ALBERT GRANT, Appt., spread of a contagious and deadly epidemic, if those first taken should be immediately sacrificed to the public good. But such a mode of 0. preventing the evil would hardly be regarded as PHOENIX MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE legitimate in a Christian country. I have no wish to discuss the subject at length, but simply to express the general grounds on which I think the legislation in question is ultra vires. Though as much opposed as anyone to the evil sought to be remedied, I do not think the mode adopted is a legitimate or constitutional one, because it interferes too much with the freedom of the citizen in the pursuit of lawful and proper ends. If similar laws have been passed before, that does not make it right. The question is, whether the present law, with its sweeping provisions, is within the just powers of Congress. As I do not think it is, I dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: These motions are denied. A failure to annex to or return with a writ of error an assignment of errors, as required by section 997 of the Revised Statutes, is no ground for dismissal for want of jurisdiction. If an assignment is filed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 4, Rule 21, it will ordinarily be enough. There is not in this case such a color of right to a dismissal as to make it proper for us to consider the motion to affirm. Whitney v. Cook, 99 U. S., 607 [XXV., 446]. True copy. Test: COMPANY. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 429-432.) Final decree, what is-decree in foreclosure. 1. A decree to be final, so as to give this court jurisdiction on appeal, must terminate the litigation of the parties on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance here, the court below would have nothing to do but to execute the decree it had already rendered. 2. A decree in a foreclosure suit, which does not order a sale of the property, but overrules the defense set forth in a cross-bill, and declares that the appellee is the owner of the debt secured, and refers the case to an auditor to ascertain the amount due thereon, the existence, amounts and priorities of liens, and the claims for taxes, is not a final decree. [No. 1086.] Submitted Nov. 20, 1882. Decided Dec. 18, 1882. Messrs. William F. Mattingly and Richard T. Merrick, for appellee, in support of motion. Messrs. William A. Meloy, Benjamin F. Butler and H. W. Blair, for appellant, contra. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the following decree in a suit for the foreclosure of certain deeds of trust in the nature of mortgages to secure the payment of money: "The cause came on to be heard upon the pleadings and proofs therein and having been submitted by the counsel of the respective parties and duly considered by the court, and it appearing to the court that said defendant, Albert Grant, is not entitled to any relief under his cross-bill in this cause; that the plaintiff is the holder and owner of the several obligations of said Grant, secured by the deeds of trust on the real estate prayed in the original bill of complaint herein to be sold for the payment of the indebtedness thereon, and mentioned and set forth in the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th paragraphs of said bill; that said Grant has made default in the payment of his said obligations, on which he is indebted to the plaintiff in large sums of money, with long arrearages of interest: that said Grant has not paid taxes on said real estate for a number of years, and the same are in arrears for upwards of $20,000; that said indebtedness of said defendant Grant to the plaintiff largely exceeds the value of said real estate, and that the plaintiff has no personal security for its said debt; it is, this second day of March, A. D. 1882, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that this cause be, and the same hereby is, referred to the auditor of the court to state the account between the plaintiff and the defendant, Albert Grant; the amount due under said several deeds of trust on said real estate prayed to be sold in NOTE.-What is final decree or judgment of state or other court from which appeal lies. See note to GibJames H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. bons v. Ogden, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.), 448. said bill; the amounts due said judgment and mechanics' lien creditors referred to in said bill; whether the same are liens upon any of said real estate; the relative priorities of the claims of said creditors and the plaintiff, and the value of the said real estate, all from the proofs in this cause, except as to said mechanics' lien, and report the same to this court. And said auditor shall further ascertain and report to thiscourt the amount due for taxes in arrears on said real estate, and whether the same or any part thereof has been sold for taxes, and if so, when, for what taxes, for what amount and to whom." To this was added an order appointing a receiver to take possession of the property, make leases, etc. A motion is now made to