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under Joseph E. Johnston, lay at Winchester, in the Shenandoah Valley.
THE MARCH OF MCDOWELL.
Patterson and Johnston, therefore, confronted each othPatterson enjoined er. The former was strictly enjoined to hold to hold Johnston. the Confederates at Winchester, and prevent their joining Beauregard at Manassas.
to attack Manassas.
Orders were given on July 15th for McDowell to move McDowell ordered and attack the Confederate position at Manassas Junction. He commenced carrying them into effect on the following day. His marching force was about 30,000, nearly all of them being threemonths' men. Among them were, however, 800 regulars. Fifteen thousand, Runyon's division, had been left for the defense of Washington, and the remainder, in four divisions, under Brigadier General Tyler, and Colonels Hunter, Heintzelman, and Miles, advanced.
Order of his march,
The forward movement from the Potomac was executed in four columns, converging to Fairfax Courthouse. On nearing that point, barricades were encountered, but they were either removed or passed round without difficulty. It had been expected that the Confederates would have made a stand here, but it was found that they had retired through Centreville to Bull Run, a stream flowing in front of their position at Ma
Much difficulty had been experienced in obtaining a reliable map of the country in which operations were now to be carried on, though it was so near to Washington. McDowell commenced his movement with very imperfect information in that respect. Neither the soldiers nor their officers knew any thing about marching; the army was little better than a picturesque mob in gay uniform. Under a burning sun, for the weather was excessively hot, the men moved along through roads, in the woods, or by the zigzag fences
and its disorderly character.
FIRST PLAN OF THE BATTLE.
of maize-fields, singing and joking as they went. They stopped to pick blackberries, stepped aside to avoid mud-puddles, and refilled their canteens at every stream. Many of the houses by the wayside had been deserted, except by negroes, who were here and there peeping at the window-corners or at the half-closed doors.
McDowell's first intention, on finding that his enemy had evacuated Centreville, was, under cover of a vigorous demonstration on their front, to turn their right. A personal reconnoissance, however, satisfied him that this was impracticable. The country was too densely wooded and too difficult. He therefore now changed his plan, and made preparation for turning the Confederate left, so as to seize the railroad in their rear.
Tyler makes a front
But, while McDowell was exploring the Confederate right, Tyler, supposing that he might march attack, and is worst- without much difficulty directly on Manassas, moved down from Centreville into Bull Run Valley. He opened an artillery fire on the forest bank opposite, and deployed his infantry along the stream. When too late, he saw the twinkling of the enemy's bayonets in the woods, and found himself exposed to their artillery and musketry. They were so concealed that he could only fire at the flash of their guns. He attempted to dislodge them by sending several regiments into the wood; but, though he brought up Sherman with the third brigade, he was compelled to fall back, having suffered in this imprudent affair a loss of nearly one hundred. The Confederate loss was about seventy. This check was an admonition to the military politicians who were swarming into the army that the harvest of glory they were expecting would not be easily reaped. By parading their doings in the newspapers, they had hoped to create election and office capital.
McDowell now made ready to carry into effect his atMcDowell's second tempt to turn the Confederate left, and had plan of the battle. the necessary reconnoissance made on Friday, the 19th. Bull Run, opposite Centreville, and equi
SECOND PLAN OF THE BATTLE.
The topography of
THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.
distant about three miles between the headquarters of the national and Confederate armies, flows from the northwest to the southeast. A road descending from Centreville crosses it at Blackburn's Ford: there is a lower one to Union Mills Ford, and an upper one, the Warrenton Turnpike, which, at four miles from Centreville, passes the stream over a stone bridge. These three points-the stone bridge, Blackburn's and Union Mills Fords, were the Confederate left, centre, and right, respectively. Besides these, two miles above the Confederate left there was a ford near Sudley's Spring, but only a path through the woods leading to it from
POSITION OF THE CONFEDERATES.
Centreville. Between the Sudley's Spring Ford and the
McDowell hoped to make his attack on the 20th. As he had been disappointed in reaching Centreville, the inexperience of his officers and men making him lose a day, McDowell's attack So now he was again disappointed through is delayed, a failure in receiving his supplies. The 4th Pennsylvania and Varian's battery of the New York 8th insisted on leaving him, their term having expired. He says in his report that, "on the next morning, when the army went forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. In the next few days, day by day, I shall have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army." He had, however, now 28,000 men and 49 guns.
and his troops be-
At this moment the Confederates had six brigades Distribution of the posted along Bull Run, through a distance of eight miles, in the following order: (1.) Ewell's, at Union Mills Ford; (2.) Jones's, at M'Lean's Ford; (3.) Longstreet's, at Blackburn's; (4.) Bonham's, at Mitchell's; (5.) Cocke's, at Ball's Ford; (6.) Evans's, at the stone bridge. The brigades of Early and Holmes were in reserve in the rear of the right, and those of Jackson and Bee on the left. Their total strength was about 22,000; it was less, therefore, than McDowell's, but they had the great advantage of a thorough knowledge of the ground.
Though Patterson had received the most positive or ders not to permit Johnston to escape from Patterson and joins him, he failed to do so. The Confederate
general marched through Ashby's Gap to
Piedmont, and, there taking the railroad to Manassas, joined Beauregard on the 20th with about 6000 men.
McDowell's intention was to turn the Confederate left by crossing Bull Run with his right at Sudley's Spring Ford, and thereby drive them from the stone bridge, press them from the Warrenton Turnpike, and seize Manassas Gap Railroad in their rear. He supposed that he should thus intervene between Beauregard and Johnston, not knowing that a junction had already taken place between them through Patterson's fault. To
McDowell's orders for the action.
MCDOWELL GAINS THE INITIATIVE.
The troops begin their march.
carry this out, he directed Tyler to move to the stone bridge, threaten it in front, and, at the proper time, cross it. He was to move down the Warrenton Turnpike, while Hunter and Heintzelman, following him for a certain distance, were to make a detour to the north, crossing Bull Run near Sudley's Spring, and thus come down on the flank and rear of the Confederates posted at the stone bridge. Miles, who was to remain in reserve at Centreville, was to aid in the operation by sending a brigade to make a demonstration at Blackburn's Ford. The movement was to commence at half past two o'clock on Sunday morning, July 21st, the expectation being that Tyler would reach his point when day broke, at about four o'clock, and that Hunter and Heintzelman would come into action at about six.
But simultaneously the Confederate generals had also resolved to make an attack without delay on McDowell, before Patterson had time to re-enforce him. They supposed that such a junction would take place as soon as it was discovered that Johnston had reached Manassas. They intended to cross Bull Run on the lose the initiative. night of the 20th. McDowell, however, moved first, and, as will be seen, threw them on the defensive.