court said that a patent for a process and a patent for an implement or a machine are very different things, and decided, in substance, that letters patent for a machine or implement cannot be re-issued for the purpose of claiming the process of operating that class of machines, because, if the claim for the process is anything more than for the use of the particular machine patented, it is for a different invention. To the same effect precisely is the case of Heald v. Rice, 104 U. S., 737 [XXVI., 910]. The present case falls within the rule laid down in the authorities cited. Southworth's invention, as described in his original patent, must be limited to what is there set forth, namely: a mechanism for bringing successively different portions of the plate with in the field of the lens. He did not discover the law that, to get the best effect in taking pictures, the plate or part of the plate on which the picture was to be taken should be brought into the field of the lens, nor did he invent the method of doing this by tilting the camera itself into different positions with respect to the object to be pictured. This law was known, and the practice mentioned was followed, long before Southworth's invention. His device was simply a new and specific means to take advantage of a well known law of nature. In his re-issue, by claiming as his invention the process of bringing different parts of the plate successively into the field of the lens, he seeks to put himself in as good a position as if he had been the first to discover the law referred to, and the first to invent the method of taking advantage of the law by tilting his camera into different positions. In claiming the process, he excludes all other mechanisms contrived to accomplish the same object. This he could not rightfully do. We are of opinion that the claim of the re-issued patent is for a different invention from that described in the original patent, and that the reissue is, therefore, void. Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall., 1 [89 U. S., XXII., 699]; The Wood Paper Patent, 23 Wall., 566 [90 U. S., XXIII., 31]; Powder Co. v. Powder Works, 98 U. S., 126 [XXV.,77]; Ball v. Langley, 102 U. S., 128 [XXVI., 104]; Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S., 350 (XXVI., 783]; James v. Campbell, Id., 356 [XXVI., 786]; Heald v. Rice, Id., 737 [XXVI., 910]; Johnson v. R. R. Co., 105 U. S., 539 [XXVI., 1162]; Bantz v. Frantz, 105, Id., 160 [XXVI., 1013]. The decree of the Circuit Court must be firmed. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. Cited-111 U. S., 103; 112 U. S., 669. af s. her husband, buys land and gives her promissory reserved in the deed of conveyance for the payment notes for part of the purchase money, and a lien is of the notes, such lien may be enforced against the land though the notes be void as against the woman personally. (The husband and wife went into possession, made permanent improvements, and made payments on the notes.) 2. In such case the grantee is not entitled, by reason of her coverture, to have the sale set aside and the purchase money already paid refunded, though consenting to account for rents and profits; nor will she, or her husband, be allowed for permanent improvements erected by them. interest above the ordinary legal rate may be stip3. In such case, also, in a State where, by contract, ulated for, such interest may be recovered under the vendor's lien if agreed to be given in the notes for purchase money. [No. 46.] Submitted Oct. 24, 1882. Decided Nov. 13, 1882. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennes see. The bill in this case was filed in the court below, to enforce a vendor's lien upon a certain tract of land. The said court having entered a decree for the foreclosure and sale of the land in question, the defendants appealed to this court. A further statement of the case appears in the opinion of the court. Mr. R. McP. Smith, for appellants. Messrs. A. A. Freeman and John W. Burton, for appellee. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court: This case arises on a bill in equity filed by G. W. Burton, the appellee, alleging that in February, 1872, he sold and conveyed to America Bedford, one of the appellants, wife of John R. Bedford, the other appellant, in fee, for her separate use, free from the control of her husband, a certain tract of land in Tennessee, for the consideration of $7,500, one third of which was paid down, and the balance secured by the promissory notes of Mrs. Bedford, drawing interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. The deed of conveyance specified these notes, and reserved a lien on the land for the payment thereof. The notes were paid in part but not in full, and the bill was filed for the foreclosure and sale of the land to raise the balance due. The defendants, Bedford and wife, filed a demurrer, which was overruled, and thereupon they filed an answer and cross-bill, admitting the facts stated in the bill, and that they took and still had possession under the purchase; and the cross-bill alleged that the defendants' had made permanent improvements on the land to the value of $500; and claimed that the sale was void because of the coverture of the grantee, and prayed that it might be declared void, AMERICA C. BEDFORD AND JOHN R. and that Burton should be decreed to refund that the complainant was not entitled to a per- | against the parties. This decree was affirmed sonal judgment against America Bedford. From this decree the defendants have appealed. The decree is sought to be reversed on two grounds: first, because the sale to America Bedford was void by reason of her coverture, and ought to be declared void, and the money paid by her decreed to be refunded; secondly, because the decree gives ten per cent interest on the notes, a rate of interest which is not allowed by the law unless there is a special contract therefor, the legal rate being only six per cent; and a feme covert is incapable of making such special contract. These