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SURRENDER OF MANILA DEMANDED.
General notifying him that he should remove from the city all noncombatants within the next fortyeight hours, and that the operations against Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period.
"This letter was sent August 7.
the skirmishes that were occurring nightly along the lines. The strain of these constant alarms, and the exposure of the men in the trenches, were beginning to tell on the health and spirits of the army, so General Merritt felt that the time had come to make a determined effort to put an end to what was developing into a very embarrassing situation. This was rendered easier by the arrival of the powerful armored monitor Monterey on August 4, and by the successful though hazardous landing of MacArthur's expedition. granted; but the Captain-General offered to con
The great ten and twelve inch guns of the Monterey were more than a match for the shore batteries of the enemy, so Admiral Dewey was now willing to coöperate with General Merritt in a general attack on Manilla. The story of the succeeding operations is graphically told in his report to the Adjutant-General, dated August 31 and written when he was at sea on his way to Paris where he was summoned to aid the United States peace commissioners:
"Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed that the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of entrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now. however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain
a reply was received the same date to the effect
sult his Government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications by way of Hong Kong.
This was declined on our part for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the Admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season. The sea-coast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage with them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city, filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of entrenchinents in front of the positions at the time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy.
"It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made. practicable breaches in the works and had shaken the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. This is indicated fully. It was believed, however, as most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy
out of his entrenchments before resorting to bombardment of the city.
"By orders issued some time previously, MacArthur's and Greene's brigades were organized as the Second Division of the 8th Army Corps, Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson commanding; and in anticipation of the attack General Anderson moved his headquarters from Cavite to the brigade camps and assumed direct command in the field. Copies of the written and verbal instructions were given to the division and brigade commanders on the 12th, and all the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour in the morning.
'About 9 A. M. on that day our fleet steamed forward from Cavite and before 10 A. M. opened a hot and accurate fire of heavy shells and rapidfire projectiles on the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in position in our trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing with great accuracy. At 10:25 on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder-magazine fort and the trenches flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own (Private Phoenix, Co. I, 1st Colorado)
"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidily through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss * and General MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated in his instruction.
"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon, Lieut.-Col. C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., of my staff, and Lieut. Brumby, U. S. Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers representing the two forces.
'Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the Navy. The 2d Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.
'In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th. I desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people filled with natives hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish.
"The amount of public funds and the numbers of prisoners of war have been reported in detail by cable. It will be observed that the trophies of
* "About 7,000 prisoners of war taken. The squadron has no casualties; no vessel injured Dewey." (Cablegram, August 13, 1898.)
HOSTILITIES CEASE IN PHILIPPINES.
"On the 16th a cablegram containing the text of the President's proclamation directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and at the same time an order to make the fact known to the Spanish authorities, which was done at once. This resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General in regard to the transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I replied that the status quo in which we were left with the cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist upon
the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under protest.
"After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and the suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt in the ranks and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occu pancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact, but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.
"On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to transfer my command to MajorGeneral Otis, U. S. V., and to proceed to Paris, France, for conference with the peace commission. ers. I embarked on the steamer China on the 30th in obedience to these instructions."
THE PEACE PROTOCOL AND THE TREATY OF PARIS.
Manzanillo and the Bay of Nipe- Spain's desperate condition - Ambassador Cambon presents proposals for peace - The protocol signed - The Treaty Commissioners meet at Paris, October 1, 1898 The pleas of Spain for intervention fruitless-Treaty of Paris signed December 10, 1898- The contest over ratification in the Senate Ratification - Text of the treaty Exchange of ratifications.
During the course of the blockade there were many incidents of a minor nature such as the taking of prizes, chases after blockade-runners, occasional shelling of shore batteries or detachments who ventured within range of guns of the ships, but only
two of these attained the dignity of maritime battles: the attacks on Manzanillo and the Bay of Nipe. The former was esteemed one of the strongest positions on the southern coast of Cuba, and as early as June 26 an endeavor had been made by the
Hist, Hornet and Wompatuck to destroy the Spanish vessels in the harbor, but were repulsed after disabling a torpedo boat and sinking a smaller vessel. Another attack made a day later by the Scorpion and the Oceola met the same fate, and Manzanillo was left at peace until July 18, when the same vessels reinforced by the Helena and Wilmington stood off from the harbor, just out of effective range of the Spanish guns, and poured a heavy and deliberate fire upon the shipping lying at the wharfs. This was completely destroyed, among the vessels being three blockade runners that had been active in bringing supplies to the Spanish forces. On August 12 a determined attack was made by Commander Goodrich of the Newark in an attempt to capture the city. With him were the Resolute, Suwanee, Oceola, Hist, and the Alvorado, one of the vessels captured from the enemy at Santiago. Early on the following day a general bombardment was commenced, after a refusal on the part of the Spanish commander of the garrison to surrender. An intermittent firing was kept up throughout the day and night. The next day, however, flags of truce were seen flying over the city, and from a boat put out from the same the American ships learned of the signing of the peace protocol and the declaration of an armistice.
The Bay of Nipe is situated on the northeastern coast, across the island and directly north of Santiago de Cuba. It is a splendid harbor with a narrow entrance like that of Santiago.
As this was a point of rendezvous for Spanish gunboats, it was decided to occupy it, destroying or capturing any of the vessels that might be within. Accordingly on July 21 the Annapolis, Topeka, Wasp and Leyden appeared at the mouth of the harbor, which was reported to be strongly mined. In spite of this the Wasp and the Leyden steamed into the narrow channel and by good fortune escaped injury from the mines, finding within the harbor the gunboat, Don Jorge Juan. The other ships were signaled to enter, and the four sank the Spanish vessel after a few minutes of firing. A number of mines were raised but few of them appeared to be effective.
Thus point by point the American forces were advancing towards Havana. Each day meant a loss to the Spanish cause, and each day it became more and more apparent that the disorganized and corrupt administration of Spain could not meet the exigencies of the situation. At last the light began to dawn upon the other European powers that further continuance of the struggle could only result in disasters perhaps still more serious,- disasters, indeed, that might endanger the peace of Europe. Pressure was therefore exerted upon Spain to submit to the inevitable, and sue for peace; a thing that the ministry was not averse to doing. The nations of Europe had another and stronger reason for this activity for peace than mere solicitude for Spain's welfare. The threat had been made