dismiss, because the decree appealed from is not a final decree. The rule is well settled that a decree to be final, within the meaning of that term as used in the Acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeal, must terminate the litigation of the parties on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance here, the court below would have nothing to do but to execute the decree it had already rendered. This subject was considered at the present Term in Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff [ante, 73], where a large number of cases are cited. It has also been many times decided that a decree of sale in a foreclosure suit, which settles all the rights of the parties and leaves nothing to be done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds, is a final decree for the purposes of an appeal. Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch, 179; Whiting v. Bank, 13 Pet., 15; Bronson v. R. R. Co., 2 Black, 531 [67 U. S., XVII., 360]; Green v. Fisk, 103 U. S., 520 [XXVI., 486]. But in R. R. Co. v. Swasey, 23 Wall., 409 [90 U. S., XXIII., 137], it was held that "To justify such a sale, without consent, the amount due upon the debt must be determined. * Until this is done, the rights of the parties are not all settled. Final process for the collection of money cannot issue until the amount to be paid or collected by the process, if not paid, has been adjudged." In this, the court but followed the principle acted on in Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How., 656; Humiston v. Stainthorp, 2 Wall., 106 [69 U. S., XVII., 905]; Crawford v. Points, 13 How., 11, and many * # other cases. The present decree is not final according to this rule. It does not order a sale of the property. It overrules the defense of the appellant as set forth in his cross-bill, and declares that the appellee is the holder and owner of the debt secured by the deeds of trust, but refers the case to an auditor to ascertain the amount due upon the debt, the amount due certain judgment and lien creditors, the existence and priorities of liens and the claims for taxes. It is true that the court finds the amount due the appellee largely exceeds the value of the property, but this is only as a foundation for the order appointing the receiver. If, in point of fact, it is not true, the finding will not conclude the parties in the final closing up of the suit. The order for the delivery of the property is only in aid of the foreclosure proceedings, and to subject the income pending the suit, to the payment of any sum that may in the end be found to be due. If anything remains, either of the income or of the proceeds of the sale after the mortgage or trust debts are satis fied, it will go to the appellant, notwithstanding what has been decreed. There is no order as in Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How., 201; Thompson v. Dean, 7 Wall., 346 [74 U. S., XIX., 95], and other cases of a like character, adjudging the property to belong absolutely to the appellee, and ordering immediate delivery of possession. In Forgay v. Conrad, supra, which is a leading case on this question, it wasexpressly said by Chief Justice Taney (p. 204) that the rule did not extend to cases where property was directed to be delivered to a receiver. The reason is that the possession of the receiver is that of the court, and he holds, pending the suit, for the benefit of whomsoever it shall in the end be found to concern. Neither the title nor the rights of the parties are changed by his possession. He acts as the representative of the court in keeping the property so that it may be subjected to any decree that shall finally be rendered against it. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed; and it is so ordered. 1. The Act of the Legislature of West Virginia, City of Parkersburg to issue its bonds for the purpassed December 15, 1868, ch. 118, authorizing the pose of lending the same to persons engaged in manufacturing, was invalid, and the bonds issued under it are void, as against the City. of $20,000, issued by the City to M., under said Act, 2. As the consideration for bonds to the amount he executed to J., as trustee, a deed conveying to J certain real estate and personal property, in trust nual interest on $20,000, and of annual installments to secure the payment by M., to the City of semi-anon the principal, with a power of sale in case of default. The bonds were payable to M., or order. He iffs, who bought them for value, in good faith. M indorsed them in blank and sold them to the plaintpaid to the City one installment of interest. The City made five payments of interest on the bonds. to make further payments of interest. In a suit in It took into its possession the property and refused equity brought by the holders of the bonds against the City, Held: (1) The bonds were void because the necessary was to be raised by taxation, and such taxation was amount to pay the principal and interest of them not taxation for a public object, and the Constitution of the State did not authorize such taxation, and the