cases decided by the highest court of Tennessee, where the land lies and where the transaction took place, are of stringent authority, and they accord with our own views of the law. by the Supreme Court in an elaborate judgment, in which the authorities on the subject are fully reviewed. The court concludes the examination by saying, "If the conveyance be to the sole and separate use of the married woman, there seems to be no difficulty in treating a debt contracted in the purchase as binding on the property, although not personally obligatory on the feme, because, where she takes possession under the conveyance, the debt is contracted for the benefit of her separate estate." Again; "Her incapacity to execute valid notes, if we treat the purchase notes as void on that ground and beThe authorities are numerous and conclusive cause not expressly made obligatory on her septo the effect that a feme covert may, with her arate estate, would not affect the vendor's right husband's consent, take land by purchase, and to subject the land to the satisfaction of the unthat a security given thereon by her for the pur-paid purchase money by virtue of the vendor's chase money will be enforced. It was so held equity and of the lien reserved. By the delivby this court in the case of Chilton v. Braiden, ery and acceptance of the deed of conveyance, 2 Black, 458 [67 U. S., XVII., 304], where a the contract was executed and the title vested lien for the unpaid purchase money of land sold in her. She takes the title subject to the charge to a married woman was enforced by a decree created by the terms of the deed. Trezevant v. for the sale of the land. Mr. Justice Grier, de- Bettis, 1 Leg. Rep., 48; Lee v. Newman, 1 livering the opinion of the court, said: "When Memph. L.J., 139; Eskridge v. Eskridge,51 Miss., one person has got the estate of another, he 522. Under such circumstances, the married ought not, in conscience, to be allowed to keep woman is not entitled to have the cash payment it without paying the consideration. It is on refunded. In making the payment, as we have this principle that courts of equity proceed as seen, she exercised a right which the law conbetween vendor and vendee. The purchase cedes. * * * All she can claim is exemption money is treated as a lien on the land sold, where from personal liability." the vendor has taken no separate security." In a well considered case decided by the Chancellor of New Jersey, Armstrong v. Ross, 5 C. E. Green [20 N. J. Eq.], 109, where property was sold and conveyed to a married woman, and she and her husband executed a mortgage for the purchase money, but the execution by the wife was void because she was not privately examined, it was nevertheless held that the vendor had a lien for the purchase money, and also that the mortgage, being given for the benefit of her separate estate, although void as a mortgage, might be decreed a lien on such separate estate. In the case of Willingham v. Leake, 7 Bax.,453, it was held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that where land was sold and a title bond given to a married woman, who gave her notes for a part of the purchase money, the vendor's lien could be enforced, although the notes might be void as against the vendee personally. In the subsequent case of Jackson v. Rutledge, 3 Lea, 626, decided as late as December Term, 1879, the same court held that if a married woman buy land, partly for cash and partly on time, and accept a deed of conveyance to her separate use, a lien being retained for the unpaid installments, she cannot have the money, which she has paid, refunded merely because of her covert ure, and the lien reserved for the payment of the purchase money may be enforced in equity. This case was nearly parallel to the present. A deed was executed to the married woman for her sole and separate use, retaining a lien on the land for the payment of the notes given for the purchase money, and the grantee and her husband went into possession. A cross-bill was filed, as in the present case, seeking to set aside the contract as void, and for a return of the money paid, and the value of permanent improvements. A decree for the sale of the land to satisfy the unpaid purchase money was made by the Chancellor, but no personal decree See 16 OTTO. U S., Book 27. It should be added that by the statute law of Tennessee, "Married women over the age of twenty-one years, owning the fee or other legal or equitable interest or estate in real estate, shall have the same powers of disposition, by will, deed or otherwise, as are possessed by femes sole or unmarried women." Code of Tennessee, sec. 2486. This provision would seem to be sufficient to confer upon a married woman, purchasing land to her own use, power to execute a mortgage upon the land to secure the purchase money-binding at least upon the land, if not creating any personal obligation against her. But the present case is a stronger one than that of a mortgage. The deed by which she holds the property is qualified by expressly retaining a lien for the payment of the purchase money. The lien goes with the estate and affects it in a manner similar to a condition. It is, indeed, in the nature of a condition impressed upon the estate itself. It makes the deed say, in effect, "I convey to you the land, but only upon the condition that you pay the notes given for purchase money; if they are not paid I am to hold it as security." This peculiar character of the lien seems to be a good answer to the second ground for reversal-the reservation of interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum on the notes. Ten per cent is not an unlawful rate of interest in Tennessee. It may be reserved if the parties so agree. If they make no agreement, the law gives six. The agreement to pay ten per cent in this case may not be binding on the wife personally, but it is not binding on the same ground that the principal is not binding upon her personally. 