "inland" as here used was evidently intended to apply to all waters of the United

ion of the court:
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin-

This application is denied. We have had occasion to say at the present Term, in Ex parte Curtis [ante, 232], that "We have no general power to review the judgments of the inferior courts of the United States in criminal cases, by

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. the use of the writ of habeas corpus or other

The jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment and charged to have been forged, show ments of the inferior courts of the United States in criminal cases, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise, is limited to the single question of the power of the court to commit the prisoner for

(See 8. C. “Miller v. Lancaster Bank" 16 Otto, 542- this petition, the Lancaster Bank filed an an

Mr. Justice Miller took no part in the decisof this case.

ion
True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8.

by the judgment below, any "title, right, priv- | in the Danville Bank by way of defense, and that ilege or immunity specially set up or claimed' is not claiming for themselves any title, right, under the banking Act. As early as 1809 it was privilege or immunity given by the law. held by this court in Owings v. Norwood, 5 The motion to dismiss is granted. Cranch, 344, that, in order to give us jurisdiction in this class of cases, the right, title or immunity which is denied must grow out of the Constitution, or a treaty or statute of the United States relied on. Under this rule jurisdiction was not taken in that case, although it was an action of ejectment by Norwood's lessee, and the record showed that an effort was made to defeat the recovery because of an outstanding title in a third person adverse to Norwood and protected by a treaty. Chief Justice Marshall, in speaking for the court, said: "Whenever a right grows out of or is protected by a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the States, and whoever may have

UNITED STATES, Piff.,

v.

R. G. HARRIS ET AL.

(See S. C., 16 Otto, 629–644.)

when constitutional.

1. That the certificate of division of opinion in a criminal case in a circuit court does not expressly state that the point of difference between the judges their counsel, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of this was certified upon the request of either party or court.

2. If the request may be fairly inferred, from the all that is necessary to satisfy the statute. circumstances which appear in the record, that is

this right, is to be protected. But if the per- Certificate of division-form of criminal law— son's title is not affected by the treaty, or if he claims nothing under a treaty, his title cannot be protected by the treaty." The principle thus announced has been recognized in many cases since. Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat., 129; Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How., 323; Wynn v. Morris, 20 How., 5 [61 U. S., XV., 801]; Hale v. Gaines, 22 How., 160 [63 U. S., XVI., 269]; Verden v. Coleman, 1 Black, 472 [66 U. S., XVII., 161]; Long v. Converse, 91 U. S.,105 [XXIII., 233]. Henderson v. Tennessee, like Owings v. Norwood, was an action of ejectment, and the effort was to defeat the recovery by showing an outstanding title in a third person under a treaty with which the party in possession did not connect himself; but the jurisdiction was denied, Chief Justice Taney saying in the opinion: "The right to make this defense is not derived from the treaties, nor from any au

3. Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes, making it

a criminal offense for two or more persons in a son of the equal protection of the laws of the State, State or Territory to conspire to deprive any peris unconstitutional.

4. Those provisions of the law which are broader than is warranted by the article of the Constitution by which they are supposed to be authorized, cannot be sustained.

[No. 7.] Submitted Nov. 7, 1882. Decided Jan. 22, 1883.

thority exercised under the General Government. On the Judges of the Circuit Court of the

It is given by the laws of the State, which provide that the defendant in ejectment may set up title in a stranger in bar of the action. It is true the title set up in this case was claimed under a treaty. Butto give jurisdiction to this court the party must claim the right for himself, and not for a third person in whose title he has no interest. " And in Hale v. Gaines it was said: "The plaintiff in error must claim for himself, some title, right, privilege or exemption under an Act of Congress, etc., and the decision must be against his claim to give this court jurisdiction. Setting up a title in the United States by way of defense is not claiming a personal interest affecting the subject in litigation."

N a certificate of division in opinion between United States for the Western District of Tennessee.

The history and facts appear in the

Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Woods: Section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States declares: "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise upon the highway or on the premises of another for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privleges or immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws, each of said persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." This section was originally a part of section 2 of the Act of April 20, 1871. 17 Stat at L., 13, 14.

In our opinion, these cases are conclusive of the present motion. The plaintiffs in error set up no title against the Bank. In effect, they seek to prevent the issue of an execution on a judgment against them or those under whom they claim, because, as between the Danville Bank and the Lancaster Bank, a conveyance made by the Danville Bank, of the property to be delivered under the execution, is inoperative on account of the provisions of the banking law. What was done between the two Banks At the November Term, 1876, of the United had no effect on the title of the parties in pos- States Circuit Court for the Western District of session, and it was a matter of no importance Tennessee an indictment, based on this section, to them whether the execution issued on the was returned by the grand jury against one R. application of the one or the other. Clearly, G. Harris and nineteen others. The indictment therefore, the plaintiffs in error occupy no oth-contained four counts. The first count charged er position than that of parties setting up title as follows: "That R. G. Harris," and nineteen

