intercourse, particularly the opium trade. This was also ratified by the Senate.*

Under the pretext of executing the treaty of 1880, an act was passed in March 1882, during the first session of the Forty-seventh Congress, suspending Chinese immigration for a period of twenty years, but President Arthur, considering that this act meant absolute prohibition, vetoed it April 4.† In order to meet this objection, Congress passed another, bill (approved by the President, May 6, 1882, but amended July 5, 1884) which suspended the immigration for only ten years, but imposed some very severe provisions. The Chinese already here were allowed to remain. Those who were exempted under the act (that is those not laborers), must, if they desire to enter this country, secure certificates of identification from the Chinese government and viséd by the United States consul at the port from which they sailed, also giving rank, occupation or profession, value of business, financial standing, etc. Chinese laborers who departed must take out return certificates, upon presentation of which at the port of entry, they would be allowed to enter again, but if

*Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 295–299; Blaine, vol. ii., pp. 651-656; Hoar, vol. ii., pp. 120-122; Foreign Relations, 1881, China; Chester Holcombe, The Real Chinese Question, pp. 281-283.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. viii., pp. 112-118; McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1882, pp. 92-99.

For these laws see Statutes-at-Large, vol. xxii., p. 58, vol. xxiii., p. 115; McPherson, 1882, pp. 105-107; 1884, pp. 138–141.

subject and identification card failed to agree the rejected person must be sent back to the port of departure at the expense of the United States. Heavy penalties were provided for false registry and for forgery; and the masters of vessels who tried to smuggle Chinese into the country or land any who were unauthorized were subject to fine and imprisonment and forfeiture of their vessels.*

On October 1, 1888, the President signed a bill known as the Scott Act (passed by the House September 3, and by the Senate on the 7th) amending the acts of 1882 and 1884. By the terms of the Scott Act the permission given to the Chinese laborer to return was taken away, the issue of return certificates was prohibited and all that had been issued were declared void. This act enraged the Chinese government so greatly that it refused to ratify a treaty then pending by which China would have prohibited the emigration of laborers to the United States.†

During the first session of the Fiftysecond Congress, the question again came up for attention. It was claimed. that the provisions of the law of 1882 were being evaded by fraud and forgery, and Senator Dolph, of Oregon,

* Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 299-301; A. C. Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 327-340; Hoar, vol. ii., pp. 123-125.

Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 300-301; Foreign Relations, 1888, China; see also President Cleveland's message of October 1, 1888, Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. viii., pp. 630635 McPherson, Hand-book of Politics, 1890, p. 13. The text of the proposed treaty is given in McPherson, 1888, p. 193.

introduced a bill extending the restriction against" coolies " to all Chinese laborers, and provisions were made to prevent evasion and fraud. The Committee on Foreign Affairs, after careful considération, then instructed Mr. Dolph to report a bill extending the act of 1882 for five years with amendments providing against fraud. This bill passed the Senate, and went to the House, where on February 18, 1892, a bill to absolutely prohibit the immigration of Chinese was reported and passed April 4. The Senate, however, amended the House bill, and on April 25 the amendment was agreed to by a vote of 43 to 14. As the House refused to ratify the Senate bill it went to a conference committee and after a lengthy debate was passed by both Houses and became a law May 5. Besides extending the act of 1882 for ten years, it provided that the Chinese lawfully in this country must take out a certificate of residence within one year after the passage of the act, naming severe penalties for failure to do so.*

Negotiations were then entered upon which finally resulted in the signing of a treaty March 17, 1894, which was ratified by the Senate August 13, and proclaimed December 8 of that year. This was similar to the treaty of 1888, which had not been ratified.† It extended the former term of restriction for ten years, and this term

* McPherson, Handbook of Politics, 1892, pp. 202-206.

For the text of this treaty, see Foster, American Diplomacy, pp. 450-453.

was again extended for the same period by the act of April 29, 1902.*

In 1895 the United States was on the verge of war with Great Britain because of a dispute between the latter country and Venezuela over a boundary line, the United States claiming the right to interfere under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine.

The early history of the dispute is long and complicated, and only a general summary will be given here. Great Britain claimed that the territory of British Guiana included all the country touched by the estuaries of the Essequibo River, and thus that the boundary line between the two countries should be drawn along the summit of the hills separating the watersheds of the Orinoco and Essequibo rivers. Venezuela disputed this claim, but no settlement was reached and the matter was allowed to drift. In 1840 Sir Robert Schomburgk was commissioned to lay out the boundaries, and according to his survey Great Britain was entitled to the lands in dispute. Venezuela protested against this award also, and after much diplomatic correspondence and negotiation, Lord Aberdeen on behalf of Great Britain receded from his position, ordering the Schomburgk monuments marking the boundary removed.

Other boundaries were from time to time suggested but none decided upon, and finally in 1886 Venezuela renewed her claim for the territory included in the Schomburgk survey. She reso

*Foster, pp. 302-305.

lutely adhered to this policy, and the controversy continued until 1894 when Venezuela sent a force into the disputed territory and raised her flag at Yuruan. The British officials, how ever, soon afterward removed the flag but they were arrested for the act. Great Britain then demanded an apology and reparation. The British officials were released but the dispute still continued.*

In his annual message to Congress on December 3, 1894, President Cleveland called attention to the dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain, and expressed his belief that "its early settlement

is in the

"

66

of instruction to Ambassador Bayard,* reviewing the history of the dispute and of the efforts of the United States to settle it, and stating that the basis of the present intervention was the Monroe Doctrine. Olney declared that any permanent political union between a European and an American State was unnatural and inexpedient"; that European interests" are irreconcilably diverse from those of America "; that to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."+ He also asked for a definite answer as to whether the British government would or would not submit the Venezuela matter in its entirety to arbitration. Lord Salisbury replied November 26, 1895. He denied the contention that the Monroe Doctrine gave this country the right to interfere in the boundary dispute and refused to arbitrate the matter unless upon the terms already stated by Great Britain. He gave a complete history of the dispute with Venezuela and again upheld the righteousness of the British claim.‡

On December 17, 1895, President Cleveland sent to Congress his celebrated message and with it submitted

House Ex. Doc. No. 1, 54th Congress, 1st session; Henderson, pp. 417-433, where the text of the despatch is given in full; Cleveland, p. 259 et seq.

