THE Victory of the Confederates at Manassas gave them unbounded confidence in their military superiority, and was regarded throughout the South as the sure harbinger of ultimate success; and had they known. with certainty of the demoralized condition of the Union forces, and been able to make a prompt movement forward, it is very possible that Washington would have been in danger of capture. With many commands overcome by the unaccustomed fatigue of battle and the severe trials of the day, disorganized by their heavy loss in killed and wounded, and somewhat demoralized by their unexpected victory at the close of the action, they were in no condition to gather the legitimate fruits of this, their greatest, opportunity. Within a few days Fairfax Court House was occupied by the Confederate cavalry, and the main body occupied a line from Union Mills on Bull Run to Centreville. About the 10th of August Evans's brigade occupied Leesburg as an outpost, while the main body was advanced to the line from Flint Hill through Fairfax Court House, Fairfax Station to Mitchell's Ford covering Centreville, with the cavalry under Colonel J. E. B. Stuart in close touch with the Union forces on the front and flanks. Upton's, Munson's, and Mason's Hills were speedily occupied as advance posts by the Confederates, giving them the advantage of favorable points of observation on the Union army and of communication by signal with their spies in Washington. This disposition of the Confederate army confined McClellan's forces to a narrow strip bordering the Vir

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ished in the meantime, but rather the contrary was

true.

With respect to the purpose that the Confederate leaders had in view after the battle of Manassas, and why it was not carried into effect, these were the subjects of a conference held at Fairfax Court House between President Davis and Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith about the last of September, 1861. On January 31, 1862, General Smith submitted his written recollections of this conference to his associates, Generals Johnston and Beauregard, who likewise signed them, fully agreeing in General Smith's statement as a correct record of the conference. This paper, taken in connection with McClellan's letter of September 8th, is of sufficient importance to warrant its insertion here: *

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On the 26th of September, 1861, General Joseph E. Johnston addressed a letter to the Secretary of War in regard to the importance of putting this army in condition to assume the offensive, and suggested that his Excellency the President, or the Secretary of War, or some one representing them, should at an early day come to the headquarters of the army, then at or near Fairfax Court House, for the purpose of deciding whether the army could be re-enforced to the extent that the commanding general deemed necessary for an offensive campaign.

"His Excellency the President arrived at Fairfax Court House a few days thereafter, late in the afternoon, and proceeded to the quarters of General Beauregard.

"On the same evening General Johnston and I called to pay our respects. No official subjects of importance were alluded to in that interview. At eight o'clock the next evening, by appointment of the President, a conference was had between himself, General Johnston, General Beauregard, and myself. Various matters of detail were introduced by the President, and

* Confederate War Papers, G. W. Smith, p. 14.

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GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

to take and to hold the Ohio River as a boundary, a dis-
astrous defeat of this army would at once be followed
by an overwhelming wave of Northern invaders that
would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extending
to the northern part of the cotton States, if not to New
Orleans. Similar views were expressed in regard to
ultimate results in northwestern Virginia being de-
pendent upon the success or failure of this army, and
various other special illustrations were offered-show-
ing, in short, that success here was success everywhere,
defeat here, defeat everywhere, and that this was the
point upon which all the available forces of the Confed-
erate States should be concentrated.

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It seemed to be conceded by all that our force at that time here was not sufficient for assuming the offensive beyond the Potomac, and that even with a much larger force an attack upon their army under the guns of their fortifications on this side of the river was out of the question.

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I answered,

The President asked me what number of men were necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an offensive campaign, to cross the Potomac, cut off the communications of the enemy with their fortified capital, and carry the war into their country. 'Fifty thousand effective, seasoned soldiers,' explaining that by seasoned soldiers I meant such men as we had here present for duty, and added that they would have to be drawn from the Peninsula, about Yorktown, Norfolk, from Western Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most expedient.

"General Johnston and General Beauregard both said that a force of sixty thousand such men would be necessary, and that this force would require large additional transportation and munitions of war, the supplies here being entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force. In this connection there was some discussion of the difficulties to be overcome and the probabilities of success, but no one questioned the disastrous results of remaining inactive throughout the winter.