Miscellaneous. Cited in Gleason v. Duffy, 116 Fed. 301, 54 C. C. A. 100, to effect that proceeding to limit liability available after rendition of judgment in personam in State court; In re Morrison, 147 U. S. 34, 37 L. Ed. 67, 13 Sup. Ct. 253; Re The Norwich & New York Transp. Co., 10 Ben. 194, Fed. Cas. 10,361; The Garden City, 26 Fed. 773; Miller v. O'Brien, 35 Fed. 783; The Katie, 40 Fed. 485, 493, 495, 7 L. R. A. 61, 66; The Annie Faxon, 66 Fed. 579; The Columbia, 73 Fed. 228, 19 C. C. A. 436; The E. A. Shores, Jr., 73 Fed. 348.

13 Wall. 128-150, 20 L. Ed. 519, UNITED STATES v. KLEIN.

Proceeds of cotton which has come into possession of treasury as captured or abandoned property, may be recovered through Court of Claims by parties entitled. .

Approved in Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 194, 23 L. Ed. 653, as proving that cotton, though private property, was a legitimate subject of capture; Broadway v. Rhem, 71 N. C. 200, holding an action of trespass could not be maintained against a soldier for making capture of enemy property in the course of military duty.

Effect of captured and abandoned property act of 1863 is not to absolutely divest property of original owner, even though disloyal, and by seizure, government constitutes itself a trustee for parties rightfully entitled to proceeds.

Approved in Neel's Exr. v. Noland's Heirs, 166 Ky. 467, 179 S. W. 435, holding title to proceeds of cotton coming into possession of Fedcral government by capture, was not divested out of owner; Haycraft v. United States, 22 Wall. 94, 22 L. Ed. 741, holding that an unpardoned rebel was not entitled to the benefit of the act; Lamar v. Browne, 92 U. S. 195, 23 L. Ed. 653, holding that capture for private gain was not permitted, all went to the government; dissenting opinion in Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 470, 22 L. Ed. 374, majority holding purchaser of cotton from government of Confederate States, could not, after its capture and sale by the United States, recover proceeds in Court of Claims.

Pardon, granted on conditions, blots out the offense on proof of compliance with the conditions; person pardoned may sue for restoration of property within two years of suppression of Rebellion.

Approved in United States v. Burdick, 211 Fed. 493, 494, holding President had power to grant pardon though person pardoned not convicted of offense; People v. Rose, 207 Ill. 361, 69 N. E. 765, holding Ill. Laws 1901, p. 124, requiring filing of annual corporation reports, making failure prima facie evidence of nonuser, warranting forfeiture, nakes failure prima facie evidence; Armstrong v. United States, 13

Wall. 155, 20 L. Ed. 615, holding that the proclamation of December 25, 1868, granted pardon unconditionally, and on suit within two years Court of Claims was bound to give effect thereto; Haycraft v. United States, 22 Wall. 95, 96, 22 L. Ed. 742, holding that a rebel not pardoned until after two years from the suppression of the Rebellion was not entitled to sue for proceeds in Court of Claims; Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 153, 24 L. Ed. 443, on effect of the general pardon and amnesty of 1868 not entitling the recipient to proceeds of sale of property previously confiscated and paid into treasury; Austin v. United States, 155 U. S. 427, 430, 39 L. Ed. 210, 211, 15 Sup. Ct. 171, 173, holding that the act of March 3, 1886, as to Austin's claims making the establishment of loyalty in fact a prerequisite to jurisdiction of the Court of Claims not in conflict with the innocence at law produced by a pardon; In re Monroe, 46 Fed. 57, holding that the effect of a pardon by a city mayor under city ordinance for breach of an ordinance destroys the offense and bars commitment by police judge; State v. Page, 60 Kan. 670, 57 Pac. 516, affirming constitutionality of statute establishing the State reformatory and authorizing the managers to grant paroles and discharges for good conduct before expiration of term; Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 768, 31 Am. Rep. 386, holding a pardon by president for embezzlement before end of term of sentence restores the right to be registered as voter in State; People v. Court of Sessions, 141 N. Y. 295, 23 L. R. A. 858, 36 N. E. 388, holding that statute authorizing court to suspend sentence during good behavior does not conflict with Governor's right to grant reprieves and pardons; Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 391, 48 Am. Rep. 471, holding a Governor's pardon on ground of danger to health cannot be impeached for fraud in the physician's certificate; Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 400, holding that effect of Revised Statutes, section 7303, constituting a presiding judge a committing magistrate, cannot override the effect of discharge of a jury amounting to an acquittal on the indictment; Easterwood v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 409, 31 S. W. 296, holding that in Texas the Governor's pardon removed all disabilities arising out of and attaching to a conviction for felony, including competency to act as a juror; Arnold v. Keley, 5 W. Va. 447, holding the legislature cannot itself nor empower a court to set aside a judgment rendered before passage of the act.

