230 nineteen thousand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with forty-one guns; some three thousand six hundred and fifty-two disposable cavalry and the railroad guards, about two thousand one hundred men, amount to about thirty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-seven men. It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say eight hundred and fifty men, being, with some five hundred cavalry, one thousand three hundred and fifty men on the Lower Potomac. To recapitulate: At Warrenton there is to be At Manassas, say. In the Valley of the Shenandoah. In all 7,780 10,859 35,467 1,350 55,456 There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some eighteen thousand, inclusive of the batteries under instruction. The These troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where their services may be most required. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General Commanding. Brigadier-General L. THOMAS, Adjutant General, U. S. Army.* But the very next day, April 2d, General Wadsworth reported to the Secretary of War that in his judgment the numerical strength and character of the force left under his command was entirely inadequate to and unfit for the important duty to which it was assigned. He reported that he had but fifteen thousand three hundred and thirty-five infantry, forty-two hundred and ninety-four artillery, and eight hundred and forty-eight cavalry, a total of twenty thousand four hundred and seventy-seven, leaving, after deducting those sick, in arrest, and confinement, but nineteen thousand and twenty-two present for duty. * Official War Records, vol. v, p. 60 et seq. EMBARKATION FOR FORT MONROE. OPENING OF PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.-SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.-ADOPTION OF WHITE HOUSE AS BASE. UPON this the Secretary of War referred the matter to Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas and MajorGeneral E. A. Hitchcock with instructions to examine all the circumstances bearing on the case, and to report to him whether the President's order and instructions had been complied with in respect to the forces to be left for the defense of Washington and its security, and at Manassas, and, if not, wherein those instructions had been departed from. These officers at once substantially reported that the President's order required that the city of Washington should be left entirely secure before any new base of operations should be taken up; that in their opinion it was the judgment of the general officers forming the council of war of March 13th that it would require a force of thirty thousand men to man the forts properly, which, with the covering force of twenty-five thousand, would make a total force of fifty-five thousand; that if there was need of a military force for the safety of the city. of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate. In conclusion they say: "In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the 232 requirement of the President that this city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the general in chief, but that of the commanders of all the army corps also, has not been fully complied with." As a result of this report and its full approval by the War Department and the President, the latter directed that either Sumner's or McDowell's corps be detached from McClellan's command and be retained Thus inin front of Washington, and on April 4th the order detaching McDowell's corps was issued. stead of carrying with him to the Peninsula, as he had expected, four full corps, McClellan was at the last moment deprived of a corps and a division, amounting in all to about fifty thousand men. Before this action of the Administration was taken McClellan had embarked on the steamer Commodore, and was on his way to Fort Monroe, having in mind no apprehension that his strength was to be further reduced after Blenker had been taken from him, and though he feared he could not rely upon any efficient co-operation of the navy, he allowed his imagination to indulge in the hope that some sort of assistance might be arranged by him in consultation with Commodore Goldsborough. He also believed that he would be able to control the movements and disposition of all the forces operating in the Valley and those in the vicinity of Washington and at Manassas. With these anticipations in mind he reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d of April, and as early as possible sought an interview with Commodore Goldsborough, from whom he learned that the assistance he expected from the navy could not be furnished; that the James River, as a line of supply or for flanking operations, must needs be eliminated from his plans so long as the Merrimac threatened aggressive action; and that but a limited assistance of the navy could be furnished as a protection to his right flank below the mouth of the York River. General McClellan was forced to concede the justness of Commodore Goldsborough's decision in this matter, as the latter |