It is clear from the terms of the contract that Richardson was not bound by it. He did not agree to purchase any share in the lands or to pay Hardwick any money. The contract gave Hardwick no cause of action against Richardson. The latter was not bound to become interested in the lands, or to pay any money thereon, unless he chose to do so. In suits upon unilateral contracts, it is only where the defendant has had the benefit of the consideration for which he bargained that he can be held bound. Jones v. Robinson, 17 L.J. Exch., 36; Mills v. Blackall, 11 Q. B., 358; Morton v. Burn, Ad. & El., 23; Kennaway v. Treleavan, 5 Mees. & W., 501. In this case, Richardson having failed to pay the money or any part of it within the time limited, the privilege accorded him by the contract was at an end, and all the rights under it ceased. The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill was, therefore, right, and must be affirmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. s. ROBERT M. WALLACE, Public Administrator of LEWIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, In Charge of the Estate of WILLIAM Y. WILLIAMS, Deceased, AND SARAH C. WILLIAMS, Appts., v. URI S. PENFIELD AND FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF QUINCY, ILLINOIS. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 260-264.) Sufficient description in deed-voluntary conreyance, when fraudulent as to creditors. 1. Although a deed does not give an accurate description of the land intended to be conveyed, the deed will be held good if the description is such as to leave no one in serious doubt of the land intended. 2. A voluntary conveyance by a person in debt is not, as to subsequent creditors, fraudulent per se; to make it fraudulent, as to subsequent creditors, there must be proof of actual or intentional fraud. If the effect of the conveyance is to hinder or defraud existing creditors, it is, as to them, invalid. [No. 19.] Submitted Oct. 12, 1882. Decided Nov. 27, 1882. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. The history and facts of the case appear in the Statement of the case by Mr. Justice Harlan: The First National Bank of Quincy, Illinois, recovered against W. Y. Williams and others, not. NOTE.-Settlement or conveyance for benefit of wife and child; when good or void as to creditors. See, note to Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U. S. (8 Wheat.), 229. Misdescription in deed, when avoids it; when does If the subject of the grant cannot be ascertained from the description the grant itself is void. Campbell v. Johnson, 44 Mo., 247; Bailey v. White, 41 N. H., 337; Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex., 44; Massie v. Long, 2 Ohio, 287; Shackleford v. Bailey, 35 Ill., 391. Uncertainty or defects in the description do not render the deed void, if that result can be avoided by construction. Stone v. Stone, 116 Mass., 279; Bosworth v. Sturtevant, 2 Cush., 392; Harvey v. Mitchell, 31 N. H., 575; Andrews v. Murphy, 12 Ga., 431. An evident omission may be thus supplied. Hoffman v. Riehl, 27 Mo., 554. in the Circuit Court of Lewis County, Missouri, three judgments: one, on the 10th day of May, 1873, upon a note, dated June 19, 1871, and signed by J. R. Harris & Co., G. H. Simpson, W. Y. Williams and R. N. Blackwood; and the others, on the 5th day of March, 1874, upon notes, dated, respectively, July 19, June 3, and July 3, 1871, and each signed by J. R. Harris & Co., G. H. Simpson, W. Y. Williams, J. A. Hay and John Sisler. The La Grange Savings Bank of Missouri recovered, in the same court, against Williams and others, two judgments, each on May 12, 1873, upon two notes: one for $1,635.25, dated August 14, 1871, and signed by G. H. Simpson, W. Y. Williams and R. N. Blackwood; the other, upon a note, dated February 1, 1872, and signed by G. H. Simpson, W. Y. Williams, John S. Motter and J. A. Hay. It Upon these various judgments executions issued, and were levied upon a tract of land, in Lewis County, Missouri, containing forty-two acres, and occupied by Williams and his family as their residence. The legal title to the land, at that time, was in the wife of Williams. was conveyed to her by deed of February 11, 1868, duly filed for record on the 24th day of February, 1868. The deed did not accurately describe the metes an dbounds of the property intended to be conveyed and, in order to correct the description, another deed was made to Mrs. Williams on the 13th day of December, 1871, which was duly filed for record on the 6th day of the succeeding month. The property so levied on, with all the improvements thereon, were sold at public auction, when U. S. Penfield became the purchaser, at the sum of $25, "in trust for the use and benefit of the execution creditors.' As to the balance of the judgment debts, the executions were returned unsatisfied, and Penfield received from the sheriff a deed, in trust for the use and benefit of the creditors in whose behalf he bid off the property. The present suit was commenced on the 30th day of June, 1875. It proceeds upon these grounds: that the property, so conveyed to Mrs. Williams, was purchased and paid for with the means of the husband, who caused the title to be