train had been captured; he could not resist much longer, for the cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he had steel. The fixed bayo nets of his reserve brigade covered him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the cedar thicket toward the Nashville Road. In this memorable and most glorious resistance he had lost 1630 men. "Here's all that are left," he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and now met.

After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was noth Resistance of Neg- ing for Negley but to follow. He did so, ley and Rousseau. securing his way against all resistance. In

vain had Thomas sent his other division under Rousseau to the front of the battle. It too, after a desperate strug gle, was forced out of the cedar grove.

Rosecrans establishes a new line.

Meantime, on a knoll in the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville Turnpike on its rear. In the critical moment of establishing this new formation, every thing depended on the resistance of Hazen's brigade, which was on the left of Palmer's division. Of that division the two right brigades had been forced away, but Hazen stood firm, delivering such a fire as to sweep his assailants back, though losing one third of his numbers. While thus he held firm, Rosecrans had adjusted his new front, and was ready for the final Confederate charge.

Confederates.

On that new line the gray-coated Confederates came Final charge of the forth from the cedar thickets they had won, advancing over the plain, a magnificent column of attack. Their advance was but for a moment. Instantly in front of them sprang up a cloud-wall of sul phury smoke that shut out Rosecrans's line from their

CHAP. LIII.]

RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

365

view. There burst forth from the cannon hidden in it a double-shotted iron-fire, from the musketry a sirocco of lead. Four times the Southern soldiers tried to face the tempest. A horrible slaughter ensued. The momentum of the fire hurled them back into the dark green shade of the cedars. One of Cleburne's brigades was in an instant almost destroyed.

It was all over in front; but Bragg, unwilling to be foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on Rosecrans's left flank with 7000 fresh men. His first attack was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate.

ground.

So stood affairs when night came-a clear and beautiful starlight night-the closing night of 1862. On New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. Rosecrans holds his On January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank. Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position, ordering him to drive the enemy across the river-a task which that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished, for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to pieces. In twenty minutes he lost two thousand men.

Renewal of the battle.

Bragg retreats to
Tullahoma.

A violent storm prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough, retreating to Tullahoma, and Rosecrans at last grasped his blood-clotted prize, so crippled, however, that it was im possible for him to make any pursuit.

Losses in the battles.

men.

In these dreadful battles the Confederates lost 14,700 On the national side there were kill ed 1553, wounded more than 7000, prisoners more than 3000; more than one third of its artillery and a large portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all thought of crossing the Ohio River. Two desperate but unsuccessful attempts had convinced them that they could not break through the line of investment between the Cumberland Mountains and the Free States.

SECTION XI.

CAMPAIGN FOR THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. FIRST PERIOD. THE ADVANCE.
The national government undertook a campaign for the capture of Richmond.
It was based on incorrect principles, and carried out with irresolution by General
McClellan.

The movement of the army was so much procrastinated that the government was
constrained to order an advance. Scarcely had the expedition departed for the
Peninsula when it was found that Washington had been left unprotected.
General McClellan besieged Yorktown, captured it, and slowly advanced up the
Peninsula.

The battles of FAIR OAKS and SEVEN PINES.

FROM the West we have now to turn to the East-from the Mississippi Valley to the Atlantic border.

The war-cry of the

of Richmond.

If in the West there was a popular war-object universally adopted-the opening of the Missis East was the capture sippi River, in the East there was a war-object not less distinctly accepted-the capture of Richmond. "On to Richmond" became a war-cry. This was not because Richmond was a source of strength to the Confederacy; not because it offered any historical recollections; not because it was the emblem of a nationality, but because in the eyes of the loyal Americans it was a token of defiance to the republic. We have already seen (p. 143) that the strength of the Confederacy lay not in the possession of any locality, but in its armies, and hence, in a military point of view, campaigns directed to the capture of Richmond were not based upon a cor

Incorrectness of the Richmond campaign.

rect principle. The operations now to be described, dis astrous to the nation, but glorious to the Confederacy, were not decisive of the contest, nor would they have been so had their result been reversed.

Military operations having the city of Richmond for their objective once determined upon, the question arose in what manner they ought to be conducted.

The problem of the
Richmond cam-

paign.

In solving that problem there was a special condition to be steadfastly borne in mind.

A paramount condition.

the enemy.

No movement was admissible which would risk the capture of Washington by

That condition accepted, it implied an adequate force covering Washington, and if to act offensively, acting on the direct line between that city and Richmond.

Military authorities declare that the fewer the lines of Effect of many lines operation the better. It is better to have two lines of operation than five; better one

of operation.

than two.

The more numerous the lines of operation, the more must the force for disposal upon them be divided, and therefore the weaker it must be on each. Such lines are exterior to an enemy holding a central position, and therefore at his choice able to deliver overwhelming blows in succession against each.

Effect of mixed lines, naval and military.

Still more dangerous is this division if the lines are not purely military, but naval and military mixed. The introduction of shipping brings an extraneous, perhaps an independent command; precision and punctuality of movement are endan gered, for even since the introduction of steam naval operations are greatly controlled by the weather. In such a mixed movement a general must necessarily feel that his army is not in hand.