Legislature had no power to pass said Act. (2) The payment of interest on the bonds by the City did not, nor did the acts of its officers or agents in dealing with the property, operate, by way of the bonds, there having been a total want of power estoppel or ratification, to make the City liable on to issue them originally. (3) The bill having prayed for a receiver of the property, but none having been applied for, and the suit not having been brought to a hearing for nearly three years, and the City having been allowed to control and manage the property meantime, and M., being a party to the suit, and making *Head notes by Mr. Justice BLATCEFORD. no defense; and the City having acted in good faith | its creation and existence, but not for private and with reasonable discretion, in taking care of the property and disposing of some of it, the receipt purposes merely. Nor can it be compelled to of the property by the City did not create an obli- execute such a trust. gation on its part to pay the bonds. incident to the bonds. (4) M., had a right to reclaim the property and to call on the City to account for it, in disaffirmance of the illegal contract, the transaction being merely malum prohibitum, and the City being the principal offender. Such right passed to the plaintiffs as an (5) A decree was ordered declaring that the City, in issuing the bonds, exceeded its lawful powers, and that they cannot be enforced as obligations of the City; and providing for a sale of the remaining property, and the taking of an account between the City and the property, crediting the City with the sums it had paid in good faith to acquire, protect, preserve and dispose of the property; and for insurance and taxes, and the amount it had paid in paying the coupons it had paid; and charging it with what it had received, but not charging it with any sum for loss of or damage to or depreciation of the property, and the distribution among the plaintiffs of the net proceeds of the sale and the net amount of money, if any, remaining in the hands of the City, received from M., or from the sales by it of any of the property received by it. [No. 124.] Argued Dec. 12, 13, 1882. Decided Jan. 8, 1883. Vidal v. Girard 2 How., 128; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall.,468 (86 U. S., XXÍI., 164); In the Matter of Howe, 1 Paige, 214; Ang. and Ames, Corp., sec. 168; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., secs. 437– 443, inclusive, and notes; Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns.,422; 2 Kent, Com., 280; Sutton v. Cole, 3 Pick., 232; Chapin v. School Dist. 35 N. H., 445; Berrian v. Mayor, 4 Rob. (N. Y.), 553. Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal., 134. Messrs. Charles Marshall, B. M. Ambler, William A. Fisher and W. W. Van Winkle, for appellees: If these bonds were void, the City had no right to touch the security, because only persons interested in the bonds could resort to that property. If accountable as trustee, the City is certainly liable for the amount at which she appraised the property when she assumed the trusts. Brown v. Lambert 33 Grat., 256. We submit that it is too late for the City to APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United deny its liability to pay the equivalent of the States for the District of West Virginia. The history and facts of the case fully appear in the opinion of the court. Messrs. William A. Cook and C. C. Cole, for appellant: The Act of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed on the 15th day of December, 1868, purports to authorize the city council to issue and loan its bonds in furtherance of a private enterprise. bonds, even if the bonds be void ab initio. The defense of ultra vires is not allowed to prevail where it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong. R. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S., 258 (XXV., 693). But the City, having power to purchase under its charter, arranged as a new contract to pay the bonds. The obligation to do justice rests upon all It is presumed that the legislative intent was persons, natural or artificial, and if the county to empower the collection of a tax for the ulti-obtains the money or property of others withmate payment of these bonds should it become out authority, the law will compel restitution necessary. This is in excess of the legislative or compensation. power of taxation, and it follows that the Act and bonds are void. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655 (87 U. S., XXII., 455); Allen v. Inhab. of Jay, 60 Me., 124; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass., 454; State v. Osaukee, 14 Kan., 418; Weismer v. Vil. of Douglas, 64 N. Y., 91; Crampton v. Zabris kie, 101 U. S., 601 (XXV., 1070). The bonds in question were issued in violation of the provisions of the 8th section of the 10th article of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia, adopted on the 22d day of August, 1872. List v. Wheeling, 7 W. Va., 501; Aspinwall v. Comrs., 22 How., 364 (63 U. S., XVI., 296). If the statute confers no power to issue the bonds, there can be no bona fide holding and no estoppel. Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall., 355 (79 U. S., XX., 457); Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655 (87 U. S., XXII., 455); Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S., 260 (XXIV., 154); Township of Oakland v. Skinner, 94 U. S., 255 (XXIV., 125); U. S. v. Macon Co., 99 U. S., 582 (XXV., 331); Anthony v. Co.of Jasper, 101 U. S.,693 (XXV., 1005); Wells v. Supervisors, 102 U. S., 625 (XXVI, 122); Ogden v. Co. of Daviess, 102 U. S., 634 (XXVI., 263); 1 Dill. Mun. Corp., sec. 381. The City cannot be charged as a trustee of the property. A municipal corporation may take and hold in trust the property for purposes germane to Marsh v. Fulton Co., 10 Wall., 676 (77 U. S., XIX., 1040); Argenti v. San Francisco, 16 Cal., 255; Dill. Mun. Corp., 3d ed., sec. 460. A city is compelled to refund money raised by her from the sale of void bonds. Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U. S., 294 (XXVI., 153); Paul v. Kenosha, 22 Wis., 266. Where bonds are issued to cover a valid debt, although the bonds were ultra vires and void, yet the indebtedness must be paid. Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U. S., 341 (XXIV., 659). Where the corporation has received the consideration, it is estopped to dispute the validity of the bonds. Pendleton Co.v.Amy, 13 Wall., 297 (80 U. S., XX., 579); Dill. Mun. Corp., secs. 460, 260, 261, 524, 938, 939, 458. In the exercise of powers regarding property, a corporation stands (in Va.) upon the same footing as individuals. R. F. & P. R. R. Co. v. Richmond, 26 Gratt., 83-95. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opinion of the court: On the 15th of December, 1868, the Legislature of West Virginia passed an Act which provided as follows (ch. 118): "Section 1. That the Mayor and Council of of the City of Parkersburg are hereby authorized and empowered to issue the bonds of said City to an amount not exceeding $200,000, for the purpose of lending the same to manufacturers carry SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. * OCT. TERM, municipal corporation, except in cases where such corporations have already authorized their bonds to be issued, shall hereafter be allowed to become indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment *centum on the value of the taxable property for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness; nor without, at the same time, providing for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay, annually, the interest on such debt, and the principal thereof within, and not exceeding thirty-four years; Provided, That no debt shall be contracted under this section, unless all questions connected with the same shall have been first submitted to a vote of the people, and have received three fifths of all the votes cast for and against the same. ing on business in or near the said City, in the said County of Wood. The said bonds shall run twenty years, and bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum; and they shall be issued upon the recommendation of the following named persons, who shall be considered the trustees of said loan, that is to say: * who shall have power to fill all vacancies that may occur in their number. They shall have power to make loans of said bonds to good, solvent companies or individuals, on the following terms, that is to say: when persons engaged in manufacturing, shall have invested in their business thirty-five (35) per cent of the amount proposed to be employed in the business of manufacturing, clear of all liabilities, to be shown to said trustees by affidavits of the applicants, or by other satisfactory evidence; and when such proof is furnished, then said trustees, five members concurring, may lend to such applicants such amounts of said bonds as they may deem proper and judicious, not, however, to exceed sixty-five per cent of the capital proposed to be used in manufacturing by the applicant; Provided, however, When such loans shall be made, the interest thereon shall be paid by the borrower semi-annually to the treasurer of said City; and five per cent of the principal shall be paid annually to the said City by the borrower, to be placed to the account of the sinking fund of said City, until the several loans are paid in full. The said loans shall be secured by deed of trust or mortgage on real estate, or by other satisfactory security, sanctioned by said trustees. And provided, also, That no bonds shall be issued under this section until a majority of the qualified voters of said City concur in the same, by voting for or against the same, at an election to be held for that purpose." On the 17th of April, 1869, an election was held in the City of Parkersburg, under authority of an ordinance passed by the mayor and city council of said City, "Upon the proposition to authorize the said city council to issue bonds of the said City, to the amount of $200,000 to be loaned to manufacturers under the provisions of said law and said ordinance." At said election 441 votes were cast in favor of said