placed in her name, with the fraudulent intent to hinder and delay his creditors; that after the conveyance Williams, being insolvent and in expectation of contracting future debts, did, with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, existing and future, and for the purpose of placing his means beyond the reach of creditors, with the knowledge, consent and approval of his wife, and out of his own means, exclusively, make. valuable, permanent and Where by rejecting a false and impossible part, a perfect description remains, the false part will be rejected and the deed held good. Tubbs v. Gatewood, 26 Ark., 128; Anderson v. Boughman, 7 Mich., 69; Beal v. Gordon, 55 Me., 482; Wade v. Deray, 50 Cal., 376; Wendell v. Jackson, 8 Wend., 183; S. Č., 22 Am. Dec., 635; Raymond v. Coffey, 5 Oregon, 132; Thayer v. Torrey, 37 N. J. L., 339; Bond v. Fay, 12 Allen, 86; Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo., 218; Vose v. Handy, 2 Greenl., 322; S. C., 11 Am. Dec., 101'; Worthington v. Hylyer, 4 Mass., 196; Seaman v. Hogeboom, 21 Barb., 408; Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill, 458; Melvin v. Proprietors, 5 Met.. 15; S. C., 38 Am. Dec., 384. No part will be rejected if all can stand together. Herrick v. Hopkins, 23 Me., 217; Lane v. Thompson, 43 N. H., 320; Robertson v. Mosson, 26 Tex., 248. expensive improvements on the land, to the in- | jury of his creditors; that the wife accepted the conveyance with knowledge and notice of the fraud imputed to her husband, and confeder ated with him to cheat and hinder his creditors by withholding from them, as well the land as all the moneys invested in its purchase and improvement. The prayer of the bill is, that the conveyance to Mrs. Williams be declared inoperative against the creditors of the husband, and that the title to the land be decreed to and vested in Penfield, in trust for the execution creditors, and that he be decreed possession thereof for their use and benefit; that if the deed cannot be declared inoperative, as to creditors, then that the amount expended by Williams in the improvement of the land be declared a charge and incumbrance thereon in favor of his creditors. The material allegations of the bill are denied in the answer both of Williams and his wife. The circuit court, upon final hearing, decreed all the right, title and interest of both Williams and his wife in the land be, without further conveyance, vested in Penfield in trust for the banks, and that possession be forthwith delivered to him. From that decree the present appeal is prosecuted. Messrs. F. M. Cockrell, W. H. Hatch and Eppa Hunton, for appellants. Messrs. John D. S. Dryden and H. S. Lipscomb, for appellees. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: A very careful scrutiny of the record has brought our minds to the conclusion that the decree cannot be sustained. That the land described in the conveyances to Mrs. Williams was purchased and paid for by her husband, with his means exclusively, and that the purchase was made with the intention of immediately improving the land and making it the permanent residence of himself and family, are facts clearly established by the evidence. Indeed, they are substantially admitted in the answer of both Williams and his wife. But the evidence falls far short of establishing fraud upon the part of Williams, either in causing the conveyance to be made to his wife, or in using his means, to the extent that he did, in improving the land. The facts are entirely consistent with an honest purpose to deal fairly with any creditors he then had, or might thereafter have, in the ordinary course of his business. It is true that Williams was somewhat indebted at the time of this voluntary settlement upon his wife, but his indebtedness was not such in amount or character as, taking into consideration the value of his other property interests, rendered it unjust to creditors existing or future, that he should, out of his income or estate, provide a home for his family by improving the land in question. When the conveyance was made to the wife, as well as during all the period when the land was being improved by the erection of a dwelling and other houses thereon, he had, according to weight of evidence, property which creditors could reach, exceeding, in value, all his existing indebtedness by several thousand dollars. He was engaged in active business, with fair prospects, good credit and, as we may infer from the record, of an unsullied reputation. His indebtedness existing at the time of the settlement upon the wife, as well as that which arose during the period when the improvements were made, was subsequently, and without unreasonable delay, fully discharged by him. The improvements were commenced in 1868, and were all, with trifling exceptions, completed and paid for before the close of the summer of 1869. So far as the record discloses, no creditor, who was such when the settlement was made or while the improvements were going on, was hindered materially by the withdrawal by Williams, from his means or business, of the sums necessary to pay for the land and the improvements. Those who seek, in this suit, to impeach the original settlement, or to reach