8 113 Nevertheless, as it is a rate that may be lawfully stipulated for, if it is stipulated for, and is made part of the consideration for which a lien is retained on the land, it is as much secured by the lien as the principal is. which this motion was made reads as follows: Whenever judgment shall be rendered against either party under the provisions of this chapter, it shall be lawful for the party against whom such judgment is rendered, his | heirs or assigns, at any time before the first day of the next succeeding term, to pay all costs recovered thereby, and, upon application of the James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. party against whom the same was rendered, his We see no error in the decree, and it is therefore affirmed. True copy. Test: EQUATOR MINING AND SMELTING COMPANY, Piff. in Err., v. GEORGE W. HALL ET AL. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 86-89.) heirs or assigns, the court shall vacate such judgment and grant a new trial in such case, but neither party shall have but one new trial in any case, as of right, without showing cause. And after such judgment is vacated, the cause shall stand for trial the same as though it had never been tried." Two questions are presented for our consideration in reviewing the action of the circuit court on this motion for a new trial. The first is, whether the Circuit Court of the United States Colorado practice as to new trial when binding sitting in Colorado is to be governed by the stat on Federal Courts. ute of that State on this subject. At the common law, the fiction in an action *1. Section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure of of ejectment, by which John Doe and Richard Colorado grants as of right, without cause shown, one new trial to each party, as it may in turn have Roe were made plaintiff and defendant, pera verdict or judgment rendered against it in an ac-mitted any number of trials after verdict and tion of ejectment. 2. The law of the State in that respect is binding on the Circuit Court of the United States in cases tried in that State. [No. 55.] Submitted Oct. 27, 1882. Decided Nov. 13, 1882. the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the District of Colorado. The case was an action of ejectment, to recover possession of a silver mine. The plaintiffs below were Hall and Marshall, who obtained a judgment for the possession of the property in controversy. At the December Term, 1878, of the circuit court, the case had been submitted, by agreement of the parties, waiving a jury, to the Judge, who rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiffs paid the costs of the suit up to that time, and moved the court to grant them a new trial without showing any cause, which was ordered under the provisions of section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Colorado. At the May Term, 1879, the case was submitted to a jury and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs, on which judgment was entered on the 15th of July. The defendant then made a motion for a new trial without showing cause, which was claimed to be a matter of right under the same section. On the question whether this new trial should be granted, the Judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion, and a judgment was entered overruling the motion. They have certified that question to this court. The section of the Code of Colorado under *Head notes by Mr. Justice MILLER. judgment between the same parties in interest on the same question of title, by the use of other fictitious names, and other allegations of demise, entry, and ouster. The evil of this want of conclusiveness in the result of this form of action led to the interposition of a court of equity, in which, after repeated verdicts and judgments in favor of the same party and upon the same title, that court would enjoin the unsuccessful party from further disturbance of the one who had recovered these judgments. The This form of action, with its inconclusive results, would be the law in Colorado for the recovery of the possession of real estate, but for the statutes of that State, of which section 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a part. framers of those statutes, in abolishing the old common law action of ejectment with its accompanying evils, and in substituting an action between the real parties, plaintiff and defendant, found it necessary to provide a rule on the subject of new trials in actions concerning the titles of land. A title to real estate has, under the traditions of the common law, been held, in all the States where that law prevailed, to be too important, we might almost say too sacred, to be concluded forever by the result of one action between the contesting parties. Hence, those States which, by abolishing the fictions of the action at the common law, and substituting a direct suit between the parties actually claiming under conflicting titles, which, according to the nature of this new proceeding, would end in a judgment concluding both parties, have found it necessary to provide for new trials to such extent as each State Legislature has thought sound policy to require. These provisions for new trials in actions of ejectment are not the same in all the States, but it is believed that almost all of them which have abolished the common law action have made provision for one or more new trials as a matter of right. We are of opinion that when an action of ejectment is tried in a Circuit Court of the United States according to the statutory mode of proceeding, that court is governed by the pro- | visions concerning new trials as it is by the other provisions of the state statute. There is no reason why the Federal Court should disregard one of the rules by which the State Legislature has guarded the transfer of the possession and title to real estate within its jurisdiction. See Miles v. Caldwell,2 Wall.,35 [69 U.S.,XVII., 755]. The history and facts of the case sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. On motion by part of the appellees to dismiss as to them for want of jurisdiction, and motion by others to affirm as to them, on the ground that the appeal was taken for delay. Mr. J. M. Butler, for appellees, in support of motions. Messrs. James D. Campbell and Herbert B. Turner, for appellants, contra. