sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in position on your right his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route. The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock and of the forces with which he moves. By order of the President, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. General McClellan has maintained that this order rendered it impossible for him to use the James River as a line of operations, forced him to establish his depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north. But, as has already been noted, this decision had been reached by him before the reception of this order. In a dispatch to Stanton, dated May 10th, while he was at Roper's Church, he said: "I have fully established my connection with the troops near West Point, and the dangerous movement has passed. The West Point Railway is not very much injured. Materials for repairs, such as rails, etc., cars, and engines, may now be sent me. Should Norfolk be taken and the Merrimac destroyed, I can change my line to the James River and dispense with the railroad." The only conclusion that it is possible to draw, taking into consideration the tenor of all his dispatches and the letters that have been made public, may be thus summarized. He felt satisfied that his conduct of affairs had been on the whole gratifying. With a force greatly inferior to that of the enemy, according to his own estimate, he had forced the evacuation of Yorktown, had won a brilliant victory at Williamsburg, and was about to concentrate all the divisions of his army at New Kent, where, after a thorough examination of the country, he would be able to act understandingly. He nowhere exhibits his intention to attack the enemy, but confidently relies upon his ability to resist any attack that the latter may make upon him, and the expectation that the scene of this great battle will be near the Chickahominy is frequently stated. To enable him to reap the most decisive re 282 sults he incessantly implores the Administration to From this time until the Army of the Potomac was established on the banks of the Chickahominy the movements were painfully slow. The roads, it is true, were exceedingly bad and the weather unprecedentedly wretched; a depot had to be established and supplies had to be collected; the country was unknown and its topography had to be investigated. Granting all these time-devouring causes, there was nevertheless a lack of enterprise and aggressiveness that should not have characterized a pursuing army on the heels of one disheartened by its supposed defeat at Williamsburg. A few days after the battle of Williamsburg General McClellan expressed his dissatisfaction to the Secretary of War with the corps organization of the Army of the Potomac, stating that as it came near bringing on a disastrous defeat there he was unwilling to be held responsible for the existing arrangement, and requested full and complete authority to relieve from duty commanders of corps or divisions who proved themselves incompetent. The Secretary, in reply, authorized him to temporarily suspend that organization in the army under his command and adopt any other that he might see fit, until further orders. But the President, in granting him this authority, thought it best to give him some words of caution. He says: "I wish to say a few words to you privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course, on my own judgment, I do not pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we can not entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything? When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them. 66 "But to return: Are you strong enough-are you strong enough, even with my help-to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you. The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.' Certainly up to this time McClellan had not sought advice from his corps commanders, and had never called them together in councils of war. His failure to do so may have given rise to an impression throughout the army that he was antagonistic to them, strengthened perhaps by the knowledge that in the selection of the corps commanders his wishes and advice had not been consulted. All three had been present at Williamsburg, and there affairs had been woefully mismanaged. On the other hand, it was also a matter of gen 284 eral knowledge that he had a high admiration for General Porter especially, and for Generals Smith and Franklin as well. Their belief in McClellan's military ability and admiration for his personal character were strengthened by constant association, and resulted in the strongest mutual affection, which, when we consider the charming traits of McClellan's personality, is not surprising. Under the authority granted him McClellan reorganized the army, forming the Fifth and Sixth Provisional Corps, under the command of Generals Porter and Franklin respectively, on the 18th of May, so that for the remainder of the campaign the five corps of the army were as follows: Second, Sumner, Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions; Third, Heintzelman, Hooker's and Kearny's divisions; Fourth, Keyes, Couch's and Casey's divisions; Fifth, Porter, Porter's (afterward Morell's) and Sykes's divisions and the reserve artillery; Sixth, Franklin, Franklin's (afterward Slocum's) and W. F. Smith's divisions. CHAPTER XI. JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN. HANOVER COURT HOUSE.-BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.-FAIR OAKS. VERY slowly did the Army of the Potomac move toward Richmond, for it was not until the 21st of May that its front was established along the Chickahominy. Its tardy progress was excused by the wretched roads, made worse than usual by the unprecedented inclement weather, and the necessity of cautious advance in the presence of a supposed superior force ready to offer battle at the first favorable opportunity. Meantime the Confederate army leisurely retreated without compulsory pressure, Smith's and Magruder's divisions taking the road through New Kent to Baltimore Cross Roads, nineteen miles from Barhamsville, while Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, following the road to Long Bridge, occupied the line of the York River Railroad near Bottom's Bridge. In this position they had direct communication with Richmond by the railroad, and here they remained for five days. But when, on the 14th, Johnston heard of the destruction of the Merrimac, he crossed his army the next day to cover Richmond against a possible advance from the south, and on the 17th his army was encamped on the main roads leading into Richmond from that direction, and covering at the same time the approaches by way of New Bridge and Mechanicsville to the east. A brief reference to the sequence of events which intervened to prevent McDowell from joining forces with McClellan may not be out of place. It will be remembered that from the time when McClellan ceased to be general in chief, the duties of that office were ad |