the means invested by the husband in improving the wife's land, became creditors of the former sometime after the improvements (with slight exceptions not worth mentioning) had been made and paid for. If they trusted the husband in the belief that he owned the land, it was negligent in them so to do, for the conveyance of February 11, 1868, duly acknowledged, was filed for record within a few days after its execution. The circumstance that the original deed did not give an accurate description of the land intended to be conveyed, ought not to be permitted to defeat the original settlement upon the wife; this, because the description was such as to leave no one in serious doubt that the land intended to be conveyed was the identical land now in dispute. There is no intimation in the pleadings that the banks supposed, when contracting with Williams or when accepting from others commercial paper upon which his name appeared, that the deed of February 11, 1868, described land other than that upon which Williams, after that date, resided. On the contrary, the amended bill proceeds, in part, upon the ground, distinctly stated, that the land intended to be conveyed When effect cannot be given to the whole descrip- | sufficiently clear to identify the thing intended to tion the more definite and fixed prevails. Johnson v. McMillan, 1 Strob., 143; Den v. Graham, 1 Dev. & B., 76; S. C., 27 Am. Dec., 226; Abbott v. Abbott, 53 Me., 356; Gates v. Lewis, 7 Vt., 511; Piercy v. Crandall, 34 Cal., 334; Vance v. Forè, 24 Cal., 435; Reed v. Spicer, 27 Cal., 57; Bass v. Mitchell, 22 Tex., 285. A description by a known meridian will prevail over that by a county. Sickmon v. Wood, 69 Ill., 329. A mortgage is void if it fails to state the township or range, or the county or State in which the land is situate. Boyd v. Ellis, 11 Iowa, 97; Cochran v. Utt, 42 Ind., 267. An omission of a township and range in describing land may be supplied by parol evidence. Foute v. Fairman, 48 Miss., 550. The addition of false or mistaken descriptions in a deed will not frustrate the grant if there are others be granted. Morton v. Jackson, 1 Smedes & M., 494; S. C., 40 Am. Dec., 107; Jackson v. Marsh, 6 Cow., 284; McNaughton v. Loomis, 18 Johns., 81; Loomis v. McNaughton, 19 Johns., 448; Fish v. Hubbard, 21 Wend., 262; Hull v. Foster, 7 Vt., 100; Andrews v. Murphy, 12 Ga., 431; Gibson v. Bogy, 28 Mo., 478; Cooley v. Warren, 53 Mo., 166; Myers v. Ladd, 26 Ill., 415; Kruse v. Wilson, 79 Ill., 233; Eggleston v. Bradford, 12 Ohio, 312; Doane v. Willcutt, 16 Gray, 368. A particular description will control a general description of the same tract. Phillips v. Porter, 3 Ark., 18; S. C., 36 Am. Dec., 448. A mistake in the description will not vitiate a deed, if it is nevertheless sufficient to ascertain the land intended to be conveyed. Clark v. Munyan, 22 Pick., 410; S. C., 33 Am. Dec., 752. by that deed was the land now in dispute, and that the only purpose of the deed of December 13, 1871, was to correct the erroneous description in the deed of 1868. to hinder or defraud his then existing creditors. Nor does the evidence justify the conclusion that the conveyance was executed, or the im provements made, with an intent to hinder or defraud either existing or subsequent creditors. Giving full weight to all the circumstances, there is no reason to impute fraud to the husband. The decree is reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. An effort is made to show that some of the debts, evidenced by the notes, upon which the banks obtained judgment, existed when the conveyance of 1868 was executed, or when the improvements in question were made. But the evidence furnishes no basis for such a contention, except as to the note for $1,635.25, executed August 14, 1871, by G. H. Simpson, W. Y. Williams and R. Ń. Blackwood, and held by the La Grange Savings Bank. As to that note, the president of the bank states that in it was merged a prior note for $800 or $1,000, given by the parties last named in 1866 or 1867. But his evidence shows that he is not at all clear or positive in his recollections upon the subject; COMPANY, LIMITED, Claimant, Appt., and, according to the decided preponderance of testimony, Williams was not a party to the note, which, it is claimed, was merged in that of August 14, 1871. The proof, upon this point, renders it quite certain that no part of the debt evidenced by that note existed against Williams, until, as surety for Simpson, he signed that note. THE STEAMSHIP NEVADA, Her Tackle, etc., LIVERPOOL AND GREAT WESTERN STEAM v. SERGEANT J. QUICK, Libelant, ET AL. (See S. C., "The Nevada," 16 Otto, 154-160.) Collision-want of lookout-towage of steamerinjury by-canal-boat, when not in fault. *1. An ocean steamer starting from a crowded slip, the motion of her propeller caused a canal-boat to break her fastenings and swing around against the propeller, whereby she was sunk. Held, that the steamer was in fault for not having a lookout at her stern, by whom the peril of the canal-boat could have been seen in time to stop the propeller and prevent the collision. steamer from a crowded slip or harbor without in- stantial usefulness. 