Distinguished in Hart v. United States, 118 U. S. 67, 30 L. Ed. 98, 6 Sup. Ct. 963, as to effect of pardons showing it did not authorize payment of a claim which was forbidden by the joint resolution of May 2, 1867; The Laura, 19 Blatchf. 568, 569, 8 Fed. 616, holding that penalties for carrying excessive number of passengers, imposed by Congress, could be remitted by Secretary of Treasury, and was not a pardon requiring action of the President.

Conditional pardons. Notes, 111 Am. St. Rep. 109; 7 Ann. Cas. 92, 94.

Legislative power to grant pardon or amnesty. Note, 34 L. R. A.

253.

Provision of appropriation act of 1870, respecting appropriation to pay judgments in Court of Claims, to the effect that Supreme Court and Court of Claims should dismiss all claims for confiscated property, founded upon the President's pardon, thus denying to such pardons their previous legal effect, is unconstitutional as a legislative infringement upon judicial power.

Approved in Ex parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 Fed. 1000, holding under section 21, Judicial Code, mere filing of affidavit of prejudice did not prevent judge from proceeding in action, since, if so construed, parties could at will deprive courts of jurisdiction; United States v. Aakervik, 180 Fed. 145, holding time for vacating order admitting to citizenship for error of law having expired before act of June 29, 1906, suit did not lie to vacate it, though act authorized suits to vacate certificates of citizenship; State v. Prouty, 115 Iowa, 666, 84 N. W. 673, holding court erred dismissing contempt proceedings for maintaining nuisance under prior law; Phillips v. Byrd, 43 Okl. 562, 143 Pac. 686, holding act of Congress of May 27, 1908, providing enrollment records of commissioner of Civilized Tribes should be conclusive evidence of age did not apply to transaction relating to contract of sale of lands completed before act took effect; In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 427, 51 Ark. 14, holding prison commissioners without authority to grant conditional discharge or parol to convict; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 152, 21 L. Ed. 428, holding the President's pardon relieves a claimant of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property from the necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their claims.

Distinguished in Hart v. United States, 118 U. S. 66, 30 L. Ed. 97, 6 Sup. Ct. 963, holding that the joint resolution No. 46 of 1867 did not take from a pardoned rebel anything conferred by the pardon but merely forbade payment of certain debts till ordered by Congress; Austin v. United States, 155 U. S. 424, 427, 39 L. Ed. 209, 210, 15 Sup. Ct. 170, 171, holding the proviso in act of 1883, authorizing the Court of Claims to hear certain claims for cotton, making the establishment of loyalty a prerequisite to jurisdiction, was constitutional.

Vacating of judgments and decrees on motion, when not specially
authorized by statute. Note, 60 Am. St. Rep. 634.

Power of legislature to validate or invalidate judgments of courts.
Note, 2 Ann. Cas. 241.

Since 1863 Court of Claims has exercised all the functions of a court from which appeal lies to the Supreme Court. It has jurisdiction of contracts between the government and the citizen. It is subject to control of legislature as to organization, existence and subjects appealable.

Approved in Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124 U. S. 599, 31 L. Ed. 533, 8 Sup. Ct. 638, arguendo.

Right of executive to sign bill after adjournment of legislature.
Note, 37 L. R. A. 396.

