donation, testament, or otherwise--just as those citizens themselves. But as to the States by whose existing laws aliens are not permitted to hold real estate, the treaty engages that the President shall recommend to them the passage of such laws as may be necessary for the purpose of conferring that right.

It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between independent nations, in their construction words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended. And it has been held by this court that where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487. The stipulation that the government of France in like manner accords to the citizens of the United States the same rights within its territory in respect to real and personal property and inheritance as are enjoyed there by its own citizens, indicates that that government considered that similar rights were extended to its citizens within the territory of the United States, whatever the designation given to their different political communities.

5. The rule of effectiveness.

INTERPRETATION OF PEACE TREATIES WITH BULGARIA, HUNGARY
AND ROMANIA (SECOND PHASE)

International Court of Justice
Advisory Opinion of July 18, 1950
I.C.J. Reports, 1950, p. 211.

International Law Reports, 1950, Case No. 102, p. 318.

Having stated, in its Opinion of March 30th, 1950, that the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are obligated to carry out the provisions of those articles of the Peace Treaties which relate to the settlement of disputes, including the provisions for the appointment of their representatives to

the Treaty Commissions, and having received information from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that none of those Governments had notified him, within thirty days from the date of the delivery of the Court's Advisory Opinion, of the appointment of its representative to the Treaty Commissions, the Court is now called upon to answer Question III in the Resolution of the General Assembly of October 22nd, 1949, which reads as follows:

III. If one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty Commission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a representative to the Treaty Commission, is the Secretary-General of the United Nations authorized to appoint the third member of the Commission upon the request of the other party to a dispute according to the provisions of the respective Treaties?

Articles 36, 40 and 38, respectively, of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, after providing that disputes concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaties which had not been settled by direct negotiation should be referred to the Three Heads of Mission, continue:

Any such dispute not resolved by them within a
period of two months shall, unless the parties to the
dispute mutually agree upon another means of settle-
ment, be referred at the request of either party to
the dispute to a Commission composed of one representa-
tive of each party and a third member selected by mutual
agreement of the two parties from nationals of a third
country. Should the two parties fail to agree within
a period of one month upon the appointment of the third
member, the Secretary-General of the United Nations may
be requested by either party to make the appointment.

2. The decision of the majority of the members of the Commission shall be the decision of the Commission and shall be accepted by the parties as definitive and binding.

The question at issue is whether the provisions empowering the Secretary-General to appoint the third member of the Commission applies to the present case, in which one of the parties refuses to appoint its own representative to the Commission.

Held "that, if one party fails to appoint a representative to a Treaty Commission under the Feace Treaties with Bulgaris, Hungary and Romania where that party is obligated to appoint a representative to the Treaty Commission, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is not authorized to appoint the third member of the Commission upon the request of the other party to a dispute." The Court said: .

As the Court has declared in its Opinion of March 30th, 1950, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are under an obligation to appoint their representatives to the Treaty Commission, and it is clear that refusal to fulfil a treaty obligation involves international responsibility. Nevertheless, such a refusal cannot alter conditions contemplated in the Treaties for the exercise of the SecretaryGeneral of his power of appointment. These conditions are not present in this case, and their absence is not made good by the fact that it is due to the breach of a treaty obligation. The failure of machinery for settling disputes by reason of the practical impossibility of creating the Commission provided for in the Treaties is one thing; international responsibility is another. The breach of a treaty obligation cannot be remedied by creating a Commission which is not the kind of Commission contemplated by the Treaties. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them.

The principle of interpretation expressed in the maxim: Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, often referred to as the rule of effectiveness, cannot justify the Court in attributing to the provisions for the settlement of disputes in the Peace Treaties a meaning which, as stated above, would be contrary to their letter and spirit. . . .

[I]t has been alleged that a negative answer by the Court to Question III would seriously jeopardize the future of the large number of arbitration clauses which have been drafted on the same model as that which appears in the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The ineffectiveness in the present case of the clauses dealing with the settlement of disputes does not permit such a generalization. An examination of the practice of arbitration shows that, whereas the draftsmen of arbitration conventions have very often taken care to provide for the consequences of the inability of the parties to

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agree on the appointment of a third member, they have, apart from exceptional cases, refrained from anticipating a refusal by a party to appoint its own commissioner. The few Treaties containing express provisions of such a refusal indicate that the States which adopted this course felt the impossibility of remedying this situation simply by way of interpretation. fact, the risk of such a possibility of a refusal is a small one, because normally each party has a direct interest in the appointment of its commissioner and must in any case be presumed to observe its treaty obligations. That this was not so in the present case does not justify the Court in exceeding its judicial function on the pretext of remedying a default for the occurrence of which the Treaties have made no provision.

[Judge Reed, who dissented along with Judge Azevedo, disagreed with the Court's handling of the principle of effectiveness, stating, inter alia:]

It is inconceivable to me that the Allied and
Associated Powers would have consented to the setting
up of machinery for the settlement of disputes arising
out of such important matters which could be rendered
ineffective by the sole will of any one of the three
Governments concerned, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.
I am, therefore, inclined at the outset to the view
that the Disputes Articles must be interpreted in a
manner which will ensure their real effectiveness
rather than a manner which would deprive them of all
effectiveness.

6. Interpretive rules for reservations.

RESERVATIONS TO THE CONVENTION ON GENOCIDE

International Court of Justice
Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951

I.C.J. Reports, 1951

International Law Reports, 1951, Case No. 118, p. 364

On November 16, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the following Resolution:

The General Assembly,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General regarding reservations to multilateral conventions,

Considering that certain reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have been objected to by some States,

Considering that the International Law Commission is studying the whole subject of the law of treaties, including the question of reservations,

Considering that different views regarding reservations have been expressed during the fifth session of the General Assembly, and particularly in the Sixth Committee,

I. Requests the International Court of Justice to give

an Advisory Opinion on the following questions:

In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention subject to a reservation made either on ratification or on accession, or on signature followed by ratification:

I. Can the reserving State be regarded as being
a party to the Convention while still main-
taining its reservation if the reservation is
objected to by one or more of the parties to
the Convention but not by others?

II.

If the answer to Question I is in the affirma-
tive, what is the effect of the reservation as
between the reserving State and:

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The parties which object to the reservation? (b) Those which accept it?

III. What would be the legal effect as regards the
answer to Question I if an objection to a re-
servation is made:

(a) By a signatory which has not yet ratified?
(b) By a State entitled to sign or accede but
which has not yet done do?