4. Those in charge of the canal-boat, in this case, having done all that reasonable prudence required of them, by properly fastening their boat, were held free from blame. [No. 58.] Argued Oct. 30, 31, 1882. Decided Nov. 27, 1882. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United York. States for the Southern District of New the opinion of the court. The principles of law which must determine the rights of the parties are well established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri. In Pepper v. Carter, 11 Mo., 543, that court, after remarking that the question as to what would render a voluntary conveyance void as to creditors under the Statute of Elizabeth, from which the Missouri Statute was borrowed, had undergone much discussion, and been the subject of contradictory opinions, said: "Some would make an indebtedness per se evidence of fraud against existing creditors. Others would leave every conveyance of the kind to be judged by its own circumstances, and from them infer the existence or non-existence of fraud in each particular transaction. Without determining the question as to existing creditors, we may safely affirm that all the cases will warrant the opinion that a voluntary conveyance as to subsequent creditors, although the party be embarrassed at the time of its execution, is not fraudulent per se as to them; but the fact, whether it is fraudulent or not, is to be determined from all the circumstances. I do not say that the fact of indebtedness is not to weigh in the consideration of the question of fraud in such cases, but that it is not conclusive." the later case of Payne v. Stanton, 59 Mo., 159, the same court, while quoting approvingly the language just cited from Pepper v. Carter, said that the "Doctrine is well settled that a voluntary conveyance by a person in debt is not, as trict Court for the Southern District of New This case arises upon a libel filed in the Disto subsequent creditors, fraudulent per se. make it fraudulent, as to subsequent creditors, the canal-boat Kate Green, for himself and for York, by S. J. Quick, master and owner of there must be proof of actual or intentional F. A. McKnight, against the steamship Nevada, fraud. As to creditors existing at the time, if in a cause of collision. The libel alleges that the effect and operation of the conveyance are to hinder or defraud them, it may, as to them, otherwise, with the interest of the Western InMcKnight was invested by subrogation, or be justly regarded as invalid, but no such reason can be urged in behalf of those who be-surance Company of Buffalo, who were insurers of 8100 bushels of corn, the cargo of The come creditors afterwards." These decisions control the present case. Nei- Kate Green at the time of the collision; that on ther the conveyance to the wife nor the with the 27th of September, 1871, whilst the boat was drawal of the husband's means from his busi-lying securely fastened in a slip in New York ness for the purpose of improving the land set- City, between piers No.46 and No.47 on the North tled upon the wife, had the effect and operation In To Mr. Stephen P. Nash, for appellant. lees. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: *Head notes by Mr. Justice BRADLEY. River, The Nevada, which had been moored in the same slip on the north side of pier No. 46, proceeded on her way to sea, and carelessly and negligently ran into and struck The Kate Green with her propeller, causing her to sink, whereby she was greatly injured and the cargo was destroyed, resulting in a total damage of $12,000. The Liverpool and Great Western Steam Company appeared as claimants of The Nevada, and answered the libel, setting up that the collision was occasioned solely by the carelessness and negligence of the master and crew of The Kate Green. McKnight filed a petition for leave to intervene, setting forth his interest in the cargo, to wit: that it had been insured by the Western Insurance Company, which became liable for and paid the full value thereof to the owners, and afterwards became bankrupt, and at the sale of its assets, he, McKnight, became the purchaser of its claims arising from the loss and destruction of said cargo. He was allowed to intervene accordingly. Proofs being taken, a decree was made by the district court that the libelants recover their damages and costs against The Nevada, and it was referred to a commissioner to ascertain the amount of damage. The commissioner reported that the damage done to The Kate Green, her furniture, loss of freight and interest, amounted to $4,289.72; and that the damage to the cargo, with interest, was $8,109.64. A decree was made for these sums with costs. of the water which caused The C. H. Hart to break her fastenings, and The Kate Green to swing around under the stern of The Nevada, where she was struck by the propeller and sunk and much injured, and her cargo was lost. She was not seen from The Nevada when she came in, and no special notice was given to her that The Nevada was about to leave, and those in charge of her had no actual knowledge of the fact until the propeller of The Nevada began to move. As soon as she began to swing around her master called loudly to The Nevada to stop her propeller, but he was not heard, or, if heard, not heeded. The court further found as follows: "10. No one on board of The Nevada knew of the parting of The Hart's lines, or of the swinging of The Green, or of the accident until after they arrived in Liverpool. If a man had looked from her deck over her side into the slip, he could not have failed to see what was going on all the time, from the first movement of the propeller and before, until she got out. 11. There was an abundance of time after the breaking of the fastenings of The Hart, and after The Green began to swing, and after the hail of her master, to have stopped the propeller, before the collision. 