who immediately fell, severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, 24th Infantry, who five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, 9th Infantry.”*

In the meantime the other detachment of General Hawkins' brigade, under his immediate leadership, was meeting serious difficulties.

"It was impossible for officers or men to preserve anything like regular formation, and advance in lines of columns of fours was as impracticable as advance in regular line. The two regiments had to get through the chaparral in the quickest possible manner. Somehow the enemy had discovered or expected this approach, although we could see nothing of them. The enemy's fire was continuous and heavy, many officers and men being killed and wounded in this dense tropical undergrowth.

"It was hoped, as we could not reply to the fire, the enemy would at last conclude that there was no force in the undergrowth, but having an unlimited supply of ammunition, the enemy kept up their fire, and it was necessary to get through the chaparral or retreat.

"Officers set a gallant example to their men. It was while engaged in an attempt to show a way to bewildered troops that Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, 17th Infantry, aid-de-camp on my personal staff, gallantly sacrificed his life.

"Lieut. J. G. Ord † was also conspicuous in his efforts to encourage the men. Capt. W. E. Horton, adjutant-general of the brig ade, assisted me greatly in getting some sort of order out of the confusion.

"Upon finally emerging from this dense growth we found ourselves in a wide field, with tall grass, knee-high, and instead of our being in a flanking position the ridge occupied by the enemy was found to be parallel to us. To remain where we were would have subjected us to great loss. The loss would also be great for us to return through the jungle.

"We had promised to take the position, and it was essential to do so. The advance was therefore sounded, and repeated from time to time to insure its being heard above the din of the

Report of Brigadier-General Kent.
Afterwards killed at the crest of the hill.

musketry.*

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It was made gallantly across the wide grass field. Then began the ascent of the very steep hill, without pausing to take breath. The very audacity of the assault seemed to demoralize the enemy, who did not wait for the bayonet to be used." †

This charge of General Hawkins and his men was one of the heroic in

cidents of the war. His account gives credit to all who took part in it, but he neglects to point out that he was the head of his men, encouraging them onward without a thought of his own safety. With miraculous good fortune he escaped injury at this time, not to be so fortunate later on, as he received a severe wound in his foot. The figure of this grizzled hero leading his straggling band of soldiers, mostly young men and inexperienced in wars, waving his hat and calling on his buglers to blow, makes a picture that will not soon be forgotten.

After the movement to the line of battle preparatory to the attack on the Spanish entrenchments, the forces were obliged to cease their advance under conditions desperate and at some points untenable. A portion of Hawkins' brigade was forced to retire to avoid being annihilated, and at various places along the widely extended line the troops were being torn to pieces by the ceaseless rain of bullets from sharpshooters concealed in the trees on all sides of the men, and by the shrapnel from the machine guns in the trenches. Their orders required that they wait for Lawton,

Trumpeters Shroeder and Dorris were commended by General Hawkins for their bravery in sounding the calls through the charge.

Report of Brigadier-General Hawkins.

but Lawton was occupied with all he could do at that time, and soon the folly of a longer wait impressed itself upon General Shafter. Already, however, the commanders at the front had seen clearly that the situation as it stood could not be maintained; nothing was being accomplished, yet the men were receiving a punishment as severe as if making an immediate attack on the enemy. To fall back would be a virtual repulse with its attendant loss of prestige; to wait longer for Lawton was madness — the only alternative was to move forward to the attack.

General Shafter, who was ill at the time, had established himself on a hill near Pozo, some three miles from the front. He was represented at the front by the Adjutant-General of the 5th Corps, McClernand, and his aidde-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Miley. General Wheeler was also sick with fever, but left his tent at the sound of the firing and went to the front. On General Shafter's order, he was given direction of all the forces engaged before San Juan. He saw clearly the dangers of the situation, and it was with a sense of relief that he received through McClernand permission to advance against the enemy. Immediately the cavalry under Sumner and Wood moved forward against Little San Juan Hill. Soon after, under cover of the firing from Parker's battery, which had been pushed to the front with much daring, the infantry division (Kent's) also began its charge on the main

fortifications under Hawkins, Ewers and Pearson. In the charge on Little San Juan, the Rough Riders under Colonel Colonel Roosevelt again covered themselves with glory. As in the case with El Caney, in the mad rush across the open in front of the Spanish trenches and up the steeps they crowned; all rank and order was forgotten for the moment. Firing at will, the men went forward on a run, ignoring the Mauser bullets that were cutting them down by scores at pointblank range, passing barbed-wire barricades as best they could, and finally pouring over the crest of the hill as if they were going to take the enemy with their bare hands the deeds of this remarkable regiment and its still more remarkable leader form an interesting chapter in American history.

Nevertheless, in spite of the exceedingly valuable services of that regiment before Santiago, after all the battle was fought and won by the regulars.

regulars. There were only four regiments of volunteers in the entire action: the 2d Massachusetts at El Caney; the Rough Riders and the 71st New York; and the 33d Michigan at Aguadores. It is a fact that should not be overlooked in the quest for the spectacular, that it was the American army, trained for its work, that drove the Spanish soldiers from their sheltering trenches and block-houses, occupying them themselves against all efforts to dislodge them.