proposition and 19 against it. was 66 On the 6th of September, 1870, a communication having been received by the city council from M. J. O'Brien & Brother in regard to the erection of a manufacturing establishment and marine railway within the city limits, it Resolved, that the council agree when the trustees of the improvement loan certify that the Messrs. O'Brien & Bro. have satisfactorily secured the bonds loaned to them and complied with the Act of the Legislature authorizing the loan of said bonds, that they will release said parties from city taxation on their property, to the amount of bonds invested in the same, not exceeding $20,000; provided, however, the release shall extend so long as the said property shall be used or operated as a manufacturing establishment and marine railway, but not in any event to exceed twenty years. Nothing further was done on the subject until after section 8 of article 10 of the new Constitution of West Virginia went into operation on the 22d of August, 1872, which was as follows: "8. No county, city, school district or 240 adopted the following resolution: "Be it reOn the 22d of April, 1873, the city council solved by the Mayor and Council of the City of Parkersburg, that, in the event of the firm of M. J. O'Brien & Brother taking from the City a loan of twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars of its bonds authorized under former resolution, dated September 6, 1870, for manufacturing purposes, and paying punctually the interest thereon and five per cent (5) of the principal for sixteen years, the said firm be released from any further payments and the balance of said bonds be paid by the City, and the said M. J. O'Brien & Brother are released from making a marine railway.' of May, 1873, the trustees of said loan made a At a meeting of the city council on the 13th report, showing that they had adopted the following resolution: O'Brien & Brother, are desirous of obtaining a Whereas, M. J. O'Brien and W. S. O'Brien, composing the firm of M. J. loan of the bonds of the City, under and by authority of an Act of the Legislature of West Virginia, passed December 15, 1868, for manufacturing purposes, to the amount of $20,000, for the purpose of aiding them in the erection of a foundry and machine works in the City of Parkersburg; and whereas, for the purpose of erecting these works, they have bought of Mrs. and also from her as the guardian of Bettie C. Joanna Wait, widow of Walton Wait, deceased, Wait, infant heir of Walton Waite, deceased, lot No. 80 in said City of Parkersburg, on Kanawha Street being 85 by 170 feet, and have received a conveyance from her of said lot, both as the widow of said Walton Wait and as the guardian of said Bettie C. Wait; and whereas, it appears, by a schedule of personal property of said M. J. O'Brien & Brother, verified by affidavit, and now in the hands of the city attorney, that said M. J. O'Brien & Brother are the owners of $15,000 worth of personal property in their works at Volcano, free of incumbrance, we, therefore, recommend to the City Council of the City of Parkersburg, upon the said M. J. and W. S. O'Brien and their wives executing a deed of trust to the said City on the said $15,000 worth lot No. 80, the city council to take from Mrs. of personal property, as well as upon the said Joanna Wait, or some one for her, bank stock, with power of attorney to dispose of the same, or solvent bonds, to the amount of $5,000, as security that said Joanna Wait, guardian, will obtain from the Circuit Court of Wood County, within two years, authority to convey to M. J. and W. S. O'Brien the said lot No. 80, for and on behalf of said ward, and when said authority is obtained, and said deed made, said stock or bonds to be given up, then the city council may deliver to said M. J. and W. S. O'Brien, upon the deposit of the aforesaid collaterals, $10,000 of said city bonds; and when said M. J. and W. S. O'Brien have put a building or buildings on said lot ready for the roof, costing not less than $8.000 when completed, shown by bills rendered and authenticated for same to the council, and when said Joanna Wait, guardian of said Bettie C. Wait, by the authority of the said Circuit Court of Wood County, has conveyed for and on behalf of her said ward the said lot No. 80, free of incumbrance, to said O'Brien & Brother, or made a further deposit of bank stock or bonds to the amount of $8,000, under the conditions aforesaid, as security that she will obtain such authority within two years from the date hereof, and make said conveyance, which shall be held by said City as security for the payment of said bonds and interest until said deed is made by authority of said court, then said city council may deliver to said M. J. O'Brien & Brother the remaining $10,000, of said bonds; and said city council shall take as a further security for the payment of said bonds and interest, from said M. J. O'Brien & Brother, to be deposited with the city treasurer, their insurance policies, amounting to $14,500, transferred to the said City, on their machinery, stock, etc., at Volcano; and when