12. The report of the commissioner as to the damages is warranted by the evidence, and the libelant, McKnight, was the owner of the claim for damages when the libel was filed. The conclusions of law found by the circuit court were as follows: "1. The Nevada was in fault for not keeping Upon appeal to the circuit court, this decree a sufficient lookout aft and on the side next the was affirmed and a new decree was entered (in-slip, and in not seeing The Kate Green when she cluding interest to the date of the decree) in came in, or as she swung over, and in not stopfavor of Quick for the sum of $4,577.65, be- ping the propeller in time to avoid the collision. sides costs; and in favor of McKnight for the 2. The Kate Green, under the peculiar cirsum of $8,653.98, besides his costs. cumstances in which she was placed, was not in fault. The owners of The Nevada have appealed from this decree. So far as relates to Quick, the owner of The Kate Green, under the recent ruling of this court in the case of Ex parte R.R. Co. [ante, 78], decided at the present Term, the appeal must be dismissed; as to McKnight, it is necessary to examine the case at large. 3. The libelants are entitled to recover the damages reported by the commissioner." It seems hardly necessary to do more than to state the case as the facts are found by the court in order to decide it. The Kate Green came into the slip, it is true, at the time The Nevada was The circuit court found the facts in detail, of about to leave; and those in charge of her ought which it is sufficient to state, that about 3 to have known this fact from the ringing of o'clock P. M., September 27, 1871, the propel- The Nevada's bells and her visible signals for ler steamship Nevada, belonging to one of the starting. But supposing they did know it, what regular lines between New York and Liverpool, more could they do than they did do? They was lying alongside of pier No. 46 in the slip immediately made fast to The C. H. Hart, between that pier and pier No. 47 on the North which was also made fast to the ship lying at River, New York, about to start on her voyage the north pier. It was reasonable for them to to Liverpool. She had been advertised to start suppose that the fastening of The Hart was seat that hour, had rung her bells and blown her cure. They could not know that it would break. whistle several times, and her signals for start- It was that break which set them adrift, subject ing were flying at mast-head. At that instant to the suction caused by the motion of The before her screw was put in motion, a steam- Nevada's propeller. Their own fastenings were tug entered the slip with the canal-boat Kate sufficient. We do not see how the court could Green in tow, and placed her alongside of an- find otherwise than that they were free from other canal-boat, The C. H. Hart, lying fast-fault or negligence. Perhaps they might have ened to a grain elevator, which was in turn fast-done something else which would have been ened to the steamship Scotia, lying alongside better. The event is always a great teacher. pier No. 47 on the north side of the slip. The They might have staid out in the river and not master and steersman of The Kate Green, which lay about sixty feet from The Nevada, instantly made her fast to The Hart, and at that moment the propeller of The Nevada began to revolve, and produced a suction and commotion entered the slip; or, having entered, they might have gone back to the bulk-head, and staid there till The Nevada left. But these possibilities are not the criteria by which they are to be judged. The question is: did they do all that reasonable prudence required them to do under the circumstances? And this question, we think, must be answered in the affirmative. Then, how is it with The Nevada? Did those on board of her do all that was reasonably required of them? It is significantly asked by her counsel, whether a steamship is to be precluded from the use of her own means of locomotion? Must she be subjected to the inconvenience and expense of employing a tug to tow her out into open water? That does not necessarily follow. If, indeed, the action of her propellers is such as to cause unavoidable injury to other craft in a crowded harbor, or in a confined space like that of a slip or dock used by vessels of every kind, she might be justly required to find other means of moving in a position involving so much peril. This is no more than is required in analogous cases. Railroad companies are compelled to slacken the speed of their trains in passing through cities, and are often either prohibited from