San Juan was gained without Lawton, and it was not until 24 hours later that he reached that point,

his men utterly exhausted, having marched twenty or more miles, fought and won a battle, and even now were not unwilling to do something more. Bates' regiment also reached San Juan Hill at noon of the 2d, and was assigned a position on the heights adjoining Little San Juan. With these reinforcements, however, the situation of the American soldiers was precarious in the extreme. Virtually the whole available army was on the firing line, and should an overwhelming force be brought against them there was possibility of a disaster that would do incalculable injury to the cause of the United States. General Shafter recognized the strength of this argument, which was impressed upon him by some of the officers of his command, but Gen

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eral Wheeler sent a strong letter opposing such action. In it he says: "A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a strong position further back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discountenanced this, as it would cost us much prestige."* His advice was followed, and its wisdom was apparent when, two days later Cervera's fleet went forth to destruction.

The record of this ex-Confederate General, who had as much to do as any one man with the success at Santiago, is worthy of all honor. The heroic activities of his youth under the banner of the Confederacy, which advanced him from a lieutenant to senior general of cavalry, are repeated and perhaps excelled by his heroic activities under the flag of the United States. He will ever stand as the most striking symbol of a reunited nation.

While the toils were thus tightening around Santiago on the landward side, the semi-circle of ships kept up an unwearied watch from the sea. It was a slow and nerve-racking experience; for in addition to the strain of waiting for an enemy seemingly never to appear, was the discomfort

of life on a battleship in a tropical. summer, with the ship stripped all the while, as it were, for battle. The only things that varied the daily routine of the sailors were the occasional bombardments of the Santiago fortifications. In these much ammunition was expended, but without doing the

damage that might be anticipated.* These bombardments, whether immediately effective, were tremendously so in the long run, for they served as target practice under war conditions, and as such their extravagance may be justified. War is an expensive thing at the best, and the sacrifice of ammunition that results finally in victory needs little defense. What the gunners of the American ships learned at San Juan and against Morro and Socapa, they applied with a skill that astonished the world when Cervera's ships were fleeing along the coast of Cuba.

There were several actions of this kind during the time the army was pushing the Spanish back to the inner defences of Santiago. As has been seen, the fleet joined with the army in an attack on Aguadores on July 1. Again, on July 2, Punta Gorda, Socapa, and the other batteries were heavily bombarded, the first-named being the principal point of attack, the fire of the Indiana and the Oregon being wholly directed against it. In spite, however, of the moral effect of these attacks from the sea, General Shafter knew that Santiago could not be taken until the problem of the fleet had been solved. Already the ships in the harbor had joined in the attacks

Causing us only an insignificant number of casualties. They destroyed four huts belonging to the families of the lighthouse tenders without dismounting a single gun. It is inconceivable that so little damage was done, considering how many shells were directed against it [Morro Castle], including a dynamite projectile thrown one night by the Vesuvius.”― Captain Victor Concas y Palau, The Squadron of Admiral Cervera.

on the army, firing large projectiles over the hills into the American lines. Accordingly, therefore, on July 2, he wrote to Admiral Sampson requesting that he make an active move against the Spanish fleet. The latter had already pointed out the difficulties of such an endeavor, replying, nevertheless, that he would undertake it, if General Shafter insisted. The closing words of this letter are as follows: "It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port." As the result of this correspondence, it was arranged that Shafter and Sampson should hold a conference at Siboney on the next day.

dressed in their holiday best, and the decks of the ships were enlivened with the suits of white duck the sailors had. donned for the day. Prayers had been heard, and they were enjoying themselves just as they had done during the four Sundays that preceded. If one could forget the purpose and meaning of these tremendous engines of destruction, nothing could have been more peaceful than the day and the scene. But in a twinkling all was transformed! Suddenly a signal broke forth from the yards of the Iowa, followed immediately by the report of a gun. It was signal 250, "The enemy's vessels are escaping." Thus, rudely disturbed, the quiet and peace of the Sunday morning yielded to the tumult and the horrible necessities of war.

The Iowa was stationed directly opposite the mouth of the harbor, commanding a view down the same as far as Estrella Point. Lieutenant F. K. Hill, who was on the bridge in company with the navigator of the Iowa,

Second squadron (Commodore Schley).-Brooklyn. Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about 6 miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.

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Lieutenant Scheutze, caught the first glimpse (9:30) of the Spanish ships as they rounded Cay Smith. Giving the command to display the signal, he rushed to a gun on the bridge, aimed it towards the Spanish vessel and fired. In a second the whole fleet was stirring with preparations for the approaching struggle. The American ships were not under full head of steam, but they were in perfect condition, and fully able to develop sufficient speed to cope with the Spanish vessels, whose hulls were foul after the ocean voyage and the enforced. inactivity within the harbor. Within five minutes every vessel in the blockading fleet was under way, closing in on the enemy. Owing to the peculiar situation of the Spanish fleet, each ship as it emerged became the target of the guns of all the opposing vessels, without opportunity to reply save with the forward guns.

The first of the ships to emerge was the Spanish flag-ship, the Infanta Maria Teresa, with Admiral Cervera and its commander, Captain Concas y Palau, on the bridge. For ten minutes she was alone in the open, torn by the masses of steel hurled against her. Turning to the west at full speed, she replied to her opponents as well as her desperate condition permitted. It was originally planned for the Teresa to ram the Brooklyn, but the maneuver of the Brooklyn in turn

*"In compliance with this order [to ram the Brooklyn], put our bow toward the armored cruiser Brooklyn. * The position of the Brooklyn and the danger of being rammed by these two ships [Texas and Iowa].