13 Wall. 646-654, 20 L. Ed. 685, WHITE v. HART.

Constitutions adopted by various Confederate States at close of Civil War were submitted to Congress as voluntary laws and State is estopped to assail their binding character on ground of coercion by Congress. The action of Congress cannot be inquired into; the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of the government, and is concluded by it. Congress has no power to supersede the national Constitution.

Approved in In re Smith, 8 N. B. R. 405, 22 Fed. Cas. 401, holding the Federal Constitution does not preclude Congress from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and sustaining the amendment of 1873 to the bankruptcy act; Smith v. Good, 34 Fed. 208, holding that the determination by the State officers on the question of the due adoption of an amendment to Rhode Island Constitution was binding on the Federal courts; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 5 Baxt. 91, in separate opinion, holding that the joint resolution of Congress, restoring Tennessee to her rights in the Union, did not make the action of the State that of the general government; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 286, 12 Am. Rep. 513, holding that the homestead exemption law of Virginia of 1870 could not be sustained on the plea that it had been sanctioned by Congress in approving the new Constitution; dissenting opinion in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 659, 15 N. W. 636, majority holding State courts had power to review action of legislature in matter of an amendment to State Constitution.

Distinguished in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 612, 15 N. W. 613, affirming the power of the judicial department of a State to review the action of the legislature in the matter of an amendment to the State Constitution.

At no time were the rebellious States out of the Union; their rights under the Constitution were suspended, not destroyed; their constitutional duties and obligations remained the same.

Approved in Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 462, 24 L. Ed. 1074, showing that acts passed by legislature of Tennessee, while in rebellion, were binding on State, except when in aid of Rebellion or conflicting with Constitution and laws of the United States; State v. Bank of Tennessee, 5 Baxt. 24, 40, 43, 74, holding that the constitutional prohibition against impairing contracts continued during the Rebellion, notes of the bank are entitled to priority of payment, whether issued before or after the Rebellion commenced, and State legislation, repudiating liability on notes issued after the secession, is void; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 283, 12 Am. Rep. 511, holding that the Virginia Constitution article I, section 1, and the homestead exemption act of 1870, were invalid as to prior debts.

State after Rebellion had no more power to do any act prohibited by Federal Constitution than before Rebellion or after restoration to normal position in the Union. It can no more impair the obligation of a contract by adopting a constitution than by passing a law.

Approved in Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. 490, 22 L. Ed. 793, holding that "cotton notes," authorized by legislature of Mississippi, 1861, were void and not receivable for taxes after reorganization; Oliver v. Memphis etc. R. Co., 30 Ark. 131, denying power of legislature to repcal charter provisions, exempting the railroad's property from taxation; Grand Lodge of Masons v. New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 666, 11 South. 151, holding that the statute of 1855, exempting the Masonic Grand Lodge hall from taxation, is not a provision of the charter, and is repealed by the Constitution of 1879; State v. Hickman, 9 Mont. 379, 8 L. R. A. 405, 23 Pac. 743, holding that the constitutional provision, fixing the salary of the Secretary of State, had the effect of a law, and no further legislation was required to authorize the State treasurer to pay the salary; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 282, 12 Am. Rep. 510, adjudging the Constitution of Virginia, article XI, section 1, and the homestead exemption act of 1870, invalid as to prior debts; Berry v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 203, and dissenting opinion in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 760, 27 L. Ed. 465, 2 Sup. Ct. 169, both arguendo.

Laws, which subsist at time and place of making of contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form part of it as if expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms.

Approved in Geiger v. Geiger, 57 S. C. 526, 35 S. E. 1034, holding homestead acts giving homestead exemption to widow and children against debts contracted since 1880 forms part of contract, and is constitutional; McCandless v. Richmond etc. R. Co., 38 S. C. 113, 18 L. R. A. 444, 16 S. E. 432, holding that where an amended charter was granted, subject to legislative power of amendment, a subsequent statute rendering the company liable for damages by fire caused by its engines, was constitutional; Graham v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 53 Wis. 490, 10 N. W. 616, holding that causes of action, which accrue by reason of the violation of an existing statute, are not affected by its repeal, whether they be in tort or contract.