using ordinary locomotive engines in the more public streets, or required to guard their tracks by means of gates, bars or fences in order to prevent accidents and collisions. Incidental inconveniences, it is true, attach to the use of many of the great improvements of the age; inconveniences which must be submitted to in order that the public may have the benefit of those improvements. Almost every new machine inflicts loss of employment upon some portion of the laboring class, which are thus obliged to seek other fields of industry. Steamboats have taken the place of sailing vessels; railroads have interfered with steamboats, and have rendered useless thousands of stage-coaches, and the appliances connected with them. The vast power and speed of the modern locomotive engine, carrying its thousand passengers or its hundreds of tons of merchandise, require the private carriage and the country team to await its passage and give it the right of way. The large steamer which navigates our rivers creates an agitation of the waters which cannot be prevented without staying its speed and crippling its usefulness, and which requires from smaller vessels in its neighborhood increased attention and care to avoid being foundered or injured. Horse railroads in cities incumber the streets with their iron tracks and render the passage of private vehicles more difficult and dangerous. But whilst these incidental and unavoidable inconveniences must be submitted to, in order that the greater benefit derived from the new improvements may be enjoyed, there still remains the duty of so managing and operating them as to do the least possible injury consistent with the fair attainment of their substantial benefits. The ocean steamer is one of the great inventions of the century, and one of the advanced instrumentalities of modern civilization; but whilst it may freely exercise its powerful propeller and sport its leviathan proportions on the ocean or in deep and open waters, it is justly required to observe extraordinary care and watchfulness when surrounded by feebler craft in a crowded harbor. Under some circumstances, and within a limited space, it may even be required to dispense with the use of its ordinary means of locomotion, and resort to the employment of towage or other safe and quiet means of changing its position and effecting its necessary move ments. Such a modification of the use of its power, when absolutely required for the safety of other vessels rightfully located in its vicinity, would produce no material diminution of its efficiency in the accomplishment of its principal design. However, we do not mean to say that, in the application of these principles to the present case, it was the duty of The Nevada to remit the use of her propeller in leaving her place in the slip where she lay. The court does not find her in fault for using it, but for not having a lookout at her stern, and on the side next to the slip, who could have seen the breaking away of The Hart and The Kate Green from their fastenings and, by giving timely alarm, could have averted the disaster by a momentary stopping of The Nevada's engine. In such a place, and in the midst of such a crowd of vessels as then filled the slip, since she did put her propeller in motion, she was bound to use the utmost caution and circumspection in order to avoid doing injury. The least that could be expected of her was a constant lookout at every part. But the court finds that "No one on board of The Nevada knew of the parting of The Hart's lines, or of the swinging of The Green, or of the accident, until after they arrived at Liverpool. If a man had looked from her deck over her side into the slip, he could not have failed to see what was going on all the time, from the first movement of the propeller, and before, until she got out." And the court further finds that "There was abundant time after the breaking of the fastenings of The Hart, and after The Green began to swing, and after the hail of her master, to have stopped the propeller before the collision." This, as it seems to us, settles the case and amply justifies the conclusion of law made by the court below, that "The Nevada was in fault for not keeping a sufficient lookout aft and on the side next the slip, and in not seeing The Kate Green when she came in, or as she swung over, and in not stopping the propeller in time to avoid the collision." In view of the principles to which we have adverted, and which ought to control this case, no other conclusion could have been reached. We see no error in the decree of the Circuit Court and it is, therefore, affirmed, with interest and costs. ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 327-337.) Tax on railway company. 173, as amended by the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, Under section 122 of the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. a railway company is liable to pay a tax of 5 per cent on the interest which it has paid to non-resibonds, with interest at 6 per cent from the several dent alien owners and holders of its coupons and times when the same became due and payable. [No. 11.] Argued Mar. 3, 1882. Reargued Oct. 17,18, 1882. Decided Nov. 27, 1882. |