CHAPTER XIII.

MALVERN HILL. HARRISON'S LANDING. WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC FROM THE PENINSULA. - POPE'S CAMPAIGN.

RESTORATION TO COMMAND.

MCCLELLAN'S

GENERAL LEE, though grievously disappointed at the failure of his combinations on the 30th, took immediate measures to follow McClellan early the next morning, the junction of the component portions of his army having been then effected at the crossroads. Jackson was directed to pursue by the Willis Church road; Huger to pass from his position on the Charles City road and move on Jackson's right; while Magruder, who had come up from the River road during the night to the battlefield of Glendale, was directed to move also on Jackson's right by the Quaker road; and Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to form the reserve of the Confederate army. General Lee, who was suffering from illness and excessive fatigue, that morning invited Longstreet to make reconnoissance with Magruder and Huger's columns to ascertain the feasibility of making aggressive battle upon the Union position, and Longstreet, joining Magruder, found him following the road running almost due south from the Long Bridge road, a few hundred yards east of Enroughty's House, which was known locally as the Quaker road. But Longstreet, believing him too far west from Jackson, and that the road was not the Quaker road as understood at headquarters, finally succeeded in having Magruder ordered to change his route after the latter had proceeded some distance. This caused some delay in getting Magruder into position, and Huger

was eventually interposed between D. H. Hill and Magruder. Longstreet himself soon arrived at a piece of elevated ground from which he had a good view of Porter's disposition at Malvern Hill, and could also see Jackson's troops, which were then filing into Poindexter's field. Believing that a hundred guns concentrated in front of Jackson, crossing their fire with a forty-gun battery established on the ground near his point of observation, would soon overwhelm the Union artillery and justify a frontal attack on Porter's lines, he so reported to General Lee. The latter adopted Longstreet's suggestion and directed his pioneer corps to cut the roads for the advance of the artillery, and Armistead's brigade, being then in the vicinity of the proposed battery of position, Lee issued the following order: "Batteries have been established to rake the enemy's line. If it is broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same."

This proposed concentration of artillery upon the Confederate right and left was not effected, and there do not appear to have been explicit orders issued to bring it about, for, though the Confederate chief of artillery, General Pendleton, industriously sought for suitable sites for his reserve artillery, he makes no reference to the fact that he was acting under specific orders, and Jackson is likewise also silent with regard to the concentration of artillery. Armistead, however, was enterprising in bringing Grimes's, Pegram's, and Moorman's batteries up, but these were soon disabled, due to the efficient concentrated fire of Porter's batteries, and similar results obtained against Balthis's, Poague's, Carpenter's, and other batteries in front of Jackson's command in Poindexter's farm.

According to Longstreet, this failure to concentrate the Confederate artillery caused General Lee to abandon his adopted plan of battle, although he issued no orders specifically recalling it, under the impression that his officers had realized its failure and the abandonment of the plan, and he then sought, accom

panied by Longstreet, a route by which the two reserve divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill might reach McClellan's right flank. After a hasty reconnoissance a feasible route was thought to have been found, and the troops of the reserve were actually on the march when the battle was opened by the troops in front.

Some explanation such as this given by Longstreet seems to be necessary to account for Lee's extraordinary order, and the lack of his usual directive influence in the conduct of battle which was so markedly absent in that of Malvern Hill.

Malvern Hill, the theater of the final battle of the Seven Days' contest, was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and McClellan, quickly perceiving the advantages that it offered, gave directions for posting the troops as they arrived upon the ground, and specially directed General Humphreys to take charge of this duty. Early on the morning of the 1st he rode the circuit of the position, approved the disposition that Porter and Couch had made of their troops, and then returned to his headquarters at Haxall's Landing, but shortly afterward went on board of the gunboat Galena to select, with Commodore Rodgers, the final emplacements for the army and its depots. No argument has ever been considered strong enough to justify this separation of General McClellan from his army, then manifestly on the eve of battle. Not only the security but the salvation of the army was in jeopardy, and at this juncture it would seem that these must necessarily depend upon the best generalship that it was possible for him to exercise on that day. All the component parts of Lee's army were certain to be united before noon, and it could hardly be doubted that they would be sent forward to attack under the skillful direction of Lee himself. The continued presence of General McClellan with his troops, seeing to their best tactical disposition and giving them the inspiration of his undoubted personal magnetism, was a duty of the first importance, in comparison with which everything else was relatively of no military

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