The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which are guaranteed by the Constitution from invasion. A State may modify the remedy, but not so as to impair substantial rights. Any legislation producing this result is void, hence State Constitution, closing courts against remedy on any debt, consideration for which was a slave, is void as to pre-existing contract.

VII-46

Approved in Turk v. Mayberry, 32 Okl. 74, 121 Pac. 668, holding right of redemption from mortgage foreclosure could not be impaired by subsequent legislation; dissenting opinion in Abbott v. Beddingfield, 125 N. C. 285, 34 S. E. 420, majority holding public office to which salary attached a vested interest not taken away by subsequent statute changing name or adding a new duty; dissenting opinion in Coyle v. Smith, 28 Okl. 183, 220, 113 Pac. 969, 984, majority holding Congress could not, as condition of admission of State, limit its right to locate its capital; Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 656, 20 L. Ed. 693, holding Arkansas Constitution of 1868, prohibiting the enforcement of contracts for purchase or sale of slaves, invalid as to prior transactions; Delmas v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 667, 669, 20 L. Ed. 759, 760, 25 La. Ann. 349, 350, holding that when a State court affirmed the invalidity of a contract, based on a consideration in Confederate money, on a constitutional provision inhibiting its enforcement, the question must depend on the date of the contract; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 624, 21 L. Ed. 215, holding the exemption law of Georgia of 1869 invalid as to a creditor who had obtained a judgment lien before the act; New Orleans Water Works Co., v. Louisiana Sugar etc. Co., 125 U. S. 35, 31 L. Ed. 614, 8 Sup. Ct. 750, holding that on writ of error to State court, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, if the judgment was based wholly on State Constitution, but not if it were based on the previous law of the State; United States v. Johnson Co., 5 Dill. 213, Fed. Cas. 15,489, holding that a statute, which deprived the County Court of its power over its taxing powers for payment of bonds and interest, and vested them in another court, with limitations practically destructive of the bondholder's rights, was unconstitutional; Cominissioners Court v. Rather, 48 Ala. 447, holding that a statutory provision, requiring the levy of a tax annually for a specified period for payment of the series of a bond issue, falling due each year, did not limit the power to continue the tax levy so long as any of the bonds remained unpaid; Nelson v. M'Crary, 60 Ala. 310, denying power of Alabama legislature to exempt lands from the payment of owner's debts, homestead exemptions are to be governed by the law in force when the debt was contracted; Robards v. Brown, 40 Ark. 427, holding that the act of 1879, regulating mortgage sales, was not valid as to mortgages executed prior to act; County Commrs. v. Colorado Seminary, 12 Colo. 499, 21 Pac. 491, holding the charter provision, allowing exemptions from taxation, could not be impaired by subsequent legislation; Davis v. Rupe, 114 Ind. 593, 17 N. E. 165, sustaining constitutionality of statute of 1881, relating to redemption of land from sales on execution or decretal orders; Henderson v. Merchants' ete. Ins. Co., 25 La. Ann. 349, 350 (see Delmas v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 667, 20 L. Ed. 759, ante);

Lessley v. Phipps, 49 Miss. 800, holding that the exemption law of Mississippi of 1865, increasing the homestead exemption from one hundred and sixty to two hundred and forty acres, is invalid as to debts created before its passage; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 609, 1 L. R. A. 59, 15 Atl. 415, the Statutes of 1885 (chapter 85, section 9), making all payments within three months of a debtor's assignment, is void as to payments on antecedent contracts; Lewis v. Woodfolk, 2 Baxt. 50, holding that a change in Constitution of Louisiana annulling existing contracts for sales of slaves was unconstitutional; Grigsby v. Peak, 57 Tex. 149, holding that a State Constitution cannot divest rights once vested under statutes of limitation; The Homestead Cases, 22 Gratt. 287, 288, 12 Am. Rep. 515, holding that the homestead exemption act of 1870 of Virginia impaired the rights of contracts made prior to the passage of the act, and as to such contracts was invalid; Roberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. 216, holding the act of 1873, to revive a former law, giving courts and juries power to remit interest, is invalid as to contracts entered into when there was no such power.