The third count was identical with the second, except that the conspiracy was charged to have been with the purpose of hindering and preventing said William A. Tucker, deputysheriff, from giving and securing to Robert R. Smith alone the due and equal protection of the laws of the State.

others, naming them, "yeomen of the County | Tucker, deputy-sheriff of said county, from of Crockett, in the State of Tennessee, and all giving and securing to the said Robert R. Smith late of the county and district aforesaid, on, to and others, naming them, the due and equal wit: the fourteenth day of August, in the year protection of the laws of said State, in this, to of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and wit: that, at and before the entering into said seventy-six, in the County of Crockett, in said conspiracy, the said Robert R. Smith and othState and district, and within the jurisdictioners, naming them, were held in the custody of of this court, unlawfully, with force and arms, said deputy-sheriff by virtue of certain wardid conspire together with certain other per- rants duly issued against them, to answer cersons whose names are to the grand jurors afore-tain criminal charges, and it thereby became said unknown, then and there, for the purpose and was the duty of said deputy-sheriff to safeof depriving Robert R. Smith, William J. Over- ly keep in his custody the said Robert R. Smith ton, George W. Wells, Jr., and P. M. Wells, and others while so under arrest, and then and then and there being citizens of the United States there give and secure to them the equal protecand of said State, of the equal protection of the tion of the laws of the State of Tennessee; and laws in this, to wit: that, theretofore, to wit: on that the defendants did then and there conspire the day and year aforesaid, in said county, the together for the purpose of preventing and hinsaid Robert R. Smith, William J. Overton, dering the said deputy-sheriff from then and George W. Wells, Jr., and P. M. Wells, hav- there safely keeping, while under arrest and in ing been charged with the commission of cer- his custody, the said Robert R. Smith and othtain criminal offenses, the nature of which said ers, and giving and securing to them the equal criminal offenses being to the grand jurors afore-protection of the laws of said State. said unknown, and having upon such charges then and there been duly arrested by the lawful and constituted authorities of said State, to wit: by one William A. Tucker, the said William A. Tucker then and there being a deputy-sheriff of said county and then and there acting as such; and having been so arrested as aforesaid, and being then and there so under arrest and in the custody of said deputy-sheriff as aforesaid, they, the said Robert R. Smith, William J. Overton, George W. Wells, Jr., and P.M. Wells, were there and then by the laws of said State entitled to the due and equal protection of the laws thereof, and were then and there entitled under the said laws to have their persons protected from violence when so then and there under arrest as aforesaid. And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present that the said R. G. Harris," and nineteen others, naming them, "with certain other persons whose names are to the said grand jurors unknown, did then and there, with force and arms, unlawfully conspire together as aforesaid then and there for the purpose of depriving them, the said Robert R. Smith, William J. Overton, George W. Wells, Jr., and P. M. Wells, of their rights to the due and equal protection of the laws of said State and of their rights to be protected in their persons from violence while so then and there under arrest as aforesaid and while so then and there in the custody of the said deputy-sheriff, and did then and there deprive them, the said Robert R. Smith, William J. Overton, George W. Wells, Jr., and P. M. Wells, of such rights and protection and of the due and equal protection of the laws of the said State, by, then and there, while so under arrest as aforesaid and while so then and there in the custody of the said deputysheriff as aforesaid, beating, bruising, wounding and otherwise ill-treating them, the said Robert R. Smith, William J. Overton, George W. Wells, Jr., and P. M. Wells, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States."

The second count charged that the defendants, with force and arms, unlawfully did conspire together for the purpose of preventing and hindering the constituted authorities of the State of Tennessee, to wit: the said William A.

The fourth count charged that the defendants did conspire together for the purpose of depriving said P. M. Wells, who was then and there a citizen of the United States and the State of Tennessee, of the equal protection of the laws, in this, to wit: said Wells having been charged with an offense against the laws of said State, was duly arrested by said Tucker, deputy-sheriff, and so being under arrest was entitled to the due and equal protection of said laws and to have his person protected from violence while so under arrest; and the said defendants did then and there unlawfully conspire together for the purpose of depriving said Wells of his right to the equal protection of the laws, and of his right to be protected in person from violence while so under arrest, and Did then and there deprive him of such rights and protection, and of the due and equal protection of the laws of the State of Tennessee, by, then and there, and while he, the said P. M. Wells, was so then and there under arrest as aforesaid, unlawfully beating, bruising, wounding and killing him, the said P. M. Wells, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided," etc.

The defendants demurred to the indictment on several grounds, among them the following:

1. "Because the offenses, created by section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and upon which section the aforesaid four counts are based, are not constitutionally within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and because the matters and things therein referred to are judicially cognizable by state tribunals only, and legislative action thereon is among the rights reserved to the several States and inhibited to Congress by the Constitution of the United States;" and,

2. "Because the said section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in so far as it creates offenses and imposes penalties, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and an infringement of the rights of the several States and the people thereof.