their buildings on said lot are completed, and the machinery thereon erected, then the said M. J. O'Brien & Brother shall have the whole insured to the amount of $15,000, and keep the same so insured for the benefit and security of said City on account of said loan." At the same time the city attorney presented to the council a trust-deed executed by "said O'Brien & Brother," which was accepted, and it was resolved "That, upon the execution of the trust by M. J. O'Brien & Bro., the clerk is authorized to issue immediately $10,000, part of city bonds, as agreed upon by the resolution of the 22d of April, 1873." The trust-deed, which was executed by the two O'Briens and their wives, and acknowledged by them on the 13th of May, 1873, and recorded on the 18th of June, 1873, was in these words: "This deed, made the 13th day of May, A. D. 1873, by M. J. O'Brien and P. F. O'Brien, his wife, and W. S. O'Brien and Jane C. C. O'Brien, his wife, parties of the first part, and Okey Johnson, trustee, party of the second part, witnesseth: that for and in consideration of one dollar in hand paid by the said trustee to the parties of the first part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said parties of the first part hereby grant unto the party of the second part all, etc., of the following property, to wit: all that certain lot of ground situate on Kanawha Street, in the City of Parkersburg, known as lot No. 80 on the plat of said town, and being the same lot conveyed by Joanna M. Wait, guardian of Bettie C. Wait, and Joanna M. Wait in her own right, to the said parties of the first part, by deed dated the 12th day of May, 1873, and all the personal property mentioned in Schedule A, and hereunto annexed See 16 OTTO. U. S., Book 27. and made part of the parcel of this deed, said property now situated at Volcano, in the County of Wood, and valued at $15,040.38, which said last named property is permitted to remain in the possession of the parties of the first part, and to be removed from Volcano aforesaid and placed in the building or buildings to be erected by said parties on the lot aforesaid, until the same shall be required by the party of the second part, upon being made as hereinafter specified, that is to say: Whereas, an Act passed December 15, 1868, by the Legislature of West Virginia, authorizing the Mayor and City Council of the City of Parkersburg to lend its bonds for manufacturing purposes, to which Act reference may be had for a more explicit understanding of the provisions; and whereas, the parties of the first part have negotiated with the said City for a loan of its bonds to the amount of $20,000, according to the provisions set forth in an ordinance passed by the said city council the 22d day of April, 1873, whereby it is, among other things, provided that if the parties of the first part shall punctually pay the interest on the aforesaid sum of $20,000, and five per centum of the principal for sixteen years, the said parties of the first part shall be released from any further payment, which said ordinance was authorized under a former ordinance, dated September 6, 1870, to both of which ordinances reference may be had for a fuller understanding thereof, and are made part hereof, which negotiation for the aforesaid foan of $20,000 of the bonds of the said City is made on the part of said City, pursuant to a recommendation in writing made by the trustees of said loan, as provided in said Act of the Legislature, to which recommendation in writing reference may be had for a fuller understanding thereof, and is made part hereof, in trust to secure the faithful performance by the parties of the first part, in their payment of the aforesaid interest on said $20,000, and the payment of the five per centum of the principal, as specified in the aforesaid ordinance passed the 22d day of April, 1873. And if any default shall be made herein, then the party of the second part, as trustee aforesaid, shall proceed to sell the property hereby conveyed, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 72 of the Code of West Virginia, and the Acts amendatory thereto." Exhibit A, annexed to the trust-deed, contained a list by items of the personal property, with a valuation opposite each item, the same being principally machinery and tools. Attached to it was an affidavit made by M. J. O'Brien, setting forth that M. J. O'Brien & Brother owned all the property free of incumbrance, and that. each item was worth the sum set down opposite to it, and that the whole was then worth $15,000. On the 10th of June, 1873, an order was adopted by the council, reciting the statute, and the election, and the prior proceedings of the trustees of the loan and of the council, and the presentation of the deed of trust and the deposit of the $5,000 security, and of the insurance policies before provided for; and then ordered that the said security was satisfactory, and that $10,000 of the bonds of the City be delivered to M. J. O'Brien & Brother" forthwith, under the conditions of and in accordance with" the said Act "and the orders made September 16 241 |