who was in a position to carry out the requisite provisions for such a co-operation as McClellan had in view. Under these circumstances he could well point to the distinct and explicit language of his letter of March 19th, where he was obliged by the necessity of the case to adopt the first method of advance and be subjected to a delay of weeks in the siege of Yorktown. But it must also be said that all along he hoped for a more favorable outcome of his movements in the advance of his army owing to a misconception of the topographical features of the Peninsula, especially with regard to the character and location of the Warwick River, to which we shall refer hereafter.

CHAPTER IX.

MANASSAS EVACUATED.-DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON.

To revert now to the position of the Confederate forces in Virginia which had so long held the Army of the Potomac confined to the defensive lines surrounding Washington. This Confederate Army of the Potomac, which, according to the statement of General Johnston, its commander, never exceeded fifty thousand effectives, was stretched in observation from Aquia Creek along the Potomac batteries and at the principal fords of the Occoquan and Bull Run, in close touch with the outposts of the Union army as far as Leesburg, while its main body and reserves were in a strong defensive position at Centreville and Manassas. Colonel Stuart, the renowned and accomplished cavalry commander, kept General Johnston well informed of the growing strength of the Union army, so that the latter was well aware from this and other reliable sources that he would not long be able to maintain his position whenever McClellan should begin to advance against him. Called to a conference with the Confederate President, Mr. Davis, at Richmond, about the 20th of February, the depressing condition of the Confederate military status was considered, and it was then determined to make immediate preparations to withdraw the army from its dangerous advanced position to the safer defensive position behind the Rappahannock River as soon as the condition of the roads would permit. The successes of the Union forces in February at Forts Henry and Donelson, resulting in the occupation of Nashville,

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were indeed so depressing to the Confederate cause in the early part of 1862 that even a partial success on Recent the part of the Union forces in Virgina would probably have been fatal to their hope of success. events," said Mr. Davis to General Johnston, "have Our arms and our hopes the gloomiest cast on shadows, and at such a time we must show redoubled Under these circumstances energy and resolution." and considering the enormous preponderance of strength in McClellan's favor, it was Johnston's purpose to effect his withdrawal at the very earliest moment that the condition of the roads and weather would permit, consistent with saving his guns and acHe had reported his army as cumulated supplies. crippled and its efficiency and discipline greatly impaired owing to the lack of a sufficiency of general officers, and that the great accumulation of subsistence stores at Manassas and at the meat-curing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap would prove a serious impediment to his prompt withdrawal, and he feared that much of these supplies would have to be sacrificed owing to the limited means of transportation at his disposal. The activity displayed by the Union troops under Hooker on the eastern shore, when preparations were being made to attack the Potomac batteries, of which Johnston was informed by his spies, convinced him that McClellan was preparing for an early movement. He was also greatly concerned by the Harper's Ferry movement on the 27th of February threatening his extended left flank and was preparing to withdraw about the last of February without risking further delay. It thus appears that had the Potomac canal boats been a few inches narrower McClellan's Harper's Ferry expedition might have precipitated the retirement of the Confederate army under adverse circumstances to them and justified McClellan's anticipations of a glorious

success.

The Confederates began retiring from their positions on the Potomac early on the morning of the 8th

of March, but the troops in the vicinity of Manassas did not leave their camps till the following evening. It was conducted with secrecy and celerity, considering the limited transportation and badness of the roads, and but little property other than the heavy guns in the Potomac batteries and the subsistence surplus before mentioned was abandoned or destroyed. It must be confessed that this movement on the part of the Confederates was a complete surprise to McClellan, and in his ignorance of its immediate probability is found another marked evidence of the utter inefficiency of his service of information. On his arrival at General Porter's headquarters, McClellan issued orders for a general movement of the Army of the Potomac toward Centreville and Manassas, to take place on the morning of the 10th of March. This was not with any intention of inaugurating the overland campaign, but, as he states, "to give the troops an opportunity to gain some experience on the march and in bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other impedimenta, which accumulates so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality." After a brief one day's march toward Centreville the main body of the army was moved back on the 11th of March to the vicinity of Alexandria to prepare for embarkation to the Peninsula, and a brigade of cavalry, under General Stoneman's command, was sent forward in reconnoissance of the enemy's line of retreat on the morning of the 14th, and which ended at Cedar Run. McClellan believed that the withdrawal of the Confederates was due to a knowledge of his intended movement, which they had in some way acquired, and he ever maintained that it justified his prediction of their action should his Urbana campaign be adopted. It is certainly now well established that McClellan was in error in assuming that his plan of campaign was known to General Johnston. Indeed, the latter was for several days in complete ignorance as to the line of advance that McClellan intended to follow, and, in order to provide for every contingency, he first estab

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lished himself on the Rappahannock, placing General Holmes with the brigades of Whiting, Wigfall, and Hampton on the right in the vicinity of Fredericksburg; the two divisions of Ewell and Early at the center on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad; and the divisions of Smith and Longstreet on the left at Culpeper Court House. In justification of this disposition, he says: "We had to regard four routes to Richmond as practicable for the Federal army: That chosen in the previous July; another east of the Potomac to the mouth of the Potomac Creek and thence to Fredericksburg; the third and fourth by water, the one to the Lower Rappahannock, the other to Fort Monroe; and from these points respectively by direct roads. As the Confederate troops in Virginia were disposed, it seemed to me that invasion by the second route would be the most difficult to meet; for as the march in Maryland would be covered by the Potomac, the Federal general might hope to conceal it from us until the passage of the river was begun and so place himself at least two days' march nearer to Richmond than the Army of Northern Virginia on Bull Run. I did not doubt, therefore, that this route would be taken by General McClellan. The opinion was first suggested by the location of a division of the United States Army on it opposite Dumfries."

To carry out the provisions for the permanent retention of Manassas Junction and the security of Washington, General McClellan issued the necessary instructions, March 16th, to Generals Banks and Banks commanding the Fifth Corps, Wadsworth. then consisting of Williams's and Shields's divisions, was directed to intrench his command strongly in the vicinity of Manassas, and to open the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad as far as Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley, and when this was accomplished to intrench at least a brigade near the crossing of the Shenandoah; to build blockhouses at all the railroad bridges, and to occupy, with strong grand guards, Warrenton, Warrenton Junction, and, if possible, the theater as far