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COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES - Continued.

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**Names of ships given in italics were destroyed or captured by the American fleet.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH NAVIES - Concluded.

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*Names of ships given in italics were destroyed or captured by the American fleet.

To offset any disparity that might exist between the two fleets, the administration at Washington sought to purchase ships in whatever market was available. Two auxiliary vessels Two auxiliary vessels were secured for Commodore Dewey in Asiatic waters; three ships were purchased from Brazil, and two torpedo boats obtained in Germany. In addition the merchant marine was levied upon, and eleven ocean liners were transformed into swift, light armed cruisers. Of these the American line supplied four: the St. Louis, St. Paul, New York and Paris, the latter two being rechristened the Yale and Harvard respectively. Four

others were supplied by the Morgan line, and were renamed the Yankee,

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Dixie, Prairie, and Yosemite. A number of private yachts were also chartered and transformed into gunboats; one of them, J. P. Morgan's splendid yacht, the Corsair, proving very efficient in the batle of Santiago, under its new name, the Gloucester.

From the outset, the problem of providing for the purchase of ships, the mobilizing of an army, and all the extraordinary expenses connected with a war became the concern of Congress. It was estimated that the monthly expenses would amount to $50,000,000, and the means of raising this additional revenue was the issue before the House of Representatives and the Senate from the declaration of war, April 25, to the final passage of the

war revenue act on June 13. Already on March 8, the sum of $50,000,000 had been appropriated "for national defence," which was for the exclusive purpose of strengthening shore defenses and the fortifications near great cities. Hence it was imperative to inaugurate legislation enabling the administration to carry on the war. This was provided for in the War Revenue Act of July 13, 1898.

"The bill as reported, provided for additional internal taxes, estimated to yield about $90,000,000 per annum, of which $33,000,000, it was estimated, would come from doubling the tax of $1 per barrel on fermented liquors, $15,000,000 from doubling the 6 cents per pound tax on tobacco, and increasing the tax on cigars and cigarettes, $5,000,000 from the imposition of a special tax on dealers in tobacco and cigars, $2,000,000 from an increase in

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the tax on the tonnage in the foreign trade, and $38,000,000 from a documentary and proprietary stamp tax, based substantially on the stamptax acts enacted near the close of the War of the Rebellion."* The bill also carried a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States any sum up to $500,000,000, to be secured by 3 per cent. bonds. Under the provisions of this act these bonds were placed on sale by popular subscription June 13 to July 14, and demand for them proved one of the startling episodes of the war. The fact that $1,400,000,000 worth of the bonds were subscribed for, seven times the amount of the subscription bonds offered, is one of the many evidences revealed during the stress of the conflict of the faith the average American has in his country.

Thus after thirty years of peace the nation found itself in the throes of

preparation for war. During these years the interests and energies of the people were concerned wholly with the problems of its own development; the victories were the victories of peace. The ancient policy of the nation with regard to entangling alliances or interference with international affairs was still so consistently observed that to the majority of the foreign powers the United States of America was an unknown quantity. Yet all at once, and as the result of

* Nelson Dingley in The American-Spanish War, pp. 325–338. See also Lyman J. Gage in The American-Spanish War, pp. 367–391.

conditions apparently beyond control, the nation found itself swept onto the stage of international affairs, and forced to play a new and untried part - that of aiding an oppressed and rebellious colony in gaining its independence from the mother country. What had happened at the end of the

Eighteenth century thus found its reproduction in the Nineteenth, with this notable difference, however, that the aid rendered to the Colonies was for France the beginning of democracy; the aid rendered to Cuba by the United States was the beginning of empire.

CHAPTER II.

1898.

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

The President proclaims the adherence of the United States to the terms of the Treaty of Paris -The rendezvous of the Pacific fleet at Hong Kong-Proclamation of neutrality by Great Britain - Departure of the fleet for the Philippines- Dewey's plan for the attack - The Spanish line of battle - The battle - The Spanish fleet destroyed.

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abrogated the right of belligerent powers to issue letters of marque or permit privateering, and as the United States was not a signatory power, it was feared that the administration would resort to a method of warfare that would menace the maritime trade of the world. Nevertheless, since its promulgation in 1856, the United States had considered itself morally bound by the Declaration, and, in fact, had adhered closely to its provisions during the Civil War. If there was any doubt with regard to the matter it was dispelled by the third proclamation which was issued on April 26. In it the President stated specifically that the "war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and . sanctioned by their recent practice, it

has already been announced that the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris."

The two proclamations addressed to neutral nations had the effect of closing all foreign ports, save under exceptional conditions, and for very short periods of time to the war vessels of the belligerent powers. At the outbreak of the war, the American fleet was divided into three squadrons: two on the Atlantic coast under Acting Rear Admiral W. T. Sampson and Commodore W. S. Schley respectively, the third station at the port of Hong Kong, on the far-away coast of China, under command of Commodore George Dewey.

ginning of the end of a once majestic empire.

Early in January, 1898, when the relations between the two nations were evidently becoming more and more strained, it was evident that the slightest mistake on the part of either would result in a rupture. Recognizing this fact, Secretary of the Navy Long* ordered the captains of the various ships to fill the bunkers with the best coal to be obtained, to re-enlist the members of the crews whose terms had expired, and to keep the ships fit and ready for any contingency that might present itself. No one dreamed, however, in carrying out these commands how soon that rupture was to come, and in what a tragic manner.

On February 25, ten days after the destruction of the Maine, Commodore Dewey received the following message

Great Britain declared neutrality April 23, which forced Commodore Dewey to withdraw his fleet from British waters. The latter was accordingly confronted by a problem that had two solutions: to leave Hong Kong and sail for the coast of California, or to seek the Philippines and batter out a berth for his ships in the territory of the enemy. That the former alternative did not occur to him or to the administration at Washington is very evident. In fact, the Pacific fleet had been gathered at Hong Kong for a specific purpose, and events were now hastening toward its fulfillment. The closing of the neutral harbor to the American fleet was but the first move in the tremendous game which was to destroy the sea power of Spain Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, November

in the Pacific, and marked the be

"The commander in chief of the Asiatic Station and the commander in chief of the North Atlantic station had been engaged in thoroughly preparing the units of their commands for the test of war. The squadrons, ships, officers, and crews were in admirable condition and training, had been for months engaged in tactical maneuvers and gunnery practice, and were strengthened by the addition of the auxiliary vessels as rapidly as converted. The bureaus of the Department had, by wise forethought, prepared them with every facility in the way of men, supplies, ammunition, information, and drills, and as early as April 15, four weeks before Admiral Cer vera's fleet reached Cuban waters, the Navy of the United States was ready for the outbreak of hostilities. The North Atlantic fleet at Key West covered Cuba; the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads stood ready to defend our own coast, or threaten that of Spain, and the Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong only awaited informa tion of the outbreak of hostilities." Report of

15, 1898, in Messages and Documents, 18981899.

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