agricultural against the manufacturing and commercial classes, labor against capital, and the poor against the rich. Against a demagogue so adroit and unscrupulous, and who in his mastery over the baser instincts of the race has never been excelled, it was perhaps at the time impossible to make headway. His prodigious untruthfulness and falsifications of history would, at the present day, defeat themselves. No assertion could have been more false than that the commercial and manufacturing classes, the managers of its Banks, had, from the foundation of our government, been in desperate league to overthrow the liberties of the nation, and erect an unscrupulous oligarchy upon their ruins, classes who of all others had the most at stake in their preservation. The success which followed Jackson's attack upon the Bank enables us to understand fully that which followed Jefferson's attack upon Hamilton, as having for his whole purpose the supplanting by a monarchy, of the Republic which, with the single exception of Washington, he contributed most to establish. Hamilton told the people that they required a strong government, as a means of dealing with the refractory elements which existed on every side, that their lawless instincts. were not their proper guide. His eye took in the vast continent upon which only a lodgement had then been made ; and his polity was framed in view of its possession by a people whose sectional jealousies and peculiarities were to be controlled by laws of universal application, supported by adequate provision for their vigorous enforcement. In his presence every indolent, indifferent, incapable, and lawless nature stood rebuked, and instinctively rallied itself around the banner of his great enemy and rival. All excellence that rises much above the ordinary level is a dangerous possession, especially when it assumes to direct and control weaker or baser natures than its own. By dextrous appeals to the passions and prejudices of the people, Jefferson persuaded them that Hamilton, by opposing license, was an enemy of civil liberty. Under such a charge, which came to be considered as proved, under such a load of obloquy, his memory rested. till the War of the Rebellion. Till then Jefferson was the

demigod of the nation. By that event was he completely dethroned. Then for the first time had Hamilton a standing in the court of the nation, a right even to be heard. Jefferson

then took the place of Hamilton, to receive in full measure, from being all the more deserved, the obloquy and disgrace which he had heaped upon the latter. The event of the war has been equally fatal to Jackson. Jefferson, typifying ideas, held his place so long as these remained in the ascendant. Jackson's attack upon the Banks, and upon the commercial classes, was simply an outburst of passion and hate, hardly fitted to survive the moment of its expression. The political reputation which he enjoyed, he derived largely from the founder of the dynasty of which he was a conspicuous member, - a dynasty which, it is to be hoped, is for ever overthrown.

Who are, or rather who were, the dangerous classes in this country, those most to be feared during the epoch of Jacksonism? The whites of the South and South-west, whose moral sense had been subverted by their "peculiar institution;" who, drawing their subsistence chiefly from the soil they occupied, had the least at stake in the maintenance of social and political order; whose vanity and sectional jealousies had, from the foundation of the government, been so flattered by demagogues that they came to regard their lawless instincts as the highest expression of political and social wisdom; who, from their isolation, could see nothing better in the world than their own experience; who regarded the least restraint imposed by others to be tyranny, to be resisted by the extremest means, and who stood ready to renounce their allegiance to the general government the moment it came to be administered by those entertaining sentiments different from their own. The fate of such a people, unless rescued from their condition, is either to become the victims of despotism, or, like those of Mexico, to lose the coherence necessary to the existence of any efficient and stable form of government. Such, down to the close of the war of the Rebellion, were the dangerous classes in the United States. We are now in a position to take a retrospect of the past, and to determine accurately the relation of Jefferson and Jackson, and the political school of which they were the most conspicuous representatives, to the great crisis, the result of which is to effect a radical change in the policy of our government and the character of our people. We have passed through a great revolution, in which social order was overturned, the industries and

commerce of the country for a time destroyed, and innumerable lives sacrificed, upon pretexts no more to be justified than resistance to restraints imposed upon any lawless passion or act. Who, at the time of which we are speaking, were the least dangerous classes, in other words, who were the great conservators of the peace and order of society? Merchants, manufacturers and bankers, who always had the greater part of what they possessed in the hands of the public, and who suffered from the slightest social or political disturbance. A commercial people are necessarily pacific and orderly. Such have been throughout history the upholders of freedom, as production and trade are in ratio to the degree in which this is enjoyed.

