CHAP. LXI.] FRENCH POLICY TOWARD THE SOUTH.

519

fully impressed with the vacillations of the imperial government, which seemed as if it dared not adopt a decided character in its trans-oceanic policy, and from the com. mencement to the conclusion of the expedition resorted to little else but half measures. . . . . It is It is very certain that there was a favorable opportunity in 1862, looking at the secession of the Southern States from those of the North. Then was the time for France to have acted vigorously, and to have obtained allies even in the enemy's camp. Two courses were open, and both were practicable, but here we shall not pretend to decide between them. Either it was necessary at the first onset to decide in good earnest for the cause of the Union, and to restrain the South by a threatening demonstration on the frontier of the Rio Bravo, or, if the belligerent character of the secession party was recognized, it was essential to go the whole length without hesitation, and not recognizing the to consummate the work of separation by declaring openly for the planters of the Southern States, who, fired with the recollections of French glory, waited but the succor of our promise to offer triumphantly a helping hand to our expeditionary force which was marching on Mexico. Through an inconsist ency which one can now, on looking back, hardly conceive possible, the imperial policy wandered away from every logical tradition. The belligerent character which had been accorded to the Southern States served only to prolong to no purpose a sanguinary contest, and our gov ernment repulsed the reiterated overtures of the Southern planters, whom they had encouraged, as it were, only yesterday, and then finally abandoned to their fate."

who are blamed for

South.

In that extraordinary conversation which took place between Marshal Bazaine and Maximilian at the Hacienda de la Teja, a similar opinion is expressed: "From the moment," said the marshal, "that the United States

boldly pronounced their veto against the imperial system, your throne was nothing but a bubble, even if your maj esty had obtained the help of a hundred thousand Frenchmen. Supposing even that the Americans had observed neutrality during the continuance of the intervention, the monarchy itself had no spirit of vitality. A federal combination would have been the only system to be attempted in the face of the Union, who would no doubt have acceded to it if the South had been recognized by France at the proper time. My advice is that your majesty should voluntarily retire."

The disruption of

ered inevitable.

The French Mexican expedition was thus based on the disruption of the United States a disruption the Union consid- considered not only by the Spanish court and by the Emperor Napoleon as inevitable, but even by Lord Palmerston, who might have been better informed, and who regarded it as a predestined event. In Parliament he remarked, " Any one must have been shortsighted and little capable of anticipating the probable course of human affairs who had not for a long time foreseen events of a similar character to those which we now deplore the causes of disunion were too deeply seated to make it possible that a separation would not take place."

The Spanish minister in Paris, in November, 1858, had suggested to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Walewski, the advantages that would accrue from the establishment of a strong government in Mexico. Subsequently the views of the English government were ascertained, and in April, 1860, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that France and Eners of Europe look gland were looking favorably upon the matvention in Mexico. ter. The stumbling-block in the way was the opposition which might be expected from the United States. That opposition had for a long time been embod

The Western Pow

favorably on inter

CHAP. LXI.] EXPECTATIONS OF THE THREE POWERS.

The advantages ex

521

ied in a formula under the designation of the Monroe doctrine, which expressed a determination not to permit the interference of European powers on the North American continent. In April, 1860, the project having advanced sufficiently, Lord John Russell informed Isturitz, the Spanish minister, that England would require the protection of the Protestant worship in Mexico. The ob jects of the three contracting parties eventpected by each. ually became apparent. Spain expected that a Bourbon prince would be placed on the Mexican throne, and that she would thereby recover her ancient prestige, and find security for her valuable possession, Cuba; perhaps she might even recover Mexico itself. England, remembering the annexation of Texas, saw that it was desirable to limit the ever-threatening progress of the republic westwardly; to prevent the encircling of the West India Seas by a power which, possibly becoming hostile, might disturb the rich islands she held; nor was she insensible to the importance of partitioning what seemed to be the cotton - field of the world. France Napoleon's osten- anticipated-but the emperor himself, concealing his real motive of compensating Austria for his Italian victories, has given us his ostensible expectations in a letter to General Forey. In this letter (July 3d, 1862) Napoleon III. says: "There will not be wanting people who will ask why we expend men and money to found a regular government in Mexico. In the present state of the civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is not a matter of indifference to Europe, for it is the country which feeds our manufactures and gives an impulse to our commerce. We have an interest in the republic. of the United States being powerful and prosperous, but not that she should take possession of the whole Gulf of Mexico, thence commanding the Antilles as well as South

sible reasons.

His letter to General Forey.

you

America, and be the only dispenser of the products of the New World. We now see by sad experience how precarious is the lot of a branch of manufactures which is compelled to procure its raw material in a single market, all the vicissitudes of which it has to bear. If, on the contrary, Mexico maintains her independence and the integrity of her territory, if a stable government be there established with the assistance of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the Atlantic all its strength and prestige; we shall have guaran teed security to our West India colonies and to those of Spain; we shall have established a friendly influence in the centre of America, and that influence, by creating numerous markets for our commerce, will procure us the raw materials indispensable for our manufactures. Mexico, thus regenerated, will always be well disposed to us, not only out of gratitude, but because her interests will be in accord with ours, and because she will find support in her friendly relations with European powers. At present, therefore, our military honor engaged, the neces sities of our policy, the interests of our industry and commerce, all conspire to make it our duty to march on Mexico, boldly to plant our flag there, and to establish either a monarchy, if not incompatible with the national feeling, or at least a government which may promise some sta bility."

Secession occurs.

their scheme.

As soon as it was ascertained that the Southern States were sufficiently powerful to resist the naThe allies mature tional government, and that a partition of the Union was impending, the chief obstacle in the way of the Mexican movement seemed to be removed. Throughout the spring and summer of 1861, the three contracting powers kept that result steadfastly in mind, and omitted nothing that might tend to its accomplishment. This was the true reason of the conces

CHAP. LXI.]

THE EXPEDITION SAILS.

523

sion of belligerent rights to the Southern Confederacy in May. The downfall of Juarez was the next business in hand.

London.

The expedition

sails to Mexico.

Affairs had so far progressed that, on November 20th, The convention of 1861, a convention was signed in London between France, England, and Spain. In this it was agreed that a joint force should be sent by the three allies to Mexico; that no special advantages should be sought for by them individually, and no internal influence on Mexico exerted. A commission was designated to distribute the indemnity they proposed to exact. The ostensible reason put forth for the movement was the decree of the Mexican government, July 17th, 1861, suspending payment on the foreign debt. The allied expedition reached Vera Cruz about the end of the year. Not without justice did the Mexican Minister for Foreign Affairs complain of their "friendly but indefinite promises, the real object of which nobody unravels." Although M. Thouvenel was incessantly assuring the British govern ment, even as late as May, 1862, that France had no intention of imposing a government on Mexico, it became obvious that there was no more sincerity in this engagement than there had been in imputing the grievances of the invaders to the Mexican decree of the preceding July. The ostensible cause was a mere pretext to get a military foothold in the country. Very soon, however, it became impossible for the French to conceal their discover the inten- intentions. England and Spain withdrew tions of France, from the expedition, the alleged cause on the part of the former being the presence of Almonte, and other Mexican emigrants of known monarchical opinions, with the French, and a resolution not to join in military operations in the interior of the country; on the part of the latter, the true reason was that not a Spanish prince,

England and Spain