CHAP. LIV.] MILITARY PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN IT. upon by McClellan, 369 However, at this epoch of the war, and by the advice Course determined of General McClellan, though, as we shall see, against the judgment of the President, two lines of operation were determined on for the proposed campaign. The primary line was from the seacoast to Richmond; it was the offensive. The secondary line was from Washington to Richmond; it was the defensive. offensive line. The offensive line presented the serious inconveniences Imperfection of his that have been mentioned as appertaining to combined naval and military operations. It involved necessarily a prodigious expense. Military critics have shown that, considering the Atlantic region as being divided into two portions, an east and a west, operations conducted in the former against Richmond could not be decisive against the Confederates. In the latter they might be. Such considerations, arising from the general topog raphy of the country, were, however, disregarded; the result being that 100,000 men, with their material, were transported 180 miles by water at a cost of nineteen days of time and an enormous expenditure of money, to avoid one day's march by land; for they had already marched to Centreville, were thence marched back to Alexandria, and had subsequently to march the entire length of the Peninsula. In one week the Confederates could march from the front of McClellan at Washington to confront him again in the Peninsula. President Lincoln was therefore justi fied in his remark that, by the Peninsular movement, "nothing had been gained, but much had been lost; that the difficulty had been shifted, not surmounted." Moreover, the great Army of the Potomac was by this determination brought into a narrow peninsula, where it might be obstructed by a comparatively insignificant II.—A A Topographical diffi sula. force. It could hardly hope that flanking op culties of the Penin- erations would be possible; its movements must be executed by attacks in front. Espe cially must this be the case, as the lateral waters were sealed that on the south by the armored ship Merrimack, that on the north by the works of Yorktown. The topography of the Peninsula seemed to deny the oppor tunity of getting at the enemy's communications. If, under such circumstances, success was to be obtained, it could only be by rapidity of movement and resolu tion in attack; any sluggishness, any wavering, would render the case hopeless. In the preceding paragraphs I have reproduced prospectively the criticisms which have been made on the Peninsular campaign by military writers subsequently to its disastrous issue. The reader, in possession of these principles, has a guide in the study of the actual details, and on the many interesting questions arising can form for himself a correct opinion. How far the govern ble for the error. Should that opinion be adverse to General McClellan's decision of the plan of the campaign, it must ment was responsi- not be forgotten that the mistake was very largely concurred in by the government itself. For, though the President gave a most reluctant consent to the Peninsular campaign, he did not object to other movements the principle of which was equally incorrect. It has just been stated that there were two lines of operation against Richmond, meaning by that two under the more immediate contemplation of McClel lan; but, in fact, there were not fewer than five; for Banks was operating on a third in the Shenandoah Valley, Fremont on a fourth in the Alleghanies, and Burnside on a fifth at Roanoke. It was the misfortune of operations conducted in the proximity of Washington CHAP. LIV.] influences. INACTIVITY OF THE POTOMAC ARMY. 371 that they were under political influences. Lincoln, in Effect of political a letter to McClellan, declares that he had been unable to resist such influences: he was alluding to his having detached Blenker's division. No more striking confirmation of this need be given than the fact that, in the very crisis of the war, General Meade was appointed to command the army marching to Gettysburg, not because he was a good soldier, but because he was a Pennsylvanian. However, he won that immortal victory, not because he was a Pennsylvanian, but because he was a good soldier. These influences were less felt in the campaigns conducted between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi. Af fairs were intrusted to professional generals, not to polit ical aspirants. Eventually it was found absolutely nec essary to bring those professional generals into the At lantic region, and there they made an end of the war. armies. In the winter of 1861-2, the epoch with which this Position of the two chapter begins, the Confederate army, still inspirited by its victory of the preceding summer at Bull Run, lay round Manassas, in front of the great Army of the Potomac, which, under General McClel lan, lay at Washington. Tired of the inactivity which McClellan displayed, the McClellan's inac government was perpetually urging upon him the necessity of doing something with the great army that had been placed under his command. tivity. For some time after his promotion to his high position, McClellan undoubtedly contemplated vigorous operations-" a crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas, not to be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it." By degrees it became apparent that his movements were guided not only by military, but also by political Effect of political influences on him. considerations. In the latter respect he look. ed with favor on the views of the peace sec. tion of the Democratic party (p. 36), becoming eventu ally its candidate for the Presidency. In common with many other good men, he hoped that the extremities of war might be avoided by some compromise with the leaders of the South-a benevolent sentiment truly, but inappropriate in an officer who had been appointed to wield the armed force of the nation. He was unwilling to do any thing which might jeopardize the institution of slavery. armies. McClellan, as we have seen, had been appointed, July, Strength of the two 1861, to the command of the Army of the Potomac. On the 1st of November he was appointed to the chief command of the armies of the United States. At the latter date the Potomac Army had an effective strength of 134,285 men, with nearly 300 guns. The Confederate force in front of him did not exceed 55,000. On the 1st of February the aggregate strength of his army had risen to 222,196; present for duty, 190,806 (p. 195). The autumn and the winter passed by, and brought McClellan's excuses nothing but excuses for inaction. It was for not moving. too hot or too cold; there were too many leaves on the trees, or the roads too miry. In reality, however, up to Christmas, the weather had been superb; not once in twenty years had the roads been in as a condition at that season. good Expenses were accumulating. The public was beginning to be alarmed. Newspaper correspondents and pri vate letter-writers at Washington were spreading not only dissatisfaction, but consternation. They said The government and people are dis- that the aged General Scott, stretched upon satisfied. his sofa, had commanded to better purpose; that the army was as much organized in October as it ་ CHAP. LIV.] PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION. 373 ever would be, or as it needed to be; that it was encamped in shameful inactivity; that imposing reviews were given for the gratification of women, but not a reconnoissance was made to disturb the enemy; that the gen eral could now find nothing better to do than to send to the War Department 'the project of a splendid uniform for himself and staff; that he was enveloped in an ominous reserve; that cabinet ministers had waited in his antechambers; and that even the President of the United States had been detained there unnoticed. Non-military men, not without some show of reason, criticised and censured the prevailing military ideas. A rebellion, they said, can never be put down by standing on the defensive; the Confederacy can not be overthrown by building fortifications at Washington. There were officers who were acting as though they supposed that nothing more would be requisite; some who affirmed, with General Scott, that railroads would exert but little influence, and, like that veteran-unconscious of a coming Sheridan declared that cavalry would be of no use. There were some who expected that the war would be nothing more than an artillery duel. During the dreary winter that followed, Washington Washington block- Was an insulted city. The Baltimore and aded and insulted. Ohio Railroad was broken on one side, the Potomac blockaded by batteries on the other; the Confederate flag was flying in actual sight of the Capitol. The heart of the nation was sinking. Every thing that the young general had asked for had not only been granted, but lavishly given—and there was nothing in return but reviews, and parades, and procrastination. Perhaps without duly considering the effect which might be produced in the sentiments of the Emperor of the French, the proffered services of the Orleans princes were accepted. Services of the French princes accepted. |