The preceding remarks will find complete confirmation in an examination of the methods and operations of the Bank of the United States. It established branches in all the more important towns of the country. Wherever established, they received the notes and credits of all the State Banks in good standing, both on deposit and in the payment of their bills, as a means of increasing the amount of their loanable capital. Without such deposits, there would be no inducement to their establishment, as without them their profits would not equal the ordinary rates of interest on their own capital employed. The greater the degree of the general welfare, the greater would be the amount of their deposits, the greater their loans, and the greater the certainty of their payment. The healthier the condition of production and trade, the greater the profit, has come to be an axiom among men of affairs. It is for the interest of great institutions, like the Bank of England and the Bank of the United States, to sustain all smaller ones. They cannot oppress them, so long as the latter are adequately managed. A Bank with a capital of $100,000 may be just as strong in ratio to its liabilities as a Bank of $100,000,000. Each are equally independent and each equally at the mercy of the other. As the money in which the Bank of the United States dealt was largely created by smaller Banks and bankers, it was always for its interest that it should have an actual equal to its nominal value: otherwise it might directly lose by taking it. It was for its interest that every Bank should remain in a sound condition. If any became embarrassed, the bills of merchants would be less promptly paid. These

merchants might be the customers of the United States Bank, which might have a portion of the bills that would not be paid under discount. Merchants, manufacturers, and bankers, in fact, constitute one great firm. The loss of one is the loss of all. The loss suffered by any one member will be in ratio to the extent of his operations. As those of the United States, or of its branch, wherever it had one, were usually greater than those of any State Bank, where the former was established, it took the largest share of any loss that might be sustained. It would, consequently, have the same motive for sustaining State Banks as it would for sustaining one of its own customers, and would do all that it could properly do to keep them from failing. If it erred at all, it would, as toward its own customers, always err on the side of leniency. With it, duty, inclination and self-interest would always go together. It would always desire to see an improvement in the morals of a community, as the welfare of the nation would always be in ratio to its good conduct. It would always desire to see it become more intelligent, that its labor might be more profitably employed. It would always desire to see freedom promoted, as the essential condition of production and trade. General Jackson could charge that underwriters would insure rotten ships, or put in command of their risks ignorant, drunken, and dishonest captains and crews, nay, would set them on fire, knowing that they themselves would have to pay the losses, with the same reason that he asserted that the managers of the Bank were in conspiracy to destroy the wellbeing and morality of society. So far from this being the case, there is no morality, using the word in its broadest sense, so high as that of merchants, bankers, and manufacturers, for the reason that, from the elevated positions they occupy, they can see more clearly than others the consequences of any immoral act; and, from the magnitude of their transactions, have vastly more at stake than others in the result.

Early in 1832, four years before it was to expire, the Bank memorialized Congress for an extension of its charter. This application at once brought the controversy to a direct issue. General Jackson not only declared the Bank to be unconstitutional, that its existence was incompatible with the liberties of the country, but that it was insolvent, and an unsafe de

pository of the public moneys. To these charges, the House of Representatives, in which the administration had a very large majority on other matters, replied, by a vote of 110 to 46, that the public moneys were safe in the Bank; and by a vote of 106 to 84 extending its charter for twenty years. The Senate concurred in the last measure by a vote of 28 to 20. It was promptly vetoed by the President.

neces

As the re-election of General Jackson, with a largely increased majority of the House in his favor, for a second term, which would not expire until after the termination of the charter of the Bank, precluded all expectation of its renewal, the necessity of filling up the vacuum which was so soon to be created by the withdrawal of $35,000,000 of banking capital, of $21,355,724 of notes, and $22,671,431 of deposits, making a total circulation of $44,027,155,- equalling fully one-third of the amount of that of all the Banks in the country, sarily attracted the attention of the legislatures of the several States. It was natural that each one should feel called upon to make provision for a portion of the capital and circulation that were so soon to be withdrawn. In this way, without perception of its process, a sentiment in favor of the creation of Banks got hold of the community, a sentiment of all others the most to be dreaded, for the reason that their creation to supply an anticipated deficiency of the currency, and not for the purpose of loaning capital, is always attended by the most disastrous consequences. After a people have for a long time been habituated to a sound currency, they are in a condition most favorable for the imposition of an unsound one. The precedents of the past are accepted as a guide for the present, so that adventurers who in such a state of the public mind can obtain authority for the issue of paper money are likely to reap a rich harvest. The currency, from 1826 to 1830, whether furnished by the National or State institutions, had suffered so few fluctuations that its value was assumed as a matter of course. In 1830, there were 329 Banks, including the National one, in operation in the country, having a share capital equalling $145,192,268. Their note circulation, at the time, equalled $61,328,898; their deposits, $55,559,928: making a total circulation of $116,888,826. The number of Banks in the United States on the 1st of January,