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: These motions present the following facts: On the 24th of July, 1877, a decree was entered in a suit pending in the court below for the foreclosure of certain mortgages on the property of the Indianapolis, Bloomington & Western Railway Company, directing a sale of the mortgaged property and an application of the proceeds to the payment, among others, of "All such claims and sums of money as shall * * As regards the construction of the statute under consideration, which is the second question; while it is not clear that the language of the statute, that "Neither party shall have but one new trial in any case as of right without showing cause," gives to each party at least one new trial if he demands it, we are of opinion, on reflection, that such was the intention of the framers of the Code. This conclusion is fortified by a comparison of the previous enactments of the Colorado Legislature with this, its last expression on the subject. By the previous law, it was very clear that only one new trial was demandable as a matter of right in an action of eject-be hereinafter allowed by this court *** in ment, and the change of language adopted in preference to the liens of the herein before menthe Code of 1877 is indicative of intentional tioned mortgages or deeds of trust for debts due change in that respect; a change which can only by said railway company for work, labor, supmean that each party against whom in turn a plies, and material done and furnished during verdict may be rendered, shall have a right to the six months next preceding the first day of one new trial. Apart from this absolute right December, 1874, * which payment of the parties, the court may grant another trial for debts due as last aforesaid for six months upon reasonable grounds being shown. prior to December 1, 1874, shall be made into court without prejudice to the right of the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company to object to the same, and to appeal from any order or orders which may be hereafter made by the court directing the money so paid to be distributed to the various claimants thereof." These views require that the question whether defendants are entitled to have the judgment of the court below vacated and a new trial in said cause without further showing, should be answered in the affirmative, and dispense with the necessity of examining into the assignment of errors growing out of the trial before the jury. The judgment of the Circuit Court is, therefore, reversed, with directions to grant a new trial. True copy. Test: James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-109 U. S., 668; 112 U. S., 535. * * * At the time this decree was made it was not known how much the debts for labor and supplies would amount to. That matter had been referred, on the 4th of June before, to certain special masters to take testimony and report, but their report had not been filed. To meet this condition of the case the decree further provided that on the delivery of the deed the purchaser should pay into court enough of the purchase money to satisfy any amount that might FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COM- in the further progress of the cause be found to PANY ET AL., Appt8., 0. CHRISTIAN WATERMAN ET AL. (See S. C., 16 Otto, 265-271.) be owing. It was also specially provided that the reference to the master, which had been made and which was approved and continued, should "In nowise abridge or impair the right of any of the parties hereto to prosecute an appeal from any order or orders of the court al What partics can appeal-jurisdiction as to lowing or disallowing said claims, or any part amount. 1. Only parties to a decree can appeal. If a party to the suit is in no manner affected by what is decreed, he cannot be said to be a party to the decree. 2. If distinct causes of action in favor of distinct parties, though growing out of the same transaction, are joined in one suit, and distinct decrees are rendered in favor of the several parties, these decrees cannot be joined to give this court jurisdiction. [No. 814.] Motions Submitted Oct. 9, 1882. Decided Nov. 13, 1882. thereof, and declaring the same to be prior and superior to said mortgage.' The Farmers' Loan and Trust Company was the trustee of the mortgages, having the paramount mortgage liens on the property. On the 16th of November, 1877, the special masters filed their report as to the labor and supply claims, allowing eleven hundred and sixtythree separate claims, which had been presented to them by petition in accordance with the provisions of the order of reference, and which, in their opinion, had been established by the evi APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United dence. Of these claims only fourteen were for States for the District of Indiana. NOTE-No one but parties to record can be heard on appeal or writ of error. See note to Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.), 483. sums exceeding $5,000. All the rest, being eleven hundred and forty-nine in number, were the coming in of the report, numerous excepin every instance for less than that amount. On tions were filed by the Trust Company. These exceptions remaining undisposed of and no sale having been made under the decree, “On motion of the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company" it was, on the 8th of May, 1878, "by way of further directions for the execution of the deof date July 24, 1877, * considered by the court, and ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said original decree be, and the same is hereby, amended and modified as follows: * * * cree * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * property, subject, among