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ber of his troops, he had reason to hope that his chief would not fail to send him re-enforcements as speedily as possible. According to the estimate of General A. S. Webb, Porter's strength amounted to seventeen thousand three hundred and thirty infantry, twenty-five hundred and thirty-four artillery, and six hundred and seventy-one cavalry for duty on that field, but from the character of the ground but little of the artillery and cavalry could be used to advantage. Morell's division, comprising Butterfield's, Martindale's, and Griffin's brigades, held the left; Sykes's division, comprising Warren's, Lovell's, and Buchanan's brigades, the right; and McCall's division of Reynolds's, Seymour's, and Meade's brigades was first placed in reserve, since it had fought the preceding day at Beaver Dam, but afterward its component parts were sent in to sustain different portions of the line as the exigencies of the battle demanded. The task of defending the position was intrusted to General Fitz-John Porter, an officer of distinguished merit, who possessed in the highest degree the confidence of his chief, and who clearly perceived the great importance of his task. He says: "I, however, determined to hold my position at least long enough to make the army secure. Though in a desperate situation, I was not without strong hope of some timely assistance from the main body of the army, with which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our opponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the main body of the army, under McClellan, the result of any sacrifice or suffering of my troops or of myself. I felt that the life or death of the army depended upon our conduct in the contest of that day, and that on the issue of that contest depended an early peace or a prolonged, devastating war-for the Union cause could never be yielded. Our brave and intelligent men of all grades and ranks fully realized this, and thousands of them freely offered up their lives that day to maintain the sacred cause which they had voluntarily taken up arms to defend to the last extremity."

General Lee, in execution of his plan to attack the

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fragmentary portion of McClellan's army on the north bank of the Chickahominy and cut the line of communication with the supply depots at White House on the Pamunkey, sent forward four strong divisions against Porter; these were Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, and D. H. Hill's, and in aggregate numbered very nearly sixty thousand men, leaving twentyfive thousand men in front of McClellan on the south side of the Chickahominy to make such vigorous demonstrations as would suffice to retain that portion of the Army of the Potomac within its own lines while he overwhelmed the single corps of Porter on the north bank. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, after crossing Beaver Dam Creek, followed the roads leading to Gaines's House and Mill respectively; while Jackson and D. H. Hill, moving from the Mechanicsville road upon Old Cold Harbor, had the longer route to travel to reach their designated position.

In this tactical disposition General Lee hoped that the appearance of Jackson and D. H. Hill at Cold Harbor would cause Porter to extend his defensive line to the right to cover the York River Railway, the main Union line of communication with the Pamunkey, and thus sufficiently weaken the Union line in front of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who would then be sent forward to the attack. He placed the whole left wing of the Confederate army under the direct command of Jackson, and imparted his expectations to the latter in order that Jackson might be governed accordingly. Through some mistake of his guides Jackson's division was delayed in its advance to the field of battle, and D. H. Hill's division reached Cold Harbor in advance of Jackson, and shortly after noon. some of his regiments were skirmishing with the Union right. In the meantime A. P. Hill had carried the bridge crossing at Gaines's Mill and deployed his six brigades in front of New Cold Harbor preparatory to making an assault upon Morell's division, the Union left, whose strong position on the left bank of Boatswain Creek had been developed by the severe skirmish

fire that lasted from noon till near half past two o'clock. After satisfying himself that Longstreet was in position on his right, A. P. Hill ordered his division forward in echelon of brigades. "Desperate and unavailing attempts," says he, "were made to force the enemy's position. Gregg and Branch fought with varying success, Gregg having before him the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's brigade was suffering heavily but stubbornly held its own. Field and Archer met a withering storm of bullets but pressed on to within a short distance of the enemy's works, but the storm was too fierce for such a handful of men. They recoiled and were again pressed to the charge, but with no better success. These brave men had done all that any soldiers could do. Directing their men to lie down, the fight was continued and help awaited. From having been the attacking I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly was the ground held. My division was thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attacks afterward, and in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army that side the Chickahominy.'

While A. P. Hill's attack was in progress Jackson had so disposed D. H. Hill's division and his own corps as to be able to gather the fruits of the expected Confederate victory, but it soon became evident from the sounds of battle that A. P. Hill was not making satisfactory progress, and Jackson was forced to deploy his command for attack. With D. H. Hill's division of five brigades upon the extreme Confederate left and Ewell's four brigades next in line, a strong assaulting line was formed in front of Sykes's position, which struggled for nearly two hours to gain a foothold within the Union lines, but without success. The four brigades of Jackson's own division were sent in to reenforce the Confederate line, according to the exigencies of the time, as they came upon the field of battle; Lawton to strengthen Ewell, Jones to aid Wilcox of

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