† A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 221-222 (The Macmillan Co.); Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 253-254.

For text see Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 434-440. See also Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 262-269.

the correspondence between Secretary Olney and Lord Salisbury.* Salisbury.* He vigorously supported Mr. Olney in the attitude assumed and asked that Congress authorize him to appoint a commission to determine the merits of the dispute. President Cleveland said that if the commission found that the disputed territory belonged to Venezuela, the United States should "resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory, which, after investigation, we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela."

The message created intense excitement throughout Europe and America and there was much talk of war. A bill appropriating $100,000 for the expenses of the commission was introduced in Congress, was passed by the House December 18, by the Senate December 20, and was approved by the President on the 21st.t President Cleveland then selected the following commisssion: David J. Brewer, associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Richard H. Alvey, chief justice of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia; Andrew D. White, formerly United States minister to Russia; F. R. Coudert, of New

Senate Ex. Doc. No. 31, 54th Congress, 1st session. Woolsey severely criticizes the President's conception of the Monroe Doctrine in his America's Foreign Policy, pp. 223-238. See also Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. ix., pp. 655-658; Cleveland, pp. 269-272.

Statutes-at-Large, vol. xxix., p. 1.

York, and Daniel C. Gilman, of Maryland, president of Johns Hopkins University. Judge Brewer was selected as president of the Commission, and was soon hard at work.*

After much diplomatic correspondence the terms of arbitration were agreed upon, and at the Lord Mayor's dinner at London in November, 1896, Lord Salisbury announced that the dispute had been amicably settled, the American claims being substantially conceded. The commission continued its sittings until February 27, 1897, but before it had completed its task, the two disputants decided to arbitrate. The terms of arbitration were accepted by Venezuela, after protesting against certain portions of the stipulations, and on February 2, 1897, she concluded a treaty with Great Britain for the settlement of the boundary dispute before an arbitration tribunal to hold its meetings in Paris. In accordance with the terms of this treaty four arbitrators were appointed: Melville W. Fuller, chief justice and David J. Brewer, associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, on the part of the United States; and Baron Russell of Killowen, Lord chief justice of England and Sir Richard Collins, Lord justice of appeals, on the part of Great Britain. ain. The treaty provided that the fifth jurist should be selected by the four nominated therein; and the

* An interesting account of the work of the commission is given in Andrew D. White's Autobiography, vol. ii., pp. 117-126.

Cleveland, Presidential Problems, pp. 274-276,

tribunal was completed by the selection of Professor F. Martens, professor of international law in the University of St. Petersburg, on the part of Russia. Ex-President Harrison, Benjamin F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy in Harrison's Cabinet, the Marquis de Rajas and Severo MalletPrevost, Secretary of Cleveland's Cleveland's boundary commission of 1896, were the counsel for Venezuela; and Great Britain was represented by AttorneyGeneral Sir Richard Webster, Sir Robert Reid and others.

The sessions of this tribunal did not take place until 1899. Professor Martens, the Russian member of the tribunal, was chosen president, and M. Martin, an official in the French Foreign Office, was made permanent secretary. After more than three months of labor, the verdict, which was a compromise on the points of dispute, was rendered on October 3, Great Britain being awarded fivesixths of the territory in question and Venezuela the remaining one-sixth. remaining one-sixth. The territory awarded Great Britain included the gold district, while Venezuela secured the territory embracing the mouth of the Orinoco River, but it was decided that the mouth of the

Orinoco and both banks of a part of the Cuyuni should be kept open for the use of the British. The British practically secured the old Schomburgk line with the exception of Barima Point at the mouth of the Orinoco and a small strip of territory

situated between the Cuyuni and Wenamu Rivers.*

While this dispute with England was in course of adjustment, events were occurring along the southern borders which required the attention of United States troops and which threatened for a time to involve us with Mexico. These border outbreaks, popularly known as the "Tin Horn War," were the last troubles of importance with which the United States had to deal prior to the War with Spain and the later insurrection of the Philippine Islanders. The "Tin Horn War" was in reality a series of outbreaks against the Mexican government, beginning in the autumn of 1891, and continuing intermittently into the early part of 1894. In each of these outbreaks the insurgents operated along the Rio Grande, and evidently relied on the contiguity of the United States for safety in case of defeat. Catarino Garza, who had conducted a number of periodicals opposed to the administration of President Diaz, inaugurated the first of this series of troubles in September of his cattle ranch in Texas, near Palito 1891. He was at that time living on Blanco, at which place he collected his band of revolutionists. Issuing a manifesto, in which he proclaimed the overthrow of Diaz, he crossed the Rio

* Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 467-476; Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, pp. 103-106; Henderson, American Diplomatic Questions, pp. 441-446; Moore, American Diplomacy, pp. 153-157; Appleton's Annual Cyclopædia for 1895 and 1896.