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orders of McClellan, dated July 2d, at Buckhannon,
directing General Cox, then at Camp Dennison, Ohio,
to assume command of the First and Second Kentucky
and Twelfth Ohio Regiments and move to the Ka-
nawha. His instructions confined him to a defensive
attitude and a cautious advance until McClellan's oper-
ations had cut off the enemy's retreat from Charlestown
by the route through Beverly. But before Cox's troops
could be concentrated on the Ohio and the movement
up the Kanawha begun, the action at Rich Mountain
had occurred and McClellan was able to turn his atten-
tion to a plan of giving Cox material assistance in the
latter's operations against General Wise. This was, to
move with six regiments by way of Huttonsville, Sum-
merville, and Dogwood Ridge, to cut off whatever force
of the enemy there might be in the lower valley of the
Kanawha, and with Cox's force turn upon Wise and
drive him from the State. But while he was in the
midst of the preparations for this enterprise he received
orders to turn over his command to General Rosecrans
and to proceed at once to Washington.

The success of McClellan's West Virginia' campaign was unduly magnified by the newspaper press throughout the North, and it was the immediate cause of his being called to Washington to receive that substantial promotion that his talents as an army commander seemed to justify. A careful analysis of its main incidents and their influence upon his mental processes is, however, exceedingly instructive in giving a just estimate of his characteristic qualities of leadership, which, being peculiarly his own, must ever be in evidence throughout his whole career.

The strategic bent of his mind is shown in the admirable plan of campaign submitted June 23d, immediately upon his arrival at Grafton from Ohio. It was admirable because it could have been carried out to its successful issue by any subordinate commander with the greatly preponderating strength that was available. "Assure the genHis movements were slow, for his cautiousness grew as he approached the field of battle.

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of McClellan's expedition, and that he nevertheless did so escape, it is beyond any satisfactory explanation to justify the extravagant language McClellan employed in his congratulatory order to his soldiers on the termination of the campaign:

SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY OF THE WEST :

I am more than satisfied with you. You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers-one of the two commanders of the rebels is a prisoner, the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part.

You have proved that Union men, fighting for the preservation of our Government, are more than a match for our misguided and erring brethren; more than this, you have shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made long and arduous marches, often with insufficient food, frequently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I could rely on your endurance, patriotism, and courage.

In the future I may have still greater demands to make upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability; but I know now that by your valor and endurance you will accomplish all that is asked.

I

Soldiers, I have confidence in you, and I trust you have Remember that discipline and learned to confide in me. subordination are qualities of equal value with courage. am proud to say that you have gained the highest reward that American troops can receive-the thanks of Congress and the applause of your fellow-citizens.

This procedure was clearly in accord with the views of General Scott, upon whom the Administration relied for advice, but his military instincts were decidedly opposed to the employment of the three months' levies for an offensive campaign, as his letter to McClellan, already quoted, clearly shows. General Irwin McDowell, a major of the regular army, was appointed to the immediate command of the troops, and under great difficulties was endeavoring to organize them into some semblance of an army. General Patterson was also collecting a considerable number of equally raw troops in the near vicinity of Harper's Ferry. In the meanwhile the Confederate forces had seized Manassas Junction, thus controlling the communications to Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, and were preparing, under General Beauregard, to advance upon Washington, while General Johnston was concentrating forces at Winchester to oppose Patterson. Such was the situation late in June, when in obedience to the constantly increasing but intemperate demand of the public press an immediate advance of the Union army toward Richmond was, by the unanimous vote of the President and his Cabinet, decided upon at a Cabinet meeting held June 29th. This action, though in complete accord with the optimistic temper of the people, could hardly be justified even by the undoubted pressing political considerations of the time, and only then when certainty of success was assured. However, the more prudent military judgment of the general in chief was overborne, a plan of campaign was called for and submitted, and preparations for its prosecution immediately inaugurated.

In general outline the plan decided upon was for Patterson to hold Johnston at Winchester to prevent the latter re-enforcing Beauregard, while McDowell was to move by way of Fairfax Court House, cross the Occoquan below its junction with Bull Run, and by an attack on the right flank gain the enemy's railway communications. Information derived from reconnoissances led to a change of plan, so that it was deter