Contracts in consideration of slaves, made when slavery was lawful, are valid, and unaffected by laws passed subsequent to the abolition of slavery.

Approved in Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 548, 21 L. Ed. 757, sustaining judgment on a note given for price of slaves, executed in 1861; Turner v. Edwards, 2 Woods, 435, Fed. Cas. 14,254, affirming right to plead statute of limitations in second suit on a note, made for purchase price of a slave before the Rebellion; United States v. Jefferson Co., 5 Dill. 321, 1 McCrary, 367, Fed. Cas. 15,472, holding that the clause in the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 did not repeal the statute of 1873, making it the duty of the County Court to levy a special tax to pay the bonds and interest issued under it; Anderson v. Mills, 28 Ark. 183, sustaining notes and mortgage given on contract for purchase of slaves; Cole v. La Chambre, 31 La. Ann. 45, holding that, when incurred, an obligation of a tutrix and cotutor to a ward, which included the price of slaves, was a valid obligation, and unaffected by a subsequent amendment of State Constitution; Hedgman v. Board, 26 Mich. 54, 12 Am. Rep. 299, holding that a child of fugitive slaves does not become a citizen of the United States, under the act of 1802, by coming to reside in the United States; State v. Walsh, 31 Neb. 477, 478, 48 N. W. 265, holding that the provisions of law of 1875, in force when improvement bonds were issued, remained in force as to all improvement bonds after passage of the act and before adoption of the Constitution; Blease v. Pratt, 3 S. C. 514, holding that liberation of a slave cannot be set up as a defense to a bond for the purchase of such slave on the ground of failure of consideration; Lewis v. Woodfolk, 2 Baxt. 51, holding that a

change in Louisiana Constitution, annulling existing contracts for sales of slaves, was unconstitutional, and would not be recognized in Tennessee; Poutz v. Reggio, 25 La. Ann. 644, considering validity of mortgage given to secure price of slaves.

Effect on legal contract of subsequent statute making same illegal.
Note, 10 Ann. Cas. 1024.

Miscellaneous. Cited in dissenting opinion in Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 663; Elliott Nat. Bank v. Western etc. R. R., 2 Lea, 680.

13 Wall. 654-664, 20 L. Ed. 689, OSBORN v. NICHOLSON.

Contract valid when and where it is made is valid everywhere. Approved in Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Woods, 248, Fed. Cas. 8541, denying power of State to cancel the charter of the Louisiana State Lottery Company before expiration of the term granted.

Constitution of Arkansas of 1868, annulling contracts for purchase or sale of slaves, and prohibiting their enforcement, is, as to all prior transactions, in conflict with contract clause of national Constitution.

Approved in New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar etc. Co., 125 U. S. 35, 31 L. Ed. 613, 8 Sup. Ct. 750, holding that on writ of error to State court, the Supreme Court could review a judgment based wholly on State Constitution, but not if it were based on the previous law of the State; Hinds v. Wilcox, 22 Mont. 12, 55 Pac. 358, holding the inheritance tax act of 1897 did not apply to an estate of a testator, who died in 1896, as vested rights accrued on the death.

All contracts are inherently subject to paramount power of the sovereign, the exercise of which is never understood to involve their violation within meaning of contract clause of national Constitution; the power acts on the property, not upon the contract.

Approved in United States v. Inlots, 26 Fed. Cas. 491, a tenant at will is not entitled to compensation on the property, being taken by the government; Vermont etc. R. R. Co. v. Vermont etc. R. R. Co., 63 Vt. 21, 10 L. R. A. 565, 21 Atl. 266, sustaining constitutionality of acts of 1882 and 1884, relating to railroad taxation, so far as regarded their operation on a pre-existing lease of a railroad.

Contracts relating to slaves, valid when made, were not affected by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.

Approved in Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 548, 21 L. Ed 757, sustaining judgment on a note given for price of slaves in 1861; Hall v. United States, 92 U. S. 31, 23 L. Ed. 600, holding that a contract between slaves, made prior to the emancipation, created no obligation and conferred no