other things, "To *** such claims and sums of money asare now under consideration by, and as shall be hereafter allowed by the said court, * ** in preference to the liens of the herein before *mentioned mortgages or deeds of trust, for debts due by said railroad company for work and labor done and supplies and material furnished during a period not exceeding the six months next preceding the first day of Decemsub-ber, 1874, * but nothing herein contained shall be taken to prejudice the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, or the said Austin Corbin, Giles E. Taintor and Josiah B. Blossom, their successor or successors and assigns, or any of them, to object to the same, or to appeal from any order or orders which may be hereafter made by the said court, or either of them, in relation thereto to the Supreme Court of the United States, which said back pay, labor and supply claims finally adjudged against said property hereby conveyed, are hereby expressly assumed by the said Austin Corbin, Giles E. Taintor and Josiah B. Blossom, purchasing committee, their successor and successors or assigns, as and for a charge and lien upon the property hereby conveyed, prior and superior to any interest or estate hereby vested in them or any of them. * * 13th. That the sale be made such * * ject to claims and sums of money as are now under consideration by and as shall be. hereafter allowed by this court, * * and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States on appeal, should an appeal be taken, in preference to liens of the herein before mentioned mortgages or deeds of trust for debts due by said railroad company for work and labor done and supplies and material furnished, without prejudice to the right of the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company to object to the same and to appeal from any order or orders which may be hereafter made by the court in relation thereto; and such back pay, labor, and supply claims as shall be finally adjudged against the property herein directed to be sold, after an appeal so taken, shall be assumed by the purchaser or purchasers, in addition to the amount of the purchase money so bid. And the payment of the amount of any claims so allowed, * * * shall not be required to be made at or prior to the time of the delivery of the deed, but the said sale shall be made subject to, and the purchaser or purchasers of said property shall agree to pay off so much of the said claims or sums of money as shall be finally allowed in the progress of this cause, on or after such appeal, and the same shall be paid and discharged by said purchaser or purchasers within six months after the entry of an order of this court, upon a mandate of the Supreme Court concerning matters so appealed from being filed in this court, and the said deed shall be delivered without payment of said claims or sums of money, or any part thereof, upon the purchaser so conditionally agreeing to pay so much and no more of such claims and sums of money as may finally be allowed on such appeal, and it shall be competent for the court to enforce hereafter, by proper order or decree herein, or to be added to the foot of this decree, any of the provisions or conditions of this thirteenth article of this decree." On the 30th of October, 1878, the mortgaged property was sold under the decree of July 24, as thus modified, to Austin Corbin, Giles E. Taintor and Josiah B. Blossom, "Purchasing committee, in trust for certain bondholders under the trusts expressed in certain agreements dated December 20, 1875, and a supplement thereto, dated July 25, 1878," copies of which were attached to the report of the sale. These agreements had reference to a plan adopted by certain of the stockholders, bondholders and general creditors, for the purchase of the property, and defining their respective interests therein, if the purchase should be made. The sale was confirmed by the court on the 31st of March, 1879, upon the application of the purchasers, and the master was directed to make and deliver to the purchasers a deed of the After this deed was delivered a further reference was made to take testimony and report as to certain special matters connected with the claims before reported on. Upon the coming in of the report under this last reference, exceptions were filed by the Trust Company and the purchasers; and on the 31st of October, 1881, the court, after a hearing, decreed “That said Austin Corbin, Giles E. Taintor and Josiah B. Blossom do, within sixty days, excluding Sundays, from and after the date of the decree, pay to said several intervening petitioners and claimants the several amounts set opposite their respective names, that is to say, to Charles F. Webb $270." Then followed the names of all the other separate claimants, with the amount due them respectively set opposite. From this decree of the 31st of October the Trust Company and Corbin, Taintor and Blossom took the present appeal, which the appellees having claims less than $5,000 move to dismiss as to them, for want of jurisdiction. Those whose claims exceed $5,000 have filed motions to affirm as to them, on the ground that it is manifest the appeal was taken for delay. To our minds, it is clear the Trust Company has no interest in the questions arising under this appeal. That Company represented the bondholders for all the purposes of the foreclosure of the mortgages under which it was trustee, but the interest of the bondholders in the suit ended when the property was sold and the proceeds distributed. As the purchasers took the property subject to the lien, if any there was, of the back pay claims, the bondholders, as bondholders, cannot in any manner be affected by the result of the proceedings to determine whether such lien exists, and if so, to what extent. All questions as to such matters are between the purchasers and intervening petitioners alone. The decree ordering a sale subject to the claims was entered on the motion of the Trust Company, and the appeal is in |