port of Longstreet on the Nine-mile road; McLaws's division of three brigades, stationed on the Chickahominy Bluffs, overlooked the crossings between New and Mechanicsville Bridges; D. R. Jones's division of two brigades was on McLaws's left, and A. P. Hill's still farther to the left.

From the position of these several divisions on the 30th and the instructions that General Johnston transmitted to their commanders, he clearly intended that Huger should move at an early hour on the Charles City road, so as to relieve Rodes's brigade to enable it to join Hill on the Williamsburg road, and that Huger should then make his progress on the Charles City road conform to that of Hill, being ready to support his flank by attack, but at the same time he was cautioned to maintain a strong reserve to cover the right flank of the army; that Hill, after being joined by Rodes, should open the attack with his four brigades moving down the Williamsburg road upon the Union position, which had been accurately reconnoitered by Garland on the 30th; that Longstreet, moving down the Nine-mile road, should support Hill's attack, the two divisions coming together at Seven Pines; that Whiting, provided his division reached its prescribed position in time, was to support Longstreet, and, if not, part of McLaws's and Jones's divisions were to be drawn from their positions for this purpose and their places to be occupied by Whiting coming up later. It is impossible to conceive how the two Union corps could have escaped entire destruction had this plan been carried out as devised. But, most fortunately for the Union army, Longstreet misunderstood his instructions and moved his division over to the Williamsburg road, and in so doing delayed Whiting, Hill, and Huger in turn. This delayed the arrival of Rodes also, so that it was not until about one o'clock that the signal was given for Hill's brigades to move to the attack.

The head of Whiting's division had reached the vicinity of General Johnston's headquarters about eight

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o'clock on its way to the Nine-mile road, and was then stopped until the position of Longstreet's division was ascertained, since it was to follow the latter. Johnston doubted the accuracy of the information that was soon brought to him that Longstreet had moved over to the Williamsburg road, and dispatched his aid, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, to find Longstreet, and, if the information were true, to direct Longstreet to return the three brigades of his division to the Nine-mile road, provided this could be done without material loss of time. Under the impression that he was to be found on this road, Washington galloped rapidly down the Nine-mile road, passed the Confederate pickets, and was captured by Casey's pickets about ten o'clock near Fair Oaks, and it was the capture of this aid that convinced Keyes that Johnston was in person on the field He, howand that an attack in force was imminent. ever, believed that the movement was to be expected from the direction of Fair Oaks, and, guided by this warning and from other evidences, he directed the troops of Casey's and Couch's divisions to be under arms by eleven o'clock, and made such other dispositions as were possible to meet the coming attack.

The defensive features of the position held by the Fourth Corps consisted of a line of rifle pits at Seven Pines, at the junction of the Williamsburg and Ninemile roads, which was held by Couch's division. About half a mile in advance, under construction, was an inclosed redoubt with rifle pits extending on both flanks, which was occupied by Casey's division. Midway between Casey and Couch a belt of timber had been cut down to form a slashing that extended to the woods on both sides of the clearing. Another slashing, not quite so extensive, had been made in the edge of the woods about eight hundred yards in front of Casey's division, and at about a mile and a half in rear of Seven Pines there was a third line of rifle pits, crossing the Williamsburg road. All of these intrenchments were in an unfinished state, and Casey's line in particular could offer but little resistance because the

rainy weather, the scarcity of intrenching tools and axes, and the short time it had been under construction, combined to retard its progress. Its weak point was the left flank, which, unless strongly guarded, was capable of being turned under cover of the dense. woods that concealed the by-paths that crossed the head waters of the White Oak Swamp.

As the limits of this volume will not permit the detailed description of the battle of the 31st of May, it will suffice to confine our attention to those incidents which determined its important issues. Casey, upon whose division the brunt of Hill's attack was to fall, had disposed his troops as follows: Naglee's brigade on the right, Wessell's in the center, and Palmer's on the left. Naglee's, the strongest of the three, had one regiment off on the extreme right on the Nine-mile road, about seven hundred yards from Fair Oaks Station, supporting the line of pickets; another on the left of the York River Railroad, about five hundred yards south of Fair Oaks; his remaining three regiments, with the exception of seven companies of one and two companies of another on picket, were in support of Spratt's battery, which had been advanced about halfway between the redoubt and the edge of the woods. beyond. The strength of this brigade taken into action was seventeen hundred and fifty-three officers and men. Wessell's brigade of four regiments of raw troops occupied the line of intrenchments, with the exception of the One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania, which just before the action commenced had been advanced to strengthen the line of pickets; its effective strength was two thousand and sixty-one, and, deducting its pickets and working party, left, according to its commander, about fifteen hundred as its fighting strength when the battle opened. Palmer's brigade of four regiments, also raw, sent forward two regiments to support Spratt's battery on the left, leaving the remaining two to hold the left of the main line; its fighting strength is reported by Palmer as about one thousand. Couch's division, half a mile to the rear of