Miscellaneous. Cited in Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 95, 59 L. Ed. 482, 35 Sup. Ct. 267, as instance of acceptance of general amnesty act by asserting right thereunder; Wallach v. Van Riswick, 1 McAr. (D. C.) 77, to point that property involved in suit was of third class, as classified in principal case, of property in insurgent States.

13 Wall. 151–153, 20 L. Ed. 565, CARROLL v. UNITED STATES.

Under abandoned and captured property act, where right to recover proceeds of captured property depends on proof of loyalty of owner, ownership to be proved is that existing at time of capture. An administrator is an owner for purposes of statute.

Approved in United States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 417, 24 L. Ed. 506, holding an assignee of a claim for the proceeds of captured or abandoned goods is not an owner.

13 Wall. 154–156, 20 L. Ed. 614, ARMSTRONG v. UNITED STATES. ·

Effect of unconditional pardon of 1868 relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of loyalty during Civil War.

Approved in United States v. Burdick, 211 Fed. 494, holding President could pardon though person pardoned never convicted of act charged; Pargoud v. United States, 13 Wall. 157, 20 L. Ed. 646, holding it unnecessary to prove loyalty or personal pardon before Court of Claims; Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 152, 21 L. Ed. 428, and Austin v. United States, 155 U. S. 425, 430, 39 L. Ed. 209, 211, 15 Sup. Ct. 170, 173, both to same effect.

Distinguished in Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 153, 24 L. Ed. 443, holding that the pardon does not enable the recovery of proceeds of sale of property confiscated under the act of July 17, 1862.

Proclamation of pardon of 25th of December, 1868, was a public act, of which all Federal courts are bound to take notice and to which they are bound to give effect.

Approved in Sprinkle v. United States, 141 Fed. 820, 73 C. C. A. 285, in prosecution of violation of internal revenue laws, rules and regula

tions of Internal Revenue Department are admissible; Smith v. Shakopee, 103 Fed. 241, 44 C. C. A. 1, taking judicial notice of lighthouse regulations, made under authority of Congress; Prather v. United States, 9 App. D. C. 93, holding court would take judicial notice of departmental regulations made in pursuance of statute in prosecution for violating same; Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 222, 38 L. Ed. 419, 14 Sup. Ct. 517, holding rules and regulations of the Interior Department, in respect to contest before the land office, are matters of which courts of the United States take judicial notice; State v. Coosaw Min. Co., 45 Fed. 808, holding Federal court bound to take notice of State act, under which the plaintiffs claimed their powers to act in determining its jurisdiction; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. 841, 37 C. C. A. 588, holding courts bound to notice regulations of Treasury Department.

13 Wall. 156-158, 20 L. Ed. 646, PARGOUD v. UNITED STATES.

Unconditional pardon of 1868 relieves claimants of captured and abandoned property from proof of loyalty during Civil War.

Approved in Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 152, 21 L. Ed. 429, holding it unnecessary to prove loyalty or personal pardon before Court of Claims; Austin v. United States, 155 U. S. 425, 430, 39 L. Ed. 209, 211, 15 Sup. Ct. 170, 173, to same effect.

Distinguished in Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 153, 24 L. Ed. 443, holding that the pardon does not enable the recovery of proceeds of sale of property confiscated under the act of July 17, 1862.

13 Wall. 158-162, 20 L. Ed. 490, SEMMES v. HARTFORD INS. CO.

In computing time under statute, period of legal disability, created by war, must be excluded. Where the law imposes both the limitation and the disability, the one period should be taken from the other.

Approved in Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 184, 21 L. Ed. 130 (reversing 1 Dill. 387, Fed. Cas. 2011), excluding the duration of the Civil War from the time statute had run against the right of a mortgagee to sue on bond and mortgage; Ross v. Jones, 22 Wall. 587, 22 L. Ed. 733, rejecting a rejoinder to a plea of suspension of statute during the Civil War that the courts were not closed to legal process for the whole period; Cohen v. N. Y. Mutual Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. 623, 10 Am. Rep. 532, holding that when war prevented the transmission of the premiums the policy was not forfeited; Moore v. Smith, 29 S. C. 257, holding the statutory period after death of intestate, in which suits are forbidden against administrator, must be added to time prescribed in statute of limitations.